August 27th, 2011

Ogilvy’s Steve Hayden: Working With Steve Jobs Was ‘Challenge of a Lifetime’

More insight into Steve Jobs – a perfectionist . .

Ogilvy’s Steve Hayden: Working With Steve Jobs Was ‘Challenge of a Lifetime’

Copywriter for Apple’s ’1984′ Spot Looks Back on Meeting Exec During Industry’s Infancy

By:  Published: August 26, 2011
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In 1979, Jay Chiat moved me from Los Angeles to New York to open Chiat/Day’s first office in the big city. Just a few months later, Jay did a deal with Regis McKenna to acquire the advertising unit of his primarily PR-focused firm in Silicon Valley, thus bringing the Apple Computer account into Chiat/Day, San Francisco.

Jay and Steve Jobs seemed to get along right from the start. Even though Jay had a good 25 years on Steve, they were birds of a feather — perpetually dissatisfied perfectionists who could be brutal to their employees but always brought forth amazing work.

 

Since I’d come to Chiat/Day from a series of jobs at small industrial agencies in LA, I had quite a bit of tech experience. In fact, at one point I worked on ads for the very first microcomputer: the Altair.

For their launch campaign, I suggested we use the apple as a symbol of knowledge and stress how versatile a small computer could be. I forget the name of the client, but he said, “First of all, I just want to focus on business applications. Secondly, this tiny new company showed up at the Home Brew Computer Club in San Jose last week calling themselves Apple Computer. They’ll probably be out of business in six weeks, but we should probably stay away from apples in our ads.”

 

Jay asked me to work on Apple from New York under “deep cover.” I wasn’t supposed to put my name or writer’s number on any copy I submitted. I worked on a series of print ads with Hy Yablonka in San Francisco, while Jay went on a recruiting hunt for “a writer Steve Jobs will like.” Basically, having just moved me to New York, he didn’t want to pay to move me back to the West Coast.

 

Six months went by, and we got a lot of ads produced. I even wrote a TV campaign featuring Dick Cavett, a celebrity that had been contracted by Regis McKenna. Steve was happy with the copy, and Jay was having trouble finding the right writer to replace me. So finally he relented. Steve was coming to New York for a computer show, and Jay decided to let me out of the closet to meet him.

 

I believe the show was in the New York Hilton. Lots of little booths for lots of tiny companies. An industry in its infancy.

 

The first thing Steve said to me, noticing the pack of Marlboros in my pocket, was, “Jay says you’re smart. If you’re so smart, how come you smoke?” The first thing I said to him was, “There’s something about computing that reminds me of Bach.” Right then, one of the displays caught on fire — some equipment shorted out and the booth’s curtains went up in flames, the floor filled with smoke, and shortly thereafter, NYFD guys were there with big tanks on their backs.

 

Later that evening, Jay and I met Steve and Regis at the Four Seasons for dinner. Regis was almost fatherly to Steve, explaining the difference between secretaries and hookers and where he should shop when he got back to San Francisco. Jay was very excited about the potential of the account. In their first year, they spent $10 million at full commission. Their second year, $40 million. And now Steve was talking about spending $100 million — An astronomical sum that would make Apple the largest account in the agency.

 

Jay had been struggling to build Chiat/Day into a national agency for 25 years and it looked like he was finally going to do it. I remember Jobs turning toward him and saying, “You know, Jay, Apple Computer didn’t happen overnight. It took three years.” I did an involuntary spit take.

 

Working with Steve was the challenge of a lifetime. He had taught himself design, fashion, style, pop culture and, of course, bleeding-edge tech. He could be notoriously short-tempered and mercurial. As Bill Kelley, a friend of mine who worked on Apple at Regis McKenna, told me, “If you were 100 IQ points smarter than almost anyone you ever talked to, you’d be irritated a lot of the time, too.”

 

Between Jay and Steve’s perfectionism, it’s a wonder we got any work approved at all. The night before we presented “1984,” Jay was dissatisfied with everything we had to show. I remember we were meeting on the second floor of a dowdy Travel Lodge somewhere near the Apple campus and Jay was tearing up the room, the ads, the people in the room, the drapes, everything. When he got like that, only Lee Clow could calm him down. He took Jay out onto the balcony while we creatives cowered in the room, put his hand on his shoulder and told him it would be OK. It was.

We got approval to produce everything we showed.

After Steve saw the first rough cut of “1984,” he said, “This spot is going to create an information vacuum that we have to fill. I want an insert — maybe 20 pages — that tells people everything about the Macintosh there is to know.”

 

One of Apple’s producers, I think it was Steve Scheier, said we didn’t have time to pull off a 20-page insert because of printing, lead times, closings, etc. Steve didn’t care. “Just do it,” he said. I’m pretty sure that was before Nike’s use of the phrase.

 

Years later, after Steve’s return to Apple, I was working on IBM at Ogilvy. IBM had just come out with a very attractive all-in-one computer called the Aptiva. We were very proud of it. I ran into Steve at some computer show and asked him what he thought of it.

He said, “Well, I guess it’s OK on the outside in a kind of typical way, but what really bugs me about it is that it’s ugly on the inside. Have you looked at the motherboard? It’s a mess.” And that pretty much captures his whole aesthetic. Beauty can’t be just skin deep. It has to go all the way down, even where no one will ever see it.

 

Steve may be leaving his day job at Apple, but his spirit will never leave the building. We’ll see it in every new Apple product for at least a generation.

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Steve Hayden was the copywriter for Apple’s famous “1984″ spot and today serves as vice chairman at WPP’s Ogilvy.

 

 

August 26th, 2011

Richard Hamming : “You and Your Research”

Fascinating thoughts . .  and lots of names I recognise

 

 

Richard Hamming

 

“You and Your Research”

 

Transcription of the
Bell Communications Research Colloquium Seminar
7 March 1986

 

J. F. Kaiser
Bell Communications Research
445 South Street
Morristown, NJ 07962-1910
jfk@bellcore.com

At a seminar in the Bell Communications Research Colloquia Series, Dr. Richard W. Hamming, a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and a retired Bell Labs scientist, gave a very interesting and stimulating talk, `You and Your Research’ to an overflow audience of some 200 Bellcore staff members and visitors at the Morris Research and Engineering Center on March 7, 1986. This talk centered on Hamming’s observations and research on the question “Why do so few scientists make significant contributions and so many are forgotten in the long run?” From his more than forty years of experience, thirty of which were at Bell Laboratories, he has made a number of direct observations, asked very pointed questions of scientists about what, how, and why they did things, studied the lives of great scientists and great contributions, and has done introspection and studied theories of creativity. The talk is about what he has learned in terms of the properties of the individual scientists, their abilities, traits, working habits, attitudes, and philosophy.

In order to make the information in the talk more widely available, the tape recording that was made of that talk was carefully transcribed. This transcription includes the discussions which followed in the question and answer period. As with any talk, the transcribed version suffers from translation as all the inflections of voice and the gestures of the speaker are lost; one must listen to the tape recording to recapture that part of the presentation. While the recording of Richard Hamming’s talk was completely intelligible, that of some of the questioner’s remarks were not. Where the tape recording was not intelligible I have added in parentheses my impression of the questioner’s remarks. Where there was a question and I could identify the questioner, I have checked with each to ensure the accuracy of my interpretation of their remarks.

INTRODUCTION OF DR. RICHARD W. HAMMING

As a speaker in the Bell Communications Research Colloquium Series, Dr. Richard W. Hamming of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, was introduced by Alan G. Chynoweth, Vice President, Applied Research, Bell Communications Research.

Alan G. Chynoweth: Greetings colleagues, and also to many of our former colleagues from Bell Labs who, I understand, are here to be with us today on what I regard as a particularly felicitous occasion. It gives me very great pleasure indeed to introduce to you my old friend and colleague from many many years back, Richard Hamming, or Dick Hamming as he has always been know to all of us.

Dick is one of the all time greats in the mathematics and computer science arenas, as I’m sure the audience here does not need reminding. He received his early education at the Universities of Chicago and Nebraska, and got his Ph.D. at Illinois; he then joined the Los Alamos project during the war. Afterwards, in 1946, he joined Bell Labs. And that is, of course, where I met Dick – when I joined Bell Labs in their physics research organization. In those days, we were in the habit of lunching together as a physics group, and for some reason this strange fellow from mathematics was always pleased to join us. We were always happy to have him with us because he brought so many unorthodox ideas and views. Those lunches were stimulating, I can assure you.

While our professional paths have not been very close over the years, nevertheless I’ve always recognized Dick in the halls of Bell Labs and have always had tremendous admiration for what he was doing. I think the record speaks for itself. It is too long to go through all the details, but let me point out, for example, that he has written seven books and of those seven books which tell of various areas of mathematics and computers and coding and information theory, three are already well into their second edition. That is testimony indeed to the prolific output and the stature of Dick Hamming.

I think I last met him – it must have been about ten years ago – at a rather curious little conference in Dublin, Ireland where we were both speakers. As always, he was tremendously entertaining. Just one more example of the provocative thoughts that he comes up with: I remember him saying, “There are wavelengths that people cannot see, there are sounds that people cannot hear, and maybe computers have thoughts that people cannot think.” Well, with Dick Hamming around, we don’t need a computer. I think that we are in for an extremely entertaining talk.

THE TALK: “You and Your Research” by Dr. Richard W. Hamming

It’s a pleasure to be here. I doubt if I can live up to the Introduction. The title of my talk is, “You and Your Research.” It is not about managing research, it is about how you individually do your research. I could give a talk on the other subject – but it’s not, it’s about you. I’m not talking about ordinary run-of-the-mill research; I’m talking about great research. And for the sake of describing great research I’ll occasionally say Nobel-Prize type of work. It doesn’t have to gain the Nobel Prize, but I mean those kinds of things which we perceive are significant things. Relativity, if you want, Shannon’s information theory, any number of outstanding theories – that’s the kind of thing I’m talking about.

Now, how did I come to do this study? At Los Alamos I was brought in to run the computing machines which other people had got going, so those scientists and physicists could get back to business. I saw I was a stooge. I saw that although physically I was the same, they were different. And to put the thing bluntly, I was envious. I wanted to know why they were so different from me. I saw Feynman up close. I saw Fermi and Teller. I saw Oppenheimer. I saw Hans Bethe: he was my boss. I saw quite a few very capable people. I became very interested in the difference between those who do and those who might have done.

When I came to Bell Labs, I came into a very productive department. Bode was the department head at the time; Shannon was there, and there were other people. I continued examining the questions, “Why?” and “What is the difference?” I continued subsequently by reading biographies, autobiographies, asking people questions such as: “How did you come to do this?” I tried to find out what are the differences. And that’s what this talk is about.

Now, why is this talk important? I think it is important because, as far as I know, each of you has one life to live. Even if you believe in reincarnation it doesn’t do you any good from one life to the next! Why shouldn’t you do significant things in this one life, however you define significant? I’m not going to define it – you know what I mean. I will talk mainly about science because that is what I have studied. But so far as I know, and I’ve been told by others, much of what I say applies to many fields. Outstanding work is characterized very much the same way in most fields, but I will confine myself to science.

In order to get at you individually, I must talk in the first person. I have to get you to drop modesty and say to yourself, “Yes, I would like to do first-class work.” Our society frowns on people who set out to do really good work. You’re not supposed to; luck is supposed to descend on you and you do great things by chance. Well, that’s a kind of dumb thing to say. I say, why shouldn’t you set out to do something significant. You don’t have to tell other people, but shouldn’t you say to yourself, “Yes, I would like to do something significant.”

In order to get to the second stage, I have to drop modesty and talk in the first person about what I’ve seen, what I’ve done, and what I’ve heard. I’m going to talk about people, some of whom you know, and I trust that when we leave, you won’t quote me as saying some of the things I said.

Let me start not logically, but psychologically. I find that the major objection is that people think great science is done by luck. It’s all a matter of luck. Well, consider Einstein. Note how many different things he did that were good. Was it all luck? Wasn’t it a little too repetitive? Consider Shannon. He didn’t do just information theory. Several years before, he did some other good things and some which are still locked up in the security of cryptography. He did many good things.

You see again and again, that it is more than one thing from a good person. Once in a while a person does only one thing in his whole life, and we’ll talk about that later, but a lot of times there is repetition. I claim that luck will not cover everything. And I will cite Pasteur who said, “Luck favors the prepared mind.” And I think that says it the way I believe it. There is indeed an element of luck, and no, there isn’t. The prepared mind sooner or later finds something important and does it. So yes, it is luck. The particular thing you do is luck, but that you do something is not.

For example, when I came to Bell Labs, I shared an office for a while with Shannon. At the same time he was doing information theory, I was doing coding theory. It is suspicious that the two of us did it at the same place and at the same time – it was in the atmosphere. And you can say, “Yes, it was luck.” On the other hand you can say, “But why of all the people in Bell Labs then were those the two who did it?” Yes, it is partly luck, and partly it is the prepared mind; but `partly’ is the other thing I’m going to talk about. So, although I’ll come back several more times to luck, I want to dispose of this matter of luck as being the sole criterion whether you do great work or not. I claim you have some, but not total, control over it. And I will quote, finally, Newton on the matter. Newton said, “If others would think as hard as I did, then they would get similar results.”

One of the characteristics you see, and many people have it including great scientists, is that usually when they were young they had independent thoughts and had the courage to pursue them. For example, Einstein, somewhere around 12 or 14, asked himself the question, “What would a light wave look like if I went with the velocity of light to look at it?” Now he knew that electromagnetic theory says you cannot have a stationary local maximum. But if he moved along with the velocity of light, he would see a local maximum. He could see a contradiction at the age of 12, 14, or somewhere around there, that everything was not right and that the velocity of light had something peculiar. Is it luck that he finally created special relativity? Early on, he had laid down some of the pieces by thinking of the fragments. Now that’s the necessary but not sufficient condition. All of these items I will talk about are both luck and not luck.

How about having lots of `brains?’ It sounds good. Most of you in this room probably have more than enough brains to do first-class work. But great work is something else than mere brains. Brains are measured in various ways. In mathematics, theoretical physics, astrophysics, typically brains correlates to a great extent with the ability to manipulate symbols. And so the typical IQ test is apt to score them fairly high. On the other hand, in other fields it is something different. For example, Bill Pfann, the fellow who did zone melting, came into my office one day. He had this idea dimly in his mind about what he wanted and he had some equations. It was pretty clear to me that this man didn’t know much mathematics and he wasn’t really articulate. His problem seemed interesting so I took it home and did a little work. I finally showed him how to run computers so he could compute his own answers. I gave him the power to compute. He went ahead, with negligible recognition from his own department, but ultimately he has collected all the prizes in the field. Once he got well started, his shyness, his awkwardness, his inarticulateness, fell away and he became much more productive in many other ways. Certainly he became much more articulate.

And I can cite another person in the same way. I trust he isn’t in the audience, i.e. a fellow named Clogston. I met him when I was working on a problem with John Pierce’s group and I didn’t think he had much. I asked my friends who had been with him at school, “Was he like that in graduate school?” “Yes,” they replied. Well I would have fired the fellow, but J. R. Pierce was smart and kept him on. Clogston finally did the Clogston cable. After that there was a steady stream of good ideas. One success brought him confidence and courage.

One of the characteristics of successful scientists is having courage. Once you get your courage up and believe that you can do important problems, then you can. If you think you can’t, almost surely you are not going to. Courage is one of the things that Shannon had supremely. You have only to think of his major theorem. He wants to create a method of coding, but he doesn’t know what to do so he makes a random code. Then he is stuck. And then he asks the impossible question, “What would the average random code do?” He then proves that the average code is arbitrarily good, and that therefore there must be at least one good code. Who but a man of infinite courage could have dared to think those thoughts? That is the characteristic of great scientists; they have courage. They will go forward under incredible circumstances; they think and continue to think.

Age is another factor which the physicists particularly worry about. They always are saying that you have got to do it when you are young or you will never do it. Einstein did things very early, and all the quantum mechanic fellows were disgustingly young when they did their best work. Most mathematicians, theoretical physicists, and astrophysicists do what we consider their best work when they are young. It is not that they don’t do good work in their old age but what we value most is often what they did early. On the other hand, in music, politics and literature, often what we consider their best work was done late. I don’t know how whatever field you are in fits this scale, but age has some effect.

But let me say why age seems to have the effect it does. In the first place if you do some good work you will find yourself on all kinds of committees and unable to do any more work. You may find yourself as I saw Brattain when he got a Nobel Prize. The day the prize was announced we all assembled in Arnold Auditorium; all three winners got up and made speeches. The third one, Brattain, practically with tears in his eyes, said, “I know about this Nobel-Prize effect and I am not going to let it affect me; I am going to remain good old Walter Brattain.” Well I said to myself, “That is nice.” But in a few weeks I saw it was affecting him. Now he could only work on great problems.

When you are famous it is hard to work on small problems. This is what did Shannon in. After information theory, what do you do for an encore? The great scientists often make this error. They fail to continue to plant the little acorns from which the mighty oak trees grow. They try to get the big thing right off. And that isn’t the way things go. So that is another reason why you find that when you get early recognition it seems to sterilize you. In fact I will give you my favorite quotation of many years. The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, in my opinion, has ruined more good scientists than any institution has created, judged by what they did before they came and judged by what they did after. Not that they weren’t good afterwards, but they were superb before they got there and were only good afterwards.

This brings up the subject, out of order perhaps, of working conditions. What most people think are the best working conditions, are not. Very clearly they are not because people are often most productive when working conditions are bad. One of the better times of the Cambridge Physical Laboratories was when they had practically shacks – they did some of the best physics ever.

I give you a story from my own private life. Early on it became evident to me that Bell Laboratories was not going to give me the conventional acre of programming people to program computing machines in absolute binary. It was clear they weren’t going to. But that was the way everybody did it. I could go to the West Coast and get a job with the airplane companies without any trouble, but the exciting people were at Bell Labs and the fellows out there in the airplane companies were not. I thought for a long while about, “Did I want to go or not?” and I wondered how I could get the best of two possible worlds. I finally said to myself, “Hamming, you think the machines can do practically everything. Why can’t you make them write programs?” What appeared at first to me as a defect forced me into automatic programming very early. What appears to be a fault, often, by a change of viewpoint, turns out to be one of the greatest assets you can have. But you are not likely to think that when you first look the thing and say, “Gee, I’m never going to get enough programmers, so how can I ever do any great programming?”

And there are many other stories of the same kind; Grace Hopper has similar ones. I think that if you look carefully you will see that often the great scientists, by turning the problem around a bit, changed a defect to an asset. For example, many scientists when they found they couldn’t do a problem finally began to study why not. They then turned it around the other way and said, “But of course, this is what it is” and got an important result. So ideal working conditions are very strange. The ones you want aren’t always the best ones for you.

Now for the matter of drive. You observe that most great scientists have tremendous drive. I worked for ten years with John Tukey at Bell Labs. He had tremendous drive. One day about three or four years after I joined, I discovered that John Tukey was slightly younger than I was. John was a genius and I clearly was not. Well I went storming into Bode’s office and said, “How can anybody my age know as much as John Tukey does?” He leaned back in his chair, put his hands behind his head, grinned slightly, and said, “You would be surprised Hamming, how much you would know if you worked as hard as he did that many years.” I simply slunk out of the office!

What Bode was saying was this: “Knowledge and productivity are like compound interest.” Given two people of approximately the same ability and one person who works ten percent more than the other, the latter will more than twice outproduce the former. The more you know, the more you learn; the more you learn, the more you can do; the more you can do, the more the opportunity – it is very much like compound interest. I don’t want to give you a rate, but it is a very high rate. Given two people with exactly the same ability, the one person who manages day in and day out to get in one more hour of thinking will be tremendously more productive over a lifetime. I took Bode’s remark to heart; I spent a good deal more of my time for some years trying to work a bit harder and I found, in fact, I could get more work done. I don’t like to say it in front of my wife, but I did sort of neglect her sometimes; I needed to study. You have to neglect things if you intend to get what you want done. There’s no question about this.

On this matter of drive Edison says, “Genius is 99% perspiration and 1% inspiration.” He may have been exaggerating, but the idea is that solid work, steadily applied, gets you surprisingly far. The steady application of effort with a little bit more work, intelligently applied is what does it. That’s the trouble; drive, misapplied, doesn’t get you anywhere. I’ve often wondered why so many of my good friends at Bell Labs who worked as hard or harder than I did, didn’t have so much to show for it. The misapplication of effort is a very serious matter. Just hard work is not enough – it must be applied sensibly.

There’s another trait on the side which I want to talk about; that trait is ambiguity. It took me a while to discover its importance. Most people like to believe something is or is not true. Great scientists tolerate ambiguity very well. They believe the theory enough to go ahead; they doubt it enough to notice the errors and faults so they can step forward and create the new replacement theory. If you believe too much you’ll never notice the flaws; if you doubt too much you won’t get started. It requires a lovely balance. But most great scientists are well aware of why their theories are true and they are also well aware of some slight misfits which don’t quite fit and they don’t forget it. Darwin writes in his autobiography that he found it necessary to write down every piece of evidence which appeared to contradict his beliefs because otherwise they would disappear from his mind. When you find apparent flaws you’ve got to be sensitive and keep track of those things, and keep an eye out for how they can be explained or how the theory can be changed to fit them. Those are often the great contributions. Great contributions are rarely done by adding another decimal place. It comes down to an emotional commitment. Most great scientists are completely committed to their problem. Those who don’t become committed seldom produce outstanding, first-class work.

Now again, emotional commitment is not enough. It is a necessary condition apparently. And I think I can tell you the reason why. Everybody who has studied creativity is driven finally to saying, “creativity comes out of your subconscious.” Somehow, suddenly, there it is. It just appears. Well, we know very little about the subconscious; but one thing you are pretty well aware of is that your dreams also come out of your subconscious. And you’re aware your dreams are, to a fair extent, a reworking of the experiences of the day. If you are deeply immersed and committed to a topic, day after day after day, your subconscious has nothing to do but work on your problem. And so you wake up one morning, or on some afternoon, and there’s the answer. For those who don’t get committed to their current problem, the subconscious goofs off on other things and doesn’t produce the big result. So the way to manage yourself is that when you have a real important problem you don’t let anything else get the center of your attention – you keep your thoughts on the problem. Keep your subconscious starved so it has to work on your problem, so you can sleep peacefully and get the answer in the morning, free.

Now Alan Chynoweth mentioned that I used to eat at the physics table. I had been eating with the mathematicians and I found out that I already knew a fair amount of mathematics; in fact, I wasn’t learning much. The physics table was, as he said, an exciting place, but I think he exaggerated on how much I contributed. It was very interesting to listen to Shockley, Brattain, Bardeen, J. B. Johnson, Ken McKay and other people, and I was learning a lot. But unfortunately a Nobel Prize came, and a promotion came, and what was left was the dregs. Nobody wanted what was left. Well, there was no use eating with them!

Over on the other side of the dining hall was a chemistry table. I had worked with one of the fellows, Dave McCall; furthermore he was courting our secretary at the time. I went over and said, “Do you mind if I join you?” They can’t say no, so I started eating with them for a while. And I started asking, “What are the important problems of your field?” And after a week or so, “What important problems are you working on?” And after some more time I came in one day and said, “If what you are doing is not important, and if you don’t think it is going to lead to something important, why are you at Bell Labs working on it?” I wasn’t welcomed after that; I had to find somebody else to eat with! That was in the spring.

In the fall, Dave McCall stopped me in the hall and said, “Hamming, that remark of yours got underneath my skin. I thought about it all summer, i.e. what were the important problems in my field. I haven’t changed my research,” he says, “but I think it was well worthwhile.” And I said, “Thank you Dave,” and went on. I noticed a couple of months later he was made the head of the department. I noticed the other day he was a Member of the National Academy of Engineering. I noticed he has succeeded. I have never heard the names of any of the other fellows at that table mentioned in science and scientific circles. They were unable to ask themselves, “What are the important problems in my field?”

If you do not work on an important problem, it’s unlikely you’ll do important work. It’s perfectly obvious. Great scientists have thought through, in a careful way, a number of important problems in their field, and they keep an eye on wondering how to attack them. Let me warn you, `important problem’ must be phrased carefully. The three outstanding problems in physics, in a certain sense, were never worked on while I was at Bell Labs. By important I mean guaranteed a Nobel Prize and any sum of money you want to mention. We didn’t work on (1) time travel, (2) teleportation, and (3) antigravity. They are not important problems because we do not have an attack. It’s not the consequence that makes a problem important, it is that you have a reasonable attack. That is what makes a problem important. When I say that most scientists don’t work on important problems, I mean it in that sense. The average scientist, so far as I can make out, spends almost all his time working on problems which he believes will not be important and he also doesn’t believe that they will lead to important problems.

I spoke earlier about planting acorns so that oaks will grow. You can’t always know exactly where to be, but you can keep active in places where something might happen. And even if you believe that great science is a matter of luck, you can stand on a mountain top where lightning strikes; you don’t have to hide in the valley where you’re safe. But the average scientist does routine safe work almost all the time and so he (or she) doesn’t produce much. It’s that simple. If you want to do great work, you clearly must work on important problems, and you should have an idea.

Along those lines at some urging from John Tukey and others, I finally adopted what I called “Great Thoughts Time.” When I went to lunch Friday noon, I would only discuss great thoughts after that. By great thoughts I mean ones like: “What will be the role of computers in all of AT&T?”, “How will computers change science?” For example, I came up with the observation at that time that nine out of ten experiments were done in the lab and one in ten on the computer. I made a remark to the vice presidents one time, that it would be reversed, i.e. nine out of ten experiments would be done on the computer and one in ten in the lab. They knew I was a crazy mathematician and had no sense of reality. I knew they were wrong and they’ve been proved wrong while I have been proved right. They built laboratories when they didn’t need them. I saw that computers were transforming science because I spent a lot of time asking “What will be the impact of computers on science and how can I change it?” I asked myself, “How is it going to change Bell Labs?” I remarked one time, in the same address, that more than one-half of the people at Bell Labs will be interacting closely with computing machines before I leave. Well, you all have terminals now. I thought hard about where was my field going, where were the opportunities, and what were the important things to do. Let me go there so there is a chance I can do important things.

Most great scientists know many important problems. They have something between 10 and 20 important problems for which they are looking for an attack. And when they see a new idea come up, one hears them say “Well that bears on this problem.” They drop all the other things and get after it. Now I can tell you a horror story that was told to me but I can’t vouch for the truth of it. I was sitting in an airport talking to a friend of mine from Los Alamos about how it was lucky that the fission experiment occurred over in Europe when it did because that got us working on the atomic bomb here in the US. He said “No; at Berkeley we had gathered a bunch of data; we didn’t get around to reducing it because we were building some more equipment, but if we had reduced that data we would have found fission.” They had it in their hands and they didn’t pursue it. They came in second!

The great scientists, when an opportunity opens up, get after it and they pursue it. They drop all other things. They get rid of other things and they get after an idea because they had already thought the thing through. Their minds are prepared; they see the opportunity and they go after it. Now of course lots of times it doesn’t work out, but you don’t have to hit many of them to do some great science. It’s kind of easy. One of the chief tricks is to live a long time!

Another trait, it took me a while to notice. I noticed the following facts about people who work with the door open or the door closed. I notice that if you have the door to your office closed, you get more work done today and tomorrow, and you are more productive than most. But 10 years later somehow you don’t know quite know what problems are worth working on; all the hard work you do is sort of tangential in importance. He who works with the door open gets all kinds of interruptions, but he also occasionally gets clues as to what the world is and what might be important. Now I cannot prove the cause and effect sequence because you might say, “The closed door is symbolic of a closed mind.” I don’t know. But I can say there is a pretty good correlation between those who work with the doors open and those who ultimately do important things, although people who work with doors closed often work harder. Somehow they seem to work on slightly the wrong thing – not much, but enough that they miss fame.

I want to talk on another topic. It is based on the song which I think many of you know, “It ain’t what you do, it’s the way that you do it.” I’ll start with an example of my own. I was conned into doing on a digital computer, in the absolute binary days, a problem which the best analog computers couldn’t do. And I was getting an answer. When I thought carefully and said to myself, “You know, Hamming, you’re going to have to file a report on this military job; after you spend a lot of money you’re going to have to account for it and every analog installation is going to want the report to see if they can’t find flaws in it.” I was doing the required integration by a rather crummy method, to say the least, but I was getting the answer. And I realized that in truth the problem was not just to get the answer; it was to demonstrate for the first time, and beyond question, that I could beat the analog computer on its own ground with a digital machine. I reworked the method of solution, created a theory which was nice and elegant, and changed the way we computed the answer; the results were no different. The published report had an elegant method which was later known for years as “Hamming’s Method of Integrating Differential Equations.” It is somewhat obsolete now, but for a while it was a very good method. By changing the problem slightly, I did important work rather than trivial work.

In the same way, when using the machine up in the attic in the early days, I was solving one problem after another after another; a fair number were successful and there were a few failures. I went home one Friday after finishing a problem, and curiously enough I wasn’t happy; I was depressed. I could see life being a long sequence of one problem after another after another. After quite a while of thinking I decided, “No, I should be in the mass production of a variable product. I should be concerned with all of next year’s problems, not just the one in front of my face.” By changing the question I still got the same kind of results or better, but I changed things and did important work. I attacked the major problem – How do I conquer machines and do all of next year’s problems when I don’t know what they are going to be? How do I prepare for it? How do I do this one so I’ll be on top of it? How do I obey Newton’s rule? He said, “If I have seen further than others, it is because I’ve stood on the shoulders of giants.” These days we stand on each other’s feet!

You should do your job in such a fashion that others can build on top of it, so they will indeed say, “Yes, I’ve stood on so and so’s shoulders and I saw further.” The essence of science is cumulative. By changing a problem slightly you can often do great work rather than merely good work. Instead of attacking isolated problems, I made the resolution that I would never again solve an isolated problem except as characteristic of a class.

Now if you are much of a mathematician you know that the effort to generalize often means that the solution is simple. Often by stopping and saying, “This is the problem he wants but this is characteristic of so and so. Yes, I can attack the whole class with a far superior method than the particular one because I was earlier embedded in needless detail.” The business of abstraction frequently makes things simple. Furthermore, I filed away the methods and prepared for the future problems.

To end this part, I’ll remind you, “It is a poor workman who blames his tools – the good man gets on with the job, given what he’s got, and gets the best answer he can.” And I suggest that by altering the problem, by looking at the thing differently, you can make a great deal of difference in your final productivity because you can either do it in such a fashion that people can indeed build on what you’ve done, or you can do it in such a fashion that the next person has to essentially duplicate again what you’ve done. It isn’t just a matter of the job, it’s the way you write the report, the way you write the paper, the whole attitude. It’s just as easy to do a broad, general job as one very special case. And it’s much more satisfying and rewarding!

I have now come down to a topic which is very distasteful; it is not sufficient to do a job, you have to sell it. `Selling’ to a scientist is an awkward thing to do. It’s very ugly; you shouldn’t have to do it. The world is supposed to be waiting, and when you do something great, they should rush out and welcome it. But the fact is everyone is busy with their own work. You must present it so well that they will set aside what they are doing, look at what you’ve done, read it, and come back and say, “Yes, that was good.” I suggest that when you open a journal, as you turn the pages, you ask why you read some articles and not others. You had better write your report so when it is published in the Physical Review, or wherever else you want it, as the readers are turning the pages they won’t just turn your pages but they will stop and read yours. If they don’t stop and read it, you won’t get credit.

There are three things you have to do in selling. You have to learn to write clearly and well so that people will read it, you must learn to give reasonably formal talks, and you also must learn to give informal talks. We had a lot of so-called `back room scientists.’ In a conference, they would keep quiet. Three weeks later after a decision was made they filed a report saying why you should do so and so. Well, it was too late. They would not stand up right in the middle of a hot conference, in the middle of activity, and say, “We should do this for these reasons.” You need to master that form of communication as well as prepared speeches.

When I first started, I got practically physically ill while giving a speech, and I was very, very nervous. I realized I either had to learn to give speeches smoothly or I would essentially partially cripple my whole career. The first time IBM asked me to give a speech in New York one evening, I decided I was going to give a really good speech, a speech that was wanted, not a technical one but a broad one, and at the end if they liked it, I’d quietly say, “Any time you want one I’ll come in and give you one.” As a result, I got a great deal of practice giving speeches to a limited audience and I got over being afraid. Furthermore, I could also then study what methods were effective and what were ineffective.

While going to meetings I had already been studying why some papers are remembered and most are not. The technical person wants to give a highly limited technical talk. Most of the time the audience wants a broad general talk and wants much more survey and background than the speaker is willing to give. As a result, many talks are ineffective. The speaker names a topic and suddenly plunges into the details he’s solved. Few people in the audience may follow. You should paint a general picture to say why it’s important, and then slowly give a sketch of what was done. Then a larger number of people will say, “Yes, Joe has done that,” or “Mary has done that; I really see where it is; yes, Mary really gave a good talk; I understand what Mary has done.” The tendency is to give a highly restricted, safe talk; this is usually ineffective. Furthermore, many talks are filled with far too much information. So I say this idea of selling is obvious.

Let me summarize. You’ve got to work on important problems. I deny that it is all luck, but I admit there is a fair element of luck. I subscribe to Pasteur’s “Luck favors the prepared mind.” I favor heavily what I did. Friday afternoons for years – great thoughts only – means that I committed 10% of my time trying to understand the bigger problems in the field, i.e. what was and what was not important. I found in the early days I had believed `this’ and yet had spent all week marching in `that’ direction. It was kind of foolish. If I really believe the action is over there, why do I march in this direction? I either had to change my goal or change what I did. So I changed something I did and I marched in the direction I thought was important. It’s that easy.

Now you might tell me you haven’t got control over what you have to work on. Well, when you first begin, you may not. But once you’re moderately successful, there are more people asking for results than you can deliver and you have some power of choice, but not completely. I’ll tell you a story about that, and it bears on the subject of educating your boss. I had a boss named Schelkunoff; he was, and still is, a very good friend of mine. Some military person came to me and demanded some answers by Friday. Well, I had already dedicated my computing resources to reducing data on the fly for a group of scientists; I was knee deep in short, small, important problems. This military person wanted me to solve his problem by the end of the day on Friday. I said, “No, I’ll give it to you Monday. I can work on it over the weekend. I’m not going to do it now.” He goes down to my boss, Schelkunoff, and Schelkunoff says, “You must run this for him; he’s got to have it by Friday.” I tell him, “Why do I?”; he says, “You have to.” I said, “Fine, Sergei, but you’re sitting in your office Friday afternoon catching the late bus home to watch as this fellow walks out that door.” I gave the military person the answers late Friday afternoon. I then went to Schelkunoff’s office and sat down; as the man goes out I say, “You see Schelkunoff, this fellow has nothing under his arm; but I gave him the answers.” On Monday morning Schelkunoff called him up and said, “Did you come in to work over the weekend?” I could hear, as it were, a pause as the fellow ran through his mind of what was going to happen; but he knew he would have had to sign in, and he’d better not say he had when he hadn’t, so he said he hadn’t. Ever after that Schelkunoff said, “You set your deadlines; you can change them.”

One lesson was sufficient to educate my boss as to why I didn’t want to do big jobs that displaced exploratory research and why I was justified in not doing crash jobs which absorb all the research computing facilities. I wanted instead to use the facilities to compute a large number of small problems. Again, in the early days, I was limited in computing capacity and it was clear, in my area, that a “mathematician had no use for machines.” But I needed more machine capacity. Every time I had to tell some scientist in some other area, “No I can’t; I haven’t the machine capacity,” he complained. I said “Go tell your Vice President that Hamming needs more computing capacity.” After a while I could see what was happening up there at the top; many people said to my Vice President, “Your man needs more computing capacity.” I got it!

I also did a second thing. When I loaned what little programming power we had to help in the early days of computing, I said, “We are not getting the recognition for our programmers that they deserve. When you publish a paper you will thank that programmer or you aren’t getting any more help from me. That programmer is going to be thanked by name; she’s worked hard.” I waited a couple of years. I then went through a year of BSTJ articles and counted what fraction thanked some programmer. I took it into the boss and said, “That’s the central role computing is playing in Bell Labs; if the BSTJ is important, that’s how important computing is.” He had to give in. You can educate your bosses. It’s a hard job. In this talk I’m only viewing from the bottom up; I’m not viewing from the top down. But I am telling you how you can get what you want in spite of top management. You have to sell your ideas there also.

Well I now come down to the topic, “Is the effort to be a great scientist worth it?” To answer this, you must ask people. When you get beyond their modesty, most people will say, “Yes, doing really first-class work, and knowing it, is as good as wine, women and song put together,” or if it’s a woman she says, “It is as good as wine, men and song put together.” And if you look at the bosses, they tend to come back or ask for reports, trying to participate in those moments of discovery. They’re always in the way. So evidently those who have done it, want to do it again. But it is a limited survey. I have never dared to go out and ask those who didn’t do great work how they felt about the matter. It’s a biased sample, but I still think it is worth the struggle. I think it is very definitely worth the struggle to try and do first-class work because the truth is, the value is in the struggle more than it is in the result. The struggle to make something of yourself seems to be worthwhile in itself. The success and fame are sort of dividends, in my opinion.

I’ve told you how to do it. It is so easy, so why do so many people, with all their talents, fail? For example, my opinion, to this day, is that there are in the mathematics department at Bell Labs quite a few people far more able and far better endowed than I, but they didn’t produce as much. Some of them did produce more than I did; Shannon produced more than I did, and some others produced a lot, but I was highly productive against a lot of other fellows who were better equipped. Why is it so? What happened to them? Why do so many of the people who have great promise, fail?

Well, one of the reasons is drive and commitment. The people who do great work with less ability but who are committed to it, get more done that those who have great skill and dabble in it, who work during the day and go home and do other things and come back and work the next day. They don’t have the deep commitment that is apparently necessary for really first-class work. They turn out lots of good work, but we were talking, remember, about first-class work. There is a difference. Good people, very talented people, almost always turn out good work. We’re talking about the outstanding work, the type of work that gets the Nobel Prize and gets recognition.

The second thing is, I think, the problem of personality defects. Now I’ll cite a fellow whom I met out in Irvine. He had been the head of a computing center and he was temporarily on assignment as a special assistant to the president of the university. It was obvious he had a job with a great future. He took me into his office one time and showed me his method of getting letters done and how he took care of his correspondence. He pointed out how inefficient the secretary was. He kept all his letters stacked around there; he knew where everything was. And he would, on his word processor, get the letter out. He was bragging how marvelous it was and how he could get so much more work done without the secretary’s interference. Well, behind his back, I talked to the secretary. The secretary said, “Of course I can’t help him; I don’t get his mail. He won’t give me the stuff to log in; I don’t know where he puts it on the floor. Of course I can’t help him.” So I went to him and said, “Look, if you adopt the present method and do what you can do single-handedly, you can go just that far and no farther than you can do single-handedly. If you will learn to work with the system, you can go as far as the system will support you.” And, he never went any further. He had his personality defect of wanting total control and was not willing to recognize that you need the support of the system.

You find this happening again and again; good scientists will fight the system rather than learn to work with the system and take advantage of all the system has to offer. It has a lot, if you learn how to use it. It takes patience, but you can learn how to use the system pretty well, and you can learn how to get around it. After all, if you want a decision `No’, you just go to your boss and get a `No’ easy. If you want to do something, don’t ask, do it. Present him with an accomplished fact. Don’t give him a chance to tell you `No’. But if you want a `No’, it’s easy to get a `No’.

Another personality defect is ego assertion and I’ll speak in this case of my own experience. I came from Los Alamos and in the early days I was using a machine in New York at 590 Madison Avenue where we merely rented time. I was still dressing in western clothes, big slash pockets, a bolo and all those things. I vaguely noticed that I was not getting as good service as other people. So I set out to measure. You came in and you waited for your turn; I felt I was not getting a fair deal. I said to myself, “Why? No Vice President at IBM said, `Give Hamming a bad time’. It is the secretaries at the bottom who are doing this. When a slot appears, they’ll rush to find someone to slip in, but they go out and find somebody else. Now, why? I haven’t mistreated them.” Answer, I wasn’t dressing the way they felt somebody in that situation should. It came down to just that – I wasn’t dressing properly. I had to make the decision – was I going to assert my ego and dress the way I wanted to and have it steadily drain my effort from my professional life, or was I going to appear to conform better? I decided I would make an effort to appear to conform properly. The moment I did, I got much better service. And now, as an old colorful character, I get better service than other people.

You should dress according to the expectations of the audience spoken to. If I am going to give an address at the MIT computer center, I dress with a bolo and an old corduroy jacket or something else. I know enough not to let my clothes, my appearance, my manners get in the way of what I care about. An enormous number of scientists feel they must assert their ego and do their thing their way. They have got to be able to do this, that, or the other thing, and they pay a steady price.

John Tukey almost always dressed very casually. He would go into an important office and it would take a long time before the other fellow realized that this is a first-class man and he had better listen. For a long time John has had to overcome this kind of hostility. It’s wasted effort! I didn’t say you should conform; I said “The appearance of conforming gets you a long way.” If you chose to assert your ego in any number of ways, “I am going to do it my way,” you pay a small steady price throughout the whole of your professional career. And this, over a whole lifetime, adds up to an enormous amount of needless trouble.

By taking the trouble to tell jokes to the secretaries and being a little friendly, I got superb secretarial help. For instance, one time for some idiot reason all the reproducing services at Murray Hill were tied up. Don’t ask me how, but they were. I wanted something done. My secretary called up somebody at Holmdel, hopped the company car, made the hour-long trip down and got it reproduced, and then came back. It was a payoff for the times I had made an effort to cheer her up, tell her jokes and be friendly; it was that little extra work that later paid off for me. By realizing you have to use the system and studying how to get the system to do your work, you learn how to adapt the system to your desires. Or you can fight it steadily, as a small undeclared war, for the whole of your life.

And I think John Tukey paid a terrible price needlessly. He was a genius anyhow, but I think it would have been far better, and far simpler, had he been willing to conform a little bit instead of ego asserting. He is going to dress the way he wants all of the time. It applies not only to dress but to a thousand other things; people will continue to fight the system. Not that you shouldn’t occasionally!

When they moved the library from the middle of Murray Hill to the far end, a friend of mine put in a request for a bicycle. Well, the organization was not dumb. They waited awhile and sent back a map of the grounds saying, “Will you please indicate on this map what paths you are going to take so we can get an insurance policy covering you.” A few more weeks went by. They then asked, “Where are you going to store the bicycle and how will it be locked so we can do so and so.” He finally realized that of course he was going to be red-taped to death so he gave in. He rose to be the President of Bell Laboratories.

Barney Oliver was a good man. He wrote a letter one time to the IEEE. At that time the official shelf space at Bell Labs was so much and the height of the IEEE Proceedings at that time was larger; and since you couldn’t change the size of the official shelf space he wrote this letter to the IEEE Publication person saying, “Since so many IEEE members were at Bell Labs and since the official space was so high the journal size should be changed.” He sent it for his boss’s signature. Back came a carbon with his signature, but he still doesn’t know whether the original was sent or not. I am not saying you shouldn’t make gestures of reform. I am saying that my study of able people is that they don’t get themselves committed to that kind of warfare. They play it a little bit and drop it and get on with their work.

Many a second-rate fellow gets caught up in some little twitting of the system, and carries it through to warfare. He expends his energy in a foolish project. Now you are going to tell me that somebody has to change the system. I agree; somebody’s has to. Which do you want to be? The person who changes the system or the person who does first-class science? Which person is it that you want to be? Be clear, when you fight the system and struggle with it, what you are doing, how far to go out of amusement, and how much to waste your effort fighting the system. My advice is to let somebody else do it and you get on with becoming a first-class scientist. Very few of you have the ability to both reform the system and become a first-class scientist.

On the other hand, we can’t always give in. There are times when a certain amount of rebellion is sensible. I have observed almost all scientists enjoy a certain amount of twitting the system for the sheer love of it. What it comes down to basically is that you cannot be original in one area without having originality in others. Originality is being different. You can’t be an original scientist without having some other original characteristics. But many a scientist has let his quirks in other places make him pay a far higher price than is necessary for the ego satisfaction he or she gets. I’m not against all ego assertion; I’m against some.

Another fault is anger. Often a scientist becomes angry, and this is no way to handle things. Amusement, yes, anger, no. Anger is misdirected. You should follow and cooperate rather than struggle against the system all the time.

Another thing you should look for is the positive side of things instead of the negative. I have already given you several examples, and there are many, many more; how, given the situation, by changing the way I looked at it, I converted what was apparently a defect to an asset. I’ll give you another example. I am an egotistical person; there is no doubt about it. I knew that most people who took a sabbatical to write a book, didn’t finish it on time. So before I left, I told all my friends that when I come back, that book was going to be done! Yes, I would have it done – I’d have been ashamed to come back without it! I used my ego to make myself behave the way I wanted to. I bragged about something so I’d have to perform. I found out many times, like a cornered rat in a real trap, I was surprisingly capable. I have found that it paid to say, “Oh yes, I’ll get the answer for you Tuesday,” not having any idea how to do it. By Sunday night I was really hard thinking on how I was going to deliver by Tuesday. I often put my pride on the line and sometimes I failed, but as I said, like a cornered rat I’m surprised how often I did a good job. I think you need to learn to use yourself. I think you need to know how to convert a situation from one view to another which would increase the chance of success.

Now self-delusion in humans is very, very common. There are enumerable ways of you changing a thing and kidding yourself and making it look some other way. When you ask, “Why didn’t you do such and such,” the person has a thousand alibis. If you look at the history of science, usually these days there are 10 people right there ready, and we pay off for the person who is there first. The other nine fellows say, “Well, I had the idea but I didn’t do it and so on and so on.” There are so many alibis. Why weren’t you first? Why didn’t you do it right? Don’t try an alibi. Don’t try and kid yourself. You can tell other people all the alibis you want. I don’t mind. But to yourself try to be honest.

If you really want to be a first-class scientist you need to know yourself, your weaknesses, your strengths, and your bad faults, like my egotism. How can you convert a fault to an asset? How can you convert a situation where you haven’t got enough manpower to move into a direction when that’s exactly what you need to do? I say again that I have seen, as I studied the history, the successful scientist changed the viewpoint and what was a defect became an asset.

In summary, I claim that some of the reasons why so many people who have greatness within their grasp don’t succeed are: they don’t work on important problems, they don’t become emotionally involved, they don’t try and change what is difficult to some other situation which is easily done but is still important, and they keep giving themselves alibis why they don’t. They keep saying that it is a matter of luck. I’ve told you how easy it is; furthermore I’ve told you how to reform. Therefore, go forth and become great scientists!

(End of the formal part of the talk.)

DISCUSSION – QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

A. G. Chynoweth: Well that was 50 minutes of concentrated wisdom and observations accumulated over a fantastic career; I lost track of all the observations that were striking home. Some of them are very very timely. One was the plea for more computer capacity; I was hearing nothing but that this morning from several people, over and over again. So that was right on the mark today even though here we are 20 – 30 years after when you were making similar remarks, Dick. I can think of all sorts of lessons that all of us can draw from your talk. And for one, as I walk around the halls in the future I hope I won’t see as many closed doors in Bellcore. That was one observation I thought was very intriguing.

Thank you very, very much indeed Dick; that was a wonderful recollection. I’ll now open it up for questions. I’m sure there are many people who would like to take up on some of the points that Dick was making.

Hamming: First let me respond to Alan Chynoweth about computing. I had computing in research and for 10 years I kept telling my management, “Get that !&@#% machine out of research. We are being forced to run problems all the time. We can’t do research because were too busy operating and running the computing machines.” Finally the message got through. They were going to move computing out of research to someplace else. I was persona non grata to say the least and I was surprised that people didn’t kick my shins because everybody was having their toy taken away from them. I went in to Ed David’s office and said, “Look Ed, you’ve got to give your researchers a machine. If you give them a great big machine, we’ll be back in the same trouble we were before, so busy keeping it going we can’t think. Give them the smallest machine you can because they are very able people. They will learn how to do things on a small machine instead of mass computing.” As far as I’m concerned, that’s how UNIX arose. We gave them a moderately small machine and they decided to make it do great things. They had to come up with a system to do it on. It is called UNIX!

A. G. Chynoweth: I just have to pick up on that one. In our present environment, Dick, while we wrestle with some of the red tape attributed to, or required by, the regulators, there is one quote that one exasperated AVP came up with and I’ve used it over and over again. He growled that, “UNIX was never a deliverable!”

Question: What about personal stress? Does that seem to make a difference?

Hamming: Yes, it does. If you don’t get emotionally involved, it doesn’t. I had incipient ulcers most of the years that I was at Bell Labs. I have since gone off to the Naval Postgraduate School and laid back somewhat, and now my health is much better. But if you want to be a great scientist you’re going to have to put up with stress. You can lead a nice life; you can be a nice guy or you can be a great scientist. But nice guys end last, is what Leo Durocher said. If you want to lead a nice happy life with a lot of recreation and everything else, you’ll lead a nice life.

Question: The remarks about having courage, no one could argue with; but those of us who have gray hairs or who are well established don’t have to worry too much. But what I sense among the young people these days is a real concern over the risk taking in a highly competitive environment. Do you have any words of wisdom on this?

Hamming: I’ll quote Ed David more. Ed David was concerned about the general loss of nerve in our society. It does seem to me that we’ve gone through various periods. Coming out of the war, coming out of Los Alamos where we built the bomb, coming out of building the radars and so on, there came into the mathematics department, and the research area, a group of people with a lot of guts. They’ve just seen things done; they’ve just won a war which was fantastic. We had reasons for having courage and therefore we did a great deal. I can’t arrange that situation to do it again. I cannot blame the present generation for not having it, but I agree with what you say; I just cannot attach blame to it. It doesn’t seem to me they have the desire for greatness; they lack the courage to do it. But we had, because we were in a favorable circumstance to have it; we just came through a tremendously successful war. In the war we were looking very, very bad for a long while; it was a very desperate struggle as you well know. And our success, I think, gave us courage and self confidence; that’s why you see, beginning in the late forties through the fifties, a tremendous productivity at the labs which was stimulated from the earlier times. Because many of us were earlier forced to learn other things – we were forced to learn the things we didn’t want to learn, we were forced to have an open door – and then we could exploit those things we learned. It is true, and I can’t do anything about it; I cannot blame the present generation either. It’s just a fact.

Question: Is there something management could or should do?

Hamming: Management can do very little. If you want to talk about managing research, that’s a totally different talk. I’d take another hour doing that. This talk is about how the individual gets very successful research done in spite of anything the management does or in spite of any other opposition. And how do you do it? Just as I observe people doing it. It’s just that simple and that hard!

Question: Is brainstorming a daily process?

Hamming: Once that was a very popular thing, but it seems not to have paid off. For myself I find it desirable to talk to other people; but a session of brainstorming is seldom worthwhile. I do go in to strictly talk to somebody and say, “Look, I think there has to be something here. Here’s what I think I see …” and then begin talking back and forth. But you want to pick capable people. To use another analogy, you know the idea called the `critical mass.’ If you have enough stuff you have critical mass. There is also the idea I used to call `sound absorbers’. When you get too many sound absorbers, you give out an idea and they merely say, “Yes, yes, yes.” What you want to do is get that critical mass in action; “Yes, that reminds me of so and so,” or, “Have you thought about that or this?” When you talk to other people, you want to get rid of those sound absorbers who are nice people but merely say, “Oh yes,” and to find those who will stimulate you right back.

For example, you couldn’t talk to John Pierce without being stimulated very quickly. There were a group of other people I used to talk with. For example there was Ed Gilbert; I used to go down to his office regularly and ask him questions and listen and come back stimulated. I picked my people carefully with whom I did or whom I didn’t brainstorm because the sound absorbers are a curse. They are just nice guys; they fill the whole space and they contribute nothing except they absorb ideas and the new ideas just die away instead of echoing on. Yes, I find it necessary to talk to people. I think people with closed doors fail to do this so they fail to get their ideas sharpened, such as “Did you ever notice something over here?” I never knew anything about it – I can go over and look. Somebody points the way. On my visit here, I have already found several books that I must read when I get home. I talk to people and ask questions when I think they can answer me and give me clues that I do not know about. I go out and look!

Question: What kind of tradeoffs did you make in allocating your time for reading and writing and actually doing research?

Hamming: I believed, in my early days, that you should spend at least as much time in the polish and presentation as you did in the original research. Now at least 50% of the time must go for the presentation. It’s a big, big number.

Question: How much effort should go into library work?

Hamming: It depends upon the field. I will say this about it. There was a fellow at Bell Labs, a very, very, smart guy. He was always in the library; he read everything. If you wanted references, you went to him and he gave you all kinds of references. But in the middle of forming these theories, I formed a proposition: there would be no effect named after him in the long run. He is now retired from Bell Labs and is an Adjunct Professor. He was very valuable; I’m not questioning that. He wrote some very good Physical Review articles; but there’s no effect named after him because he read too much. If you read all the time what other people have done you will think the way they thought. If you want to think new thoughts that are different, then do what a lot of creative people do – get the problem reasonably clear and then refuse to look at any answers until you’ve thought the problem through carefully how you would do it, how you could slightly change the problem to be the correct one. So yes, you need to keep up. You need to keep up more to find out what the problems are than to read to find the solutions. The reading is necessary to know what is going on and what is possible. But reading to get the solutions does not seem to be the way to do great research. So I’ll give you two answers. You read; but it is not the amount, it is the way you read that counts.

Question: How do you get your name attached to things?

Hamming: By doing great work. I’ll tell you the hamming window one. I had given Tukey a hard time, quite a few times, and I got a phone call from him from Princeton to me at Murray Hill. I knew that he was writing up power spectra and he asked me if I would mind if he called a certain window a “Hamming window.” And I said to him, “Come on, John; you know perfectly well I did only a small part of the work but you also did a lot.” He said, “Yes, Hamming, but you contributed a lot of small things; you’re entitled to some credit.” So he called it the hamming window. Now, let me go on. I had twitted John frequently about true greatness. I said true greatness is when your name is like ampere, watt, and fourier – when it’s spelled with a lower case letter. That’s how the hamming window came about.

Question: Dick, would you care to comment on the relative effectiveness between giving talks, writing papers, and writing books?

Hamming: In the short-haul, papers are very important if you want to stimulate someone tomorrow. If you want to get recognition long-haul, it seems to me writing books is more contribution because most of us need orientation. In this day of practically infinite knowledge, we need orientation to find our way. Let me tell you what infinite knowledge is. Since from the time of Newton to now, we have come close to doubling knowledge every 17 years, more or less. And we cope with that, essentially, by specialization. In the next 340 years at that rate, there will be 20 doublings, i.e. a million, and there will be a million fields of specialty for every one field now. It isn’t going to happen. The present growth of knowledge will choke itself off until we get different tools. I believe that books which try to digest, coordinate, get rid of the duplication, get rid of the less fruitful methods and present the underlying ideas clearly of what we know now, will be the things the future generations will value. Public talks are necessary; private talks are necessary; written papers are necessary. But I am inclined to believe that, in the long-haul, books which leave out what’s not essential are more important than books which tell you everything because you don’t want to know everything. I don’t want to know that much about penguins is the usual reply. You just want to know the essence.

Question: You mentioned the problem of the Nobel Prize and the subsequent notoriety of what was done to some of the careers. Isn’t that kind of a much more broad problem of fame? What can one do?

Hamming: Some things you could do are the following. Somewhere around every seven years make a significant, if not complete, shift in your field. Thus, I shifted from numerical analysis, to hardware, to software, and so on, periodically, because you tend to use up your ideas. When you go to a new field, you have to start over as a baby. You are no longer the big mukity muk and you can start back there and you can start planting those acorns which will become the giant oaks. Shannon, I believe, ruined himself. In fact when he left Bell Labs, I said, “That’s the end of Shannon’s scientific career.” I received a lot of flak from my friends who said that Shannon was just as smart as ever. I said, “Yes, he’ll be just as smart, but that’s the end of his scientific career,” and I truly believe it was.

You have to change. You get tired after a while; you use up your originality in one field. You need to get something nearby. I’m not saying that you shift from music to theoretical physics to English literature; I mean within your field you should shift areas so that you don’t go stale. You couldn’t get away with forcing a change every seven years, but if you could, I would require a condition for doing research, being that you will change your field of research every seven years with a reasonable definition of what it means, or at the end of 10 years, management has the right to compel you to change. I would insist on a change because I’m serious. What happens to the old fellows is that they get a technique going; they keep on using it. They were marching in that direction which was right then, but the world changes. There’s the new direction; but the old fellows are still marching in their former direction.

You need to get into a new field to get new viewpoints, and before you use up all the old ones. You can do something about this, but it takes effort and energy. It takes courage to say, “Yes, I will give up my great reputation.” For example, when error correcting codes were well launched, having these theories, I said, “Hamming, you are going to quit reading papers in the field; you are going to ignore it completely; you are going to try and do something else other than coast on that.” I deliberately refused to go on in that field. I wouldn’t even read papers to try to force myself to have a chance to do something else. I managed myself, which is what I’m preaching in this whole talk. Knowing many of my own faults, I manage myself. I have a lot of faults, so I’ve got a lot of problems, i.e. a lot of possibilities of management.

Question: Would you compare research and management?

Hamming: If you want to be a great researcher, you won’t make it being president of the company. If you want to be president of the company, that’s another thing. I’m not against being president of the company. I just don’t want to be. I think Ian Ross does a good job as President of Bell Labs. I’m not against it; but you have to be clear on what you want. Furthermore, when you’re young, you may have picked wanting to be a great scientist, but as you live longer, you may change your mind. For instance, I went to my boss, Bode, one day and said, “Why did you ever become department head? Why didn’t you just be a good scientist?” He said, “Hamming, I had a vision of what mathematics should be in Bell Laboratories. And I saw if that vision was going to be realized, I had to make it happen; I had to be department head.” When your vision of what you want to do is what you can do single-handedly, then you should pursue it. The day your vision, what you think needs to be done, is bigger than what you can do single-handedly, then you have to move toward management. And the bigger the vision is, the farther in management you have to go. If you have a vision of what the whole laboratory should be, or the whole Bell System, you have to get there to make it happen. You can’t make it happen from the bottom very easily. It depends upon what goals and what desires you have. And as they change in life, you have to be prepared to change. I chose to avoid management because I preferred to do what I could do single-handedly. But that’s the choice that I made, and it is biased. Each person is entitled to their choice. Keep an open mind. But when you do choose a path, for heaven’s sake be aware of what you have done and the choice you have made. Don’t try to do both sides.

Question: How important is one’s own expectation or how important is it to be in a group or surrounded by people who expect great work from you?

Hamming: At Bell Labs everyone expected good work from me – it was a big help. Everybody expects you to do a good job, so you do, if you’ve got pride. I think it’s very valuable to have first-class people around. I sought out the best people. The moment that physics table lost the best people, I left. The moment I saw that the same was true of the chemistry table, I left. I tried to go with people who had great ability so I could learn from them and who would expect great results out of me. By deliberately managing myself, I think I did much better than laissez faire.

Question: You, at the outset of your talk, minimized or played down luck; but you seemed also to gloss over the circumstances that got you to Los Alamos, that got you to Chicago, that got you to Bell Laboratories.

Hamming: There was some luck. On the other hand I don’t know the alternate branches. Until you can say that the other branches would not have been equally or more successful, I can’t say. Is it luck the particular thing you do? For example, when I met Feynman at Los Alamos, I knew he was going to get a Nobel Prize. I didn’t know what for. But I knew darn well he was going to do great work. No matter what directions came up in the future, this man would do great work. And sure enough, he did do great work. It isn’t that you only do a little great work at this circumstance and that was luck, there are many opportunities sooner or later. There are a whole pail full of opportunities, of which, if you’re in this situation, you seize one and you’re great over there instead of over here. There is an element of luck, yes and no. Luck favors a prepared mind; luck favors a prepared person. It is not guaranteed; I don’t guarantee success as being absolutely certain. I’d say luck changes the odds, but there is some definite control on the part of the individual.

Go forth, then, and do great work!

(End of the General Research Colloquium Talk.)

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF RICHARD HAMMING

Richard W. Hamming was born February 11, 1915, in Chicago, Illinois. His formal education was marked by the following degrees (all in mathematics): B.S. 1937, University of Chicago; M.A. 1939, University of Nebraska; and Ph.D. 1942, University of Illinois. His early experience was obtained at Los Alamos 1945-1946, i.e. at the close of World War II, where he managed the computers used in building the first atomic bomb. From there he went directly to Bell Laboratories where he spent thirty years in various aspects of computing, numerical analysis, and management of computing, i.e. 1946-1976. On July 23, 1976 he `moved his office’ to the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California where he taught, supervised research, and wrote books.

While at Bell Laboratories, he took time to teach in Universities, sometimes locally and sometimes on a full sabbatical leave; these activities included visiting professorships at New York University, Princeton University (Statistics), City College of New York, Stanford University, 1960-61, Stevens Institute of Technology (Mathematics), and the University of California, Irvine, 1970-71.

Richard Hamming has received a number of awards which include: Fellow, IEEE, 1968; the ACM Turing Prize, 1968; the IEEE Emanuel R. Piore Award, 1979; Member, National Academy of Engineering, 1980; and the Harold Pender Award, U. Penn., 1981. In 1987 a major IEEE award was named after him, namely the Richard W. Hamming Medal, “For exceptional contributions to information sciences and systems”; fittingly, he was also the first recipient of this award, 1988. In 1996 in Munich he received the prestigious $130,000 Eduard Rhein Award for Achievement in Technology for his work on error correcting codes. He was both a Founder and Past President of ACM, and a Vice Pres. of the AAAS Mathematics Section.

He is probably best known for his pioneering work on error-correcting codes, his work on integrating differential equations, and the spectral window which bears his name. His extensive writing has included a number of important, pioneering, and highly regarded books. These are:

 

  • Numerical Methods for Scientists and Engineers, McGraw-Hill, 1962; Second edition 1973; Reprinted by Dover 1985; Translated into Russian.
  • Calculus and the Computer Revolution, Houghton-Mifflin, 1968.
  • Introduction to Applied Numerical Analysis, McGraw-Hill, 1971.
  • Computers and Society, McGraw-Hill, 1972.
  • Digital Filters, Prentice-Hall, 1977; Second edition 1983; Third edition 1989; translated into several European languages.
  • Coding and Information Theory, Prentice-Hall, 1980; Second edition 1986.
  • Methods of Mathematics Applied to Calculus, Probability and Statistics, Prentice-Hall, 1985.
  • The Art of Probability for Scientists and Engineers, Addison-Wesley, 1991.
  • The Art of Doing Science and Engineering: Learning to Learn, Gordon and Breach, 1997.

He continued a very active life as Adjunct Professor, teaching and writing in the Mathematics and Computer Science Departments at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California for another twenty-one years before he retired to become Professor Emeritus in 1997. He was still teaching a course in the fall of 1997. He passed away unexpectedly on January 7, 1998.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to acknowledge the professional efforts of Donna Paradise of the Word Processing Center who did the initial transcription of the talk from the tape recording. She made my job of editing much easier. The errors of sentence parsing and punctuation are mine and mine alone. Finally I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Richard Hamming and Alan Chynoweth for all of their help in bringing this transcription to its present readable state.

J. F. Kaiser

 

August 20th, 2011

Hillary Rodham Clinton : Remarks on Principles for Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific

 

Remarks

Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State

Shangri-La, Hong Kong
July 25, 2011

 

 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chipman, and thanks to all of you for being here today. I also wish to acknowledge and thank Mr. Ronnie Chan, chairman of the Asia Society, and Mr. Norman Chan, chief executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. 

And I am so pleased to be here and to have this opportunity to speak with you today, and it was made possible by the U.S., Hong Kong, and Macau chambers of commerce and the Asia Society. And I thank the chamber very much on a personal level for its support of the U.S. Pavilion at the Shanghai Expo. I have been called the mother of the pavilion, which is actually one of the nicer things I’ve been called – (laughter) – during my very long public career.

And I am delighted to be back in Hong Kong, a city I have admired ever since I first visited about 30 years ago when my husband, who was then governor of Arkansas, led the first ever trade mission to East Asia from our small state. Hong Kong stood out then, as it does today, as a symbol of the open exchange of goods and ideas. People were drawn to this place from every part of the world, even far away Arkansas, as evidenced by a good friend of ours from Arkansas, Nancy Hernreich Bowen, who is here with us today.

Now, since that time, Hong Kong has changed a great deal. Certainly, the skyline attests to that. And after all, few things have stood still in East Asia. But one thing about Hong Kong has not changed – the principles that find a home here. Under the “one country, two systems” policy, this remains a city that bridges East and West and looks outward in all directions, a place where ideas become businesses, where companies compete on the merits, and where economic opportunity is palpable and real for millions of people, a place that defines the fierce and productive economic competition of our time.

That is why businessmen and women continue to flock to Hong Kong, and an opportunity to meet some of the Americans who have called Hong Kong home for 20, 25, even 30 years. And it is why I have come here today to talk about how the nations of this region and the United States can intensify our economic partnership on behalf of ourselves, each other, and the world, and how together we can work toward a future of prosperity and opportunity for people everywhere.

But before I talk about where we need to go together, let’s consider how far we’ve come. The economic rise of the Asia-Pacific region is an astonishing historic achievement that is reshaping our world today and into the future. In Hanoi, bicycles and water buffalo have given way to motorcycles and internet cafes. Small Chinese fishing villages like Shenzhen have become megacities with their own stock exchanges. And while much work remains to improve labor practices and expand access to the formal economies, the numbers tell a powerful story.

Thirty years ago when I first came to Hong Kong, 80 percent of the people of this region lived on less than $1.25 a day. By 2005, that number had dropped to 20 percent. In the Lower Mekong Region countries, per capita GDP has more than tripled in the last 20 years. And in Thailand alone, the poverty rate fell from 42 percent in 1988 to 8 percent today. Never in history have so many people climbed so far, so fast.

And though this progress is largely due to the hard work and ingenuity of the people of Asia themselves, we in the United States are proud of the role we have played in promoting prosperity. Of course, we helped Japan and South Korea rebuild, patrolled Asia’s sea lanes to preserve freedom of navigation, promoted global shipping, and supported China’s membership in the WTO. Along with our treaty allies – Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and Philippines, and other key partners like New Zealand and Singapore – we have underwritten regional security for decades, and that in turn has helped create the conditions for growth.

And the U.S. continues to contribute to Asia’s growth as a major trade and investment partner, a source of innovation that benefits Asia’s companies, a host to 350,000 Asian students every year, a champion of open markets, an advocate for universal human rights, and a guarantor of stability and security across the Asia-Pacific. The Obama Administration has made a comprehensive commitment to reinvigorate our engagement as a Pacific power – shoring up alliances and friendships, reaching out to emerging partners, and strengthening multilateral institutions.

These efforts reflect our optimism and enthusiasm for what is happening in Asia today. Of course, countries in this region are grappling with challenges. We all are. But we are bullish on Asia’s future, and while the United States is facing its own difficulties, make no mistake: We are bullish on America’s future too.

America remains an opportunity society – a place to excel, a country of possibility and mobility where a brilliant idea hatched in a college dorm room or a product invented in a garage can find a global market and grow into a multibillion dollar company. Our workers are the world’s most productive. Our inventors hold the most patents. And today, we are reinvesting in our fundamentals – infrastructure, clean energy, health, and education. And we are doing the critical work of shoring up our financial system so that it protects investors and curbs excesses.

Now, as I have traveled around the region, a lot of people have asked me about how the United States is going to resolve our debt ceiling challenge. Well, let me assure you we understand the stakes. We know how important this is for us and how important it is for you. The political wrangling in Washington is intense right now. But these kinds of debates have been a constant in our political life throughout the history of our republic. And sometimes, they are messy. I well remember the government shutdown of the 1990s; I had a front row seat for that one. But this is how an open and democratic society ultimately comes together to reach the right solutions. So I am confident that Congress will do the right thing and secure a deal on the debt ceiling, and work with President Obama to take the steps necessary to improve our long-term fiscal outlook. Through more than a century of growth, the American economy has repeatedly shown its strength, its resilience, and its unrivaled capacity to adapt and reinvent itself. And it will keep doing so.

As we pursue recovery and growth, we are making economics a priority of our foreign policy. Because increasingly, economic progress depends on strong diplomatic ties and diplomatic progress depends on strong economic ties. And so the United States is working to harness all aspects of our relationships with other countries to support our mutual growth. This is an issue I recently addressed at the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, and will again in a larger speech about America’s strategic and economic choices this fall. But economic issues have been front and center in my travels during the past two weeks – to Greece, which is working to put itself back on the path to economic stability, and to four rising centers of economic growth: Turkey, India, Indonesia, and then China.

Now, naturally, much of our economic diplomacy is focused on East Asia and the Pacific. The American Chamber in Hong Kong represents 1,200 companies, and thousands more looking to this region for new customers and markets. Last year, American exports to Hong Kong totaled $26 billion – that’s more than the Indonesian export amount of $20 billion — and our exports to the Pacific Rim were $320 billion, supporting 850,000 American jobs.

Now, numbers like these reflect how closely America’s future is linked to the future of this region. And the reverse is true as well. Because the future of the Asia-Pacific is linked to America’s. We are a resident power in Asia—not only a diplomatic or military power, but a resident economic power. And we are here to stay.

Now, while the U.S. economy and those in the Asia-Pacific are well positioned to grow together, our success — neither of ours — is preordained. Prosperity is not a birthright, it’s an achievement. And whether we achieve it will be determined by how we answer a defining question of our time: How do we turn a generation of growth in this region into a century of shared prosperity?

The United States approaches this question with great humility, and with hard-won lessons learned from overcoming difficult economic challenges throughout our history.

We must start with the most urgent task before us: realigning our economies in the wake of the global financial crisis. This means pursuing a more balanced strategy for global economic growth – the kind that President Obama and President Hu Jintao have embraced, and the G20 is promoting.

This demands rigorous reform by all nations, including the United States and the countries of Asia. We in the United States are in the middle of a necessary transition: we must save more and spend less. And we must not only save more and spend less, we must borrow less, as well. Our partners must meet this change with changes of their own. There is no way around it: Long-term growth requires stronger and broader-based domestic demand in today’s high-saving Asian economies. This will raise living standards across the region, create jobs in America, improve business for many in this room, and help stabilize the global economy.

For years, my image of the global economy was an inverted pyramid resting on the shoulders of American women, since we are the primary consumers in the world. And therefore, it seems to me that that is no longer a sustainable model. And so we have to change how we do business internally and externally. And, above all, we must reach agreement on the rules and principles that will anchor our economic relationships in the coming decades.

Last March in APEC meetings in Washington, I laid out four attributes that I believe characterize healthy economic competition. And these are very simple concepts, easy to say, hard to do: open, free, transparent, and fair. Hong Kong is helping to give shape to these principles and is showing the world their value.

First, we must seek an open system where any person anywhere can participate in markets everywhere.

Second, we must seek a free system, one in which ideas, information, products and capital can flow unimpeded by unnecessary or unjust barriers. That is why President Obama has mobilized a government-wide effort to attract foreign investment to America. Now, in the past, foreign investment has been seen as controversial. But today we know it helps create growth and jobs, and it can attract American dollars held overseas back into the U.S. economy. As we welcome investors to our country, we hope that all investors, including those from America, will receive an enthusiastic welcome overseas.

Third, we must seek a transparent economic system. Rules and regulations need to be developed out in the open through consultation with stakeholders. They must be known to all and applied equally to all. Hong Kong is a testament to the power of transparency, good governance, the rule of law, freedom of the press, an independent judiciary, and a vibrant civil society, all of which help to explain why so many people choose to do business here.

Openness, freedom and transparency contribute to the fourth principle we must ensure: fairness. Fairness sustains faith in the system. That faith is difficult to sustain when companies are forced to trade away their intellectual property just to enter or expand in a foreign market, or when vital supply chains are blocked. These kinds of actions undermine fair competition, which turns many off from competing at all.

A growing number of countries in Asia are proving the value of these principles. And the United States deeply believes in them, because their value has been proven time and again, not only in times of prosperity but also in times of hardship, as well. At the end of the Vietnam War, there was a thriving commentary around the world on the idea of America’s economic decline. That seems to be a theme that kind of repeats itself every couple of decades. But all the while, then and now, these principles were nurturing a system of entrepreneurship and innovation that allowed two college students to found a small tech startup called Microsoft. And today, they are helping power companies like Solyndra, a green-energy startup in California that began producing solar panels in 2007 and now installs them in more than 20 countries worldwide.

Every time in history when the United States has experienced a downturn, we’ve overcome it through reinvention and innovation. Now, these capacities are not unique or innate to the people of the United States. They are activated by our economic model, which we work hard to keep open, free, transparent, and fair, a model that has its imperfections but remains the most powerful source of prosperity known to humankind.

Of course, no nation is perfect when it comes to safeguarding these principles, including my own. We all recognize the temptation to bend them. And we all recognize the inevitability of human nature’s capacity to look for ways around them. Some nations are making short-term gains doing that. Some developing countries—admirably focused on fighting poverty—might be slow to implement at home the same rules they benefit from abroad. And a number of nations, wealthy in the aggregate but often poorer per capita, might even think the rules don’t apply to them.

In fact, all who benefit from open, free, transparent, and fair competition have a vital interest and a responsibility to follow the rules. Enough of the world’s commerce takes place with developing nations, that leaving them out of the rules-based system would render the system unworkable. And that, ultimately, that would impoverish everyone.

The businessmen and women of Asia seek the benefits that these principles offer. Malaysian manufacturers want access to markets overseas. Indian firms want fair treatment when they invest abroad. Chinese artists want to protect their creations from piracy. Every society seeking to develop a strong research and technology sector wants intellectual property protections because, without them, innovation comes with a much higher risk and fewer rewards. People everywhere want to have the chance to spend their earnings on products from other places, from refrigerators to iPods.

Now, these four principles are easily uttered and embraced, but they do not implement themselves. So our challenge is always to translate them into practice. And my country is hard at work doing that, and we encourage other governments to join us in this effort.

The United States is taking steps to promote these principles around the world through multilateral and regional institutions, new trade agreements, and outreach to new partners, to enlist us all in the quest for inclusive, sustainable growth. These steps are connected to and build upon the work we are doing to revitalize our own economy.

First, we are working through regional and international institutions to achieve balanced, inclusive, and sustainable growth. That starts with our commitment to APEC, the premier organization for pursuing economic integration and growth in the Asia-Pacific region. And President Obama is pleased to be the chair and host of APEC this year in Hawaii.

We want APEC to address next-generation trade and competition challenges, like strengthening global supply chains; empowering smaller companies to connect to global markets; promoting market-driven, non-discriminatory innovation policy. We are pursuing a low-carbon agenda by working to reduce barriers to trade in clean-energy technologies, and we hope to reach agreement on implementing transparency principles to promote economic growth and the rule of law on a 21st century field of play.

Because burdensome regulations and incompatible sets of rules in different countries can hold back trade and growth every bit as much as tariffs, we are also working at APEC to find common ground on transparent, effective regulation, with broader public consultation and better coordination. The quality of the rules we put in place is just as important as our willingness to enforce them.

And I have to mention that discrimination against women is another barrier to fair competition and economic growth. A 2007 United Nations study found that the Asia-Pacific loses at least $58 billion of economic output every year because of restrictions on women’s access to employment and gender gaps in education. So, as host of APEC, we are organizing a high-level Summit on Women and the Economy in San Francisco this September.

We are also working though the World Trade Organization to address continuing challenges to fair competition. Take government procurement. The purchases that governments make represent an important part of the global economy, and citizens everywhere deserve to know that their governments are getting the best product at the best prices. Consistent with the WTO Government Procurement Agreement that we signed, America lets companies from other nations who have signed that same agreement compete for appropriate American Government contracts. We would naturally expect countries that want access to our government contracts to offer our companies genuine access to theirs in return.

Across the full spectrum of international institutions—the G8 and G20, the IMF, OECD, ILO, WTO, and others—we are working to level playing fields and encourage robust and fair economic activity. Just as the WTO eliminated harmful tariffs in the 1990s, today we need institutions capable of providing solutions to new challenges, from some activities of state-owned enterprises to the kinds of barriers emerging behind borders.

We also support innovative partnerships that develop norms and rules to address these new concerns. We should build on the model of the Santiago Principles on sovereign wealth funds, which were negotiated jointly by host governments, recipient governments, the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and the sovereign funds themselves. This code of conduct governing sovereign investment practices has reassured stakeholders – investor nations, recipient nations, and the private sector. And it may prove a useful model for other shared challenges, like ensuring that state-owned companies and enterprises compete on the same terms as private companies.

As a second step, we are pursuing new cutting-edge trade deals that raise the standards for fair competition even as they open new markets. For instance, the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, or KORUS, will eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of U.S. consumer and industrial exports within five years. Its tariff reductions alone could increase exports of American goods by more than $10 billion and help South Korea’s economy grow by 6 percent. So, whether you are an American manufacturer of machinery or a Korean chemicals exporter, this deal lowers the barriers to reaching new customers.

But this trade deal isn’t simply about who pays what tariff at our borders. It is a deeper commitment to creating conditions that let both our nations prosper as our companies compete fairly. KORUS includes significant improvements on intellectual property, fair labor practices, environmental protection and regulatory due process.

And let me add that the benefits of KORUS extend beyond the economic bottom line. Because this agreement represents a powerful strategic bet. It signals that America and South Korea are partners for the long term—economically, diplomatically, people to people. So, for all these reasons, President Obama is pursuing congressional approval of KORUS, together with necessary Trade Adjustment Assistance, as soon as possible. He is also pursuing passage of the Colombia and Panamanian Free Trade Agreements as well.

Now, we have learned that, in our system, getting trade deals right is challenging, painstaking work. But it’s essential. We consider KORUS a model agreement. Asian nations have signed over 100 bilateral trade deals in less than a decade, but many of those agreements fall short on key protections for businesses, workers, and consumers. There are a lot of bells and whistles, but many of the hard questions are glossed over or avoided.
Beyond that, there is now a danger of creating a hodgepodge of inconsistent and partial bilateral agreements which may lower tariffs, but which also create new inefficiencies and dizzying complexities. A small electronics shop, for example, in the Philippines might import alarm clocks from China under one free trade agreement, calculators from Malaysia under another, and so on—each with its own obscure rules and mountains of paperwork—until it no longer even makes sense to take advantage of the trade agreements at all. Instead, we should aim for true regional integration.

That is the spirit behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the so-called TPP, which we hope to outline by the time of APEC in November, because this agreement will bring together economies from across the Pacific—developed and developing alike—into a single trading community.

Our goal for TPP is to create not just more growth, but better growth. We believe the TPP needs to include strong protections for workers, the environment, intellectual property, and innovation. It should also promote the free flow of information technology and the spread of green technology, as well as the coherence of our regulatory system and the efficiency of supply chains.

We are working to ensure that the TPP is the first trade pact designed specifically to reduce barriers for small and medium-sized enterprises. After all, these are the companies that create most of the world’s jobs, but they often face significant challenges to engaging in international trade. So, the TPP aims to ensure fair competition, including competitive neutrality among the state-owned and private enterprises.

The idea is to create a new high standard for multilateral free trade, and to use the promise of access to new markets to encourage nations to raise their standards and join. We are taking concrete steps to promote regional integration and put ourselves on a path over time to bring about a genuine Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific.

Finally, we need to pursue strategies for achieving not just growth, but sustainable, inclusive growth. Now, it is a maxim of mine that foreign policy must deliver results for people. Because ultimately, our progress will not be measured by profit margins or GDP, but by the quality of people’s lives – whether men and women can work in dignity, earn a decent wage, raise healthy families, educate their children, and take hold of the opportunities to improve their own and the next generation’s futures.

The United States supports a number of endeavors to promote inclusive growth in the region. Our Millennium Challenge Corporation, for example, makes large-scale investments in partner countries to reduce poverty through growth. We have a compact with the Philippines to invest in roads, community development projects, and more effective tax collection. We are negotiating a compact with Indonesia to promote low carbon development, and we began a threshold partnership with Timor-Leste earlier this year to fight corruption and improve children’s health.

Across the region, we are partnering with governments to encourage and help them uphold their commitments to inclusive growth by practicing good governance, providing public goods like health and education, and creating tax systems that improve revenue collection and ensure that everyone pays their fair share. We are supporting civil society and citizens alike in holding governments accountable, supplying job training and networking, and being a strong voice for bringing opportunity to places where it is scarce.

And we are working very closely with the private sector. Two years ago, I created a Global Partnership Initiative to support a new generation of public-private partnerships focused on everything from protecting and developing the Lower Mekong region to helping more families gain access to clean cookstoves, to protect them from the harmful smoke that kills two million people worldwide every year, and puts black soot carbon into the atmosphere.

We also launched the Global Entrepreneurship Program, to identify promising entrepreneurs, training them, linking them with mentors and potential investors, advocating for supportive policies and regulations, helping spread best practices. And we are supporting initiatives like Partners for a New Beginning, which supports economic opportunity, education, science and technology exchanges between the United States and Muslim communities worldwide, and we just opened a chapter in Indonesia.

We are connecting entrepreneurs with Diaspora communities in the United States that are eager to help fund new projects in countries where they have family ties. And we are looking to the private sector to help us. There are so many ways that we are grateful to the private sector. After all, it drives what we are talking about today. But we do need to try to consider, even within the constraints of modern financial practices and expectations, not just short-term benefits but long-term consequences. The work that each of you do in your businesses can help lift people’s lives, promote human rights and dignity, and create new markets, creating a virtuous cycle. Or it can further ensnare people in poverty and environmental degradations, creating a vicious cycle.

So that’s our agenda, and you can see why I’ve come to Hong Kong to talk about it, because here, we have a perfect example of what can be done and how important it is to lead in the economic realm with the kind of principles that Hong Kong has developed on. Now, we know very well that the future is arriving at a breathtaking pace, and the choices we make today will define what is possible economically for so many millions of people

And so while the specifics are forever changing, many of the ideals that guided us in the 20th century are the same ones we need to embrace in the 21st – a belief that a good idea is a good idea no matter where it comes from or from whom, a willingness to embrace change, a culture driven by marriage, faith in the notion that a rising tide of economic growth and innovation can improve everyone’s quality of life whether they live in Hong Kong or Appalachia. It is up to us to translate those enduring principles into common practice, shared prosperity, the opportunity for as many people as possible on both sides of the Pacific to live up to their God-given potential.

And what is standing in the way of achieving that vision? Well, there are many issues and challenges we can enumerate, but ultimately, it comes down to leadership – leadership in both the public and the private sector. We were blessed over the last part of the 20th century with farsighted and effective leaders in many parts of the world, leaders who set the rules that created the economic growth that we enjoyed in the 20th century, leaders who changed course in their own nations and catalyzed the extraordinary growth that we have seen in a country like China, leaders who had visions, private sector leaders who were able to look over the horizon and understand the consequences of not just this quarter’s results but the decades. We need that leadership again. We need it everywhere. And we need it both in governments and in business. That’s why the partnership between the public and private sectors is so essential.

Sitting in the office of the Secretary of State and knowing that I’m here in this position after so many luminaries in my own country have held it, it is a very humbling experience. And I often marvel at what they achieved. And I think a lot about George Marshall and Harry Truman and the Marshall Plan. What an amazing decision – to rebuild former enemies with an eye toward the future. And I think about it in very personal terms, because at the end of World War II, my late father had served in the Navy, so when he left service as so many men of that time did and returned to private life, the last thing he wanted to hear his president or secretary of State say was, “Guess what? We’re going to still be taxing you to send money to Germany, to Europe. We’re going to rebuild Japan because we believe it is in the best interests of your children.”

But it wasn’t only our public leadership who sounded that note. It was also our business leadership as well who basically said, “Okay, we get it. And we’re willing to do our part as well.” In fact, when support for the program was flagging, the White House and the State Department called the heads of large corporations and universities and asked them to fan out across the United States making the case. So the United States invested $13 billion over four years, which in today’s money would be about 150 billion.

Imagine leaders today in either government or business going to their people and saying something similar. When the Berlin Wall fell, Helmut Kohl said, “We’re going to pay what it takes to reunify Germany and we’re going to rebuild our neighbors because the wall is gone,” and people said, “Oh, what a incredible investment of our money. We won; we should be the ones getting all the benefits.” But no; it was a decision that was supported by both government and business.

We face a lot of similar challenges today, and we need visionary leaders in both government and business. But those leaders need to be guided by these principles. Whether we’re talking about politics or economics, openness, transparency, freedom and fairness stand the test of time. And in the 21st century, every citizen who is now potentially connected with everyone else in the world will not sit idly by if those principles do not deliver, and if governments and business do not make good on when we’ll provide long-term opportunity for all.

This agenda is good for Asia, it’s good for America, it’s good for business. Most importantly, it’s good for people. And I absolutely believe it will help us create more a peaceful, stable, and prosperous world for the rest of this century. Thank you all very much. (Applause.)

August 12th, 2011

Mikhail Gorbchev’s Files

Not all new . . but corroborates what was known before . .

08/11/2011 03:57 PM

The Gorbachev Files

Secret Papers Reveal Truth Behind Soviet Collapse

By Christian Neef

Communist hardliners staged a coup against Mikhail Gorbachev 20 years ago, and the Soviet Union collapsed soon afterwards. Previously unknown documents, which SPIEGEL has obtained, show just how desperate the last Soviet leader was as he fought to retain power — and how he begged Germany for money to save his country.

There is one moment — a single decision — that some people still hold against Mikhail Gorbachev today, 20 years later.

Gorbachev, the last leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and last president of the Soviet Union, his wife and his closest confidants had survived the attempted coup by the KGB, the military leadership and the interior minister. They returned to Moscow from their house arrest at Gorbachev’s vacation home in the Crimean resort of Foros. Their plane landed in the capital at 2:15 a.m., local time, on August 22, 1991.

For the last three days, some 60,000 people had been holding out in front of the Russian White House, the parliamentary seat of the Russian Soviet Republic, which had become the bastion of Gorbachev’s supporters. When they heard on the radio that he had been released from house arrest on the Crimean Peninsula, they cheered and chanted “President, President,” and waited for an appearance by the then 60-year-old Gorbachev.

But Gorbachev, who was only released because the leaders of the coup had become afraid of their own people and did not venture to storm the White House, shocked his jubilant fellow Russians. Instead of asking to be taken from the airport directly to his supporters, and instead of savoring the moment of victory and celebrating the defeat of the plotters, he ordered his driver to take him out to his dacha. He spent the rest of the night at home, and drove to work at the Kremlin the next morning.

By today’s standards, it was a PR gaffe beyond compare. But the three days of house arrest on the Crimean Peninsula didn’t just confuse the country, it also upset Gorbachev’s inner balance — and especially that of his wife, Raisa Maximovna Gorbachova.

Erasing the Past

Gorbachev’s wife had paid the highest price for those three days. She was forced to lie down on the flight to Moscow. She had hematomas in her eyes, her speech was impaired and she felt paralyzed on one side of her body. Doctors diagnosed a stroke, which was later found to have been a severe attack of hypertension.

The stress of those days, when the Soviet Union was coming to an end after almost 69 years in existence, was too much for the Gorbachevs to handle. It was not the Kremlin chief but his former protégé Boris Yeltsin who was now shining as the new political star in Moscow. Immediately after the coup, Yeltsin banned all activities of the Soviet Communist Party, of which Gorbachev had been the general secretary until then. And because the secession movement among the non-Russian Soviet republics was continuing, Gorbachev became a president without a state. Soon the only remaining core republic of the Soviet Union would be Russia, which Gorbachev no longer had control over.

Raisa Gorbachova spent those post-coup days on the veranda of the president’s dacha. It was on one of those days that she erased a part of her past, by burning 52 letters her husband had written to her while on official trips. They were “letters from our youth,” as Gorbachev would later say, letters his wife had kept her entire life. But following her experiences in Foros, she had become fearful, including of those who would be in power in the future. She wept as she threw the carefully preserved letters into the oven, telling her husband that she wanted to prevent outsiders from peering into their lives.

Gorbachev, who was equally in the dark as to what would happen to his family and the country in the coming weeks, and who respected his wife’s opinions, followed her lead and began burning other documents.

He tossed 25 notebooks into the flames. They included notes he had made while in office, details of everyday political life, descriptions of politicians and various plans. The only notebook he kept was his private diary. Almost 20 years would pass before he spoke of the incident again, in a February 2011 interview with Novaya Gazeta, a newspaper he publishes.

Archive Contains Thousands of Documents

The official papers from his almost six years in office were preserved. Gorbachev took them with him when he announced his resignation as the Soviet president at the end of the year, and donated them to the foundation that bears his name. Since then, about 10,000 documents have been in storage at the foundation’s headquarters on Leningrad Prospect 39 in Moscow. They include the personal archives of his foreign policy advisers, Vadim Zagladin and Anatoly Chernyaev.

The papers illustrate the end period of the communist experiment. They include the minutes of negotiations with foreign leaders, the handwritten recommendations of advisers to Gorbachev, speaker’s notes for telephone conversations and recordings of those conversations, confidential notes by ambassadors and shorthand records of debates in the politburo.

None of the issues with which the self-proclaimed reformer of the Soviet Union was confronted in those years has been left out.

There are memorandums in which the Soviet leader is advised on how to end the war in Afghanistan or how to deal with Jews seeking to emigrate, or explaining to him why he should refuse to meet with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (“nothing real to be expected from him”) or why he should avoid putting Mathias Rust, a young German aviator who had illegally landed a light aircraft near Red Square, on trial and receive him in the Kremlin instead (“there are questions as to his psychological state”).

There are reports from informers within the East German Communist Party leadership, describing how bad conditions were in East Germany and detailing who could still be depended upon in the East Berlin politburo. And there are equally meticulous reports on what the French magazine Paris Match wrote about Raisa Gorbachova or what the Russian singer Alla Pugacheva told a German magazine about Gorbachev’s perestroika policy.

Inefficient Bureaucracy

Reading the documents feels like stepping back in time. All at once, they reveal the many problems of the calcified system, where farmers and miners alike were rebelling and intellectuals were demanding democratic elections. The people of the Baltic states, the Georgians and the Moldovans were revolting against the Russians, while the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine — the Soviet Union foreign policy that countries could not leave the Warsaw Pact — was looming in Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev, who had once been a provincial official in Stavropol, stood at the helm of this country, watching it suffocate as a result of its sheer size and the refusal of its bureaucracy to change course. The documents also show that even under Gorbachev, the bureaucracy was as inefficient as ever.

Gorbachev’s aide Anatoly Chernyaev, for example, complains about incompetent leaders in the global communist movement, like French Communist Party leader Georges Marchais (“a dead horse”) and Gus Hall, the chairman of the Communist Party USA (“a philistine with plebeian conceits”). Nevertheless, Moscow was still paying millions to support its representatives around the world.

At this time, shops in the Soviet Union had run out of eggs and sugar, and even vodka was in short supply. Conditions were so bad that, in September 1988, Chernyaev had to submit a written request to get a telephone connection in the apartment of his driver Nikolai Nikolayevich Maikov, so that the general secretary could reach him.

SPIEGEL is also mentioned repeatedly in the internal documents in the Gorbachev archive. For example, a June 1987 memo reveals that Chernyaev was clearly upset about 54 questions SPIEGEL journalists had sent to the Kremlin leader, which he characterized as “rather insolent.” He suspected that SPIEGEL intended to conduct an interview it had requested with Gorbachev “as an interrogation.” In the memo, Chernyaev writes that the Kremlin should “of course not react” to this request. The request is stamped “return with denial.” As it happened, the interview did not take place. Now, 24 years later, it is clear why.

Still Taboo

Gorbachev later used some of the documents in his books, much to the chagrin of the current Kremlin leadership. But many of the papers are still taboo to this day. This is partly because they relate to decisions or people that Gorbachev is still unwilling to talk about. But most of all it is because they do not fit into the image that Gorbachev painted of himself, namely that of a reformer pressing ahead with determination, gradually reshaping his enormous country in accordance with his ideas.

During a research visit to the Gorbachev Foundation, the young Russian historian Pavel Stroilov, who lives in London today, secretly copied about 30,000 pages of the material archived there and made them available to SPIEGEL.

The documents reveal something that Gorbachev prefers to keep quiet: that he was driven to act by developments in the dying Soviet state and that he often lost track of things in the chaos. They also show that he was duplicitous and, contrary to his own statements, sometimes made deals with hardliners in the party and the military.

In other words, the Kremlin leader did what many retired statesmen do: He later significantly embellished his image as an honest reformer.

 

Did Gorbachev Know about Violent Crackdowns?

The West has praised Gorbachev for not forcefully resisting the demise of the Soviet Union. In reality, it remains unclear to this day whether the Kremlin leader did not in fact sanction military actions against Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Lithuanians, who had rebelled against the central government in Moscow between 1989 and 1991. When Soviet troops violently quelled the demonstrations, 20 people were killed in Georgia, 143 in Azerbaijan and 14 in Lithuania, not to mention the wars and unrest in Nagorno-Karabakh, Trans-Dniester and Central Asia. 

Many have not forgotten the tragedy that unfolded in the Georgian capital Tbilisi on the night of April 8-9, 1989, when Russian soldiers used sharpened spades and poison gas to break up a protest march in the city.

Gorbachev claims that he was not made aware of the incident until six hours later. He had not given the military or the intelligence service clear signals to exercise restraint in the smoldering conflict, even though he knew how fragile the relationship was between Russians and Georgians. He also did not call anyone to account later on. Even today, he still says that it was “a huge mystery” as to who gave the orders to use violence in Tbilisi.

But when Gorbachev met with Hans-Jochen Vogel, the then-floor leader of Germany’s center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), on April 11, two days after the bloody suppression of the protests, he sought to justify the hardliners’ approach. He later had the following passage deleted from the published version of the Russian minutes of the conversation with Vogel:

You have heard about the events in Georgia . Notorious enemies of the Soviet Union had gathered there. They abused the democratic process, shouted provocative slogans and even called for the deployment of NATO troops to the republic. We had to take a firm approach in dealing with these adventurers and defending perestroika — our revolution.

The “notorious enemies of the Soviet Union” were in fact peaceful civilians. Of the 20 Georgians killed in Tbilisi, 17 were women.

A remark made at a politburo meeting on Oct. 4, 1989, in which Gorbachev learned that 3,000 demonstrators had been killed on Tiananmen Square in Beijing that June, shows that he was prepared for resistance to his reform plans and was not necessarily ruling out the need for violent action. Gorbachev said:

We must be realists. They have to defend themselves, and so do we. 3,000 people, so what?

Although the minutes of the meeting were later published, this passage was missing.

‘We Will Only Intervene if There Is Bloodshed’

In 1990 and 1991, Gorbachev could assume that very few leading politicians in the West would question his role in the bloody conflicts with the Soviet republics vying for their independence. In those weeks, the only concern of Americans and Western Europeans alike was if the Soviets would really withdraw from Eastern Europe. As a result, they allowed Gorbachev to blatantly lie to them, such as when Moscow tried to stop the Baltic independence movement at the last minute.

In January 1991, under pressure from the intelligence service and the military, Gorbachev apparently agreed to what was already a futile venture: proclaiming presidential rule in Lithuania under Moscow’s control. As was once the case in Budapest and Prague, “workers” loyal to the Soviet Union were to ask Moscow to send troops to their aid, which is precisely what transpired. On Jan. 13, special Soviet army and state security units advanced in tanks to the building housing the state television headquarters in Vilnius, where they stormed the station and killed 14 people.

In a telephone conversation with then-US President George Bush two days earlier, Gorbachev had flatly denied that Moscow would intervene in Vilnius:

Bush: I’m worried about your internal problems. As an outsider, all I can say is this: If you manage to avoid the use of force, it will benefit your relations with us, and not just with us.

Gorbachev: We will only intervene if there is bloodshed or if there is unrest that not only threatens our constitution, but also human lives. I am now under tremendous pressure to introduce presidential control in Lithuania . I am still holding back, and only in the case of a very serious threat will I take tough measures.

Helmut Kohl, the German chancellor who, in the name of his government, had consistently campaigned for the right of self-determination by national populations, declined to make any criticism of Gorbachev. When the two leaders spoke by telephone five days after the bloody events in Vilnius, he only mentioned the Soviet military action in passing:

Gorbachev: Now everyone is beginning to ask: Is Gorbachev abandoning his course? Is the new Gorbachev finished, and has he moved to the right? I can say in all honesty: We will not change our policy.

Kohl: As a politician, I understand that there are moments when evasive maneuvers are unavoidable if one hopes to achieve certain political goals.

Gorbachev: Helmut, I am familiar with your assessment of the situation, and I greatly respect it. Goodbye.

But Gorbachev lost his last shred of credibility with his own people during those days. “He is on the side of those who committed murder in Vilnius,” a bitterly disappointed Anatoly Chernyaev, his closest confidant, wrote in his diary. He dictated to his secretary a long letter to Gorbachev that reads like a settling of accounts:

Mikhail Sergeyevich!

Your speech in the Supreme Soviet (about the events in Vilnius ) signaled the end. It was not an appearance by a great statesman. It was a confused, babbling speech. You are unwilling to say what you really intend to do. And you apparently don’t know what the people think about you — outside in the streets, in the shops and in the trolleybuses. All they talk about is “Gorbachev and his clique.” You claimed that you wanted to change the world, and now you are destroying this work with your own hands.

The secretary took down the letter, but then she accused Chernyaev of betraying Gorbachev. The letter disappeared into a safe instead of being sent.

‘Kohl Is Not the Greatest Intellectual’

Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl figures particularly prominently in the Gorbachev documents. He was greatly indebted to the Russian leader at the time, because Gorbachev had declined not to deploy tanks in East Berlin to stop the collapse of East Germany in the fall of 1989. He also did not stand in the way of reunification the following year. In fact, to the consternation of many comrades in his own ranks, Gorbachev didn’t even oppose a reunited Germany joining NATO.

Kohl was able to repay the favor in 1991, which was precisely what Gorbachev expected of him. During this phase, Kohl was, in many respects, Gorbachev’s last hope.

The Soviet leader had apparently forgotten that he had viewed the German chancellor as a mediocre provincial politician for years. On Nov. 1, 1989, when he received Egon Krenz — the successor to East German leader Erich Honecker and East Germany’s last communist leader — at the Kremlin, he said to Krenz:

It seems that Kohl is not the greatest intellectual, but he enjoys a certain amount of popularity in his country, especially among ordinary citizens.

The message seems to have been: This isn’t someone you need to worry about. Gorbachev himself had ignored Kohl for years. He had viewed him as a mouthpiece of the Americans and, for a long time, had deliberately steered clear of West Germany during his trips to Europe.

The minutes of the meeting between Krenz and Gorbachev were later published in Moscow, and were recently also made accessible to the public in Germany. However, the passage relating to Kohl is missing in the Russian version. Gorbachev was so embarrassed about it that he had it deleted.

 

Breaking the Ice with ‘Helmut’

In the summer of 1990, after both men had negotiated the details of German reunification, his relationship with Kohl changed. The ice was finally broken when Gorbachev and his wife Raisa traveled to Germany in November, visiting the Kohls at their house in Oggersheim in western Germany and touring the nearby Speyer Cathedral with them. They even dined at Kohl’s favorite restaurant, the Deidesheimer Hof. The two men switched to first-name terms on that occasion — the breakthrough in their relationship. 

Gorbachev needed the influential German chancellor, now that the situation was becoming dicey at home. There were shortages of everything in the shops — meat, butter, powdered milk — and his popularity was sinking.

In those months, Gorbachev reached for the phone more and more often to discuss the situation with his “friend Helmut,” who had suddenly become his political adviser. The two men used a special telephone line, and hardly any of these conversations between Moscow and Bonn would later appear in Gorbachev’s books. Kohl, in his memoirs, also mentions them only in passing.

This hesitation becomes clear to anyone who reads the transcripts, most of which were prepared by translators who also had to report to the KGB. The conversations were filled with Gorbachev’s complaints, the cries for help of a drowning man — words that the once-proud Soviet leader did his utmost to sweep under the rug two decades later.

At the time, however, he wanted Kohl to encourage the West to rescue the Soviet Union. He wanted the chancellor to portray the impending collapse as a catastrophe that could send the entire world into turmoil. Or course, he also hoped for support in his fight against his toughest rival, Boris Yeltsin.

The two men spoke by telephone once again on the evening of Feb. 20, 1991. Kohl had called Gorbachev, after Yeltsin, in a television address on the previous day, had called upon Gorbachev to resign from his post at the Kremlin. Gorbachev never published this conversation, either, because it reveals the extent to which he had underestimated his rival and incorrectly assessed the situation:

Kohl: Hello, Mikhail. Did you resign, as Yeltsin is demanding?

Gorbachev: I think he senses that he is losing authority and becoming more and more isolated. His appearance yesterday was an act of desperation or a stupid mistake. Yeltsin is a destroyer by nature. He has nothing constructive left to offer. He is exploiting the current difficult situation and trying to unleash a political fight.

Kohl: That will benefit you.

Gorbachev: At today’s meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR , someone said that such methods were undignified for a man of his rank. He will probably have to retract his words. The president of Kazakhstan and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine have already distanced themselves from him.

Kohl: That’s advantageous to you. I sense that you feel better now. I’m pleased about that.

Less than four months later, more than 45 million voters elected the supposedly beleaguered Yeltsin to be the first president of the Russian Federation, the largest Soviet republic. This marked the beginning of a dual leadership that heralded the end of the Soviet realm. In a telephone conversation on April 30, Kohl assured the Kremlin leader:

Kohl: I am doing everything I can to garner support for you here in Western Europe . I’ll do the same in Washington , where I’m going in two weeks. You should realize that some people here are expressing grim opinions about your situation.

Gorbachev: Yes, I’m aware of that.

Kohl: To summarize, this is roughly what is being said: Yes, Gorbachev is a strong politician, but he will be unable to achieve the things he had planned. In this situation, it is extremely important to create a different environment psychologically. That’s why I need authentic information from you, Mikhail. You have to tell me what the situation is really like.

Gorbachev: You know, Helmut, there are many people among our American friends who are whispering things about “Gorbachev’s situation.” They’re saying, for example: Look, Gorbachev supports preserving the union, while Yeltsin might grant theBaltic states and other republics their independence. Yeltsin supports private ownership, while Gorbachev favors a mixed economy. Yeltsin will be more preoccupied with domestic issues and therefore won’t get in the way of the Americans in various parts of the world. These are not credible recommendations. Bush and his secretary of state, (James) Baker, are still holding their ground, but they are coming under growing pressure. Of course, I also have to overcome these difficulties.

Kohl: You can rely on me, Mikhail. I will make this sufficiently clear to the Western European and American leaders.

On July 5, when Yeltsin was already the de-facto president of Russia, waiting only for his inauguration, Kohl met with Gorbachev at the summer residence of the Ukrainian Communist Party in Mezhgorye. At that moment, neither of the two leaders could know that, half a year later, Ukraine would already be an independent country.

As they were being driven from the Kiev airport to Mezhgorye, Kohl reviewed the worst-case scenario:

Kohl: I’ve thought about it: What would happen if Gorbachev would suddenly leave and Yeltsin would take his place? I have to say that the mere thought of it horrified me. Of course the country cannot be left to such a man.

Gorbachev: We certainly agree on that point.

Kohl: What will you do, Mikhail, when the Baltic states finally leave the union?

Gorbachev: They can do that, of course. It’s difficult to change their ideas about sovereignty. They refuse to engage in any reasonable argumentation. If they truly want to withdraw, there is only one way to do it — the constitutional approach. But they are terrified of taking the normal constitutional path.

Kohl: You really won’t keep them in the union by force. On the other hand, it must be clear to the Baltic states that there is no option other than the one prescribed by the constitution. And the West’s verbal support for them changes nothing in this regard.

Neither the German nor the Russian would later publicize this conversation, because Kohl’s view of Yeltsin was as devastating as Gorbachev’s. What the chancellor also preferred not to see in print was the fact that he drew a clear distinction between his public support for the principle of self-determination and his actual position. Kohl did not truly support the Baltic Soviet republics withdrawing from the union, and he demanded that such decisions be approved by the parliament in Moscow — which, by then, was already wishful thinking.

Kohl: Only a donkey can assume that the destruction of the union benefits anyone. The collapse of the Soviet Union would be a catastrophe for everyone. Anyone who supports this is jeopardizing peace. Not everyone understands me on this issue. But you can assume that I will not change my opinion in this regard… Gorbachev’s reform course must be consistently supported. If Yeltsin comes to us, I will tell him the same thing. I will tell him that he doesn’t stand a chance if he doesn’t cooperate with you. The Americans have told him the same thing.

Gorbachev: No, they are practically encouraging him. In their eyes, he is a reformer.

Kohl: If Yeltsin comes to Germany , it will be a working visit. My most important goal is that you don’t attack each other.

Gorbachev: Perhaps it would be a good idea not to invite him on behalf of the chancellor? Someone else should invite him, and the chancellor could then join the meeting as if by accident.

Kohl: Good.

Gorbachev’s goal of spoiling Yeltsin’s chances of further advancement and getting Kohl on board, if possible, is understandable from a human standpoint. Politically, however, it was absurd.

It seems even more absurd that Gorbachev still wanted to be perceived as the leader of a world power, even as he was forced to beg for assistance behind the scenes.

 

‘We Need Money for Current Expenses’

Two weeks later, he traveled to London to attend, for the first time, a summit of the seven leading industrialized nations, and to request that his country be admitted to this club of economic heavyweights. Kohl had paved the way to London for Gorbachev, over the objections of the Americans and Japanese. In reality, however, he traveled to London to beg for at least $30 billion to rescue the ailing Soviet Union and its president. 

Many of the reports written in those weeks — none of which Gorbachev would later publish — indicate that he must have perceived the situation as demeaning.

At the meeting in Kiev, he berated a man in Kohl’s entourage who would become one of his key contacts in the coming weeks: Horst Köhler, the later German president, who was then a state secretary at the German Finance Ministry and Kohl’s “sherpa” (personal representative) at the G-7 summit.

When Köhler called upon the Soviets to submit to the rules of the International Monetary Fund, the Kremlin leader snapped: “The USSR isn’t Costa Rica. The direction that history now takes will depend on how you configure your relations to us.”

As for the idea of a Marshall Plan for the Soviet Union, Gorbachev described it as a “return to the old arrogance, according to which the Soviet economic train cannot be pulled up the mountain without the capitalist locomotive.”

In reality, this locomotive was the Soviets’ only remaining option. Their confidence in Kohl during those weeks was unlimited. In fact, they were practically euphoric, believing that things would improve for the Soviets in the slipstream of the powerful chancellor. In Kiev, Gorbachev adviser Chernyaev noted:

The new friendship with the Germans has been given yet another large scoop of cement. If all goes well with the Soviet-German factor, it will determine the fate of both Europe and global politics.

On the flight back to Moscow, Gorbachev said:

Kohl … will do everything to help us rise up again and become a modern superpower. Well, he is very anxious about Ukraine (Kohl also met with the Ukrainian leadership in Kiev ). But for him it’s no longer Hitler’s Lebensraum.

By early September, about three weeks after the August coup, the financial situation in the USSR was so precarious that Gorbachev took then German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher aside while Genscher was visiting Moscow and, abandoning any sense of pride, said:

Gorbachev: We need money for current expenses, so that we can continue to live and maintain imports while the negotiations on the restructuring of our short-term debts are underway. I plan to discuss this with Kohl on the phone today.

Genscher: I don’t know if you should address such a delicate matter on the telephone. I can send the chancellor an encrypted telegram right away, so that only he can read it.

Gorbachev: We need two billion dollars. Perhaps you advance half a billion from the payments we are to receive from you in October, and we’ll take another half out of our reserves. We hope to obtain the second billion in the Middle East . I have sent (the deputy head of the KGB) Primakov there with this mission.

Genscher: I don’t have the authority to respond to that. But I will convey everything to the chancellor right away.

Kohl sent Köhler to Moscow. Gorbachev, who was already predicting horrific scenarios in light of the hesitant support from the West, met with Köhler on Sept. 12.

Gorbachev: What is happening with the assistance for the USSR ? We are negotiating, weighing the options and doing the calculations. This is simply inexcusable. It’s reminiscent of the Weimar Republic in Germany . While the democrats argued with each other, Hitler came to power without any particular effort. Foreign countries owe us about $86 billion, which is roughly the sum we need now. I hope you will draw the necessary conclusions from what I have said.

Köhler: The chancellor has authorized me to inform you that we have approved the first request, namely to provide a billion deutschmarks. As far as the request for the second billion is concerned, we have no choice but to involve our partners in the European Union and the G-7. The search for options is complicated by the rather steep financial expectations on your side.

Gorbachev: Couldn’t you find a way to provide loans at more favorable terms? Perhaps even interest-free loans?

Köhler: That’s very difficult. I will try to convince my partners (in the G-7) that your country is still creditworthy. To that end, however, I need details on your foreign debt and the possibilities of selling your gold reserves.

Gorbachev: The harvest figures are not good. I spoke with (Kazakh President Nursultan) Nazarbayev just before your arrival. He told me that the harvest in the area of newly reclaimed land is worse than even the most modest estimates had predicted.

Köhler: According to American agencies, the harvest in your country will amount to 190 million tons of grain this year, compared with 230 million last year. A massive difference.

Gorbachev: It would be nice if we could bring in 180 million tons… During the Gulf War (following Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait ), everyone got together and collected huge sums of money to support the effort, close to $100 billion. But when it comes to supporting this historic process in a huge country, one that everything in the world depends on, we start to haggle.

Köhler: The Americans won that war without investing a single dollar of their own.

Gorbachev: And what about all the things the Soviet Union has done for the world? Who is tallying up those figures? How much have our perestroika and our new way of thinking saved? Hundreds of billions of dollars for the rest of the world!

Köhler: There is no time to lose. It’s a matter of weeks, even days. One of the miscalculations in your perestroika was to underestimate the economic side of this issue.

But the plan to pump billions into Moscow with German help, and save Gorbachev that way, did not succeed. When the Ukrainians affirmed their declaration of independence with a referendum on Dec. 1, 1991 and elected their own president, the die had been cast. Seven days later, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus formed the Commonwealth of Independent States, which eight non-Slavic republics then joined.

The Soviet Union was being liquidated. Germany was celebrating Christmas when Gorbachev resigned as president on Dec. 25 and the Soviet Union came to a peaceful end. He sent a letter to Bonn on the same day:

Dear Helmut!

Although the events did not go the way I felt would have been correct and the most advantageous, I have not lost hope that the effort I began six years ago will eventually be concluded successfully, and that Russia and the other countries that are now part of a new community will transform themselves into modern and democratic countries.

With all our hearts, Raisa and I wish Hannelore (Kohl) and your entire family health, prosperity and happiness.

Your Mikhail

In this letter, Gorbachev is fully the statesman once again. That explains why the letter was among the few papers from the fateful year of 1991 that the failed reformer would later publish.

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

August 7th, 2011

US Equity market – a picture

The first week of August has seen a significant decline/sell off in the US equity market.

 

 

 

 

August 7th, 2011

US debt downgrade perspective

Nice perspective on the S&P downgrade of  US debt on Friday evening after the US markets closed for the week.

 

5 Things You Should Know About the S&P Downgrade

Donald Marron

Director of the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center and a visiting professor at the Georgetown Public Policy Institute in Washington, DC; formerly various senior position in the White House and Congress.

 

On Friday night, Standard and Poors announced that it was downgrading U.S. long-term sovereign debt from AAA to AA+, the first such downgrade in U.S. history.

Here are five things you should know about the downgrade — four important, one trivia.

1. S&P downgraded U.S. debt not only because of the deteriorating fiscal outlook, but also because of concerns about America’s ability to govern itself.

It said:

The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America’s governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal policy. Despite this year’s wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in other entitlements, the containment of which we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.

2. Moody’s and Fitch recently reaffirmed their AAA ratings on U.S. sovereign debt.

On Tuesday, Moody’s reaffirmed its Aaa rating, but assigned a negative outlook given the risk that the U.S. might flinch from further fiscal tightening, borrowing costs might rise, and the economy might weaken. Fitch similarly reiterated its AAA rating on Tuesday, but noted that it would have a fuller reassessment by the end of August. Fitch also emphasized the need for further fiscal adjustments.

One issue (on which I haven’t seen much discussion) is how the impact of a downgrade would increase if it spreads from just one rating agency to two or three.

3. In the past thirty years, five nations — Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden– have regained a AAA rating after losing it.

See, for example, this nice chart from BusinessWeek:

America still has much to learn from other nations that fixed their economics and budgets after financial crises. Sweden, for example, did a remarkable job addressing the fiscal challenges that followed its financial crisis in the early 1990s.

 

 

 

 

 

 

4. This downgrade may set off a cascade of further downgrades for other U.S. debt.

The federal government provides an implicit or explicit backstop for many other debt securities. For example, the federal government stands behind trillions of dollars of debt and guarantees issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, GNMA securities, and securities backed by guaranteed students loans. It implicitly stands behind systemically important financial institutions. And it provides substantial support to state and local governments. S&P did not specifically address these other credits in Friday’s report, but did say that:

On Monday, we will issue separate releases concerning affected ratings in the funds, government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance, public finance, and structured finance sectors.

S&P did reaffirm its highest, A-1+ rating on U.S. short-term debt, which should limit impacts on money market funds and other short-term lending markets.

5. S&P was not the first rating agency to downgrade U.S. sovereign debt. In the category of trivia, China’s Dagong credit rating agency downgraded U.S. credit to A with a negative outlook earlier this week. Dagong had initiated U.S. coverage with a AA rating about a year ago, which was lowered to A+ last November. Dagong apparently views the United States as a greater risk than China. Despite all of America’s problems, that seems a stretch.

August 6th, 2011

Michael F. Canon on Entitlements and Medicare

NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE www.nationalreview.com PRINT

MICHAEL F. CANNON
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JULY 5, 2011 4:00 A.M.
Entitlement Bandits
Adapted from the July 4, 2011, issue of NR.

The budget blueprint crafted by Paul Ryan, passed by the House of Representatives, and voted down by the Senate would essentially give Medicare enrollees a voucher to purchase private coverage, and would change the federal government’s contribution to each state’s Medicaid program from an unlimited “matching” grant to a fixed “block” grant. These reforms deserve to come back from defeat, because the only alternatives for saving Medicare or Medicaid would either dramatically raise tax rates or have the government ration care to the elderly and disabled. What may be less widely appreciated, however, is that the Ryan proposal is our only hope of reducing the crushing levels of fraud in Medicare and Medicaid.

The three most salient characteristics of Medicare and Medicaid fraud are: It’s brazen, it’s ubiquitous, and it’s other people’s money, so nobody cares.

Consider some of the fraud schemes discovered in recent years. In Brooklyn, a dentist billed taxpayers for nearly 1,000 procedures in a single day. A Houston doctor with a criminal record took her Medicare billings from zero to $11.6 million in one year; federal agents shut down her clinic but did not charge her with a crime. A high-school dropout, armed with only a laptop computer, submitted more than 140,000 bogus Medicare claims, collecting $105 million. A health plan settled a Medicaid-fraud case in Florida for $138 million. The giant hospital chain Columbia/HCA paid $1.7 billion in fines and pled guilty to more than a dozen felonies related to bribing doctors to help it tap Medicare funds and exaggerating the amount of care delivered to Medicare patients. In New York, Medicaid spending on the human-growth hormone Serostim leapt from $7 million to $50 million in 2001; but it turned out that drug traffickers were getting the drug prescribed as a treatment for AIDS wasting syndrome, then selling it to bodybuilders. And a study of ten states uncovered $27 million in Medicare payments to dead patients.

These anecdotes barely scratch the surface. Judging by official estimates, Medicare and Medicaid lose at least $87 billion per year to fraudulent and otherwise improper payments, and about 10.5 percent of Medicare spending and 8.4 percent of Medicaid spending was improper in 2009. Fraud experts say the official numbers are too low. “Loss rates due to fraud and abuse could be 10 percent, or 20 percent, or even 30 percent in some segments,” explained Malcolm Sparrow, a mathematician, Harvard professor, and former police inspector, in congressional testimony. “The overpayment-rate studies the government has relied on . . . have been sadly lacking in rigor, and have therefore produced comfortingly low and quite misleading estimates.” In 2005, the New York Times reported that “James Mehmet, who retired in 2001 as chief state investigator of Medicaid fraud and abuse in New York City, said he and his colleagues believed that at least 10 percent of state Medicaid dollars were spent on fraudulent claims, while 20 or 30 percent more were siphoned off by what they termed abuse, meaning unnecessary spending that might not be criminal.” And even these experts ignore other, perfectly legal ways of exploiting Medicare and Medicaid, such as when a senior hides and otherwise adjusts his finances so as to appear eligible for Medicaid, or when a state abuses the fact that the federal government matches state Medicaid outlays.

Government watchdogs are well aware of the problem. Every year since 1990, the U.S. Government Accountability Office has released a list of federal programs it considers at a high risk for fraud. Medicare appeared on the very first list and has remained there for 22 straight years. Medicaid assumed its perch eight years ago.

How can there possibly be so much fraud in Medicare and Medicaid that even the “comfortingly low” estimates have ten zeros? How can this much fraud persist decade after decade? How can it be that no one has even tried to measure the problem accurately, much less take it seriously? The answers are in the nature of the beast. Medicare and Medicaid, the two great pillars of Pres. Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” agenda, are monuments to the left-wing ideals of coerced charity and centralized economic planning. The staggering levels of fraud in these programs can be explained by the fact that the politicians, bureaucrats, patients, and health-care providers who administer and participate in them are spending other people’s money — and nobody spends other people’s money as carefully as he spends his own. What’s more, Medicare and Medicaid are spending other people’s money in vast quantities. Medicare, for example, is the largest purchaser of medical goods and services in the world. It will spend $572 billion in 2011. Each year, it pays 1.2 billion claims to 1.2 million health-care providers on behalf of 47 million enrollees.

For providers, Medicare is like an ATM: So long as they punch in the right numbers, out comes the cash. To get an idea of the potential for fraud, imagine 1.2 million providers punching 1,000 codes each into their own personal ATMs. Now imagine trying to monitor all those ATMs.
For example, if a medical-equipment supplier punches in a code for a power wheelchair, how can the government be sure the company didn’t actually provide a manual wheelchair and pocket the difference? About $400 million of the aforementioned fines paid by Columbia/HCA hospitals were for a similar practice, known as “upcoding.”

And how does the government know that providers are withdrawing no more than the law allows? Medicaid sets the prices it pays for prescription drugs based on the “average wholesale price.” But as the Congressional Budget Office has explained, the average wholesale price “is based on information provided by the manufacturers. Like the sticker price on a car, it is a price that few purchasers actually pay.” Pharmaceutical companies often inflate the average wholesale price so they can charge Medicaid more. Teva Pharmaceuticals recently paid $27 million to settle allegations that it had overcharged Florida’s Medicaid program by inflating its average wholesale prices, and the Department of Justice has accused Wyeth of doing the same. Merck recently settled a similar case.

Most ominously, how does the government know that people punching numbers into the ATMs are health-care providers at all? In his testimony, Malcolm Sparrow explained how a hypothetical criminal can make a quick million: “In order to bill Medicare, Billy doesn’t need to see any patients. He only needs a computer, some billing software to help match diagnoses to procedures, and some lists. He buys on the black market lists of Medicare or Medicaid patient IDs.” With this information in hand, Billy strides right up to the ATM, or several at a time, and starts punching in numbers. “The rule for criminals is simple: If you want to steal from Medicare, or Medicaid, or any other health-care-insurance program, learn to bill your lies correctly. Then, for the most part, your claims will be paid in full and on time, without a hiccup, by a computer, and with no human involvement at all.” These schemes are sophisticated, so Billy might hire people within Medicare and at his bank to help him avoid detection.

Last year, the feds indicted 44 members of an Armenian crime syndicate for operating a sprawling Medicare-fraud scheme. The syndicate had set up 118 phony clinics and billed Medicare for $35 million. They transferred at least some of their booty overseas. Who knows what LBJ’s Great Society is funding?

And there are other forms of fraud. An entire cottage industry of elder-law attorneys has emerged, for instance, to help well-to-do seniors appear poor on paper so that Medicaid will pay their nursing-home bills. Medicaid even encourages the elderly to get sham divorces for the same reason. It’s all perfectly legal. It’s still fraud.

Medicaid’s matching-grant system also invites fraud. When a high-income state such as New York spends an additional dollar on its Medicaid program, it receives a matching dollar from the federal government — that is, from taxpayers in other states. Low-income states can receive as much as $3 for every additional dollar they devote to Medicaid, and without limit. If they’re clever, states can get this money without putting any of their own on the line. In a “provider tax” scam, a state passes a law to increase Medicaid payments to hospitals, which triggers matching money from the federal government. Yet in the very same law, the state increases taxes on hospitals. If the tax recoups the state’s original outlay, the state has obtained new federal Medicaid funds at no cost. If the tax recoups more than the original outlay, the state can use federal Medicaid dollars to pay for bridges to nowhere. As Vermont began preparations for its Obamacare-sanctioned single-payer system this year, it used a provider-tax scam to bilk taxpayers in other states out of $5.2 million. In his book Stop Paying the Crooks, consultant Jim Frogue chronicles more than half a dozen ways that states game Medicaid’s matching-grant system to defraud the federal government.

Since 1986, the GAO has published at least 158 reports about Medicare and Medicaid fraud, and there have been similar reports by the HHS inspector general and other government agencies. In 1993, Attorney General Janet Reno declared health-care fraud America’s No. 2 crime problem, after violent crime. Since then, Congress has enacted 194 pages of statutes to combat fraud in these programs, and countless pages of regulations.

Yet federal and state anti-fraud efforts remain uniformly lame. Medicare does almost nothing to detect or fight fraud until the fraudulent payments are already out the door, a strategy experts deride as “pay and chase.” Even then, Medicare reviews fewer than 5 percent of all claims filed. Congress doesn’t integrate Medicare’s myriad databases, which might help prevent fraud, nor does it regularly review the efficacy of most of the anti-fraud spending it authorizes. Many of the abuses noted above, such as those of the Brooklyn dentist, were discovered not by the government but by curious reporters poking through Medicaid records. The amateurs at the New York Times found “numerous indications of [Medicaid] fraud and abuse that the state had never looked into,” but “only a thin, overburdened security force standing between [New York’s] enormous program and the unending attempts to steal from it.

The federal government’s approach to fraud is sometimes so inept as to be counterproductive. Sparrow testified that a defect in the strategy of Billy, our hypothetical criminal, is that he doesn’t know which providers and patients on his stolen lists are “dead, deported, or incarcerated.” But Medicare’s anti-fraud protocols help him solve this problem. When Medicare catches those claims, it sends Billy a notice that they have been rejected. “From Billy’s viewpoint,” Sparrow explained, “life could not be better. Medicare helps him ‘scrub’ his lists, making his fake billing scam more robust and less detectable over time; and meanwhile Medicare pays all his other claims without blinking an eye or becoming the least bit suspicious.”

Efforts to prevent fraud typically fail because they impose costs on legitimate beneficiaries and providers, who, as voters and campaign donors respectively, have immense sway over politicians. At a recent congressional hearing, the Department of Health and Human Services’ deputy inspector general, Gerald T. Roy, recommended that Congress beef up efforts to prevent illegitimate providers and suppliers from enrolling in Medicare. But even if Congress took Roy’s advice, it would rescind the new requirements in a heartbeat when legitimate doctors — who are already threatening to leave Medicare over its low payment rates — threatened to bolt because of the additional administrative costs (paperwork, site visits, etc.).

Politicians routinely subvert anti-fraud measures to protect their constituents. When the federal government began poking around a Buffalo school district that billed Medicaid for speech therapy for 4,434 kids, the New York Times reported, “the Justice Department suspended its civil inquiry after complaints from Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York, and other politicians.” Medicare officials, no doubt expressing a sentiment shared by members of Congress, admit they avoid aggressive anti-fraud measures that might reduce access to treatment for seniors.

It’s not just the politicians. The Legal Aid Society is pushing back against a federal lawsuit charging that New York City overbilled Medicaid. Even conservatives fight anti-fraud measures, albeit in the name of preventing frivolous litigation, when they oppose expanding whistle-blower lawsuits, where private citizens who help the government win a case get to keep some of the penalty.

Sparrow argued that when Medicare receives “obviously implausible claims,” such as from a dead doctor, “the system should bite back. . . . A proper fraud response would do whatever was necessary to rip open and expose the business practices that produce such fictitious claims. Relevant methods include surveillance, arrest, or dawn raids.” Also: “All other claims from the same source should immediately be put on hold.”

Some of the implausible claims will be honest mistakes, such as when a clerk mistakenly punches the wrong patient number into the ATM. And sometimes the SWAT team will get the address wrong, or will take action that looks like overkill, as when the Department of Education raided a California home because it suspected one of the occupants of financial-aid fraud. How many times would federal agents have to march a handcuffed doctor past a stunned waiting room full of Medicare enrollees before Congress prohibited those measures?

“It seems extraordinary,” Sparrow said, that the HHS Office of Inspector General recommends “weak and inadequate response[s] . . . to false claims and fake billings” and that Medicare “fail[s] . . . to properly distinguish between the imperatives of process management and the imperatives of crime control.” Extraordinary? How could it be any other way? Anti-fraud efforts will always be inadequate when politicians spend other people’s money. Apologists for Medicare and Medicaid will retort that fraud against private health plans is prevalent as well, but this only drives home the point: Since employers purchase health insurance for 90 percent of insured non-elderly Americans, workers care less about health-care fraud, and have a lower tolerance for anti-fraud measures, than they would if they paid the fraud-laden premiums themselves.

The fact that Medicare and Medicaid spend other people’s money is why the number of fraud investigators in New York’s Medicaid program can fall by 50 percent even as spending on the program more than triples. That is why, as Sparrow explained in an interview with The Nation, “The stories are legion of people getting a Medicare explanation of benefits statement saying, ‘We’ve paid for this operation you had in Colorado,’ when those people have never been in Colorado. And when you complain [to Medicare] about it, nobody seems to care.”

The Ryan plan offers the only serious hope of reducing fraud in Medicare and Medicaid. Its Medicare reforms, especially if they were expanded later, would make it easier for the federal government to police the program, and its Medicaid reforms would increase each state’s incentive to curb fraud.

To see how the Ryan plan would reduce Medicare fraud, imagine that the proposal really were what its critics claim it is: a full-blown voucher program, with each enrollee receiving a chunk of cash to spend on medical care, apply toward health-insurance premiums, or save for the future. Instead of processing 1.2 billion claims, Medicare would hand out just 50 million vouchers, with sick and low-income enrollees receiving larger ones. The number of transactions Medicare would have to monitor each year would fall by more than 1 billion.

Social Security offers reason to believe that a program engaging in fewer (and more uniform) transactions could dramatically reduce fraud and other improper payments. As a Medicare-voucher program would, Social Security adjusts the checks it sends to enrollees according to such variables as lifetime earnings and disability status. The Social Security Administration estimates that overpayments account for just 0.37 percent of Social Security spending. Overpayments are higher in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program (8.4 percent), a much smaller, means-tested program also administered by the Social Security Administration. But total overpayments across both programs still come to less than 1 percent of outlays.

In reality, the Ryan “voucher” is much closer to the current Medicare Advantage program, through which one in four Medicare enrollees selects a private health plan and the government makes risk-adjusted payments directly to insurers. Skeptics will rightly note that, judging by the official improper-payment rates, Medicare Advantage (14.1 percent) is in the same ballpark as traditional Medicare (10.5 percent). Therefore, the Ryan plan should be seen not as a solution to Medicare fraud in itself, but as a step toward a vastly simplified, Social Security–like program in which the task of policing fraud is less daunting.

The Ryan plan would also vastly increase the states’ incentive to curb Medicaid fraud. Just as a state that increases funding for Medicaid gets matching federal funds, a state that reduces Medicaid fraud gets to keep only (at most) half of the money saved. As much as 75 percent of recovered funds revert back to the federal government. In a report for the left-wing Center for American Progress, former Obama adviser Marsha Simon noted that “states are required to repay the federal share . . . of any payment errors identified, even if the money is never collected.” The fact that Albany splits New York’s 50 percent share of the spending with municipal governments may explain why the Empire State is such a hot spot for fraud: No level of government is responsible for a large enough share of the cost to do anything about it. The result is that states’ fraud-prevention efforts are only a tiny fraction of what Washington spends to fight Medicare fraud.

Ryan would replace Medicaid’s federal matching grants with a system of block grants. Under a block-grant system, states would keep 100 percent of the money they saved by eliminating fraud. In many states, the incentive to prevent fraud would quadruple or more. Block grants performed beautifully when Congress used them to reform welfare in 1996. They can do so again.

The Ryan plan would not reduce Medicare and Medicaid fraud to tolerable levels, but neither would any plan that retains a role for government in providing medical care to the elderly and disabled. What the Ryan plan would do is reduce how much the fraudsters — many of whom sport congressional lapel pins — fleece the American taxpayer. And that is no small thing.

— Michael F. Cannon is director of health-policy studies at the Cato Institute and co-author of Healthy Competition: What’s Holding Back Health Care and How to Free It. This article is adapted from the one that appeared in the July 4, 2011, issue of National Review.

November 4th, 2010

Sir John Sawer Speech

Former Society of Editors president and current board member Simon Bucks, Associate Editor at Sky News, and vice chairman of the Defence Press and Broadcast Advisory Committee, chaired the event and introduced Sir John Sawers

Sir John’s speech

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Sir John’s speech

The Times published a reader’s letter earlier this year. It read: “Sir – is it not bizarre that MI5 and MI6, otherwise known as the secret services, currently stand

accused of being – er – secretive?”

I may be biased. But I think that reader was on to something rather important and most government work these days is done by conventional and transparent

processes. But not all.

Britain’s foreign intelligence effort was first organised in 1909, when the Secret Intelligence Service was formed.

We have just published an official history of our first 40 years. I’m sure you will all have read all 800 pages of it.

The first chief, Mansfield Cumming, used to pay the salaries of SIS officials out of his private income, dispensed in cash from a desk drawer. I’m glad to say that,

even after the chancellor’s statement last week, I’m not in the same position.

SIS’s existence was admitted only in 1994. We British move slowly on such things.

And this, I believe, is the first public speech given by a serving chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service.

“Why now?” might you ask. Well, intelligence features prominently in the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review, published

last week.

We often appear in the news. Our popular name – MI6 – is an irresistible draw. We have a website, and we’ve got versions in Arabic and Russian. We recruit our

staff openly, with adverts in the national press.

But debate on SIS’s role is not well informed, in part because we have been so determined to protect our secrets.

In today’s open society, no government institution is given the benefit of the doubt all the time. There are new expectations of public – and legal – accountability

that have developed. In short, in 2010 the context for the UK’s secret intelligence work is very different from 1994.I am not going to use today to tantalise you with

hints of sensitive operations or intelligence successes.

Instead, I want to answer two important questions: what value do we get from a secret overseas intelligence effort in the modern era? How can the public have

confidence that work done in secret is lawful, ethical, and in their interests?

First, how do we all fit in? The Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, operates abroad, dealing with threats overseas and gathering intelligence mainly from human

sources. The security service, MI5, works here in the UK, protecting the homeland from terrorist attack and other threats.

GCHQ produces intelligence from communications, and takes the lead in the cyber world.

These three specialised services form the UK intelligence community, and we operate in what the foreign secretary has called a networked world. Technology

plays an ever growing part in our work, for SIS as well as GCHQ, and the boundary line between home and abroad is increasingly blurred.

So the three agencies work increasingly closely together, and the next five years will see us intensifying our collaboration to improve our operational impact

and to save money. Yes, even the intelligence services have to make savings.

Secret intelligence is important information that others wish you not to know; it’s information that deepens our understanding of a foreign country or grouping, or

reveals their true intentions. It’s information that gives us new opportunities for action.

We at SIS obtain our intelligence from secret agents. These are people are nearly all foreign nationals, who have access to secret information and who choose

to work with us.

Our agents are the true heroes of our work. They have their own motivations and hopes. Many of them show extraordinary courage and idealism, striving in their

own countries for the freedoms that we in Britain take for granted.

Our agents are working today in some of the most dangerous and exposed places, bravely and to hugely valuable effect, and we owe a debt to countless more

whose service is over.

Agents take serious risks and make sacrifices to help our country. In return, we give them a solemn pledge: that we shall keep their role secret.

The information we get from agents is put into an intelligence report. The source is described in general terms. It is just that – a report. It tells us something new

or corroborates what we suspect.

A report’s value can be overplayed if it tells us what we want to hear, or it can be underplayed if it contains unwelcome news or runs against received wisdom.

It is a part of the picture, and may not be even wholly accurate, even if the trusted agent who gave it to us is sure that it is.

So sources of intelligence have to be rigorously evaluated, and their reports have to be honestly weighed alongside all other information. Those who produce it,

and those who want to use it, have to put intelligence in a wider context. The Joint Intelligence Committee plays a crucial role.

The Butler Review following Iraq was a clear reminder, to both the agencies and the centre of government, politicians and officials alike, of how intelligence

needs to be handled. The SIS board recently reviewed our implementation of Lord Butler’s recommendations, to make sure we’ve implemented them fully, in

spirit as well as in substance.

I am confident that they have been. And we will look at the wider issues again once the Chilcott Inquiry reports.

So why do we need secret intelligence? Well, let’s start with the terrorist problem.

Most people go about their daily work not worrying about the risk of a terrorist attack. That a bomb may have been planted on their route, or hostages might be

seized. I’m glad they don’t worry about those sorts of things: part of our job is to make people feel safe.

But those threats exist, as we’re recalling now with the 7/7 inquest. That said, on any given day the chances that a terrorist attack will happen on our streets,

even in central London, feel small enough to be safely ignored by the public.

You, and millions of people like you, go about your business in our cities and towns free of fear because the British government works tirelessly, out of the public

eye, to stop terrorists and would-be terrorists in their tracks.

The most draining aspect of my job is reading, every day, intelligence reports describing the plotting of terrorists who are bent on maiming and murdering

people in this country.

It’s an enormous tribute to the men and women of our intelligence and security agencies, and to our cooperation with partner services around the world, that so

few of these appalling plots develop into real terrorist attacks.

Some of these terrorists are British citizens, trained in how to use weapons, how to make bombs. Others are foreign nationals who want to attack us to

undermine our support for forces of moderation around the world.

Many of the reports I read describe the workings of the al-Qaida network, rooted in a nihilistic version of Islam.

Al-Qaida have ambitious goals. Weakening the power of the west. Toppling moderate Islamic regimes. Seizing the holy places of Islam to give them moral

authority. Taking control of the Arab world’s oil reserves. They’re unlikely to achieve these goals, but they remain set on trying, and are ready to use extreme

violence.

Jonathan Evans, the head of MI5, recently described how the threat is intensifying. Precisely because we are having some success in closing down the space for

terrorist recruitment and planning in the UK, the extremists are increasingly preparing their attacks against British targets from abroad.

It’s not just the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen, Somalia and North Africa pose real threats to the UK.

From his remote base in Yemen, Al-Qaida leader and US national Anwar al-Awlaki broadcasts propaganda and terrorist instruction in fluent English over the

internet.

Our intelligence effort needs to go where the threat is. One of the advantages of the way we in SIS work is that we are highly adaptable and flexible. We don’t

get pinned in one place.

There is no one reason for the terrorist phenomenon. Some blame political issues like Palestine or Kashmir or Iraq. Others cite economic disadvantage.

Distortions of the Islamic faith. Male supremacy. The lack of the normal checks and balances in some countries. There are many theories.

I’ve worked a lot in the Islamic world. I agree with those who say we need to be steady and stand by our friends.

Over time, moving to a more open system of government in these countries, one more responsive to people’s grievances, will help. But if we demand an abrupt

move to the pluralism that we in the west enjoy, we may undermine the controls that are now in place and terrorists would end up with new opportunities.

Whatever the cause or causes of so-called Islamic terrorism, there is little prospect of it fading away soon.

SIS deals with the realities, the threats as they are. We work to minimise the risks. Our closest partners include many in the Muslim world who are concerned at

the threat Al-Qaida and their like poses to Islam itself.

In the UK, the security service, MI5, leads our counter-terrorism effort. They do a superb job and SIS’s work starts with the priorities that the security service sets.

It’s not enough to intercept terrorists here, at the very last minute. They need to be identified and stopped well before then, which means action far beyond our

own borders.

This is where SIS comes in. Over one-third of SIS resources are directed against international terrorism. It’s the largest single area of SIS’s work.

We get inside terrorist organisations to see where the next threats are coming from. We work to disrupt terrorist plots aimed against the UK, and against our

friends and allies. What we do is not seen. Few know about the terrorist attacks we help stop.

It scarcely needs saying, but I’ll say it anyway: working to tackle terrorism overseas is complex and often dangerous. Our agents, and sometimes our staff, risk

their lives.

Much intelligence is partial, fragmentary. We have to build up a picture. It’s like a jigsaw, but with key sections missing, and pieces from other jigsaws mixed in.

SIS officers round the world make judgements at short notice with potentially life or death consequences.

Say an agent warns us of a planned attack. We may need to meet that agent fast and securely, to understand his intelligence more fully. To work with GCHQ

who look for other signs. To work with MI5 and the police to act on that intelligence here in the UK.

Ministers and lawyers need to be briefed and consulted on next steps. We need partner agencies abroad to pool information, to monitor individuals or to detain

them where there are clear, specific concerns.

Disrupting the terrorists is a painstaking process with much careful preparation, and then sudden rapid activity. Details have to be got right. It all has to be

tackled fast and securely. There is little margin for error.

All this goes on 24 hours a day, every day of the year. And it keeps us far safer than we would be without it.

Proliferation terrorism is difficult enough and, despite our collective efforts, an attack may well get through. The human cost would be huge. But our country, our

democratic system, will not be brought down by a typical terrorist attack.

The dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons – and chemical and biological weapons – are more far-reaching. It can alter the whole balance of power in a

region.

States seeking to build nuclear weapons against their international legal obligations are obsessively secretive about it. SIS’s role is to find out what these states

are doing and planning, and identify ways to slow down their access to vital materials and technology.

The revelations around Iran’s secret enrichment site at Qom were an intelligence success. They led to diplomatic pressure on Iran intensifying, with tougher UN

and EU sanctions which are beginning to bite. The Iranian regime must think hard about where its best interests lie.

The risks of failure in this area are grim. Stopping nuclear proliferation cannot be addressed purely by conventional diplomacy. We need intelligence-led

operations to make it more difficult for countries like Iran to develop nuclear weapons.

The longer international efforts delay Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons technology, the more time we create for a political solution to be found.

Long-range strategic intelligence: the National Security Strategy which the prime minister published last week sets out the strategic direction for foreign,

defence and security policy for the years ahead. Intelligence is at the heart of that strategy.

SIS has the responsibility to gather long-range strategic intelligence, to track military and economic power in other countries, and find out what they going to do

with it. We try to see inside the minds of potential policy adversaries and predict their behaviour.

We have expertise on states that operate opaquely and without public accountability. We provide early warning of new weapons systems, or of major changes

in policy.

Machiavelli said that “surprise is the essential factor in victory”. A lot of SIS work is about making sure that the British government does not face unwelcome

surprises. And that some of our adversaries do.

Cyber: My colleague Iain Lobban at GCHQ recently described the cyber threats we face in the modern world.

Attacks on government information and commercial secrets of our companies are happening all the time. Electricity grids, our banking system, anything

controlled by computers, could possibly be vulnerable. For some, cyber is becoming an instrument of policy as much as diplomacy or military force.

As Iain is the first to recognise, there isn’t a purely technological solution. We need to invest in technology to defend ourselves, and the government has

allocated funds for that purpose in the Spending Round.

Even high technology threats have that crucial human dimension, and SIS will be gathering intelligence on individuals and states launching cyber attacks

against us, to find out how they organise themselves and to develop ways to counter them.

We have already set to work. It’s a big task of the future.

Supporting the military, and building security where the military are involved in a conflict, you will find SIS and GCHQ alongside them.

In Afghanistan, our people provide tactical intelligence that guides military operations and saves our soldiers’ lives. Our strategic intelligence helps map the

political way forward.

We are building up the Afghan security service, already probably the most capable of the Afghan security institutions, to help the Afghans take responsibility for

their own security.

Capacity building is not limited to Afghanistan. We offer training and support to partner services around the world. It wins their cooperation, it improves the

quality of their work, and it builds respect for human rights.

Our government expects SIS to maintain a global reach, collecting intelligence in all areas of major British interest to reduce the risk of unpleasant surprises.

And we have our network of partners which provides us a discreet channel of communication to other governments on the most sensitive issues.

So we are a very special part of government. SIS exists to give the UK advantage. We are a sovereign national asset. We are the secret frontline of our national

security.

How can the public have confidence that work done by us in secret is lawful, ethical and in their interests?

Let me explain how it all works in practice.

SIS does not choose what it does. The 1994 Intelligence Services Act sets the legal framework for what we do. Ministers tell us what they want to know, what

they want us to achieve. We take our direction from the National Security Council.

As chief of SIS, I am responsible for SIS operations. I answer directly to the foreign secretary.

When our operations require legal authorisation or entail political risk, I seek the foreign secretary’s approval in advance. If a case is particularly complex, he

can consult the attorney general. In the end, the foreign secretary decides what we do.

Submissions for operations go to the foreign secretary all the time. He approves most, but not all, and those operations he does not approve do not happen. It’s

as simple as that.

There is oversight and scrutiny by parliamentarians and by judges.

The Intelligence and Security committee is chaired by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, and includes other senior politicians, many of them former ministers. They hold us to

account and can investigate areas of our activity.

And two former judges have full access to our files, as intelligence commissioner and interception commissioner. They make sure our procedures are proper and

lawful.

These processes of control and accountability are as robust as you will find anywhere. SIS fully supports them. We want to enjoy public confidence.

We don’t operate on our own. Intelligence is a team game. If we need to track a British terrorist in another country, or stop a shipment of components for a

secret nuclear programme, we need to work with services abroad.

We work with over 200 partner services around the world, with hugely constructive results. And our intelligence partnership with the United States is an

especially powerful contributor to UK security.

No intelligence service risks compromising its sources. So we have a rule called the control principle – the service who first obtains the intelligence has the right

to control how it is used, who else it can be shared with, and what action can be taken on it.

It’s rule number one of intelligence sharing. We insist on it with our partners, and they insist on it with us. Because whenever intelligence is revealed, others try

to hunt down the source. Agents can get identified, arrested, tortured and killed by the very organisations who are working against us.

So if the control principle is not respected, the intelligence dries up. That’s why we have been so concerned about the possible release of intelligence material

in recent court cases.

We can’t do our job if we work only with friendly democracies. Dangerous threats usually come from dangerous people in dangerous places. We have to deal

with the world as it is.

Suppose we receive credible intelligence that might save lives, here or abroad. We have a professional and moral duty to act on it. We will normally want to

share it with those who can save those lives.

We also have a duty to do what we can to ensure that a partner service will respect human rights. That is not always straightforward.

Yet if we hold back, and don’t pass that intelligence, out of concern that a suspect terrorist may be badly treated, innocent lives may be lost that we could have

saved.

These are not abstract questions for philosophy courses or searching editorials. They are real, constant, operational dilemmas.

Sometimes there is no clear way forward. The more finely-balanced judgments have to be made by Ministers themselves. I welcome the publication of the

consolidated guidance on detainee issues. It reflects the detailed guidance issued to SIS staff in the field and the training we give them.

Torture is illegal and abhorrent under any circumstances, and we have nothing whatsoever to do with it. If we know or believe action by us will lead to torture

taking place, we’re required by UK and international law to avoid that action. And we do, even though that allows the terrorist activity to go ahead.

Some may question this, but we are clear that it’s the right thing to do. It makes us strive all the harder to find different ways, consistent with human rights, to get

the outcome we want.

Other countries respect our approach on these issues. Even where we find deep differences of culture and tradition, we can make progress, slowly but surely, by

seeking careful assurances and providing skilled training.

I also welcome the prime minister’s initiative in setting up the Gibson Inquiry into the detainee issue. If there are more lessons to be learned, we want to learn

them.

And, after 9/11, the terrorist threat was immediate and paramount. We are accused by some people not of committing torture ourselves but of being too close to

it in our efforts to keep Britain safe.

Let me say this: SIS is a Service that reflects our country. Integrity is the first of the service’s values.

I am confident that, in their efforts to keep Britain safe, all SIS staff acted with the utmost integrity, and with a close eye on basic decency and moral principles.

So, back to that reader’s letter in The Times.

The recent debate about secrecy reflects two concerns. First, national security, and the need for the intelligence and security agencies to work in secret to

protect British interests and our way of life from those who threaten it.

And second, the need for justice – the rights of citizens to raise complaint against the government and get a fair hearing.

As a public servant, and as a citizen, I devoutly want both objectives upheld, and not to have one undermine the other.

The judges have to determine what constitutes a fair trial.

We in the intelligence and security agencies have to make sure that our secrets don’t become available to those who are threatening our country. And we have

to protect our partners secrets.

As the prime minister said in parliament, at present we’re unable to use secret material in court with confidence that the material will be protected.

The government has promised a green paper to set out some better options for dealing with national security issues in the courts, and I look forward to that.

Part of sustaining public confidence in the intelligence services is debate about the principles and value of intelligence work.

And the purpose of today is to explain what we in SIS do and why we do it. Why our work is important, and why we can’t work in the open. A lot is at stake.

Secret organisations need to stay secret, even if we present an occasional public face, as I am doing today. If our operations and methods become public, they

won’t work.

Agents take risks. They will not work with SIS, will not pass us the secrets they hold, unless they can trust us not to expose them.

Foreign partners need to have certainty that what they tell us will remain secret – not just most of the time, but always.

Without the trust of agents, the anonymity of our staff, the confidence of partners, we would not get the intelligence. The lives of everyone living here would be

less safe. The United Kingdom would be more vulnerable to the unexpected, the vicious and the extreme.

Secrecy is not a dirty word. Secrecy is not there as a cover up. Secrecy plays a crucial part in keeping Britain safe and secure.

And without secrecy, there would be no intelligence services, or indeed other national assets like our Special Forces. Our nation would be more exposed as a

result.

Without secrecy, we can’t tackle threats at source. We would be forced to defend ourselves on the goal-line, on our borders. And it’s more than obvious that the

dangers of terrorism, nuclear proliferation and cyber attack are not much impressed by international borders.

Ladies and gentlemen, the remarkable men and women who make up the staff of SIS are among the most loyal, dedicated and innovative in the entire public

service.

We ask more of them than we do of any other public servants not in uniform. Exceptional people, doing extraordinary things for their country.

Our people can’t and don’t talk about what they do. They receive recognition for their achievements only within the confines of the service.

You don’t know them, but I do. It is an honour to lead them.

Vote of thanks by David Schlesinger, Editor-in-Chief, Reuters

There is a natural tension between the keepers of secrets and the revealers of secrets. And yet, the two sides of the seeming divide have much in common, too -

we both assemble facts and impressions into narrative, spinning tales to make sense of the world and provide insight. In that spirit, this has been an important

and remarkable morning; one that I hope starts a lasting dialogue. I would like to thanks Sir John Sawers and his office for making this possible, the Society of

Editors for being a beacon of openness and my colleagues at Reuters news and Thomson Reuters for all the arrangements.

Sir John’s speech
The Times published a reader’s letter earlier this year. It read: “Sir – is it not bizarre that MI5 and MI6, otherwise known as the secret services, currently stand
accused of being – er – secretive?”
I may be biased. But I think that reader was on to something rather important and most government work these days is done by conventional and transparent
processes. But not all.
Britain’s foreign intelligence effort was first organised in 1909, when the Secret Intelligence Service was formed.
We have just published an official history of our first 40 years. I’m sure you will all have read all 800 pages of it.
The first chief, Mansfield Cumming, used to pay the salaries of SIS officials out of his private income, dispensed in cash from a desk drawer. I’m glad to say that,
even after the chancellor’s statement last week, I’m not in the same position.
SIS’s existence was admitted only in 1994. We British move slowly on such things.
And this, I believe, is the first public speech given by a serving chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service.
“Why now?” might you ask. Well, intelligence features prominently in the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review, published
last week.
We often appear in the news. Our popular name – MI6 – is an irresistible draw. We have a website, and we’ve got versions in Arabic and Russian. We recruit our
staff openly, with adverts in the national press.
But debate on SIS’s role is not well informed, in part because we have been so determined to protect our secrets.
In today’s open society, no government institution is given the benefit of the doubt all the time. There are new expectations of public – and legal – accountability
that have developed. In short, in 2010 the context for the UK’s secret intelligence work is very different from 1994.I am not going to use today to tantalise you with
hints of sensitive operations or intelligence successes.
Instead, I want to answer two important questions: what value do we get from a secret overseas intelligence effort in the modern era? How can the public have
confidence that work done in secret is lawful, ethical, and in their interests?
First, how do we all fit in? The Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, operates abroad, dealing with threats overseas and gathering intelligence mainly from human
sources. The security service, MI5, works here in the UK, protecting the homeland from terrorist attack and other threats.
GCHQ produces intelligence from communications, and takes the lead in the cyber world.
These three specialised services form the UK intelligence community, and we operate in what the foreign secretary has called a networked world. Technology
plays an ever growing part in our work, for SIS as well as GCHQ, and the boundary line between home and abroad is increasingly blurred.
So the three agencies work increasingly closely together, and the next five years will see us intensifying our collaboration to improve our operational impact
and to save money. Yes, even the intelligence services have to make savings.
Secret intelligence is important information that others wish you not to know; it’s information that deepens our understanding of a foreign country or grouping, or
reveals their true intentions. It’s information that gives us new opportunities for action.
We at SIS obtain our intelligence from secret agents. These are people are nearly all foreign nationals, who have access to secret information and who choose
to work with us.
Our agents are the true heroes of our work. They have their own motivations and hopes. Many of them show extraordinary courage and idealism, striving in their
own countries for the freedoms that we in Britain take for granted.
Our agents are working today in some of the most dangerous and exposed places, bravely and to hugely valuable effect, and we owe a debt to countless more
whose service is over.
Agents take serious risks and make sacrifices to help our country. In return, we give them a solemn pledge: that we shall keep their role secret.
The information we get from agents is put into an intelligence report. The source is described in general terms. It is just that – a report. It tells us something new
or corroborates what we suspect.
A report’s value can be overplayed if it tells us what we want to hear, or it can be underplayed if it contains unwelcome news or runs against received wisdom.
It is a part of the picture, and may not be even wholly accurate, even if the trusted agent who gave it to us is sure that it is.
So sources of intelligence have to be rigorously evaluated, and their reports have to be honestly weighed alongside all other information. Those who produce it,
and those who want to use it, have to put intelligence in a wider context. The Joint Intelligence Committee plays a crucial role.
The Butler Review following Iraq was a clear reminder, to both the agencies and the centre of government, politicians and officials alike, of how intelligence
needs to be handled. The SIS board recently reviewed our implementation of Lord Butler’s recommendations, to make sure we’ve implemented them fully, in
spirit as well as in substance.
I am confident that they have been. And we will look at the wider issues again once the Chilcott Inquiry reports.
So why do we need secret intelligence? Well, let’s start with the terrorist problem.
Most people go about their daily work not worrying about the risk of a terrorist attack. That a bomb may have been planted on their route, or hostages might be
seized. I’m glad they don’t worry about those sorts of things: part of our job is to make people feel safe.
But those threats exist, as we’re recalling now with the 7/7 inquest. That said, on any given day the chances that a terrorist attack will happen on our streets,
even in central London, feel small enough to be safely ignored by the public.
You, and millions of people like you, go about your business in our cities and towns free of fear because the British government works tirelessly, out of the public
eye, to stop terrorists and would-be terrorists in their tracks.
The most draining aspect of my job is reading, every day, intelligence reports describing the plotting of terrorists who are bent on maiming and murdering
people in this country.
It’s an enormous tribute to the men and women of our intelligence and security agencies, and to our cooperation with partner services around the world, that so
few of these appalling plots develop into real terrorist attacks.
Some of these terrorists are British citizens, trained in how to use weapons, how to make bombs. Others are foreign nationals who want to attack us to
undermine our support for forces of moderation around the world.
Many of the reports I read describe the workings of the al-Qaida network, rooted in a nihilistic version of Islam.
Al-Qaida have ambitious goals. Weakening the power of the west. Toppling moderate Islamic regimes. Seizing the holy places of Islam to give them moral
authority. Taking control of the Arab world’s oil reserves. They’re unlikely to achieve these goals, but they remain set on trying, and are ready to use extreme
violence.
Jonathan Evans, the head of MI5, recently described how the threat is intensifying. Precisely because we are having some success in closing down the space for
terrorist recruitment and planning in the UK, the extremists are increasingly preparing their attacks against British targets from abroad.
It’s not just the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen, Somalia and North Africa pose real threats to the UK.
From his remote base in Yemen, Al-Qaida leader and US national Anwar al-Awlaki broadcasts propaganda and terrorist instruction in fluent English over the
internet.
Our intelligence effort needs to go where the threat is. One of the advantages of the way we in SIS work is that we are highly adaptable and flexible. We don’t
get pinned in one place.
There is no one reason for the terrorist phenomenon. Some blame political issues like Palestine or Kashmir or Iraq. Others cite economic disadvantage.
Distortions of the Islamic faith. Male supremacy. The lack of the normal checks and balances in some countries. There are many theories.
I’ve worked a lot in the Islamic world. I agree with those who say we need to be steady and stand by our friends.
Over time, moving to a more open system of government in these countries, one more responsive to people’s grievances, will help. But if we demand an abrupt
move to the pluralism that we in the west enjoy, we may undermine the controls that are now in place and terrorists would end up with new opportunities.
Whatever the cause or causes of so-called Islamic terrorism, there is little prospect of it fading away soon.
SIS deals with the realities, the threats as they are. We work to minimise the risks. Our closest partners include many in the Muslim world who are concerned at
the threat Al-Qaida and their like poses to Islam itself.
In the UK, the security service, MI5, leads our counter-terrorism effort. They do a superb job and SIS’s work starts with the priorities that the security service sets.
It’s not enough to intercept terrorists here, at the very last minute. They need to be identified and stopped well before then, which means action far beyond our
own borders.
This is where SIS comes in. Over one-third of SIS resources are directed against international terrorism. It’s the largest single area of SIS’s work.
We get inside terrorist organisations to see where the next threats are coming from. We work to disrupt terrorist plots aimed against the UK, and against our
friends and allies. What we do is not seen. Few know about the terrorist attacks we help stop.
It scarcely needs saying, but I’ll say it anyway: working to tackle terrorism overseas is complex and often dangerous. Our agents, and sometimes our staff, risk
their lives.
Much intelligence is partial, fragmentary. We have to build up a picture. It’s like a jigsaw, but with key sections missing, and pieces from other jigsaws mixed in.
SIS officers round the world make judgements at short notice with potentially life or death consequences.
Say an agent warns us of a planned attack. We may need to meet that agent fast and securely, to understand his intelligence more fully. To work with GCHQ
who look for other signs. To work with MI5 and the police to act on that intelligence here in the UK.
Ministers and lawyers need to be briefed and consulted on next steps. We need partner agencies abroad to pool information, to monitor individuals or to detain
them where there are clear, specific concerns.
Disrupting the terrorists is a painstaking process with much careful preparation, and then sudden rapid activity. Details have to be got right. It all has to be
tackled fast and securely. There is little margin for error.
All this goes on 24 hours a day, every day of the year. And it keeps us far safer than we would be without it.
Proliferation terrorism is difficult enough and, despite our collective efforts, an attack may well get through. The human cost would be huge. But our country, our
democratic system, will not be brought down by a typical terrorist attack.
The dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons – and chemical and biological weapons – are more far-reaching. It can alter the whole balance of power in a
region.
States seeking to build nuclear weapons against their international legal obligations are obsessively secretive about it. SIS’s role is to find out what these states
are doing and planning, and identify ways to slow down their access to vital materials and technology.
The revelations around Iran’s secret enrichment site at Qom were an intelligence success. They led to diplomatic pressure on Iran intensifying, with tougher UN
and EU sanctions which are beginning to bite. The Iranian regime must think hard about where its best interests lie.
The risks of failure in this area are grim. Stopping nuclear proliferation cannot be addressed purely by conventional diplomacy. We need intelligence-led
operations to make it more difficult for countries like Iran to develop nuclear weapons.
The longer international efforts delay Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons technology, the more time we create for a political solution to be found.
Long-range strategic intelligence: the National Security Strategy which the prime minister published last week sets out the strategic direction for foreign,
defence and security policy for the years ahead. Intelligence is at the heart of that strategy.
SIS has the responsibility to gather long-range strategic intelligence, to track military and economic power in other countries, and find out what they going to do
with it. We try to see inside the minds of potential policy adversaries and predict their behaviour.
We have expertise on states that operate opaquely and without public accountability. We provide early warning of new weapons systems, or of major changes
in policy.
Machiavelli said that “surprise is the essential factor in victory”. A lot of SIS work is about making sure that the British government does not face unwelcome
surprises. And that some of our adversaries do.
Cyber: My colleague Iain Lobban at GCHQ recently described the cyber threats we face in the modern world.
Attacks on government information and commercial secrets of our companies are happening all the time. Electricity grids, our banking system, anything
controlled by computers, could possibly be vulnerable. For some, cyber is becoming an instrument of policy as much as diplomacy or military force.
As Iain is the first to recognise, there isn’t a purely technological solution. We need to invest in technology to defend ourselves, and the government has
allocated funds for that purpose in the Spending Round.
Even high technology threats have that crucial human dimension, and SIS will be gathering intelligence on individuals and states launching cyber attacks
against us, to find out how they organise themselves and to develop ways to counter them.
We have already set to work. It’s a big task of the future.
Supporting the military, and building security where the military are involved in a conflict, you will find SIS and GCHQ alongside them.
In Afghanistan, our people provide tactical intelligence that guides military operations and saves our soldiers’ lives. Our strategic intelligence helps map the
political way forward.
We are building up the Afghan security service, already probably the most capable of the Afghan security institutions, to help the Afghans take responsibility for
their own security.
Capacity building is not limited to Afghanistan. We offer training and support to partner services around the world. It wins their cooperation, it improves the
quality of their work, and it builds respect for human rights.
Our government expects SIS to maintain a global reach, collecting intelligence in all areas of major British interest to reduce the risk of unpleasant surprises.
And we have our network of partners which provides us a discreet channel of communication to other governments on the most sensitive issues.
So we are a very special part of government. SIS exists to give the UK advantage. We are a sovereign national asset. We are the secret frontline of our national
security.
How can the public have confidence that work done by us in secret is lawful, ethical and in their interests?
Let me explain how it all works in practice.
SIS does not choose what it does. The 1994 Intelligence Services Act sets the legal framework for what we do. Ministers tell us what they want to know, what
they want us to achieve. We take our direction from the National Security Council.
As chief of SIS, I am responsible for SIS operations. I answer directly to the foreign secretary.
When our operations require legal authorisation or entail political risk, I seek the foreign secretary’s approval in advance. If a case is particularly complex, he
can consult the attorney general. In the end, the foreign secretary decides what we do.
Submissions for operations go to the foreign secretary all the time. He approves most, but not all, and those operations he does not approve do not happen. It’s
as simple as that.
There is oversight and scrutiny by parliamentarians and by judges.
The Intelligence and Security committee is chaired by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, and includes other senior politicians, many of them former ministers. They hold us to
account and can investigate areas of our activity.
And two former judges have full access to our files, as intelligence commissioner and interception commissioner. They make sure our procedures are proper and
lawful.
These processes of control and accountability are as robust as you will find anywhere. SIS fully supports them. We want to enjoy public confidence.
We don’t operate on our own. Intelligence is a team game. If we need to track a British terrorist in another country, or stop a shipment of components for a
secret nuclear programme, we need to work with services abroad.
We work with over 200 partner services around the world, with hugely constructive results. And our intelligence partnership with the United States is an
especially powerful contributor to UK security.
No intelligence service risks compromising its sources. So we have a rule called the control principle – the service who first obtains the intelligence has the right
to control how it is used, who else it can be shared with, and what action can be taken on it.
It’s rule number one of intelligence sharing. We insist on it with our partners, and they insist on it with us. Because whenever intelligence is revealed, others try
to hunt down the source. Agents can get identified, arrested, tortured and killed by the very organisations who are working against us.
So if the control principle is not respected, the intelligence dries up. That’s why we have been so concerned about the possible release of intelligence material
in recent court cases.
We can’t do our job if we work only with friendly democracies. Dangerous threats usually come from dangerous people in dangerous places. We have to deal
with the world as it is.
Suppose we receive credible intelligence that might save lives, here or abroad. We have a professional and moral duty to act on it. We will normally want to
share it with those who can save those lives.
We also have a duty to do what we can to ensure that a partner service will respect human rights. That is not always straightforward.
Yet if we hold back, and don’t pass that intelligence, out of concern that a suspect terrorist may be badly treated, innocent lives may be lost that we could have
saved.
These are not abstract questions for philosophy courses or searching editorials. They are real, constant, operational dilemmas.
Sometimes there is no clear way forward. The more finely-balanced judgments have to be made by Ministers themselves. I welcome the publication of the
consolidated guidance on detainee issues. It reflects the detailed guidance issued to SIS staff in the field and the training we give them.
Torture is illegal and abhorrent under any circumstances, and we have nothing whatsoever to do with it. If we know or believe action by us will lead to torture
taking place, we’re required by UK and international law to avoid that action. And we do, even though that allows the terrorist activity to go ahead.
Some may question this, but we are clear that it’s the right thing to do. It makes us strive all the harder to find different ways, consistent with human rights, to get
the outcome we want.
Other countries respect our approach on these issues. Even where we find deep differences of culture and tradition, we can make progress, slowly but surely, by
seeking careful assurances and providing skilled training.
I also welcome the prime minister’s initiative in setting up the Gibson Inquiry into the detainee issue. If there are more lessons to be learned, we want to learn
them.
And, after 9/11, the terrorist threat was immediate and paramount. We are accused by some people not of committing torture ourselves but of being too close to
it in our efforts to keep Britain safe.
Let me say this: SIS is a Service that reflects our country. Integrity is the first of the service’s values.
I am confident that, in their efforts to keep Britain safe, all SIS staff acted with the utmost integrity, and with a close eye on basic decency and moral principles.
So, back to that reader’s letter in The Times.
The recent debate about secrecy reflects two concerns. First, national security, and the need for the intelligence and security agencies to work in secret to
protect British interests and our way of life from those who threaten it.
And second, the need for justice – the rights of citizens to raise complaint against the government and get a fair hearing.
As a public servant, and as a citizen, I devoutly want both objectives upheld, and not to have one undermine the other.
The judges have to determine what constitutes a fair trial.
We in the intelligence and security agencies have to make sure that our secrets don’t become available to those who are threatening our country. And we have
to protect our partners secrets.
As the prime minister said in parliament, at present we’re unable to use secret material in court with confidence that the material will be protected.
The government has promised a green paper to set out some better options for dealing with national security issues in the courts, and I look forward to that.
Part of sustaining public confidence in the intelligence services is debate about the principles and value of intelligence work.
And the purpose of today is to explain what we in SIS do and why we do it. Why our work is important, and why we can’t work in the open. A lot is at stake.
Secret organisations need to stay secret, even if we present an occasional public face, as I am doing today. If our operations and methods become public, they
won’t work.
Agents take risks. They will not work with SIS, will not pass us the secrets they hold, unless they can trust us not to expose them.
Foreign partners need to have certainty that what they tell us will remain secret – not just most of the time, but always.
Without the trust of agents, the anonymity of our staff, the confidence of partners, we would not get the intelligence. The lives of everyone living here would be
less safe. The United Kingdom would be more vulnerable to the unexpected, the vicious and the extreme.
Secrecy is not a dirty word. Secrecy is not there as a cover up. Secrecy plays a crucial part in keeping Britain safe and secure.
And without secrecy, there would be no intelligence services, or indeed other national assets like our Special Forces. Our nation would be more exposed as a
result.
Without secrecy, we can’t tackle threats at source. We would be forced to defend ourselves on the goal-line, on our borders. And it’s more than obvious that the
dangers of terrorism, nuclear proliferation and cyber attack are not much impressed by international borders.
Ladies and gentlemen, the remarkable men and women who make up the staff of SIS are among the most loyal, dedicated and innovative in the entire public
service.
We ask more of them than we do of any other public servants not in uniform. Exceptional people, doing extraordinary things for their country.
Our people can’t and don’t talk about what they do. They receive recognition for their achievements only within the confines of the service.
You don’t know them, but I do. It is an honour to lead them.
Vote of thanks by David Schlesinger, Editor-in-Chief, Reuters
There is a natural tension between the keepers of secrets and the revealers of secrets. And yet, the two sides of the seeming divide have much in common, too -
we both assemble facts and impressions into narrative, spinning tales to make sense of the world and provide insight. In that spirit, this has been an important
and remarkable morning; one that I hope starts a lasting dialogue. I would like to thanks Sir John Sawers and his office for making this possible, the Society of
Editors for being a beacon of openness and my colleagues at Reuters news and Thomson Reuters for all the arrangements.

Sir John’s speech
The Times published a reader’s letter earlier this year. It read: “Sir – is it not bizarre that MI5 and MI6, otherwise known as the secret services, currently stand
accused of being – er – secretive?”
I may be biased. But I think that reader was on to something rather important and most government work these days is done by conventional and transparent
processes. But not all.
Britain’s foreign intelligence effort was first organised in 1909, when the Secret Intelligence Service was formed.
We have just published an official history of our first 40 years. I’m sure you will all have read all 800 pages of it.
The first chief, Mansfield Cumming, used to pay the salaries of SIS officials out of his private income, dispensed in cash from a desk drawer. I’m glad to say that,
even after the chancellor’s statement last week, I’m not in the same position.
SIS’s existence was admitted only in 1994. We British move slowly on such things.
And this, I believe, is the first public speech given by a serving chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service.
“Why now?” might you ask. Well, intelligence features prominently in the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review, published
last week.
We often appear in the news. Our popular name – MI6 – is an irresistible draw. We have a website, and we’ve got versions in Arabic and Russian. We recruit our
staff openly, with adverts in the national press.
But debate on SIS’s role is not well informed, in part because we have been so determined to protect our secrets.
In today’s open society, no government institution is given the benefit of the doubt all the time. There are new expectations of public – and legal – accountability
that have developed. In short, in 2010 the context for the UK’s secret intelligence work is very different from 1994.I am not going to use today to tantalise you with
hints of sensitive operations or intelligence successes.
Instead, I want to answer two important questions: what value do we get from a secret overseas intelligence effort in the modern era? How can the public have
confidence that work done in secret is lawful, ethical, and in their interests?
First, how do we all fit in? The Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, operates abroad, dealing with threats overseas and gathering intelligence mainly from human
sources. The security service, MI5, works here in the UK, protecting the homeland from terrorist attack and other threats.
GCHQ produces intelligence from communications, and takes the lead in the cyber world.
These three specialised services form the UK intelligence community, and we operate in what the foreign secretary has called a networked world. Technology
plays an ever growing part in our work, for SIS as well as GCHQ, and the boundary line between home and abroad is increasingly blurred.
So the three agencies work increasingly closely together, and the next five years will see us intensifying our collaboration to improve our operational impact
and to save money. Yes, even the intelligence services have to make savings.
Secret intelligence is important information that others wish you not to know; it’s information that deepens our understanding of a foreign country or grouping, or
reveals their true intentions. It’s information that gives us new opportunities for action.
We at SIS obtain our intelligence from secret agents. These are people are nearly all foreign nationals, who have access to secret information and who choose
to work with us.
Our agents are the true heroes of our work. They have their own motivations and hopes. Many of them show extraordinary courage and idealism, striving in their
own countries for the freedoms that we in Britain take for granted.
Our agents are working today in some of the most dangerous and exposed places, bravely and to hugely valuable effect, and we owe a debt to countless more
whose service is over.
Agents take serious risks and make sacrifices to help our country. In return, we give them a solemn pledge: that we shall keep their role secret.
The information we get from agents is put into an intelligence report. The source is described in general terms. It is just that – a report. It tells us something new
or corroborates what we suspect.
A report’s value can be overplayed if it tells us what we want to hear, or it can be underplayed if it contains unwelcome news or runs against received wisdom.
It is a part of the picture, and may not be even wholly accurate, even if the trusted agent who gave it to us is sure that it is.
So sources of intelligence have to be rigorously evaluated, and their reports have to be honestly weighed alongside all other information. Those who produce it,
and those who want to use it, have to put intelligence in a wider context. The Joint Intelligence Committee plays a crucial role.
The Butler Review following Iraq was a clear reminder, to both the agencies and the centre of government, politicians and officials alike, of how intelligence
needs to be handled. The SIS board recently reviewed our implementation of Lord Butler’s recommendations, to make sure we’ve implemented them fully, in
spirit as well as in substance.
I am confident that they have been. And we will look at the wider issues again once the Chilcott Inquiry reports.
So why do we need secret intelligence? Well, let’s start with the terrorist problem.
Most people go about their daily work not worrying about the risk of a terrorist attack. That a bomb may have been planted on their route, or hostages might be
seized. I’m glad they don’t worry about those sorts of things: part of our job is to make people feel safe.
But those threats exist, as we’re recalling now with the 7/7 inquest. That said, on any given day the chances that a terrorist attack will happen on our streets,
even in central London, feel small enough to be safely ignored by the public.
You, and millions of people like you, go about your business in our cities and towns free of fear because the British government works tirelessly, out of the public
eye, to stop terrorists and would-be terrorists in their tracks.
The most draining aspect of my job is reading, every day, intelligence reports describing the plotting of terrorists who are bent on maiming and murdering
people in this country.
It’s an enormous tribute to the men and women of our intelligence and security agencies, and to our cooperation with partner services around the world, that so
few of these appalling plots develop into real terrorist attacks.
Some of these terrorists are British citizens, trained in how to use weapons, how to make bombs. Others are foreign nationals who want to attack us to
undermine our support for forces of moderation around the world.
Many of the reports I read describe the workings of the al-Qaida network, rooted in a nihilistic version of Islam.
Al-Qaida have ambitious goals. Weakening the power of the west. Toppling moderate Islamic regimes. Seizing the holy places of Islam to give them moral
authority. Taking control of the Arab world’s oil reserves. They’re unlikely to achieve these goals, but they remain set on trying, and are ready to use extreme
violence.
Jonathan Evans, the head of MI5, recently described how the threat is intensifying. Precisely because we are having some success in closing down the space for
terrorist recruitment and planning in the UK, the extremists are increasingly preparing their attacks against British targets from abroad.
It’s not just the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen, Somalia and North Africa pose real threats to the UK.
From his remote base in Yemen, Al-Qaida leader and US national Anwar al-Awlaki broadcasts propaganda and terrorist instruction in fluent English over the
internet.
Our intelligence effort needs to go where the threat is. One of the advantages of the way we in SIS work is that we are highly adaptable and flexible. We don’t
get pinned in one place.
There is no one reason for the terrorist phenomenon. Some blame political issues like Palestine or Kashmir or Iraq. Others cite economic disadvantage.
Distortions of the Islamic faith. Male supremacy. The lack of the normal checks and balances in some countries. There are many theories.
I’ve worked a lot in the Islamic world. I agree with those who say we need to be steady and stand by our friends.
Over time, moving to a more open system of government in these countries, one more responsive to people’s grievances, will help. But if we demand an abrupt
move to the pluralism that we in the west enjoy, we may undermine the controls that are now in place and terrorists would end up with new opportunities.
Whatever the cause or causes of so-called Islamic terrorism, there is little prospect of it fading away soon.
SIS deals with the realities, the threats as they are. We work to minimise the risks. Our closest partners include many in the Muslim world who are concerned at
the threat Al-Qaida and their like poses to Islam itself.
In the UK, the security service, MI5, leads our counter-terrorism effort. They do a superb job and SIS’s work starts with the priorities that the security service sets.
It’s not enough to intercept terrorists here, at the very last minute. They need to be identified and stopped well before then, which means action far beyond our
own borders.
This is where SIS comes in. Over one-third of SIS resources are directed against international terrorism. It’s the largest single area of SIS’s work.
We get inside terrorist organisations to see where the next threats are coming from. We work to disrupt terrorist plots aimed against the UK, and against our
friends and allies. What we do is not seen. Few know about the terrorist attacks we help stop.
It scarcely needs saying, but I’ll say it anyway: working to tackle terrorism overseas is complex and often dangerous. Our agents, and sometimes our staff, risk
their lives.
Much intelligence is partial, fragmentary. We have to build up a picture. It’s like a jigsaw, but with key sections missing, and pieces from other jigsaws mixed in.
SIS officers round the world make judgements at short notice with potentially life or death consequences.
Say an agent warns us of a planned attack. We may need to meet that agent fast and securely, to understand his intelligence more fully. To work with GCHQ
who look for other signs. To work with MI5 and the police to act on that intelligence here in the UK.
Ministers and lawyers need to be briefed and consulted on next steps. We need partner agencies abroad to pool information, to monitor individuals or to detain
them where there are clear, specific concerns.
Disrupting the terrorists is a painstaking process with much careful preparation, and then sudden rapid activity. Details have to be got right. It all has to be
tackled fast and securely. There is little margin for error.
All this goes on 24 hours a day, every day of the year. And it keeps us far safer than we would be without it.
Proliferation terrorism is difficult enough and, despite our collective efforts, an attack may well get through. The human cost would be huge. But our country, our
democratic system, will not be brought down by a typical terrorist attack.
The dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons – and chemical and biological weapons – are more far-reaching. It can alter the whole balance of power in a
region.
States seeking to build nuclear weapons against their international legal obligations are obsessively secretive about it. SIS’s role is to find out what these states
are doing and planning, and identify ways to slow down their access to vital materials and technology.
The revelations around Iran’s secret enrichment site at Qom were an intelligence success. They led to diplomatic pressure on Iran intensifying, with tougher UN
and EU sanctions which are beginning to bite. The Iranian regime must think hard about where its best interests lie.
The risks of failure in this area are grim. Stopping nuclear proliferation cannot be addressed purely by conventional diplomacy. We need intelligence-led
operations to make it more difficult for countries like Iran to develop nuclear weapons.
The longer international efforts delay Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons technology, the more time we create for a political solution to be found.
Long-range strategic intelligence: the National Security Strategy which the prime minister published last week sets out the strategic direction for foreign,
defence and security policy for the years ahead. Intelligence is at the heart of that strategy.
SIS has the responsibility to gather long-range strategic intelligence, to track military and economic power in other countries, and find out what they going to do
with it. We try to see inside the minds of potential policy adversaries and predict their behaviour.
We have expertise on states that operate opaquely and without public accountability. We provide early warning of new weapons systems, or of major changes
in policy.
Machiavelli said that “surprise is the essential factor in victory”. A lot of SIS work is about making sure that the British government does not face unwelcome
surprises. And that some of our adversaries do.
Cyber: My colleague Iain Lobban at GCHQ recently described the cyber threats we face in the modern world.
Attacks on government information and commercial secrets of our companies are happening all the time. Electricity grids, our banking system, anything
controlled by computers, could possibly be vulnerable. For some, cyber is becoming an instrument of policy as much as diplomacy or military force.
As Iain is the first to recognise, there isn’t a purely technological solution. We need to invest in technology to defend ourselves, and the government has
allocated funds for that purpose in the Spending Round.
Even high technology threats have that crucial human dimension, and SIS will be gathering intelligence on individuals and states launching cyber attacks
against us, to find out how they organise themselves and to develop ways to counter them.
We have already set to work. It’s a big task of the future.
Supporting the military, and building security where the military are involved in a conflict, you will find SIS and GCHQ alongside them.
In Afghanistan, our people provide tactical intelligence that guides military operations and saves our soldiers’ lives. Our strategic intelligence helps map the
political way forward.
We are building up the Afghan security service, already probably the most capable of the Afghan security institutions, to help the Afghans take responsibility for
their own security.
Capacity building is not limited to Afghanistan. We offer training and support to partner services around the world. It wins their cooperation, it improves the
quality of their work, and it builds respect for human rights.
Our government expects SIS to maintain a global reach, collecting intelligence in all areas of major British interest to reduce the risk of unpleasant surprises.
And we have our network of partners which provides us a discreet channel of communication to other governments on the most sensitive issues.
So we are a very special part of government. SIS exists to give the UK advantage. We are a sovereign national asset. We are the secret frontline of our national
security.
How can the public have confidence that work done by us in secret is lawful, ethical and in their interests?
Let me explain how it all works in practice.
SIS does not choose what it does. The 1994 Intelligence Services Act sets the legal framework for what we do. Ministers tell us what they want to know, what
they want us to achieve. We take our direction from the National Security Council.
As chief of SIS, I am responsible for SIS operations. I answer directly to the foreign secretary.
When our operations require legal authorisation or entail political risk, I seek the foreign secretary’s approval in advance. If a case is particularly complex, he
can consult the attorney general. In the end, the foreign secretary decides what we do.
Submissions for operations go to the foreign secretary all the time. He approves most, but not all, and those operations he does not approve do not happen. It’s
as simple as that.
There is oversight and scrutiny by parliamentarians and by judges.
The Intelligence and Security committee is chaired by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, and includes other senior politicians, many of them former ministers. They hold us to
account and can investigate areas of our activity.
And two former judges have full access to our files, as intelligence commissioner and interception commissioner. They make sure our procedures are proper and
lawful.
These processes of control and accountability are as robust as you will find anywhere. SIS fully supports them. We want to enjoy public confidence.
We don’t operate on our own. Intelligence is a team game. If we need to track a British terrorist in another country, or stop a shipment of components for a
secret nuclear programme, we need to work with services abroad.
We work with over 200 partner services around the world, with hugely constructive results. And our intelligence partnership with the United States is an
especially powerful contributor to UK security.
No intelligence service risks compromising its sources. So we have a rule called the control principle – the service who first obtains the intelligence has the right
to control how it is used, who else it can be shared with, and what action can be taken on it.
It’s rule number one of intelligence sharing. We insist on it with our partners, and they insist on it with us. Because whenever intelligence is revealed, others try
to hunt down the source. Agents can get identified, arrested, tortured and killed by the very organisations who are working against us.
So if the control principle is not respected, the intelligence dries up. That’s why we have been so concerned about the possible release of intelligence material
in recent court cases.
We can’t do our job if we work only with friendly democracies. Dangerous threats usually come from dangerous people in dangerous places. We have to deal
with the world as it is.
Suppose we receive credible intelligence that might save lives, here or abroad. We have a professional and moral duty to act on it. We will normally want to
share it with those who can save those lives.
We also have a duty to do what we can to ensure that a partner service will respect human rights. That is not always straightforward.
Yet if we hold back, and don’t pass that intelligence, out of concern that a suspect terrorist may be badly treated, innocent lives may be lost that we could have
saved.
These are not abstract questions for philosophy courses or searching editorials. They are real, constant, operational dilemmas.
Sometimes there is no clear way forward. The more finely-balanced judgments have to be made by Ministers themselves. I welcome the publication of the
consolidated guidance on detainee issues. It reflects the detailed guidance issued to SIS staff in the field and the training we give them.
Torture is illegal and abhorrent under any circumstances, and we have nothing whatsoever to do with it. If we know or believe action by us will lead to torture
taking place, we’re required by UK and international law to avoid that action. And we do, even though that allows the terrorist activity to go ahead.
Some may question this, but we are clear that it’s the right thing to do. It makes us strive all the harder to find different ways, consistent with human rights, to get
the outcome we want.
Other countries respect our approach on these issues. Even where we find deep differences of culture and tradition, we can make progress, slowly but surely, by
seeking careful assurances and providing skilled training.
I also welcome the prime minister’s initiative in setting up the Gibson Inquiry into the detainee issue. If there are more lessons to be learned, we want to learn
them.
And, after 9/11, the terrorist threat was immediate and paramount. We are accused by some people not of committing torture ourselves but of being too close to
it in our efforts to keep Britain safe.
Let me say this: SIS is a Service that reflects our country. Integrity is the first of the service’s values.
I am confident that, in their efforts to keep Britain safe, all SIS staff acted with the utmost integrity, and with a close eye on basic decency and moral principles.
So, back to that reader’s letter in The Times.
The recent debate about secrecy reflects two concerns. First, national security, and the need for the intelligence and security agencies to work in secret to
protect British interests and our way of life from those who threaten it.
And second, the need for justice – the rights of citizens to raise complaint against the government and get a fair hearing.
As a public servant, and as a citizen, I devoutly want both objectives upheld, and not to have one undermine the other.
The judges have to determine what constitutes a fair trial.
We in the intelligence and security agencies have to make sure that our secrets don’t become available to those who are threatening our country. And we have
to protect our partners secrets.
As the prime minister said in parliament, at present we’re unable to use secret material in court with confidence that the material will be protected.
The government has promised a green paper to set out some better options for dealing with national security issues in the courts, and I look forward to that.
Part of sustaining public confidence in the intelligence services is debate about the principles and value of intelligence work.
And the purpose of today is to explain what we in SIS do and why we do it. Why our work is important, and why we can’t work in the open. A lot is at stake.
Secret organisations need to stay secret, even if we present an occasional public face, as I am doing today. If our operations and methods become public, they
won’t work.
Agents take risks. They will not work with SIS, will not pass us the secrets they hold, unless they can trust us not to expose them.
Foreign partners need to have certainty that what they tell us will remain secret – not just most of the time, but always.
Without the trust of agents, the anonymity of our staff, the confidence of partners, we would not get the intelligence. The lives of everyone living here would be
less safe. The United Kingdom would be more vulnerable to the unexpected, the vicious and the extreme.
Secrecy is not a dirty word. Secrecy is not there as a cover up. Secrecy plays a crucial part in keeping Britain safe and secure.
And without secrecy, there would be no intelligence services, or indeed other national assets like our Special Forces. Our nation would be more exposed as a
result.
Without secrecy, we can’t tackle threats at source. We would be forced to defend ourselves on the goal-line, on our borders. And it’s more than obvious that the
dangers of terrorism, nuclear proliferation and cyber attack are not much impressed by international borders.
Ladies and gentlemen, the remarkable men and women who make up the staff of SIS are among the most loyal, dedicated and innovative in the entire public
service.
We ask more of them than we do of any other public servants not in uniform. Exceptional people, doing extraordinary things for their country.
Our people can’t and don’t talk about what they do. They receive recognition for their achievements only within the confines of the service.
You don’t know them, but I do. It is an honour to lead them.
Vote of thanks by David Schlesinger, Editor-in-Chief, Reuters
There is a natural tension between the keepers of secrets and the revealers of secrets. And yet, the two sides of the seeming divide have much in common, too -
we both assemble facts and impressions into narrative, spinning tales to make sense of the world and provide insight. In that spirit, this has been an important
and remarkable morning; one that I hope starts a lasting dialogue. I would like to thanks Sir John Sawers and his office for making this possible, the Society of
Editors for being a beacon of openness and my colleagues at Reuters news and Thomson Reuters for all the arrangements.

November 2nd, 2010

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

A nice speech on the value in serving your country . . . .

Lecture at Duke University (All-Volunteer Force)

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Durham, North Carolina, Wednesday, September 29, 2010

Thank you President Brodhead for that very generous introduction and thank you for your warm welcome.  It’s a relief to be back on a university campus and not have to worry about football.  The first fall I was President of Texas A&M, I had to fire a longtime football coach.  I told the media at the time that I had overthrown the governments of medium-sized countries with less controversy.

I’d be remiss in not pointing out one major connection between Duke and the military – that Mike Krzyzewski attended, played for, and later coached at West Point.  Earlier this year the Duke Basketball team came to Washington to receive President Obama’s congratulations for the NCAA championship.  Coach K also brought the team by the Pentagon to see the 9/11 memorial and meet with some of the men and women in uniform.  I think I can speak for everyone they saw in saying that the visit was much appreciated.

For the undergraduates here, I know you’re well-accustomed to the challenge of staying awake through long lectures.  I promise I won’t test your endurance too much this evening.  It does remind me though of the time when George Bernard Shaw told a famous orator he had 15 minutes to speak.  The orator protested, “How can I possibly tell them all I know in 15 minutes?”  Shaw replied, “I advise you to speak slowly”.

As a former university president, visiting a college campus carries a special meaning for me.  It was not that long ago that my days and duties were made up of things like fundraising, admissions policies, student and faculty parking, dealing with the state legislature, alumni, deans, and the faculty.  In that latter case, as a number of college presidents have learned the hard way, when it comes to dealing with faculty – and I would say especially tenured faculty– it’s either be nice or be gone.

Some of my warmest memories of Texas A&M are of walking around the 48,000 student campus and talking to students – most of them between 18 and 24 years old – seeing them out on their bikes, even occasionally studying and going to class.  For nearly four years now, I have been in a job that also makes me responsible for the well-being of an larger number of young people in the same 18- to 24-year old age group.

But instead of wearing J-Crew they wear body armor.  Instead of carrying book bags they are carrying assault rifles.  And a number of them – far too many– will not come home to their parents.

These young men and women – all of whom joined knowing what would be asked of them – represent the tip of the spear of a military that has been at war for nearly a decade – the longest sustained combat in American history.  The Iraq and Afghan campaigns represent the first protracted, large-scale conflicts since our Revolutionary War fought entirely by volunteers.  Indeed, no major war in our history has been fought with a smaller percentage of this country’s citizens in uniform full-time – roughly 2.4 million active and reserve service members out of a country of over 300 million, less than one percent.

This tiny sliver of America has achieved extraordinary things under the most trying circumstances.  It is the most professional, the best educated, the most capable force this country has ever sent into battle.  Yet even as we appreciate, and sometimes marvel at, the performance of this all-volunteer force, I think it important at this time – before this audience – to recognize that this success has come at significant cost.  Above all, the human cost, for the troops and their families.  But also cultural, social, and financial costs in terms of the relationship between those in uniform and the wider society they have sworn to protect.

So for the next few minutes, I’d like to discuss the state of America’s all-volunteer force, reflecting on its achievements while at the same time considering the dilemmas and consequences that go with having so few fighting our wars for so long.  These are issues that must be acknowledged, and in some cases dealt with, if we are going to sustain the kind of military America needs in this complex and, I believe, even more dangerous 21st century.

First, some brief historical context.  From America’s founding until the end of World War II, this country maintained small standing armies that would be filled out with mass conscription in the case of war.  Consider that in the late 1930s, even as World War II loomed, the U.S. Army ranked 17th in the world in size, right behind Romania.  That came to an end with the Cold War, when America retained a large, permanent military by continuing to rely on the draft even in peacetime.

Back then, apart from heroism on the battlefield, the act of simply being in the military was nothing extraordinary or remarkable.  It was not considered a sign of uncommon patriotism or character.  It was just something a healthy young man was expected to do if called upon, just as his father and grandfather had likely done in the two world wars.

Among those who ended up in the military in those early years of the Cold War were people like Elvis Presley and Willie Mays, movie stars, future congressmen, and business executives.  The possibility of being drafted encouraged many to sign up so they could have more control over their fate.  As I can speak from personal experience, the reality of military service – and whether to embrace it, avoid it, or delay it – was something most American men at some point had to confront.

The ethos of service, reinforced by the strong arm of compulsion, extended to elite settings as well.  A prominent military historian once noted that of his roughly 750 classmates in the Princeton University class of 1956, more than 400 went on to some form of military service – a group that included a future Harvard President, a governor of Delaware, and Pulitzer Prize winning reporter for the New York Times.  That same year, more than 1,000 cadets were trained by Stanford University’s ROTC program.

The controversy associated with the Vietnam War and the bitterness over who avoided the draft and who did not, led to a number of major changes in our military and in American society.  One of them was the end of conscription and the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force under President Nixon.

Over the past four decades, after a difficult transition period during the 1970s, the all-volunteer experiment has proven to be a remarkable success.  The doubts – and there were many inside and outside the military – were largely overcome.  Indeed, the United States would not be able to sustain complex, protracted missions like Iraq and Afghanistan at such a high standard of military performance without the dedication of seasoned professionals who chose to serve – and keep on serving.  Whatever shortcomings there may have been in Iraq and Afghanistan stemmed from failures and miscalculations at the top, not those doing the fighting and the leading on the ground.  It has taken every ounce of our troops’ skill, initiative and commitment to battle a cunning and adaptive enemy at the front while overcoming bureaucratic lassitude and sometimes worse at the rear.

A key factor in this success is experience.  Consider that, according to one study, in 1969 less than 20 percent of enlisted Army soldiers had more than four years of experience.  Today, it is more than 50 percent.  Going back to compulsory service, in addition to being politically impossible, is highly impractical given the kinds of technical skills, experience, and attributes needed to be successful on the battlefield in the 21st century.  For that reason, reinstituting the draft is overwhelmingly opposed by the military’s leadership.

Nonetheless, we should not ignore the broader, long-term consequences of waging these protracted military campaigns employing – and re-employing – such a small portion of our society in the effort.

First, as a result of the multiple deployments and hardships associated with Afghanistan and Iraq, large swaths of the military – especially our ground combat forces and their families – are under extraordinary stress.  The all volunteer force conceived in the 1970s was designed to train, prepare, and deploy for a major – and quick – conventional conflict – either against the Soviet Union on the plains of Central Europe or a contingency such as the first gulf war against Iraq in 1991.  In that instance – and I remember it well as I was Deputy National Security Advisor at the time – more than half a million U.S. troops were deployed, fought, and mostly returned home within one year.

By contrast, the recent post-9/11 campaigns have required prolonged, persistent combat and support from across the military.  Since the invasion of Iraq, more than 1 million soldiers and Marines have been deployed into the fight.  The Navy has put nearly 100,000 sailors on the ground while maintaining its sea commitments around the globe.  And the Air Force, by one count, has been at war since 1991, when it first began enforcing the no-fly zone over Iraq.

U.S. troops and their families have held up remarkably well given the demands and pressures placed upon them.  With the exception of the Army during the worst stretch of the Iraq war, when it fell short of recruiting targets and some measures of quality declined, all of the services have consistently met their active recruiting and retention goals.  In some cases the highest propensity to re-enlist is found in units that are in the fight.  When I visited Camp Lejeune last year – a Marine Corps base about 150 miles from Durham – an officer told me about one unit whose assignment was switched from Japan to Afghanistan.  As a result, about 100 Marines who were planning to get out of the military decided to sign up again so they could deploy with their buddies.

The camaraderie and commitment is real.  But so is the strain.  On troops, and especially on their families.  I know – I hear it directly during my trips to Army and Marine bases across this country, where spouses and children have had their resilience tested by the long and frequent absences of a father, mother, husband or wife.

There are a number of consequences that stem from the pressure repeated of deployments – especially when a service member returns home sometimes permanently changed by their experience.  These consequences include more anxiety and disruption inflicted on children, increased domestic strife and a corresponding rising divorce rate, which in the case of Army enlisted has nearly doubled since the wars began.  And, most tragically, a growing number of suicides.

While we often speak generally of a force under stress, in reality, it is certain parts of the military that have borne the brunt of repeat deployments and exposure to fire – above all, junior and mid-level officers and sergeants in ground combat and support specialties.  These young men and women have seen the complex, grueling, maddening face of asymmetric warfare in the 21st century up close.  They’ve lost friends and comrades.  Some are struggling psychologically with what they’ve seen, and heard and felt on the battlefield.  And yet they keep coming back.

This cadre of young regular and non-commissioned officers represents the most battle-tested, innovative and impressive generation of military leaders this country has produced in a very long time.  These are the people we need to retain and lead the armed forces in the future.  But no matter how patriotic, how devoted they are, at some point they will want to have the semblance of a normal life – getting married, starting a family, going to college or graduate school, seeing their children grow up – all of which they have justly earned.

Measures such as growing the size of the Army and Marines, increasing what we call “dwell time” at home, drawing down in Iraq, and beginning a gradual transition next year in Afghanistan should reduce this stress over time.  Properly funded support programs to help troops and families under duress – the kind championed by our First Lady – can also make a difference.   But in reality, the demands on a good part of our military will continue for years to come.  And, it begs the question:  How long can these brave and broad young shoulders carry the burden that we – as a military, as a government, as a society – continue to place on them?

There is also a question – and it is an uncomfortable and politically fraught question – of the growing financial costs associated with an all-volunteer force.  Just over the past decade – fueled by increasing health costs, pay raises, and wartime recruiting and retention bonuses – the amount of money the military spends on personnel and benefits has nearly doubled:  From roughly $90 billion in 2001 to just over $170 billion this year out of a $534 billion budget.  The health care component has grown even faster, from $19 billion a decade ago to more than $50 billion this year, a portion of that total going to working-age retirees whose premiums and co-pays have not been increased in some 15 years.

To be clear, we must spare no expense to compensate or care for those who have served and suffered on the battlefield.  That is our sacred obligation.  But given the enormous fiscal pressures facing the country, there is no avoiding the challenge this government, indeed this country faces, to come up with an equitable and sustainable system of military pay and benefits that reflects the realities of this century.  A system generous enough to recruit and retain the people we need and to do right by those who’ve served – but not one that puts the Department of Defense on the same path as other industrial age organizations that sank under the weight of their personnel costs.

The political resistance to confronting these costs is understandable, given the American people’s gratitude towards their countrymen who have chosen to serve.  The nation has come a long way from the late 1960s and early 1970s, when too many returning Vietnam veterans were met with sullen indifference and often much worse – especially in cosmopolitan or academic enclaves.  Today, in airports all over the country, troops returning or leaving for Afghanistan or Iraq receive standing ovations from other passengers.  Welcome home parades, letters and care-packages, free meals, drinks, and sports tickets – all heartfelt signs of appreciation large and small that bridge the political divide.  Veterans of our wars are also welcomed to campuses all across America as they return to school.

It is also true, however, that whatever their fond sentiments for men and women in uniform, for most Americans the wars remain an abstraction.  A distant and unpleasant series of news items that does not affect them personally.  Even after 9/11, in the absence of a draft, for a growing number of Americans, service in the military, no matter how laudable, has become something for other people to do.  In fact, with each passing decade fewer and fewer Americans know someone with military experience in their family or social circle.  According to one study, in 1988 about 40 percent of 18 year olds had a veteran parent.  By 2000 the share had dropped to 18 percent, and is projected to fall below 10 percent in the future.

In broad demographic terms, the Armed Forces continue to be largely representative of the country as a whole – drawing predominantly from America’s working and middle classes.  There are disparities when it comes to the racial composition of certain specialties and ranks, especially the most senior officers.  But in all, the fears expressed when the all-volunteer force was first instituted – that the only people left willing to serve would be the poorest, the worst educated, the least able to get any other job – simply did not come to pass.  As I alluded to earlier, that group would be hard pressed to make it into a force that is, on average, the most educated in history.  Where virtually all new enlistees have a high school diploma or equivalent – about 15 percent more than their civilian peers – and nearly all officers have bachelors’ degrees, many have Masters, and a surprising number, like General David Petraeus, have PhDs.  At the same time, an ever growing portion of America’s 17 to 24 year olds – about 75% – are simply ineligible or unavailable to serve for a variety of reasons – but above all health and weight problems in an age of spiraling childhood obesity.

Having said that, the nearly four decades of all-volunteer force has reinforced a series of demographic, cultural, and institutional shifts affecting who is most likely to serve and from where.  Studies have shown that one of the biggest factors in propensity to join the military is growing up near those who have or are serving.  In this country, that propensity to serve is most pronounced in the South and the Mountain West, and in rural areas and small towns nationwide – a propensity that well exceeds these communities’ portion of the population as a whole.  Concurrently, the percentage of the force from the Northeast, the West Coast, and major cities continues to decline.  I am also struck by how many young troops I meet grew up in military families, and by the large number of our senior officers whose children are in uniform – including the recent commander of all U.S. Forces in Iraq whose son was seriously wounded in the war.

The military’s own basing and recruiting decisions have reinforced this growing concentration among certain regions and families.  With limited resources, the services focus their recruiting efforts on candidates where they are most likely to have success – with those who have friends, classmates, and parents who have already served.  In addition, global basing changes in recent years have moved a significant percentage of the Army to posts in just five states:  Texas, Washington, Georgia, Kentucky, and here in North Carolina.  For otherwise rational environmental and budgetary reasons, many military facilities in the northeast and on the west coast have been shut down, leaving a void of relationships and understanding of the armed forces in their wake.

This trend also affects the recruiting and educating of new officers.  The state of Alabama, with a population of less than 5 million, has 10 Army ROTC host programs.  The Los Angeles metro area, population over 12 million, has four host ROTC programs.  And the Chicago metro area, population 9 million, has 3.  It makes sense to focus on places where space is ample and inexpensive, where candidates are most inclined sign up and pursue a career in uniform.  But there is a risk over time of developing a cadre of military leaders that politically, culturally, and geographically have less and less in common with the people they have sworn to defend.

I’d like to close by speaking about another narrow sliver of our population, those attending and graduating from our nation’s most selective and academically demanding universities, such as Duke.  In short, students like many of you.  Over the past generation many commentators have lamented the absence of ROTC from the Ivy League and other selective universities.  Institutions that used to send hundreds of graduates into the armed forces, but now struggle to commission a handful of officers every year.  University faculty and administrators banned ROTC from many elite campuses during the Vietnam War and continued to bar the military based on the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell law – with Duke being a notable and admirable exception with your three host programs.  I am encouraged that several other comparable universities – with the urging of some of their most prominent alumni, including the President of the United States – are at least re-considering their position on military recruiting and officer training – a situation that has been neither good for the academy or the country.

But a return of ROTC back to some of these campuses will not do much good without the willingness of our nation’s most gifted students to step forward.  Men and women such as you.

One does not need to look too hard to find Duke exemplars of selflessness and sacrifice.  Consider the story of Jonathan Kuniholm, currently a Duke graduate student in biomedical engineering, who lost part of his arm as Marine reservist in Iraq.  Now he is putting his experience and expertise to work designing new prosthetics – work that will help other amputees in and out of uniform.

There is Eric Greitens, class of 1996, Rhodes Scholar, Navy Seal.  After narrowly missing injury himself during a mission in Iraq, he came back home and founded the nonprofit “The Mission Continues” to help wounded troops and veterans continue serving in some capacity.

And last year, when it came time to reshape and reform the half-trillion dollar enterprise known as the Department of Defense, the person whose counsel I relied on to make the toughest budget decisions was Lieutenant General Emo Gardner,  career Marine Corps aviator, Duke class of 1973.

No doubt, when it comes to military service, one can’t hide from the downsides:  The frustration of grappling with a huge, and frequently obtuse bureaucracy.  Frequent moves to places that aren’t exactly tourist destinations or cultural hubs.  Separation from loved ones.  The fatigue, loneliness and fear on a distant dusty outpost thousands of miles from home.  And then there is the danger and the risk.

Next to the sidewalk between your chapel and the divinity school there is an unobtrusive stone wall.  For decades the only names on it were your alumni killed in World War II.  Last October 54 names were added to the wall for those Duke men and women who died in the wars since then, including two who made the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq.

Matthew Lynch, class of 2001, champion swimmer, following in his father’s footsteps as a United States Marine.

And, James Regan, class of 2002, son of an investment banker who turned down offers from a financial services firm and a law [school] to join the army rangers.

But beyond the hardship and heartbreak – and they are real – there is another side to military service.  That is the opportunity to be given extraordinary responsibility at a young age – not just for lives of your troops, but for missions and decisions that may change the course of history.  In addition to being in the fight, our young military leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan, have to one degree or another found themselves dealing with development, governance, agriculture, health, and diplomacy.  They’ve done all this at an age when many of their peers are reading spreadsheets and making photocopies.  And that is why, I should add, they are often in such high demand with future employers and go on to do great things  in every walk of life.

So I would encourage you and all young Americans, especially those at the most selective universities who may not have considered the military, to do so.  To go outside your comfort zone and take a risk in every sense of the word.  To expand what you thought you were capable of doing when it comes to leadership, responsibility, agility, selflessness, and above all, courage.

For those for whom military service is neither possible nor the right thing for whatever reason, please consider how you can give back to the country that has given us all so much.  Think about what you can do to earn your freedom – freedom paid for by those whose names are on that Duke wall and in veterans’ cemeteries across this country and across the world.

I would leave you with one of my favorite quotes from John Adams.  In a letter that he sent to his son, he wrote, “Public business, my son, must always be done by somebody.  It will be done by somebody or another.  If wise men decline it, others will not; if honest men refuse it, others will not.”

Will the wise and honest here at Duke come help us do the public business of America?  Because, if America’s best and brightest young people will not step forward, who then can we count on to protect and sustain the greatness of this country in the 21st century?

Thank you.

October 28th, 2010

Nuclear energy – A survey of small reactors

Cast aside in the USA and Russia for a few decades, nucelar power is emerging as a very viable and attractive option for

base load power . . .

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf33.html

Small Nuclear Power Reactors

(Updated 12 October 2010)

  • There is revival of interest in small and simpler units for generating electricity from nuclear power, and for process heat.
  • This interest in small and medium nuclear power reactors is driven both by a desire to reduce capital costs and to provide power away from large grid systems.
  • The technologies involved are very diverse.

As nuclear power generation has become established since the 1950s, the size of reactor units has grown from 60 MWe to more than 1600 MWe, with corresponding economies of scale in operation. At the same time there have been many hundreds of smaller power reactors built both for naval use (up to 190 MW thermal) and as neutron sourcesa, yielding enormous expertise in the engineering of small units. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines ‘small’ as under 300 MWe, and up to 700 MWe as ‘medium’ – including many operational units from 20th century. Together they are now referred to as small and medium reactors (SMRs). This paper focuses on advanced designs in the small category, i.e. those now being built for the first time or still on the drawing board

Today, due partly to the high capital cost of large power reactors generating electricity via the steam cycle and partly to the need to service small electricity grids under about 4 GWe,b there is a move to develop smaller units. These may be built independently or as modules in a larger complex, with capacity added incrementally as required (see section below onModular construction using small reactor units). Economies of scale are provided by the numbers produced. There are also moves to develop small units for remote sites.

Generally, modern small reactors for power generation are expected to have greater simplicity of design, economy of mass production, and reduced siting costs. Most are also designed for a high level of passive or inherent safety in the event of malfunctionc. A 2010 report by a special committee convened by the American Nuclear Society showed that many safety provisions necessary, or at least prudent, in large reactors are not necessary in the small designs forthcomingd.

A 2009 assessment by the IAEA under its Innovative Nuclear Power Reactors & Fuel Cycle (INPRO) program concluded that there could be 96 small modular reactors (SMRs) in operation around the world by 2030 in its ‘high’ case, and 43 units in the ‘low’ case, none of them in the USA.

The most advanced modular project is in China, where Chinergy is preparing to build the 210 MWe HTR-PM, which consists of twin 250 MWt reactors. In South Africa, Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (Pty) Limited and Eskom had been developing the pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR) of 200 MWt (80 MWe), but funding for this project has been stopped. A US group led by General Atomics is developing another design – the gas turbine modular helium reactor (GT-MHR) – with 600 MWt (285 MWe) modules driving a gas turbine directly, using helium as a coolant and operating at very high temperatures. All three are high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTRs) which build on the experience of several innovative reactors in the 1960s and 1970s.

Another significant line of development is in very small fast reactors of under 50 MWe. Some are conceived for areas away from transmission grids and with small loads; others are designed to operate in clusters in competition with large units.

Already operating in a remote corner of Siberia are four small units at the Bilibino co-generation plant. These four 62 MWt (thermal) units are an unusual graphite-moderated boiling water design with water/steam channels through the moderator. They produce steam for district heating and 11 MWe (net) electricity each. They have performed well since 1976, much more cheaply than fossil fuel alternatives in the Arctic region.

Also in the small reactor category are the Indian 220 MWe pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs) based on Canadian technology, and the Chinese 300-325 MWe PWR such as built at Qinshan Phase I and at Chashma in Pakistan, and now called CNP-300. These designs are not detailed in this paper simply because they are well-established. The Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) is now focusing on 540 MWe and 700 MWe versions of its PHWR, and is offering both 220 and 540 MWe versions internationally. These small established designs are relevant to situations requiring small to medium units, though they are not state of the art technology.

Other, mostly larger new designs are described in the information page on Advanced Nuclear Power Reactors.

Medium and Small (25 MWe up) reactors with development well advanced

Name Capacity Type Developer
KLT-40S 35 MWe PWR OKBM, Russia
VK-300 300 MWe PWR Atomenergoproekt, Russia
CAREM 27 MWe PWR CNEA & INVAP, Argentina
IRIS 100-335 MWe PWR Westinghouse-led, international
mPower 125 MWe PWR Babcock & Wilcox, USA
SMART 100 MWe PWR KAERI, South Korea
NuScale 45 MWe PWR NuScale Power, USA
HTR-PM 2×105 MWe HTR INET & Huaneng, China
PBMR 80 MWe HTR Eskom, South Africa
GT-MHR 285 MWe HTR General Atomics (USA), Rosatom (Russia)
BREST 300 MWe LMR RDIPE, Russia
SVBR-100 100 MWe LMR Rosatom/En+, Russia
FUJI 100 MWe MSR ITHMSO, Japan-Russia-USA

Light water reactors

US experience of small light water reactors (LWRs) has been of very small military power plants, such as the 11 MWt, 1.5 MWe (net) PM-3A reactor which operated at McMurdo Sound in Antarctica 1962-72, generating a total of 78 million kWh. There was also an Army program for small reactor development, and some successful small reactors from the main national program commenced in the 1950s. One was the Big Rock Point BWR of 67 MWe which operated for 35 years to 1997.

Of the following designs, the KLT and VBER have conventional pressure vessels plus external steam generators (PV/loop design). The others mostly have the steam supply system inside the reactor pressure vessel (‘integral’ PWR design). All have enhanced safety features relative to current LWRs.

KLT-40S

Russia’s KLT-40S from OKBM Afrikantov is a reactor well proven in icebreakers and now proposed for wider use in desalination and, on barges, for remote area power supply. Here a 150 MWt unit produces 35 MWe (gross) as well as up to 35 MW of heat for desalination or district heating (or 38.5 MWe gross if power only). These are designed to run 3-4 years between refuelling with on-board refuelling capability and used fuel storage. At the end of a 12-year operating cycle the whole plant is taken to a central facility for overhaul and storage of used fuel. Two units will be mounted on a 20,000 tonne barge to allow for outages (70% capacity factor).

Although the reactor core is normally cooled by forced circulation, the design relies on convection for emergency cooling. Fuel is uranium aluminium silicide with enrichment levels of up to 20%, giving up to four-year refuelling intervals.

The first floating nuclear power plant, the Akademik Lomonosov, commenced construction in 2007 and is planned to be located near to Vilyuchinsk. The plant is due to be completed in 2011.2

RITM-200

OKBM Afrikantov is developing a new icebreaker reactor – RITM-200 – to replace the KLT reactors and to serve in floating nuclear power plants. This is an integral 210 MWt, 55 MWe PWR with inherent safety features. A single compact RITM-200 could replace twin KLT-40S (but yielding less total power). A major challenge is the reliability of steam generators and associated equipment which are much less accessible when inside the reactor pressure vessel.

VBER-150, VBER-300

A larger Russian factory-built and barge-mounted unit (requiring a 12,000 tonne vessel) is the VBER-150, of 350 MWt, 110 MWe. It has modular construction and is derived by OKBM from naval designs, with two steam generators. Uranium oxide fuel enriched to 4.7% has burnable poison; it has low burn-up (31 GWd/t average, 41.6 GWd/t maximum) and eight-year refuelling interval.

OKBM Afrikantov’s larger VBER-300 PWR is a 295 MWe unit, the first of which is planned to be built in Kazakhstan. It was originally envisaged in pairs as a floating nuclear power plant, displacing 49,000 tonnes. As a cogeneration plant it is rated at 200 MWe and 1900 GJ/hr. The reactor is designed for 60-year life and 90% capacity factor. It has four steam generators and a cassette core with 85 fuel assemblies enriched to 5% and 48 GWd/tU burn-up. Versions with three and two steam generators are also envisaged, of 230 and 150 MWe respectively. Also, with more sophisticated and higher-enriched (18%) fuel in the core, the refuelling interval can be pushed from two years out to 15 years with burn-up to 125 GWd/tU. A 2006 joint venture between Atomstroyexport and Kazatomprom sets this up for development as a basic power source in Kazakhstan, then for exporte.

VK-300

Another larger Russian reactor is the VK-300 boiling water reactor being developed specifically for cogeneration of both power and district heating or heat for desalination (150 MWe plus 1675 GJ/hr) by the N.A. Dollezhal Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (NIKIET). It has evolved from the 50 MWe (net) VK-50 BWR at Dimitrovgradf, but uses standard components wherever possible, and fuel elements similar to the VVER. Cooling is passive, by convection, and all safety systems are passive. Fuel burn-up is 41 GWd/tU. It is capable of producing 250 MWe if solely electrical. In September 2007 it was announced that six would be built at Kola and at Primorskaya in the far east, to start operating 2017-20.3

VKT-12

A smaller Russian BWR design is the 12 MWe transportable VKT-12, described as similar to the VK-50 prototype BWR at Dimitrovgrad, with one loop. It has a ceramic-metal core with uranium enriched to 2.4-4.8%, and 10-year refuelling interval. The reactor vessel is 2.4m inside diameter and 4.9 m high.

ABV

A smaller Russian OKBM Afrikantov PWR unit under development is the ABV, with a range of sizes from 45 MWt (ABV-6M ) down to 18 MWt (ABV-3), giving 4-18 MWe outputs. The units are compact, with integral steam generator. The whole unit will be factory-produced for ground or barge mounting – the ABV-6M would require a 3500 tonne barge; the ABV-3, 1600 tonne. The core is similar to that of the KLT-40 except that enrichment is 16.5% and average burn-up 95 GWd/t. Refuelling interval is about 8-10 years, and service life about 50 years.

CAREM

The CAREM reactor being developed by INVAP in Argentinag, under contract to the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA), is a modular 100 MWt (27 MWe) pressurised water reactor with integral steam generators designed to be used for electricity generation or as a research reactor or for water desalination (with 8 MWe in cogeneration configuration). CAREM has its entire primary coolant system within the reactor pressure vessel, self-pressurised and relying entirely on convection. Fuel is standard 3.4% enriched PWR fuel, with burnable poison, and is refuelled annually. It is a mature design which could be deployed within a decade, and scaled up to 300 MWe or more. The prototype is to be built in the northwestern Formosa province of Argentina4.

SMART

On a larger scale, South Korea’s SMART (System-integrated Modular Advanced Reactor) is a 330 MWt pressurised water reactor with integral steam generators and advanced safety features. It is designed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) for generating electricity (up to 100 MWe) and/or thermal applications such as seawater desalination. Design life is 60 years, with a three-year refuelling cycle. While the basic design is complete, the absence of any orders for an initial reference unit has stalled development. KAERI is now intending to proceed to licensing the design by 2012.

MRX

The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) designed the MRX, a small (50-300 MWt) integral PWR reactor for marine propulsion or local energy supply (30 MWe). The entire plant would be factory-built. It has conventional 4.3% enriched PWR uranium oxide fuel with a 3.5-year refuelling interval and has a water-filled containment to enhance safety. Little has been heard of it since the start of the Millennium.

NP-300

Technicatome (Areva TA) in France has developed the NP-300 PWR from submarine power plants and aimed it at export markets for power, heat and desalination. It has passive safety systems and can be built for applications of 100 to 300 MWe or more with up to 500,000 m3/day desalination. Areva TA makes the K15 naval reactor of 150 MW, running on low-enriched fuel, and the land-based equivalent: Réacteur d’essais à terre (RES) a test version of which is under construction at Cadarache.

NHR-200

The Chinese NHR-200 (Nuclear Heating Reactor), developed by Tsingua University’s Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology (now the Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology), is a simple 200 MWt integral PWR design for district heating or desalination. It is based on the NHR-5 which was commissioned in 1989, and runs at lower temperature than the above designsh. Used fuel is stored around the core in the pressure vessel. In 2008, the Chinese government was reported to have agreed to build a multi-effect distillation (MED) desalination plant using this on the Shandong peninsula.

IRIS

Westinghouse’s IRIS (International Reactor Innovative & Secure) is an advanced 3rd generation reactor. A 335 MWe capacity is proposed, although it could be scaled down to around 100 MWe. IRIS is a modular pressurised water reactor with integral primary coolant system and circulation by convection. Fuel is similar to present LWRs and (at least for the 335 MWe version) fuel assemblies are identical to those in AP1000, according to Westinghouse. Enrichment is 5% with burnable poison and fuelling interval of four years (or longer with higher enrichment). US design certification is at the pre-application state.

mPower

In mid-2009, Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) announced its B&W mPower reactor, a 125 MWe integral PWR designed to be factory-made and railed to sitei. The reactor pressure vessel containing core of 2×2 metres and steam generator is thus only 3.6 metres diameter and 22 m high, and the whole unit 4.5 m diameter and 23 m high. It would be installed below ground, have an air-cooled condenser giving 31% thermal efficiency, and passive safety systems. With cold water source for condensers the efficiency increases and capacity is up to 136 MWe. The integral steam generator is derived from naval designs, as is the control rod set-up. It has a “conventional core and standard fuel”j (< 20 t) enriched to 5%, with burnable poisons, to give a five-year operating cycle between refuelling, which will involve replacing the entire core as a single cartridge. Burn-up is less than 40 GWd/t. (B&W draws upon over 50 years experience in manufacturing nuclear propulsion systems for the US Navy, involving compact reactors with long core life.) A 60-year service life is envisaged, as sufficient used fuel storage would be built on site for this.

The mPower reactor is modular in the sense that several units would be combined into a power station of any size, but most likely 500-750 MWe and using 250 MWe turbine generators (also shipped as complete modules), constructed in three years. B&W’s present manufacturing capability in North America can produce these units, and it has set up B&W Modular Nuclear Energy LLC to market the design. The company intends to apply for design certification in mid-2012, with a view to a combined construction and operating licence application in 2013, construction start in 2015 and operation of the first unit in 2018.

When B&W announced the launch the mPower design, it said that Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) would begin the process of evaluating Clinch River at Oak Ridge as a potential lead site for the mPower reactor, and that a Memorandum of Understanding has been signed by B&W, TVA and a consortium of regional municipal and cooperative utilities to explore the construction of a fleet of mPower reactors. It was later reported that the other signatories of the agreement are First Energy and Oglethorpe Power5.

NuScale

A smaller unit is the NuScale multi-application small PWR, a 160 MWt or 45 MWe integral PWR which is apparently similar to IRIS but with natural circulation. It will be factory-built with 3 metre diameter pressure vessel and convection cooling, with the only moving parts being the control rod drives. It uses standard PWR fuel enriched to < 4.95% in normal PWR fuel assemblies (but which are only 1.8 m long), with 24-month refuelling cycle. Installed in a water-filled pool below ground, the 4.3 m diameter, 18 m high cylindrical containment vessel module weighs 450 tonnes and contains the reactor and steam generator. A standard power plant would have 12 modules together giving about 500 MWe. An overhead crane would hoist each module from its pool to a separate part of the plant for refueling.

An application for US design certification is expected early in 2012 and there are hopes for a first operating unit in 2018. The NuScale Power company was spun out of Oregon Sate University in 2007, though the technology originates in the US Department of Energy. The company estimates in 2010 that overnight capital cost for a 12-module, 540 MWe NuScale plant is about $4000 per kilowatt.

TRIGA

The TRIGA Power System is a PWR concept based on General Atomics’ well-proven research reactor design. It is conceived as a 64 MWt, 16.4 MWe pool-type system operating at a relatively low temperature. The secondary coolant is perfluorocarbon. The fuel is uranium-zirconium hydride enriched to 20% and with a little burnable poison and requiring refuelling every 18 months. Used fuel is stored inside the reactor vessel.

High-temperature gas-cooled reactors

Building on the experience of several innovative reactors built in the 1960s and 1970sk, new high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTRs) are being developed which will be capable of delivering high temperature (up to about 1000°C) helium either for industrial application via a heat exchanger, or to make steam conventionally via a steam generator, or directly to drive a Brayton cycle gas turbine for electricity with almost 50% thermal efficiency possible (efficiency increases around 1.5% with each 50°C increment). Improved metallurgy and technology developed in the last decade makes HTRs more practical than in the past, though the direct cycle means that there must be high integrity of fuel and reactor components. All but one of those described below have neutron moderation, one is a fast neutron reactor.

Fuel for these reactors is in the form of TRISO (tristructural-isotropic) particles less than a millimetre in diameter. Each has a kernel (ca. 0.5 mm) of uranium oxycarbide (or uranium dioxide), with the uranium enriched up to 20% U-235, though normally less. This is surrounded by layers of carbon and silicon carbide, giving a containment for fission products which is stable to over 1600°C.

There are two ways in which these particles are arranged: in blocks – hexagonal ‘prisms’ of graphite, or in billiard ball-sized pebbles of graphite encased in silicon carbide, each with about 15,000 fuel particles and 9g uranium. There is a greater amount of used fuel than from the same capacity in a light water reactor. The moderator is graphite.

HTRs can potentially use thorium-based fuels, such as highly-enriched or low-enriched uranium with Th, U-233 with Th, and Pu with Th. Most of the experience with thorium fuels has been in HTRs (see information paper on Thorium).

With negative temperature coefficient of reactivity (the fission reaction slows as temperature increases) and passive decay heat removal, the reactors are inherently safe. HTRs therefore do not require any containment building for safety. They are sufficiently small to allow factory fabrication, and will usually be installed below ground level.

Three HTR designs in particular – PBMR, GT-MHR and Antares – are contenders for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) project in the USA (see Next Generation Nuclear Plant section in the information page on US Nuclear Power Policy).

HTTR, GTHTR

Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute’s (JAERI’s) High-Temperature Test Reactor (HTTR) of 30 MWt started up at the end of 1998 and has been run successfully at 850°C for 30 days. In 2004 it achieved 950°C outlet temperature. Its fuel is in prisms and its main purpose is to develop thermochemical means of producing hydrogen from water.

Based on the HTTR, JAERI is developing the Gas Turbine High Temperature Reactor (GTHTR) of up to 600 MWt per module. It uses improved HTTR fuel elements with 14% enriched uranium achieving high burn-up (112 GWd/t). Helium at 850°C drives a horizontal turbine at 47% efficiency to produce up to 300 MWe. The core consists of 90 hexagonal fuel columns 8 metres high arranged in a ring, with reflectors. Each column consists of eight one-metre high elements 0.4 m across and holding 57 fuel pins made up of fuel particles with 0.55 mm diameter kernels and 0.14 mm buffer layer. In each two-yearly refuelling, alternate layers of elements are replaced so that each remains for four years.

HTR-10

China’s HTR-10, a 10 MWt high-temperature gas-cooled experimental reactor at the Institute of Nuclear & New Energy Technology (INET) at Tsinghua University north of Beijing started up in 2000 and reached full power in 2003. It has its fuel as a ‘pebble bed’ (27,000 elements) of oxide fuel with average burn-up of 80 GWday/t U. Each pebble fuel element has 5g of uranium enriched to 17% in around 8300 TRISO-coated particles. The reactor operates at 700°C (potentially 900°C) and has broad research purposes. Eventually it will be coupled to a gas turbine, but meanwhile it has been driving a steam turbine.

In 2004, the small HTR-10 reactor was subject to an extreme test of its safety when the helium circulator was deliberately shut off without the reactor being shut down. The temperature increased steadily, but the physics of the fuel meant that the reaction progressively diminished and eventually died away over three hours. At this stage a balance between decay heat in the core and heat dissipation through the steel reactor wall was achieved, the temperature never exceeded a safe 1600°C, and there was no fuel failure. This was one of six safety demonstration tests conducted then. The high surface area relative to volume, and the low power density in the core, will also be features of the full-scale units (which are nevertheless much smaller than most light water types).

HTR-PM

Construction of a larger version of the HTR-10, China’s HTR-PM, was approved in principle in November 2005, with construction starting in 2010. This was to be a single 200 MWe (450 MWt) unit but will now have twin reactors, each of 250 MWt driving a single 210 MWe steam turbine. The fuel is 9% enriched (520,000 elements) giving 80 GWd/t discharge burn-up. Core outlet temperature is 750ºC. The size was reduced to 250 MWt from earlier 458 MWt modules in order to retain the same core configuration as the prototype HTR-10 and avoid moving to an annular design like South Africa’s PBMR (see section on PBMR below). This 210 MWe Shidaowan demonstration plant at Rongcheng in Shandong province is to pave the way for an 18-unit (3x6x210MWe) full-scale power plant on the same site, also using the steam cycle. Plant life is envisaged as 60 years with 85% load factor.

China Huaneng Group, one of China’s major generators, is the lead organization involved in the demonstration unit with 47.5% share; China Nuclear Engineering & Construction (CNEC) will have a 32.5% stake and Tsinghua University’s INET 20% – it being the main R&D contributor. Projected cost is US$ 430 million (but later units falling to US$1500/kW with generating cost about 5 ¢/kWh). Start-up is scheduled for 2013. The HTR-PM rationale is both eventually to replace conventional reactor technology for power, and also to provide for future hydrogen production. INET is in charge of R&D, and is aiming to increase the size of the 250 MWt module and also utilize thorium in the fuel. Eventually a series of HTRs, possibly with Brayton cycle directly driving the gas turbines, will be factory-built and widely installed throughout China.

Performance of both this and South Africa’s PBMR includes great flexibility in loads (40-100%) without loss of thermal efficiency, and with rapid change in power settings. Power density in the core is about one-tenth of that in a light water reactor, and if coolant circulation ceases the fuel will survive initial high temperatures while the reactor shuts itself down – giving inherent safety. Power control is by varying the coolant pressure, and hence flow. (See also section on Shidaowan HTR-PM in the information page on Nuclear Power in China and the Research and development section in the information page on China’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle.)

PBMR

South Africa’s pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR) draws on German expertise and aims to achieve a step change in safety, economics and proliferation resistance. Full-scale production units were planned to be 400 MWt (165 MWe), the prototype being known as the PBMR Demonstration Power Plant (DPP), which was expected to start construction at Koeberg in 2009 and achieve criticality in 2013. Following a series of delays on the DPP project, it was decided to change to a 200 MWt (80 MWe) design6. Financial constraints led to further delays7 and later, in September 2010, the South African government confirmed it would stop funding the project8.

The earlier plans for the 400 MWt PBMR envisaged a direct cycle (Brayton cycle) gas turbine generator and thermal efficiency about 41%, the helium coolant leaving the bottom of the core at about 900°C and driving a turbine. Power is adjusted by changing the pressure in the system. The helium is passed through a water-cooled pre-cooler and intercooler before being returned to the reactor vessel.

The 200 MWt (80 MWe) later design uses a conventional Rankine cycle, enabling the PBMR to deliver super-heated steam via a steam generator as well as generate electricity. This design “is aimed at steam process heat applications operating at 720°C, which provides the basis for penetrating the nuclear heat market as a viable alternative for carbon-burning, high-emission heat sources.”9 An agreement with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to take forward the R&D on this design was signed in February 2010. MHI had been involved in the project since 2001, having done the basic design and R&D of the helium-driven turbo generator system and core barrel assembly, the major components of the 400 MWt direct-cycle design.

The PBMR has a vertical steel reactor pressure vessel which contains and supports a metallic core barrel, which in turn supports the cylindrical pebble fuel core. This core is surrounded on the side by an outer graphite reflector and on top and bottom by graphite structures which provide similar upper and lower neutron reflection functions. Vertical borings in the side reflector are provided for the reactivity control elements. Some 360,000 fuel pebbles (silicon carbide-coated 9.6% enriched uranium dioxide particles encased in graphite spheres of 60 mm diameter) cycle through the reactor continuously (about six times each) until they are expended after about three years. This means that a reactor would require 12 total fuel loads in its design lifetime.

For more information on the PBMR, see the PBMR section in the information page on Nuclear Power in South Africa.

GT-MHR

A larger US design, the Gas Turbine – Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR), will be built as modules of up to 600 MWt. In its electrical application each would directly drive a gas turbine at 47% thermal efficiency, giving 285 MWe capacity. It can also be used for hydrogen production (100,000 t/yr claimed) and other high temperature process heat applications. The annular core consists of 102 hexagonal fuel element columns of graphite blocks with channels for helium coolant and control rods. Graphite reflector blocks are both inside and around the core. Half the core is replaced every 18 months. Burn-up is up to 220 GWd/t, and coolant outlet temperature is 850°C with a target of 1000°C.

The GT-MHR is being developed by General Atomics in partnership with Russia’s OKBM Afrikantov, supported by Fuji (Japan). Areva was formerly involved. Initially it was to be used to burn pure ex-weapons plutonium at Seversk (Tomsk) in Russia. A burnable poison such as Er-167 is needed for this fuel. The preliminary design stage was completed in 2001, but the program to construct a prototype in Russia has languished since.

General Atomics says that the GT-MHR neutron spectrum is such, and the TRISO fuel is so stable, that the reactor can be powered fully with separated transuranic wastes (neptunium, plutonium, americium and curium) from light water reactor used fuel. The fertile actinides would enable reactivity control and very high burn-up could be achieved with it – over 500 GWd/t – the ‘Deep Burn’ concept. Over 95% of the Pu-239 and 60% of other actinides would be destroyed in a single pass.

A smaller version of the GT-MHR, the Remote-Site Modular Helium Reactor (RS-MHR) of 10-25 MWe has been proposed by General Atomics. The fuel would be 20% enriched and refuelling interval would be 6-8 years.

EM2

In February 2010, General Atomics announced a modified version of its GT-MHR design – the Energy Multiplier Module (EM2). The EM2 is a 500 MWt, 240 MWe helium-cooled fast-neutron HTR operating at 850°C and fuelled with 20 tonnes of used PWR fuel or depleted uranium, plus 22 tonnes of low-enriched uranium (~12% U-235) as starter. Used fuel from this is processed to remove fission products (about 4 tonnes) and the balance is recycled as fuel for subsequent rounds, each time topped up with 4 tonnes of further used PWR fuel. (The means of reprocessing to remove fission products is not specified.) Each refuelling cycle may be as long as 30 years. With repeated recycling the amount of original natural uranium (before use by PWR) used goes up from 0.5% to 50% at about cycle 12. High-level wastes are about 4% of those from PWR on open fuel cycle. A 48% thermal efficiency is claimed, using Brayton cycle. EM2 would also be suitable for process heat applications. The main pressure vessel can be trucked or railed to the site, and installed below ground level.

The company anticipates a 12-year development and licensing period, which is in line with the 80 MWt experimental technology demonstration gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR) in the Generation IV programl.

Antares

Another full-size HTR design is the Antares reactor being put forward by Areva. It is based on the GT-MHR and has also involved Fuji. Reference design is 600 MWt with prismatic block fuel like the GT-MHR. Target core outlet temperature is 1000°C for a very high temperature reactor (VHTR) version, or up to 850°C for the HTR version. It uses an indirect cycle, possibly with a helium-nitrogen mix in the secondary system, removing the possibility of contaminating the generation or hydrogen production plant with radionuclides from the reactor core.

Adams Engine

A small HTR concept is the Adams Atomic Engines’ 10 MWe direct simple Brayton cycle plant with low-pressure nitrogen as the reactor coolant and working fluid, and graphite moderation. The reactor core is a fixed, annular bed with about 80,000 fuel elements each 6 cm diameter and containing approximately 9 grams of heavy metal as TRISO particles, with expected average burn-up of 80 GWd/t. The initial units will provide a reactor core outlet temperature of 800°C and a thermal efficiency near 25%. Power output is controlled by limiting coolant flow. A demonstration plant is proposed for completion after 2018. The Adams Engine is deigned to be competitive with combustion gas turbines.

MTSPNR

A small Russian HTR which was being developed by the N.A. Dollezhal Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (NIKIET) is the modular transportable small power nuclear reactor (MTSPNR) for heat and electricity supply of remote regions. It is described as a single circuit air-cooled HTR with closed cycle gas turbine. It uses 20% enriched fuel and is designed to run for 25 years without refuelling. A twin unit plant delivers 2 MWe and/or 8 GJ/hr. No recent information is available.

Liquid metal-cooled fast neutron reactors

Fast neutron reactors are designed to use the full energy potential of uranium, rather than about one percent of it that conventional power reactors use. They have no moderator, a higher neutron flux and are normally cooled by liquid metal such as sodium, lead, or lead-bismuth, with high conductivity and boiling point. They operate at or near atmospheric pressure and have passive safety features (most have convection circulating the primary coolant). Automatic power regulation is achieved due to the reactivity feedback – loss of coolant flow leads to higher core temperature which slows the reaction. Fast reactors typically use boron carbide control rods.

A Gas-cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) concept – the EM2 – has been announced by General Atomics and is described in the HTR section above.

Hyperion Power Module

The Hyperion Power Module is a 70 MWt/25 MWe lead-bismuth cooled reactor concept using 20% enriched uranium nitride fuel. The reactor was originally conceived as a potassium-cooled self-regulating ‘nuclear battery’ fuelled by uranium hydridem. However, in 2009, Hyperion Power changed the design to uranium nitride fuel and lead-bismuth cooling to expedite design certification11. This now classes it as a fast neutron reactor, without moderation. Hyperion claims that the ceramic nitride fuel has superior thermal and neutronic properties compared with uranium oxide. It would be installed below ground level.

The reactor vessel housing the core and primary heat transfer circuit is about 1.5 metres wide and 2.5 metres high. It is easily portable, sealed and has no moving parts. A secondary cooling circuit transfers heat to an external steam generator. The reactor module is designed to operate for electricity or process heat (or cogeneration) continuously for up to 10 years without refuelling. Another reactor module could then take its place in the overall plant. The old module, with fuel burned down to about 15% enrichment, would be put in dry storage at site to cool for up to two years before being returned to the factory.

In March 2010, Hyperion notified the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission that it planned to submit a design certification application in 2012. The company says it has many expressions of interest for ordering units. In September 2010, the company signed an agreement with Savannah River Nuclear Solutions to possibly build a demonstration unit at the Department of Energy site there. (Over 1953-1991, this was where a number of production reactors for weapons plutonium and tritium were built and run.) Hyperion has said it plans to build a prototype by 2015, possibly with uranium oxide fuel if the nitride is not then available.

Encapsulated Nuclear Heat-Source

The Encapsulated Nuclear Heat-Source (ENHS) is a liquid metal-cooled reactor concept of 50 MWe being developed by the University of California, Berkeley. The core is at the bottom of a metal-filled module sitting in a large pool of secondary molten metal coolant which also accommodates the eight separate and unconnected steam generators. There is convection circulation of primary coolant within the module and of secondary coolant outside it. Outside the secondary pool the plant is air cooled. Control rods would need to be adjusted every year or so and load-following would be automatic. The whole reactor sits in a 17 metre deep silo. Fuel is a uranium-zirconium alloy with 13% enrichment (or U-Pu-Zr with 11% Pu) with a 15-20 year life. After this the module is removed, stored on site until the primary lead (or Pb-Bi) coolant solidifies, and it would then be shipped as a self-contained and shielded item. A new fuelled module would be supplied complete with primary coolant. The ENHS is designed for developing countries and is highly proliferation-resistant but is not yet close to commercialisation.

STAR-LM, STAR-H2, SSTAR

The Secure Transportable Autonomous Reactor (STAR) project at Argonne National Laboratory is developing small, multi-purpose systems that operate nearly autonomously for the very long term. The STAR-LM is a factory-fabricated fast neutron modular reactor cooled by lead-bismuth eutectic, with passive safety features. Its 300-400 MWt size means it can be shipped by rail. It uses uranium-transuranic nitride fuel in a 2.5 m diameter cartridge which is replaced every 15 years. Decay heat removal is by external air circulation. The STAR-LM was conceived for power generation with a capacity of about 175 MWe.

The STAR-H2 is an adaptation of the same reactor for hydrogen production, with reactor heat at up to 800°C being conveyed by a helium circuit to drive a separate thermochemical hydrogen production plant, while lower grade heat is harnessed for desalination (multi-stage flash process). Its development is further off.

A smaller STAR variant is the Small Sealed Transportable Autonomous Reactor (SSTAR) being developed by Lawrence Livermore, Argonne and Los Alamos National Laboratories in collaboration with others. It has lead or Pb-Bi cooling, 564°C core outlet temperature and has integral steam generator inside the sealed unit, which would be installed below ground level. Conceived in sizes 10-100 MWe, main development is now focused on a 45 MWt/20 MWe version as part of the US Generation IV effort. After a 30-year life without refuelling, the whole reactor unit is then returned for recycling the fuel. The reactor vessel is 12 metre high and 3.2 m diameter (20 MWe version). SSTAR will eventually be coupled to a Brayton cycle turbine using supercritical carbon dioxide. A prototype was envisaged for 2015, but this seems unlikely.

ARC-100

Advanced Reactor Concepts LLC (ARC) is commercializing a 100 MWe sodium-cooled fast reactor based on the 62.5 MWt Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II). The EBR-II was significant fast reactor prototype at Idaho National Laboratory (formerly Argonne National Laboratory – West) which produced 19 MWe over about 30 years. It used the pyrometallurgically-refined used fuel from light water reactors as fuel, including a wide range of actinides. After operating 1963 to 1994 it is being decommissioned. EBR-II was the basis of the US Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) program (originally the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor program). An EBR-III of 200-300 MWe was proposed but not developed (see also information page on Fast Neutron Reactors).

The ARC-100 system comprises a uranium alloy core submerged in sodium. The liquid sodium is passed through the core where it is heated to 510°C, then passed through a heat exchanger where it heats sodium in an intermediate loop, which in turn heats working fluid for electricity generation. It would have a refueling interval of 20 years. A 50 MWe version of the ARC is also under development.

LSPR

A lead-bismuth-eutectic (LBE) cooled fast reactor of 150 MWt /53 MWe, the LSPR (LBE-Cooled Long-Life Safe Simple Small Portable Proliferation-Resistant Reactor), is under development in Japan. Fuelled units would be supplied from a factory and operate for 30 years, then be returned. The concept is intended for developing countries.

Rapid-L

A small-scale design developed by Toshiba Corporation in cooperation with Japan’s Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) and funded by the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) is the 5 MWt, 200 kWe Rapid-L, using lithium-6 (a neutron poison) as control medium. It would have 2700 fuel pins of 40-50% enriched uranium nitride with 2600°C melting point integrated into a disposable cartridge. The reactivity control system is passive, using lithium expansion modules (LEMs) which give burn-up compensation, partial load operation as well as negative reactivity feedback. During normal operation, lithium-6 in the LEM is suspended on an inert gas above the core region. As the reactor temperature rises, the lithium-6 expands, moving the gas/liquid interface down into the core and hence adding negative reactivity. Other kinds of lithium modules, also integrated into the fuel cartridge, shut down and start up the reactor. Cooling is by molten sodium, and with the LEM control system, reactor power is proportional to primary coolant flow rate. Refuelling would be every 10 years in an inert gas environment. Operation would require no skill, due to the inherent safety design features. The whole plant would be about 6.5 metres high and 2 metres diameter.

4S

The Super-Safe, Small & Simple (4S) ‘nuclear battery’ system is being developed by Toshiba and the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) in Japan in collaboration with SSTAR work and Westinghouse (owned by Toshiba) in the USA. It uses sodium as coolant (with electromagnetic pumps) and has passive safety features, notably negative temperature coefficient of reactivity. The whole unit would be factory-built, transported to site, installed below ground level, and would drive a steam cycle via a secondary sodium loop. It is capable of three decades of continuous operation without refuelling. Metallic fuel (169 pins 10mm diameter) is uranium-zirconium enriched to less than 20% or U-Pu-Zr alloy with 24% Pu for the 30 MWt (10 MWe) version or 11.5% Pu for the 135 MWt (50 MWe) version. Steady power output over the core lifetime is achieved by progressively moving upwards an annular reflector around the slender core (0.68m diameter, 2m high in the small version; 1.2m diameter and 2.5m high in the larger version) at about one millimetre per week. After 14 years a neutron absorber at the centre of the core is removed and the reflector repeats its slow movement up the core for 16 more years. Burn-up will be 34 GWday/t. In the event of power loss the reflector falls to the bottom of the reactor vessel, slowing the reaction, and external air circulation gives decay heat removal. A further safety device is a neutron absorber rod which can drop into the core. After 30 years the fuel would be allowed to cool for a year, then it would be removed and shipped for storage or disposal.

Both versions of 4S are designed to automatically maintain an outlet coolant temperature of 550ºC – suitable for power generation with high temperature electrolytic hydrogen production. Plant cost is projected at US$ 2500/kW and power cost 5-7 cents/kWh for the small unit – very competitive with diesel in many locations. The design has gained considerable support in Alaska and toward the end of 2004 the town of Galena granted initial approval for Toshiba to build a 10 MWe (30 MWt) 4S reactor in that remote location. A pre-application Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review is under way with a view to application for design certification in October 2010 (delayed from 2009 by NRC workload), and combined construction and operating licence (COL) application to follow. Its design is sufficiently similar to PRISM – GE’s modular 150 MWe liquid metal-cooled inherently-safe reactor which went part-way through the NRC approval process (see section below on PRISM) – for it to have good prospects of licensing. Toshiba plans a worldwide marketing program to sell the units for power generation at remote mines, desalination plants and for making hydrogen. Eventually it expects sales for hydrogen production to outnumber those for power supply.

The L-4S is a Pb-Bi cooled version of the 4S design.

PRISM

GE with the US national laboratories had been developing a modular liquid metal-cooled inherently-safe reactor – PRISM (Power Reactor Innovative Small Module) – under the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor/Integral Fast Reactor (ALMR/IFR) program funded by the US Department of Energy. The program was cancelled in 1994 and no US fast neutron reactor has so far been larger than 66 MWe and none has supplied electricity commercially. However, the 1994 preapplication safety evaluation report12 for the original PRISM design concluded that “no obvious impediments to licensing the PRISM design had been identified.”

Today’s PRISM is a GE-Hitachi (GEH) design for compact modular pool-type reactors with passive cooling for decay heat removal. After 30 years of development it represents GEH’s Generation IV solution to closing the fuel cycle in the USA. Each PRISM power block consists of two modules of 311 MWe (840 MWt) each, operating at high temperature – over 500°C. The pool-type modules below ground level contain the complete primary system with sodium coolant. The metal Pu & DU fuel is obtained from used light water reactor fuel. However, all transuranic elements are removed together in the electrometallurgical reprocessing so that fresh fuel has minor actinides with the plutonium. Fuel stays in the reactor about six years, with one-third removed every two years, and breeding ratio is 0.8. Used PRISM fuel is recycled after removal of fission products. The commercial-scale plant concept, part of an ‘Advanced Recycling Center’, would use three power blocks (six reactor modules) to provide 1866 MWe. An application for design certification is expected to be submitted in 2012, and a decision by GEH on building a demonstration plant is expected soon after then. See also Electrometallurgical ‘pyroprocessing’ section in information page on Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel.

BREST

Russia has experimented with several lead-cooled reactor designs, and has used lead-bismuth cooling for 40 years in its submarine reactors. (Pb-208 – 54% of naturally-occurring lead – is transparent to neutrons.) A significant Russian design from NIKIET is the BREST fast neutron reactor, of 300 MWe or more with lead as the primary coolant, at 540°C, supplying supercritical steam generators. The core sits in a pool of lead at near atmospheric pressure. It is inherently safe and uses a U+Pu nitride fuel. No weapons-grade plutonium can be produced (since there is no uranium blanket), and used fuel can be recycled indefinitely, with on-site facilities. A pilot unit was planned to be built at Beloyarsk, and 1200 MWe units are planned.

SVBR

A smaller and newer Russian design is the Lead-Bismuth Fast Reactor (SVBR) of 75-100 MWe, from Gidropress. This is an integral design, with the steam generators sitting in the same Pb-Bi pool at 400-495°C as the reactor core. It is designed to be able to use a wide variety of fuels, though the reference model uses uranium enriched to 16.5%. Uranium-plutonium fuel is also envisaged. Refuelling interval is 7-8 years. The SVBR-100 unit would be factory-made and shipped as a 4.5m diameter, 7.5m high module, then installed in a tank of water which gives passive heat removal and shielding. A power station with 16 such modules is expected to supply electricity at lower cost than any other new Russian technology as well as achieving inherent safety and high proliferation resistance. (Russia built seven Alfa-class submarines, each powered by a compact 155 MWt Pb-Bi cooled reactor, essentially an SVBR, and 70 reactor-years operational experience was acquired with these.)

In December 2009, AKME-Engineering, a 50-50 joint venture, was set up by Rosatom and the En+ Group (a subsidiary of Basic Element Group) to develop and build a pilot SVBR unit13. En+ is an associate of EuroSibEnergo and a 53.8% owner of Rusal, which has been in discussion with Rosatom regarding a Far East nuclear power plant and Phase II of the Balakovo nuclear plant. The plan is to complete the design development by 2017 and put on line a 100 MWe pilot facility by 2020, with total investment by Russkiye Mashiny of RUR16 billion ($585 million). The site selection process is underway – earlier plans were to put it Obninsk. The SVBR-100 could be the first reactor cooled by heavy metal to be utilized to generate electricity. It is described by Gidropress as a multi-function reactor.

An SVBR-10 is also envisaged, with the same design principles, a 20-year refuelling interval and generating capacity of 12 MWe, though it too is a multi-purpose unit.

Travelling wave reactor (TWR)

An old design has resurfaced as the travelling wave reactor (TWR). This has been considered in the past as, generically, a candle reactor, or breed-burn reactor, since it burns slowly from one end of a core to the other, making the actual fuel as it goes. The reactor uses natural or depleted uranium packed inside hundreds of hexagonal pillars. In a ‘wave’ that moves through the core at only one centimetre per year, the U-238 is bred progressively into Pu-239, which is the actual fuel and undergoes fission. The reaction requires a small amount of enriched uranium to get started and could run for decades without refueling. However it is a low-density core and needs to be relatively large. The reactor uses liquid sodium as a coolant, and core temperatures are about 550ºC, giving high thermal efficiency. In 2009 this was selected by MIT Technology Review as one of ten emerging technologies of note14. In 2010, the company promoting it, Terrapower, made overtures to Toshiba concerning its development, hoping to have a 500 MWe demonstration reactor operating by 2020. Eventual sizes could range from a few hundred MWe to 1000 MWe. Microsoft founder Bill Gates is providing financial backing for Terrapower.

Korean fast reactor designs

In South Korea, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been working on sodium-cooled fast reactor designs. A second stream of fast reactor development there is via the Nuclear Transmutation Energy Research Centre of Korea (NuTrECK) at Seoul University (SNU). It is working on a lead-bismuth cooled design of 35 MW which would operate on pyro-processed fuel. It is designed to be leased for 20 years and operated without refuelling, then returned to the supplier. It would then be refuelled at the pyro-processing plant and have a design life of 60 years. It would operate at atmospheric pressure, eliminating major concern regarding loss of coolant accidents.

Molten salt reactors

During the 1960s, the USA developed the molten salt breeder reactor concept as the primary back-up option for the fast breeder reactor (cooled by liquid metal) and a small prototype 8 MWt Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) operated at Oak Ridge over four years. U-235 fluoride was in molten sodium and zirconium fluorides at 860°C which flowed through a graphite moderator. There is now renewed interest in the concept in Japan, Russia, France and the USA, and one of the six Generation IV designs selected for further development is the molten salt reactor (MSR).

In the MSR, the fuel is a molten mixture of lithium and beryllium fluoride salts with dissolved enriched uranium, thorium or U-233 fluorides. The core consists of unclad graphite moderator arranged to allow the flow of salt at some 700°C and at low pressure. Heat is transferred to a secondary salt circuit and thence to steamn. It is not a fast neutron reactor, but with some moderation by the graphite is epithermal (intermediate neutron speed). The fission products dissolve in the salt and are removed continuously in an on-line reprocessing loop and replaced with Th-232 or U-238. Actinides remain in the reactor until they fission or are converted to higher actinides which do so. MSRs have a negative temperature coefficient of reactivity, so will shut down as temperature increases beyond design limits.

Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor

The Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor (LFTR) is one kind of MSR which breeds its U-233 fuel from a fertile blanket of liquid thorium salts. Some of the neutrons released during fission of the U-233 salt in the reactor core are absorbed by the thorium in the blanket salt. U-233 is thus produced in the blanket and this is then transferred to the fuel salt. LFTRs can rapidly change their power output, and hence be used for load following. Because they are expected to be inexpensive to build and operate, 100 MWe LFTRs could be used as peak and back-up reserve power units.

Fuji MSR

The Fuji MSR is a 100 MWe design to operate as a near-breeder and being developed internationally by a Japanese, Russian and US consortium. The attractive features of this MSR fuel cycle include: the high-level waste comprising fission products only, hence shorter-lived radioactivity; small inventory of weapons-fissile material (Pu-242 being the dominant Pu isotope); low fuel use (the French self-breeding variant claims 50kg of thorium and 50kg U-238 per billion kWh); and safety due to passive cooling up to any size.

AHTR

The Advanced High-Temperature Reactor (AHTR)15 is a larger reactor using a coated-particle graphite-matrix fuel like that in the GT-MHR (see above section on the GT-MHR) and with molten fluoride salt as primary coolant. While similar to the gas-cooled HTR it operates at low pressure (less than 1 atmosphere) and higher temperature, and gives better heat transfer than helium. The salt is used solely as coolant, and achieves temperatures of 750-1000°C while at low pressure. This could be used in thermochemical hydrogen manufacture. Reactor sizes of 1000 MWe/2400 MWt are envisaged, with capital costs estimated at less than $1000/kW.

Aqueous homogeneous reactors

Aqueous homogeneous reactors (AHRs) have the fuel mixed with the moderator as a liquid. Typically, low-enriched uranium nitrate is in aqueous solution. About 30 AHRs have been built as research reactors and have the advantage of being self-regulating and having the fission products continuously removed from the circulating fuel. However, corrosion problems and the propensity of water to decompose radiolytically (due to fission fragments) releasing gas bubbles have been design problems.

A series of three reactors were built at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the mid-19402/early 1950s. The first AHR at Oak Ridge National Laboratory went critical in 1952, and attained full power of one megawatt in 1953. A second one there reached 5 MW in 1958. Plans for a 70 to 150 MWe commercial unit did not proceed. At Russia’s Kurchatov Institute the 20 kW ARGUS AHR has operated since 1981, and R&D on producing Sr-89 and Mo-99 from it is ongoing. The Mo-99 is extremely pure, making the design potentially valuable for its commercial production. As of 2006, only five AHRs were operating, but the concept of extracting medical isotopes directly from the fuel has sparked renewed interest in them. The USA, China and Russia are assessing the prospects of using AHRs for commercial radioisotope production.

In 2008, the IAEA summarised: “The use of solution reactors for the production of medical isotopes is potentially advantageous because of their low cost, small critical mass, inherent passive safety, and simplified fuel handling, processing and purification characteristics. These advantages stem partly from the fluid nature of the fuel and partly from the homogeneous mixture of the fuel and moderator in that an aqueous homogeneous reactor combines the attributes of liquid fuel homogeneous reactors with those of water moderated heterogeneous reactors. If practical methods for handling a radioactive aqueous fuel system are implemented, the inherent simplicity of this type of reactor should result in considerable economic gains in the production of medical isotopes.”16 Thermal power can be 50-300 MW at low temperature and pressure, and low enriched uranium fuel used. However, recovering desired isotopes on a continuous production basis remains to be demonstrated. As well as those in solution, a number of volatile radioisotopes used in nuclear medicine can be recovered from the off-gas arising from radiolytic ‘boiling’. For isotopes such a Sr-89 this is very much more efficient than alternative production methods.

Medical Isotope Production System

At the end of 2007, Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) notified the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission that it intended to apply for a licence to construct and operate a Medical Isotope Production System (MIPS) – an AHR system with low-enriched uranium in small 100-200 kW units for Mo-99 production. A single production facility could have four such reactors. B&W expects a five-year lead time to first production. The fuel is brought to criticality in a 200-litre vessel. As fission proceeds, the solution is circulated through an extraction facility to remove the Mo-99 and then back into the reactor vessel, which is at low temperature and pressure. In January 2009, B&W Technical Services Group signed an agreement with radiopharmaceutical and medical device supplier Covidien to develop technology for the MIPS17.

Modular construction using small reactor units

The IRIS developers have outlined the economic case for modular construction of their design (about 330 MWe), and the argument applies similarly to other smaller units. They point out that IRIS with its size and simple design is ideally suited for modular construction in the sense of progressively building a large power plant with multiple small operating units. The economy of scale is replaced here with the economy of serial production of many small and simple components and prefabricated sections. They expect that construction of the first IRIS unit will be completed in three years, with subsequent reduction to only two years.

Site layouts have been developed with multiple single units or multiple twin units. In each case, units will be constructed so that there is physical separation sufficient to allow construction of the next unit while the previous one is operating and generating revenue. In spite of this separation, the plant footprint can be very compact so that a site with three IRIS single modules providing 1000 MWe capacity is similar or smaller in size than one with a comparable total power single unit.

Eventually IRIS is expected to have a capital cost and production cost comparable with larger plants. But any small unit such as this will potentially have a funding profile and flexibility otherwise impossible with larger plants. As one module is finished and starts producing electricity, it will generate positive cash flow for the next module to be built. Westinghouse estimates that 1000 MWe delivered by three IRIS units built at three year intervals financed at 10% for ten years require a maximum negative cash flow less than $700 million (compared with about three times that for a single 1000 MWe unit). For developed countries small modular units offer the opportunity of building as necessary; for developing countries it may be the only option, because their electric grids cannot take 1000+ MWe single units.


Further Information

Notes

a. Those built as neutron sources are not designed to produce heat or steam, and are less relevant here. [Back]

b. A very general rule is that no single unit should be larger than 15% of grid capacity [Back]

c. Traditional reactor safety systems are ‘active’ in the sense that they involve electrical or mechanical operation on command. Some engineered systems operate passively, e.g. pressure relief valves. Both require parallel redundant systems. Inherent or full passive safety depends only on physical phenomena such as convection, gravity or resistance to high temperatures, not on functioning of engineered components. Because small reactors have a higher surface area to volume (and core heat) ratio compared with large units, a lot of the engineering for safety (including heat removal in large reactors) is not needed in the small ones. [Back]

d. In 2010, the American Nuclear Society convened a special committee to look at licensing issues with SMRs in the USA, where dozens of land-based small reactors were built since the 1950s through to the 1980s, proving the safety and security of light water-cooled, gas‐cooled, and metal‐cooled SMR technologies. The committee had considerable involvement from SMR proponents, along with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy laboratories and universities – a total of nearly 50 individuals. The committee’s interim report1 includes the following two tables, which highlight some of the differences between the established US reactor fleet and SMRs.

Comparison of current-generation plant safety systems to potential SMR design

Current‐generation safety‐related systems SMR safety systems
High‐pressure injection system.
Low‐pressure injection system.
No active safety injection system required. Core cooling is maintained using passive systems.
Emergency sump and associated net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements for safety‐related pumps. No safety‐related pumps for accident mitigation; therefore, no need for sumps and protection of their suction supply.
Emergency diesel generators. Passive design does not require emergency alternating‐ current (ac) power to maintain core cooling. Core heat removed by heat transfer through vessel.
Active containment heat systems. None required because of passive heat rejection out of containment.
Containment spray system. Spray systems are not required to reduce steam pressure or to remove radioiodine from containment.
Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) initiation, instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. Complex systems require significant amount of online testing that contributes to plant unreliability and challenges of safety systems with inadvertent initiations. Simpler and/or passive safety systems require less testing and are not as prone to inadvertent initiation.
Emergency feedwater system, condensate storage tanks, and associated emergency cooling water supplies. Ability to remove core heat without an emergency feedwater system is a significant safety enhancement.

Comparison of current-generation plant support systems to potential SMR design

Current LWR support systems SMR support systems
Reactor coolant pump seals. Leakage of seals has been a safety concern. Seal maintenance and replacement are costly and time‐consuming. Integral designs eliminate the need for seals.
Ultimate heat sink and associated interfacing systems. River and seawater systems are active systems, subject to loss of function from such causes as extreme weather conditions and bio‐fouling. SMR designs are passive and reject heat by conduction and convection. Heat rejection to an external water heat sink is not required.
Closed cooling water systems are required to support safety‐ related systems for heat removal of core and equipment heat. No closed cooling water systems are required for safety‐related systems.
Heating, ventilating, and air‐conditioning (HVAC). Required to function to support proper operation of safety‐related systems. The plant design minimizes or eliminates the need for safety‐related room cooling eliminating both the HVAC system and associated closed water cooling systems.

[Back]

e. The first two-unit VBER-300 plant is planned to be built in Aktau city, western Kazakhstan, with completion of the first unit envisaged in 2016, and 2017 for the second. The Kazakhstan-Russian Nuclear Stations joint stock company (JSC) was established by Kazatomprom and Atomstroyexport (on a 50:50 basis) in October 2006 for the design, construction and international marketing of the VBER-300. See page on the VBER-300 on the Kazatomprom website (www.kazatomprom.kz) [Back]

f. The 200 MWt (50 MWe net) Melekess VK-50 prototype BWR in Dimitrovgrad, Ulyanovsk commenced operation in 1965 [Back]

g. See the Invap website (www.invap.com.ar) [Back]

h. The page on the NHR-5 on the website of Tsingua University’s Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology (now the Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology, www.inet.tsinghua.edu.cn) describes the NHR-5 as “a vessel type light water reactor with advanced features, including integral arrangement, natural circulation, hydraulic control rod driving and passive safety systems. Many experiments have been conducted on the NHR-5, such as heat-electricity cogeneration, air-conditioning and seawater desalination.” [Back]

i. See the page on Modular Nuclear Reactors on the Babcock & Wilcox website (www.babcock.com) [Back]

j. The 69 fuel assemblies are identical to normal PWR ones, but at about 1.7 m long, a bit less than half the length. [Back]

k. Between 1966 and 1988, the AVR experimental pebble bed reactor at Jülich, Germany, operated for over 750 weeks at 15 MWe, most of the time with thorium-based fuel (mixed with high-enriched uranium). The fuel consisted of about 100,000 billiard ball-sized fuel elements. Maximum burn-ups of 150 GWd/t were achieved. It was used to demonstrate the inherent safety of the design due to negative temperature coefficient: reactor power fell rapidly when helium coolant flow was cut off.

The 300 MWe THTR (Thorium High-Temperature Reactor) in Germany was developed from the AVR and operated between 1983 and 1989 with 674,000 pebbles, over half containing Th/HEU fuel (the rest graphite moderator and some neutron absorbers). These were continuously recycled and on average the fuel passed six times through the core. Fuel fabrication was on an industrial scale. Several design features made the THTR unsuccessful, though the basic concept was again proven. It drove a steam turbine.

The 200 MWt (72 MWe) HTR-modul was then designed by Siemens/Interatom as a modular unit to be constructed in pairs. It was licensed in 1989, but was not constructed. This design was part of the technology bought by Eskom in 1996 and is a direct antecedent of the pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR).

During 1970s and 1980s Nukem manufactured more than 250,000 fuel elements for the AVR and more than one million for the THTR. In 2007, Nukem reported that it had recovered the expertise for this and was making it available as industry support. [Back]

l. The 80 MWt ALLEGRO demonstration GFR is planned by Euratom to incorporate all the architecture and the main materials and components foreseen for the full-sized GFR but without the direct (Brayton) cycle power conversion system. It is being developed mainly by France, with Japan and Switzerland, and operation about 2020 is envisaged. [Back]

m. The Hyperion Power Module was originally designed by Los Alamos National Laboratory as a 70 MWt ‘nuclear battery’ that uses uranium hydride (UH3) fuel, which also functions as a moderator. UH3 stores vast quantities of hydrogen, but this stored hydrogen dissociates as the temperature rises above the operating temperature of 550°C. The release of hydrogen gas lowers the density of the UH3, which in turn decreases reactivity. This process is reversed as the core temperature drops, leading to the reabsorption of hydrogen. The consequent increase in moderator density results in an increase in core reactivity10. All this is without much temperature change since the main energy gain or loss is involved in phase change. [Back]

n. As MSRs will normally operate at much higher temperatures than LWRs, they have potential for process heat. Another option is to have a secondary helium coolant in order to generate power via the Brayton cycle. [Back]

References

1. Interim Report of the American Nuclear Society President’s Special Committee on Small and Medium Sized Reactor (SMR) Licensing Issues, American Nuclear Society (July 2010) [Back]

2. Reactors ready for floating plant, World Nuclear News (7 August 2009) [Back]

3. Russia plans deployment of small reactors, World Nuclear News (13 September 2007) [Back]

4. CAREM small reactor set for Formosa province, World Nuclear News (1 December 2009) [Back]

5. B&W introduces scalable, practical nuclear energy, Babcock & Wilcox press release (10 June 2009); Small Reactors Generate Big Hopes, Wall Street Journal (18 February 2010) [Back]

6. PBMR Considering Change In Product Strategy, PBMR (Pty) news release (5 February 2009) [Back]

7. PBMR postponed, World Nuclear News (11 September 2009) [Back]

8. Address by the Minister of Public Enterprises, Barbara Hogan, to the National Assembly, on the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, Department of Public Enterprises press release (16 September 2010) [Back]

9. South Africa’s Pebble Bed Company Joins Forces with MHI of Japan, PBMR (Pty) news release (4 February 2010) [Back]

10. High hopes for hydride, Nuclear Engineering International (January 2009) [Back]

11. Hyperion launches U2N3-fuelled, Pb-Bi-cooled fast reactor, Nuclear Engineering International (November 2009) [Back]

12. Preapplication Safety Evaluation Report for the Power Reactor Innovative Small Module (PRISM) Liquid-Metal Reactor – Final Report, NUREG-1368, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (February 1994) [Back]

13. Initiative for small fast reactors, World Nuclear News (4 January 2010); En+ Group and Rosatom Form JV To Create Fast Neutron Reactor, En+ Group press release (25 December 2009) [Back]

14. TR10: Traveling-Wave Reactor, Matthew L. Wald, MIT Technology Review (March/April 2009); Special Report: 10 Emerging Technologies 2009, MIT Technology Review [Back]

15. The Advanced High-Temperature Reactor: High-Temperature Fuel, Molten Salt Coolant, and Liquid-Metal-Reactor Plant, Charles Forsberg, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, presented at the 1st International Conference on Innovative Nuclear Energy Systems for Sustainable Development of the World (COE INES-1) held at the Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan (31 October – 4 November 2004) [Back]

16. Homogeneous Aqueous Solution Nuclear Reactors for the Production of Mo-99 and other Short Lived Radioistotopes, International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA-TECDOC-1601, ISBN 9789201097088 (September 2008) [Back]

17. B&W and Covidien to develop U.S. source of key medical isotope, Babcock & Wilcox press release (26 January 2009) [Back]

Further sources

General

Report to Congress on Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, US Department of Energy (May 2001)

Innovative Nuclear Reactor Development – Opportunities for International Co-operation, International Energy Agency – Nuclear Energy Agency – International Atomic Energy Agency (2002)

Status of Small Reactor Designs Without On-Site Refuelling, International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA-TECDOC-1536, ISBN 9201156065 (January 2007)

The Need for Innovative Nuclear Reactor and Fuel Cycle Systems, Victor Mourogov, presented at the 25th Annual International Symposium 2000 of The Uranium Institute, London (31 August – 1 September 2000)

Thorium as an Energy Source – Opportunities for Norway, Thorium Report Committee, Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2008)

Trends in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Economic, Environmental and Social Aspects, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, ISBN: 9264196641 (2001)

Platts Nucleonics Week 4/10/01, 25/3/04, 17/4/03, 8/7/04, 6/1/05

Nuclear News, July and August 2001, June 2004

Light water reactors

Nuclear Seawater Desalination Plant Coupled with 200 MW Heating Reactor, Haijun Jia and Yajun Zhang, Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology (INET), Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, presented at the International Symposium on the Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Technology in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) Countries, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (3-5 November 2008)

Floating Power Sources Based on Nuclear Reactor Plants, Panov et al., Federal State Unitary Enterprise the Federal Scientific and Industrial Center I. I. Afrikantov Experimental Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering, Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, presented at the 5th International Conference on Asian Energy Cooperation: Mechanisms, Risks, Barriers (AEC-2006), organized by the Energy Systems Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and held in Yakutsk, Russia (27-29 June 2006)

Nuclear Desalination Complex with VK-300 Boiling-Type Reactor Facility, B.A. Gabaraev, Yu.N. Kuznetzov, A.A. Romenkov and Yu.A. Mishanina, presented at the 2004 World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, London (8-10 September 2004)

NuScale Power website (www.nuscalepower.com)

TRIGA Nuclear Reactors page on the General Atomics Electronic Systems website (www.ga-esi.com)

High-temperature gas-cooled reactors

HTTR Home Page page on the Japan Atomic Energy Agency website (www.jaea.go.jp)

PBMR website (www.pbmr.com)

Pebble Bed Modular Reactor – The First Generation IV Reactor To Be Constructed, Sue Ion, David Nicholls, Regis Matzie and Dieter Matzner, presented at the 2003 World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, London (3-5 September 2003)

Status of the GT-MHR for Electricity Production, M. P. LaBar, A. S. Shenoy, W. A. Simon and E. M. Campbell, presented at the 2003 World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, London (3-5 September 2003)

GT-MHR page on the General Atomics Energy Group website (www.ga.com/energy)

EM2 page on the General Atomics Energy Group website (www.ga.com/energy)

High and very high temperature reactors page on the Areva website (www.areva.com)

Adams Atomic Engines, Inc. website (www.atomicengines.com)

HTGR Advances in China, Xu Yuanhui, Nuclear Engineering International (March 2005)

Liquid metal-cooled fast reactors

Hyperion Power website (www.hyperionpowergeneration.com)

David Pescovitz, Novel Nuclear Reactor (Batteries Included)Lab Notes, College of Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, Volume 2, Issue 8 (October 2002)

Heavy Liquid Metal Reactor Development page on the Argonne National Laboratory Nuclear Engineering Division website (www.ne.anl.gov)

STAR-H2: Secure Transportable Autonomous Reactor for Hydrogen Production & Desalinization, Wade et al., presented at the Tenth International Conference on Nuclear Engineering (ICONE 10) held in Arlington, Virginia USA, (14-18 April 2002)

Status Report on the Small Secure Transportable Autonomous Reactor (SSTAR)/Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) and Supporting Research and Development, Sienicki et al., Argonne National Laboratory (29 September 2006)

Nuclear Energy to Go – A Self-Contained, Portable ReactorScience & Technology, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (July/August 2004)

Advanced Reactor Concepts, LLC website (www.advancedreactor.net)

Lead-Bismut Eutectics Cooled Long-Life Safe Simple Small Portable Proliferation Resistant Reactor (LSPR), available on the website of the Research Laboratory for Nuclear Reactors, Tokyo Institute of Technology (www.nr.titech.ac.jp)

The Galena Project Technical Publications page on the Burns and Roe website (www.roe.com)

Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor – Background Paper, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-BP-ENV-126, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, USA (May 1994)

Terrapower section on the Intellectual Ventures website (www.intellectualventures.com)

Coming down to Earth, Nuclear Engineering International (October 2002)

STAR Performer, J. Sienicki et al., Nuclear Engineering International (July 2005)

Keeping it Simple, A. Minato, Nuclear Engineering International (October 2005)

Molten salt reactors

Appendix 6.0 Molten Salt Reactor, Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems Ten-Year Program Plan – Fiscal Year 2007, Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (September 2007)

Liquid Fuel Nuclear Reactors presentation by Robert Hargraves and Ralph Moir (29 March 2010)

Robert Hargraves and Ralph Moir, Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactors, American Scientist, Vol. 98, No. 4, P. 304 (July-August 2010)

EnergyFromThorium website (www.energyfromthorium.com)

Aqueous homogeneous reactors

Nuclear Medicine – Medical Isotope Production page on the Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Group website (www.babcock.com)