August 10th, 2010

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Wall Street scandals from the past . .

Partners in crime

I-bankers, insider trades, moles, strippers – this story was fit for the big screen.

By Barney Gimbel, Fortune writer-reporter

In the summer of 2005, Elvis Santana was looking for some stock market advice. The 22-year-old assistant at Macy’s had a stack of do-it-yourself trading books, a
subscription to Investor’s Business Daily, and about $30,000 saved up. But he still wasn’t really sure where to start. So when his younger brother told him about a
friend of his, a smart, polished guy named David Pajcin (“Jeff” to his friends) who had worked on Wall Street, Santana was eager to pick his brain. When they
met at a Barnes & Noble in Brooklyn, they hit it off.
Pajcin, then a 28-year-old former Goldman Sachs analyst, was personable and self-assured, the kind of guy who attracts friends easily and girlfriends even more
easily. He told Santana he was starting his own hedge fund and would be happy to teach him some investing basics. He even offered to share some of his stock
picks. All Santana had to do was give him a cut of any earnings. Soon after their meeting, Santana opened a brokerage account. His first buys were shares of
clothing retailer Casual Male (Charts) and call options of FedEx (Charts) – both tips from Pajcin. Within a day his buying and selling had netted him a profit of
$4,662.
About six weeks and numerous trades later, though, Santana complained to Pajcin that he was back where he’d started. Once again Pajcin was happy to help
out with a tip. “Jeff called me with something he said was solid,” Santana says. The stock wasReebok (Charts), then trading at about $42. Beginning on Monday,
Aug. 1, Santana bought 465 call options and 520 shares. On Wednesday, when Pajcin called about getting his cut, Santana checked his account balance. He was
up $463,279. “I was like, ‘Oh, my God,’ ” he says.
That same day, Aug. 3, David Markowitz, then a 34-year-old lawyer and an assistant regional director of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s New York
office, was reading the Wall Street Journal on his subway ride to work. As he skimmed the front page, he read that Germany’s Adidas-Salomon AG was “close to
buying rival Reebok International Ltd. for about $4 billion in what would be a big bid by two former giants of the athletic-footwear industry to challenge the
long-running supremacy of Nike Inc.” The Journal reported that Adidas was expected to pay about $59 a share for Reebok, a 34% premium over the $43.95 at
which the stock had closed on Tuesday. That afternoon Reebok rose to almost $60.
Markowitz had forgotten about the deal until about 5 P.M., when a fax arrived on his desk. The SEC’s Market Surveillance Unit in Washington had received a tip
from the Philadelphia Stock Exchange that some people had been buying a lot of Reebok call options over the past few days – 2,952 calls for Reebok had been
traded on Monday, and another 2,315 on Tuesday, compared with average daily volume of 112 the previous week. The options traded were as much as $8 “out of
the money,” and most were due to expire soon. That meant whoever had bought them was making a very confident bet that Reebok’s stock was about to soar.
When Markowitz got a breakdown of the Reebok transactions, he saw that most of the options had been purchased by a handful of people in Croatia, Germany,
New York, and California. Sonja Anticevic of Croatia had purchased 1,997 call options – 38% of all the options traded in the past two days – and 240 shares of
Reebok. She had made $2,044,161. “We knew something was clearly fishy,” says Markowitz. He also learned there was a pending request to wire $870,000 of the
proceeds to a bank in Salzburg, Austria. “That’s when we realized we had an emergency on our hands,” Markowitz says. “Once the money is gone, you often
never see it again.”
Two days later, on Friday, Aug. 5, the SEC filed a lawsuit against Anticevic to freeze the money until investigators could figure out what was going on. When the
news hit Croatia, reporters swarmed her apartment in a working-class suburb of the small southern city of Omis. Briefly appearing on her doorstep on Sunday,
Anticevic told reporters she “never bought a stock and I have no idea how that works.” Neighbors said she had been working as a cleaning lady to supplement
the monthly pension of 1,600 kuna (about $263) she received for decades of work as a seamstress in a local underwear factory. She lived with her husband and
daughter in a two-room apartment provided by the factory. The family had no computer. Croatian reporters calling the SEC for comment passed on the fact that
she did, however, have a nephew in New York named David Pajcin.
That tip led SEC investigators, FBI agents, and lawyers from the office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York not only to Pajcin but eventually
to another young man, Eugene Plotkin. The two smart and ambitious sons of immigrant families had met in 2000 as trainees at Goldman Sachs. Over the next
five years, Pajcin, who soon left Goldman, and Plotkin, who stayed on, worked and partied together. They also, according to Mark Schonfeld, director of the
Northeast regional office of the SEC, ran “one of the most widespread, varied, and premeditated insider trading rings we have ever prosecuted.” Their total take
was not enormous – only about $7 million – but for sheer brazenness, Schonfeld says, Plotkin and Pajcin have few peers.
Now the two, along with 15 others, have been sued by the SEC for insider trading. Plotkin, Pajcin, and four others have also been indicted on federal criminal
charges of insider trading and conspiracy. Plotkin maintains his innocence. Pajcin has pleaded guilty and is helping the government try to convict his friend.
The players
David Pajcin (pronounced PIE-chin) was a charmer and a young man in a hurry. Funny and attractive, with a tall body-builder’s frame, he was born and raised in
Clifton, N.J., a son of Croatian immigrants. He excelled in school and athletics, earning a spot on the nationally ranked basketball team at Saint Anthony High
School in Jersey City. When it came time for college, Notre Dame offered him a full scholarship. There he flew under the radar, majoring in economics and not
releasing his photo for the yearbook. Soon after graduating cum laude, he landed a job in the commodities group at Goldman Sachs.
Like most young traders, Pajcin had to put in long hours, his time split between desk work and the crude oil or natural gas pits of the New York Mercantile
Exchange. “I was like, no, I can’t handle this,” Pajcin would later tell SEC investigators. “I just didn’t want to wait like four years and then still be on the floor.”
So after only 5� months at Goldman, Pajcin left for a series of jobs, none lasting longer than a few months, at small brokerage firms, day-trading shops, and a
bond futures trading company. He finally stopped working for securities firms in 2003. “We thought when we hired him he’d be great,” says Mark Shales, his
supervisor at Goldenberg Hehmeyer & Co., a brokerage where Pajcin worked for a few months. “He had all the right pedigrees: Notre Dame, Goldman. But he
never found his niche. He didn’t hang out with any of the other traders or spark any friendships. He just kind of came and went.” (Now in a federal holding facility
in Brooklyn, Pajcin declined to comment for this story.)
Pajcin did, however, make and keep the friends he wanted, and Plotkin was one of them. Plotkin, who sat down with Fortune for his only interview to date
(under the watchful eye of his lawyer, who would not let him discuss the charges against him), downplays their relationship. “We sat kind of close together in the
back of the room,” Plotkin says of their meeting at a training session at Goldman, “He’s a very socially outgoing person who makes friends easily, and I was just
one of those guys…. I wouldn’t say we were close.”
Plotkin was born in Moscow but grew up outside San Francisco. His family, he says, “came here for the American dream, that if you work hard and you do all the
right things, you can achieve.” After a year at the California Institute of Technology, he transferred to Harvard, where he majored in economics, wore a black
leather jacket, and played lots of pool.
At Harvard he also got into competitive ballroom dancing. “It just felt right,” he says. “When you’re in front of everybody, you get a chance to emote. You make
yourself very vulnerable and show who you are and who you can be.” By the time he graduated in 2000, he was a star of the Harvard-Radcliffe Ballroom Dance
Team.
Plotkin often told college friends his drive came from having grown up in modest circumstances. “Being an I-banker was that success,” one remembers. “To him
it symbolized the money and prestige he grew up living without.” So it was no surprise to those who knew him that he opted for Goldman Sachs and the promise
of money and prestige. He started as an analyst in the fixed-income research division and was eventually promoted to associate, a job that paid a base salary of
about $100,000 before a sizable bonus. He also kept dancing. “My days at the office would start early and end late – maybe around 7 or 8 – and then I’d go to the
dance studio for two hours before I went to sleep,” Plotkin says. Earlier this year the Web site DanceSportInfo.net ranked him, under the stage name “Gene
Michael” (Michael is his middle name), 49th in the country in the professional Latin category.
Whatever spare time Plotkin had he spent directing and starring in an independent movie he’d written and financed, alternatively titled One Way and Blindside.
Plotkin plays a young Wall Streeter at the fictional Galeon Partners (“the most exclusive and reputable wealth-management firm in the U.S.,” according to the
script) who becomes the victim of an elaborate conspiracy. Pajcin has a supporting role as a drug dealer who ultimately betrays him. Plotkin says he submitted
the picture without success to the Sundance Film Festival.
The plot
As pieced together by Fortune from SEC and U.S. Attorney’s filings and interviews with investigators, the tale of Plotkin and Pajcin’s alleged partnership as
insider traders begins in 2004. Pajcin took a vacation in Croatia and stayed with his aunt Sonja in Omis, a seaside town near the tourist hot spot of Split. He spent
his days on the beach and his nights at the clubs. One night a friend introduced him to a Croatian businessman living near Hamburg – Bruno Verinac. Pajcin later
met Verinac’s friend Perica Lopandic. They told Pajcin about an idea.
Most issues of Business Week contain a column by Gene Marcial called “Inside Wall Street.” It is not unusual for stocks, particularly those of small companies, to
move a few points on a mention by Marcial. If you could find out in advance which companies he was writing about, you could position yourself to profit nicely
from such a move. (This idea had occurred to other would-be insider traders. At least three times in the past decade the SEC and the U.S. Attorney have nabbed
people who got or tried to get their hands on Marcial’s column early.) But since the column is closely guarded in the magazine’s New York offices, the only way
to get an early look would be to steal a copy from Business Week’s printer. Verinac and Lopandic allegedly asked Pajcin if he would be interested in going back
to the States, hiring someone to infiltrate the plant, and sharing the info with them.
Pajcin was interested, and so was Plotkin. Back in New York, the two soon placed online job listings seeking factory workers. (They didn’t mention where.) One
response came from Nickolaus Shuster, a 23-year-old from New Jersey. Pajcin and Plotkin allegedly met him near Union Square in Manhattan and eventually
offered to pay him to move to Wisconsin and get a job at Quad/Graphics, which prints Business Week. Shuster agreed, eventually scoring a gig as a forklift
operator.
By early October, prosecutors say, Shuster was ensconced in Hartford, Wis., and had settled into a routine: On Thursday morning he would steal a copy of the
magazine, which is available online Thursday evening, and call Pajcin or Plotkin from the plant or his car. Pajcin would then trade on any tips Shuster had
turned up, which he also passed to Verinac and Lopandic. The group’s first trades, on Nov. 18, were the purchase of 6,500 shares of TheStreet.com (Charts) and
6,000 shares of Biolase Drills (Charts), a dental supply company based in Irvine, Calif. (Marcial had said Biolase would benefit from a recent management
shakeup and TheStreet.com might be ripe for a takeover.) The next day they sold the shares for a profit of $3,764. All told, the group, which ultimately totaled 12
people, made $282,573 on the scheme between November 2004 and July 2005, the SEC says.
Meanwhile, at Goldman, Plotkin, still pursuing the Wall Street career his friend had forsaken, had started recruiting for the firm at colleges and business schools.
He kept up with many of the students he met, offering to be a mentor and taking them out on the town for steak dinners and maybe even a trip to a strip club.
One of these potential prot�g�s was Stanislav Shpigelman, whom Plotkin met in the spring of 2004, when Shpigelman was a senior at Binghamton University in
upstate New York. Both of Russian descent, the two had kept in touch.
After Shpigelman took a job as a mergers and acquisitions analyst at Merrill Lynch in July 2004, Plotkin started calling him more often. Eventually they agreed to
meet on Nov. 6 at Spa 88, a Russian bathhouse nestled between a barbershop and a bodega near Wall Street. Pajcin joined them there. Shpigelman bragged
about a secret takeover he was working on: Procter & Gamble (Charts) was planning to buy Gillette. He said he had even flown to Ohio, where P&G has its
headquarters, to deliver files.
About two months later, on Jan. 25, prosecutors say, Shpigelman called Plotkin to say a bid for Gillette was imminent. The next day Pajcin and the rest of his
trading group started purchasing out-of-the-money Gillette calls. Two days later, when P&G announced a deal to buy Gillette for $57 billion, the group made
$158,930, its biggest score yet. A month later Shpigelman was at a Manhattan strip club with Pajcin and Plotkin when he got an e-mail on his BlackBerry from a
co-worker confirming that pharmaceutical company Novartis had bought a majority stake in the German generic-drug maker Eon Labs. The group made $85,473
trading in advance of that deal, the SEC says.
Throughout the spring and summer of 2005, the operations were purring along. Shpigelman allegedly tipped off Pajcin and Plotkin to three more deals. Shuster,
the forklift operator, had been fired by Quad back in January for undisclosed reasons (the company declines to comment), but he had continued to sneak into the
plant to steal copies wearing his old uniform. In May, Pajcin hired Juan Renteria Jr. to replace him via a classified ad in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. By the
summer, Pajcin had stopped trading in his own name, instead managing accounts in the names of his aunt Sonja and his girlfriend, Monika Vujovic, an exotic
dancer he had met at a club in New York. He was also passing tips to four others, including Elvis Santana, in exchange for a share of their profits.
Of course, not all of Pajcin and Plotkin’s schemes worked out, the SEC says. A plan to use strippers to coax inside information from bankers came to nothing.
Another idea was even more audacious. As luck had it, Jason Smith, a high school friend of Pajcin’s and now a mail carrier in Jersey City, had been empaneled
on a federal grand jury in Newark investigating alleged fraudulent accounting at Bristol-Myers Squibb. Smith called Pajcin on March 18, 2005, and told him a
high-ranking executive would probably be indicted. That day, Pajcin shorted 8,800 shares of Bristol-Myers. In early June, Smith called Pajcin and told him the
indictment was on the way. Pajcin, using his aunt’s account, shorted 10,500 shares. Mikhail Plotkin, Gene’s father, bought 50 put options, and Henry Siegel, the
father of an ex-girlfriend of Pajcin’s, purchased 200 puts. A week later, though, Smith had to admit that he had been wrong. The company had made a deal with
the U.S. Attorney, and the senior executive was not indicted. Pajcin and Plotkin’s group lost about $14,500.
Seven weeks later, though, came the $6 million Reebok payday – by far the group’s biggest. But only one day afterward, the SEC sent an e-mail to the address
listed on Sonja Anticevic’s brokerage account, which Pajcin used. The SEC had questions about those Reebok trades and the FBI was looking for Pajcin.
Authorities say Pajcin, Plotkin, and Smith met at Smith’s apartment in Jersey City and destroyed their laptops, hard drives, and cellphones. Soon after, Pajcin,
who had done most of the trading, flew to the Dominican Republic.
The case unravels
Once the SEC’S Markowitz heard Pajcin’s name from the Croatian reporter, things began falling into place for investigators. Anticevic’s brokerage records, for
example, had a Croatian mailing address, but computer records showed the account had been set up and managed using public wireless hotspots in New York
and New Jersey. And the same hotspots had been used at the same time to access a brokerage account registered to Monika Vujovic, who investigators would
soon find out was Pajcin’s girlfriend. A review of the various Reebok traders’ accounts showed they were investing in many of the same stocks at the same time.
The SEC figured out that many of the stocks were involved in mergers or acquisitions – and that Merrill Lynch had worked on each of the deals. “It was an aha
moment,” says Markowitz. “It looked like there was a constant leak out of one of the biggest banks in the country.”
About a week into the investigation, Melissa Coppola, an SEC forensic accountant, came into Markowitz’s office. While the Merrill Lynch explanation worked for
five of the stocks the group traded, it didn’t for the 22 others. Then Markowitz remembered an old scam he’d heard about: “Were any of these stocks mentioned
in Business Week?” he asked. When Coppola checked, she unlocked much of the rest of the case.
While investigators focused on Pajcin almost immediately, it took them a little while to discover Plotkin. His name wasn’t on any of the accounts they examined,
but he would crop up as one of Pajcin’s most frequent e-mail and phone pals. He had bought plane tickets for Pajcin to go to Croatia, Germany, and Wisconsin,
and had traveled with him to Austria and Zurich. The two had also had a joint bank account. And investigators found that Plotkin’s father, Mikhail, had
participated in many of the suspicious trades.
Still, the main target was Pajcin. After about three months in the Dominican Republic and Cuba (where Smith allegedly met him with $10,000 in cash) he
returned to New York. He had little choice: The accounts he managed had been frozen, and if he didn’t appear, the SEC could confiscate the money. “It’s one
thing to be abroad with $7 million,” says Markowitz. “It’s another thing to be abroad with zero dollars.”
Pajcin looked sharp in a dark suit when he walked into a small conference room at the SEC’s Manhattan offices just after 11 A.M. on Nov. 22. He was unfazed by
the questions posed by SEC senior trial counsel Scott Black. (He would later tell the FBI that he had planned his answers with Plotkin.) He admitted advising
many of the people involved in the case to buy Reebok, but only because he thought the stock was a bargain, not because he knew anything about a pending
merger.
Pajcin held forth for the better part of seven hours on that subject, talking at mind-numbing length about the metrics he said he had applied to the stock. The
SEC’s Black then summarized this at length, concluding, “Have we covered all the components of your analysis with respect to Reebok specifically that you can
remember, sitting here today?”
Pajcin added a few things: “The correlation of volatilities, historical and implied in terms of the S&P and just a general strong dropoff in the five-day volatility,
making new highs, so those are all things I look at.”
About half an hour later, Black changed the subject to Business Week. Pajcin said he didn’t read it often. His answers became short. When he was shown some
copies of the “Inside Wall Street” column, he said he wasn’t familiar with it. Then when he was shown articles that had appeared the day he had sold stocks of
the companies mentioned, he looked like “a deer in headlights,” according to a lawyer who was present. His explanation? He had probably gotten the tips from
two guys he had met in Croatian nightclubs, whom he knew only as “Carlo” and “Vladimir.”
“How would you go about getting Carlo and Vladimir’s last names?” Black asked.
“I don’t know if I can get Vladimir’s last name, but Carlo I think would be a function of going and just trying to find people.”
“How would you know where to go?”
“Either to Zagreb or to Split … what’s cool about these countries, there is only like three major clubs, three major places everyone goes, so it would just be a
function of going there and being like, ‘Hey, hey, I’m a friend of Carlo….’”
“He was in a bad spot,” says Black. “We knew we had him on Business Week.”
When Pajcin walked out of the SEC’s offices around 8:10 P.M.-almost nine hours after he started testifying – FBI agents were waiting for him. They put him under
arrest for insider trading for the Business Week trades.
As the government’s investigation continued, Plotkin carried on working at Goldman, Shpigelman toiled away at Merrill, and for a time Renteria allegedly kept
stealing magazines from the printing plant. But while investigators knew most of what had transpired in the previous year or so, they had only enough evidence
to bring criminal charges against Pajcin for the Business Week scheme. And they still didn’t know who the mole was inside Merrill.
Punishment
Then, in early February 2006, Benjamin Lawsky, a 36-year-old assistant U.S. attorney assigned to the case, decided to try hardball. Along with FBI special agent
David Makol, Lawsky told Pajcin the government knew all about Reebok. Then Lawsky made him a proposition: Become a government cooperator in exchange
for the chance of a lesser sentence. Pajcin accepted and soon spent hours telling Lawsky, Makol, and the SEC about the scheme from start to finish. (The terms
of his cooperation, including which charges he has pleaded to, are sealed.)
About 9:20 A.M. on April 11, Plotkin was driving his leased black BMW south on the Palisades Parkway from his home in Rockland County, N.Y., to the Manhattan
offices of Goldman Sachs. A highway-patrol car pulled him over. “I thought I was getting a speeding ticket,” Plotkin says. “When the FBI arrived, I told them they
had the wrong man.”
That’s as much of a defense as Plotkin has offered so far. He and the two forklift operators, Renteria and Shuster, are the only ones left in the scheme pleading
not guilty. (Attorneys for Renteria and Shuster declined to comment.) Plotkin is under house arrest and wearing an electronic ankle bracelet after having spent
two months in jail. He’s set for trial in April 2007. If convicted on all counts, he could face more than ten years in federal prison.
As for the other people in the case, Shpigelman, the Merrill Lynch analyst, has pleaded guilty to one count of insider trading, and Smith, the grand jury spy, has
pleaded guilty to insider trading, conspiracy, and contempt for violating grand jury secrecy rules. Both likely face about four years in prison. (Shpigelman and
Smith declined to comment.)
The SEC’s civil case will probably not proceed until the criminal charges are resolved. Lawyers for Elvis Santana, Monika Vujovic, Sonja Anticevic, and Henry
Siegel say their clients acted on what they thought was legitimate advice. Lawyers for the other six people sued by the SEC either did not respond to requests
for comment or could not be reached.
When Plotkin spoke to Fortune in early September, he talked about his plans for the future. They don’t include Wall Street. His current ambition is to become a
novelist and screenwriter like Michael Crichton. “I’d love to do something with writing or something creative,” Plotkin says. “I never thought of it as a career
choice before, but maybe I was wrong not to.”
His lawyer, Edward Little, wouldn’t comment on any of the specifics of the case. “What’s happening to Gene is a real-life rendition of the movie he made,” he
says. “The bad guy in the movie is the government cooperator trying to shift blame for what he did to the good guy. Gene played the good guy there too.”
Indeed, toward the end of his script, Plotkin’s hero pleads, “I just want my life back.”
To which Pajcin’s sinister drug dealer responds, “Sorry, bud, but I don’t think that’s gonna happen.”

In the summer of 2005, Elvis Santana was looking for some stock market advice. The 22-year-old assistant at Macy’s had a stack of do-it-yourself trading books, a
subscription to Investor’s Business Daily, and about $30,000 saved up. But he still wasn’t really sure where to start. So when his younger brother told him about a
friend of his, a smart, polished guy named David Pajcin (“Jeff” to his friends) who had worked on Wall Street, Santana was eager to pick his brain. When they
met at a Barnes & Noble in Brooklyn, they hit it off.
Pajcin, then a 28-year-old former Goldman Sachs analyst, was personable and self-assured, the kind of guy who attracts friends easily and girlfriends even more
easily. He told Santana he was starting his own hedge fund and would be happy to teach him some investing basics. He even offered to share some of his stock
picks. All Santana had to do was give him a cut of any earnings. Soon after their meeting, Santana opened a brokerage account. His first buys were shares of
clothing retailer Casual Male (Charts) and call options of FedEx (Charts) – both tips from Pajcin. Within a day his buying and selling had netted him a profit of
$4,662.
About six weeks and numerous trades later, though, Santana complained to Pajcin that he was back where he’d started. Once again Pajcin was happy to help
out with a tip. “Jeff called me with something he said was solid,” Santana says. The stock wasReebok (Charts), then trading at about $42. Beginning on Monday,
Aug. 1, Santana bought 465 call options and 520 shares. On Wednesday, when Pajcin called about getting his cut, Santana checked his account balance. He was
up $463,279. “I was like, ‘Oh, my God,’ ” he says.
That same day, Aug. 3, David Markowitz, then a 34-year-old lawyer and an assistant regional director of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s New York
office, was reading the Wall Street Journal on his subway ride to work. As he skimmed the front page, he read that Germany’s Adidas-Salomon AG was “close to
buying rival Reebok International Ltd. for about $4 billion in what would be a big bid by two former giants of the athletic-footwear industry to challenge the
long-running supremacy of Nike Inc.” The Journal reported that Adidas was expected to pay about $59 a share for Reebok, a 34% premium over the $43.95 at
which the stock had closed on Tuesday. That afternoon Reebok rose to almost $60.
Markowitz had forgotten about the deal until about 5 P.M., when a fax arrived on his desk. The SEC’s Market Surveillance Unit in Washington had received a tip
from the Philadelphia Stock Exchange that some people had been buying a lot of Reebok call options over the past few days – 2,952 calls for Reebok had been
traded on Monday, and another 2,315 on Tuesday, compared with average daily volume of 112 the previous week. The options traded were as much as $8 “out of
the money,” and most were due to expire soon. That meant whoever had bought them was making a very confident bet that Reebok’s stock was about to soar.
When Markowitz got a breakdown of the Reebok transactions, he saw that most of the options had been purchased by a handful of people in Croatia, Germany,
New York, and California. Sonja Anticevic of Croatia had purchased 1,997 call options – 38% of all the options traded in the past two days – and 240 shares of
Reebok. She had made $2,044,161. “We knew something was clearly fishy,” says Markowitz. He also learned there was a pending request to wire $870,000 of the
proceeds to a bank in Salzburg, Austria. “That’s when we realized we had an emergency on our hands,” Markowitz says. “Once the money is gone, you often
never see it again.”
Two days later, on Friday, Aug. 5, the SEC filed a lawsuit against Anticevic to freeze the money until investigators could figure out what was going on. When the
news hit Croatia, reporters swarmed her apartment in a working-class suburb of the small southern city of Omis. Briefly appearing on her doorstep on Sunday,
Anticevic told reporters she “never bought a stock and I have no idea how that works.” Neighbors said she had been working as a cleaning lady to supplement
the monthly pension of 1,600 kuna (about $263) she received for decades of work as a seamstress in a local underwear factory. She lived with her husband and
daughter in a two-room apartment provided by the factory. The family had no computer. Croatian reporters calling the SEC for comment passed on the fact that
she did, however, have a nephew in New York named David Pajcin.
That tip led SEC investigators, FBI agents, and lawyers from the office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York not only to Pajcin but eventually
to another young man, Eugene Plotkin. The two smart and ambitious sons of immigrant families had met in 2000 as trainees at Goldman Sachs. Over the next
five years, Pajcin, who soon left Goldman, and Plotkin, who stayed on, worked and partied together. They also, according to Mark Schonfeld, director of the
Northeast regional office of the SEC, ran “one of the most widespread, varied, and premeditated insider trading rings we have ever prosecuted.” Their total take
was not enormous – only about $7 million – but for sheer brazenness, Schonfeld says, Plotkin and Pajcin have few peers.
Now the two, along with 15 others, have been sued by the SEC for insider trading. Plotkin, Pajcin, and four others have also been indicted on federal criminal
charges of insider trading and conspiracy. Plotkin maintains his innocence. Pajcin has pleaded guilty and is helping the government try to convict his friend.
The playersDavid Pajcin (pronounced PIE-chin) was a charmer and a young man in a hurry. Funny and attractive, with a tall body-builder’s frame, he was born and raised in
Clifton, N.J., a son of Croatian immigrants. He excelled in school and athletics, earning a spot on the nationally ranked basketball team at Saint Anthony High
School in Jersey City. When it came time for college, Notre Dame offered him a full scholarship. There he flew under the radar, majoring in economics and not
releasing his photo for the yearbook. Soon after graduating cum laude, he landed a job in the commodities group at Goldman Sachs.
Like most young traders, Pajcin had to put in long hours, his time split between desk work and the crude oil or natural gas pits of the New York Mercantile
Exchange. “I was like, no, I can’t handle this,” Pajcin would later tell SEC investigators. “I just didn’t want to wait like four years and then still be on the floor.”
So after only 5� months at Goldman, Pajcin left for a series of jobs, none lasting longer than a few months, at small brokerage firms, day-trading shops, and a
bond futures trading company. He finally stopped working for securities firms in 2003. “We thought when we hired him he’d be great,” says Mark Shales, his
supervisor at Goldenberg Hehmeyer & Co., a brokerage where Pajcin worked for a few months. “He had all the right pedigrees: Notre Dame, Goldman. But he
never found his niche. He didn’t hang out with any of the other traders or spark any friendships. He just kind of came and went.” (Now in a federal holding facility
in Brooklyn, Pajcin declined to comment for this story.)
Pajcin did, however, make and keep the friends he wanted, and Plotkin was one of them. Plotkin, who sat down with Fortune for his only interview to date
(under the watchful eye of his lawyer, who would not let him discuss the charges against him), downplays their relationship. “We sat kind of close together in the
back of the room,” Plotkin says of their meeting at a training session at Goldman, “He’s a very socially outgoing person who makes friends easily, and I was just
one of those guys…. I wouldn’t say we were close.”
Plotkin was born in Moscow but grew up outside San Francisco. His family, he says, “came here for the American dream, that if you work hard and you do all the
right things, you can achieve.” After a year at the California Institute of Technology, he transferred to Harvard, where he majored in economics, wore a black
leather jacket, and played lots of pool.
At Harvard he also got into competitive ballroom dancing. “It just felt right,” he says. “When you’re in front of everybody, you get a chance to emote. You make
yourself very vulnerable and show who you are and who you can be.” By the time he graduated in 2000, he was a star of the Harvard-Radcliffe Ballroom Dance
Team.
Plotkin often told college friends his drive came from having grown up in modest circumstances. “Being an I-banker was that success,” one remembers. “To him
it symbolized the money and prestige he grew up living without.” So it was no surprise to those who knew him that he opted for Goldman Sachs and the promise
of money and prestige. He started as an analyst in the fixed-income research division and was eventually promoted to associate, a job that paid a base salary of
about $100,000 before a sizable bonus. He also kept dancing. “My days at the office would start early and end late – maybe around 7 or 8 – and then I’d go to the
dance studio for two hours before I went to sleep,” Plotkin says. Earlier this year the Web site DanceSportInfo.net ranked him, under the stage name “Gene
Michael” (Michael is his middle name), 49th in the country in the professional Latin category.
Whatever spare time Plotkin had he spent directing and starring in an independent movie he’d written and financed, alternatively titled One Way and Blindside.
Plotkin plays a young Wall Streeter at the fictional Galeon Partners (“the most exclusive and reputable wealth-management firm in the U.S.,” according to the
script) who becomes the victim of an elaborate conspiracy. Pajcin has a supporting role as a drug dealer who ultimately betrays him. Plotkin says he submitted
the picture without success to the Sundance Film Festival.
The plotAs pieced together by Fortune from SEC and U.S. Attorney’s filings and interviews with investigators, the tale of Plotkin and Pajcin’s alleged partnership as
insider traders begins in 2004. Pajcin took a vacation in Croatia and stayed with his aunt Sonja in Omis, a seaside town near the tourist hot spot of Split. He spent
his days on the beach and his nights at the clubs. One night a friend introduced him to a Croatian businessman living near Hamburg – Bruno Verinac. Pajcin later
met Verinac’s friend Perica Lopandic. They told Pajcin about an idea.
Most issues of Business Week contain a column by Gene Marcial called “Inside Wall Street.” It is not unusual for stocks, particularly those of small companies, to
move a few points on a mention by Marcial. If you could find out in advance which companies he was writing about, you could position yourself to profit nicely
from such a move. (This idea had occurred to other would-be insider traders. At least three times in the past decade the SEC and the U.S. Attorney have nabbed
people who got or tried to get their hands on Marcial’s column early.) But since the column is closely guarded in the magazine’s New York offices, the only way
to get an early look would be to steal a copy from Business Week’s printer. Verinac and Lopandic allegedly asked Pajcin if he would be interested in going back
to the States, hiring someone to infiltrate the plant, and sharing the info with them.
Pajcin was interested, and so was Plotkin. Back in New York, the two soon placed online job listings seeking factory workers. (They didn’t mention where.) One
response came from Nickolaus Shuster, a 23-year-old from New Jersey. Pajcin and Plotkin allegedly met him near Union Square in Manhattan and eventually
offered to pay him to move to Wisconsin and get a job at Quad/Graphics, which prints Business Week. Shuster agreed, eventually scoring a gig as a forklift
operator.
By early October, prosecutors say, Shuster was ensconced in Hartford, Wis., and had settled into a routine: On Thursday morning he would steal a copy of the
magazine, which is available online Thursday evening, and call Pajcin or Plotkin from the plant or his car. Pajcin would then trade on any tips Shuster had
turned up, which he also passed to Verinac and Lopandic. The group’s first trades, on Nov. 18, were the purchase of 6,500 shares of TheStreet.com (Charts) and
6,000 shares of Biolase Drills (Charts), a dental supply company based in Irvine, Calif. (Marcial had said Biolase would benefit from a recent management
shakeup and TheStreet.com might be ripe for a takeover.) The next day they sold the shares for a profit of $3,764. All told, the group, which ultimately totaled 12
people, made $282,573 on the scheme between November 2004 and July 2005, the SEC says.
Meanwhile, at Goldman, Plotkin, still pursuing the Wall Street career his friend had forsaken, had started recruiting for the firm at colleges and business schools.
He kept up with many of the students he met, offering to be a mentor and taking them out on the town for steak dinners and maybe even a trip to a strip club.
One of these potential prot�g�s was Stanislav Shpigelman, whom Plotkin met in the spring of 2004, when Shpigelman was a senior at Binghamton University in
upstate New York. Both of Russian descent, the two had kept in touch.
After Shpigelman took a job as a mergers and acquisitions analyst at Merrill Lynch in July 2004, Plotkin started calling him more often. Eventually they agreed to
meet on Nov. 6 at Spa 88, a Russian bathhouse nestled between a barbershop and a bodega near Wall Street. Pajcin joined them there. Shpigelman bragged
about a secret takeover he was working on: Procter & Gamble (Charts) was planning to buy Gillette. He said he had even flown to Ohio, where P&G has its
headquarters, to deliver files.
About two months later, on Jan. 25, prosecutors say, Shpigelman called Plotkin to say a bid for Gillette was imminent. The next day Pajcin and the rest of his
trading group started purchasing out-of-the-money Gillette calls. Two days later, when P&G announced a deal to buy Gillette for $57 billion, the group made
$158,930, its biggest score yet. A month later Shpigelman was at a Manhattan strip club with Pajcin and Plotkin when he got an e-mail on his BlackBerry from a
co-worker confirming that pharmaceutical company Novartis had bought a majority stake in the German generic-drug maker Eon Labs. The group made $85,473
trading in advance of that deal, the SEC says.
Throughout the spring and summer of 2005, the operations were purring along. Shpigelman allegedly tipped off Pajcin and Plotkin to three more deals. Shuster,
the forklift operator, had been fired by Quad back in January for undisclosed reasons (the company declines to comment), but he had continued to sneak into the
plant to steal copies wearing his old uniform. In May, Pajcin hired Juan Renteria Jr. to replace him via a classified ad in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. By the
summer, Pajcin had stopped trading in his own name, instead managing accounts in the names of his aunt Sonja and his girlfriend, Monika Vujovic, an exotic
dancer he had met at a club in New York. He was also passing tips to four others, including Elvis Santana, in exchange for a share of their profits.
Of course, not all of Pajcin and Plotkin’s schemes worked out, the SEC says. A plan to use strippers to coax inside information from bankers came to nothing.
Another idea was even more audacious. As luck had it, Jason Smith, a high school friend of Pajcin’s and now a mail carrier in Jersey City, had been empaneled
on a federal grand jury in Newark investigating alleged fraudulent accounting at Bristol-Myers Squibb. Smith called Pajcin on March 18, 2005, and told him a
high-ranking executive would probably be indicted. That day, Pajcin shorted 8,800 shares of Bristol-Myers. In early June, Smith called Pajcin and told him the
indictment was on the way. Pajcin, using his aunt’s account, shorted 10,500 shares. Mikhail Plotkin, Gene’s father, bought 50 put options, and Henry Siegel, the
father of an ex-girlfriend of Pajcin’s, purchased 200 puts. A week later, though, Smith had to admit that he had been wrong. The company had made a deal with
the U.S. Attorney, and the senior executive was not indicted. Pajcin and Plotkin’s group lost about $14,500.
Seven weeks later, though, came the $6 million Reebok payday – by far the group’s biggest. But only one day afterward, the SEC sent an e-mail to the address
listed on Sonja Anticevic’s brokerage account, which Pajcin used. The SEC had questions about those Reebok trades and the FBI was looking for Pajcin.
Authorities say Pajcin, Plotkin, and Smith met at Smith’s apartment in Jersey City and destroyed their laptops, hard drives, and cellphones. Soon after, Pajcin,
who had done most of the trading, flew to the Dominican Republic.
The case unravelsOnce the SEC’S Markowitz heard Pajcin’s name from the Croatian reporter, things began falling into place for investigators. Anticevic’s brokerage records, for
example, had a Croatian mailing address, but computer records showed the account had been set up and managed using public wireless hotspots in New York
and New Jersey. And the same hotspots had been used at the same time to access a brokerage account registered to Monika Vujovic, who investigators would
soon find out was Pajcin’s girlfriend. A review of the various Reebok traders’ accounts showed they were investing in many of the same stocks at the same time.
The SEC figured out that many of the stocks were involved in mergers or acquisitions – and that Merrill Lynch had worked on each of the deals. “It was an aha
moment,” says Markowitz. “It looked like there was a constant leak out of one of the biggest banks in the country.”
About a week into the investigation, Melissa Coppola, an SEC forensic accountant, came into Markowitz’s office. While the Merrill Lynch explanation worked for
five of the stocks the group traded, it didn’t for the 22 others. Then Markowitz remembered an old scam he’d heard about: “Were any of these stocks mentioned
in Business Week?” he asked. When Coppola checked, she unlocked much of the rest of the case.
While investigators focused on Pajcin almost immediately, it took them a little while to discover Plotkin. His name wasn’t on any of the accounts they examined,
but he would crop up as one of Pajcin’s most frequent e-mail and phone pals. He had bought plane tickets for Pajcin to go to Croatia, Germany, and Wisconsin,
and had traveled with him to Austria and Zurich. The two had also had a joint bank account. And investigators found that Plotkin’s father, Mikhail, had
participated in many of the suspicious trades.
Still, the main target was Pajcin. After about three months in the Dominican Republic and Cuba (where Smith allegedly met him with $10,000 in cash) he
returned to New York. He had little choice: The accounts he managed had been frozen, and if he didn’t appear, the SEC could confiscate the money. “It’s one
thing to be abroad with $7 million,” says Markowitz. “It’s another thing to be abroad with zero dollars.”
Pajcin looked sharp in a dark suit when he walked into a small conference room at the SEC’s Manhattan offices just after 11 A.M. on Nov. 22. He was unfazed by
the questions posed by SEC senior trial counsel Scott Black. (He would later tell the FBI that he had planned his answers with Plotkin.) He admitted advising
many of the people involved in the case to buy Reebok, but only because he thought the stock was a bargain, not because he knew anything about a pending
merger.
Pajcin held forth for the better part of seven hours on that subject, talking at mind-numbing length about the metrics he said he had applied to the stock. The
SEC’s Black then summarized this at length, concluding, “Have we covered all the components of your analysis with respect to Reebok specifically that you can
remember, sitting here today?”
Pajcin added a few things: “The correlation of volatilities, historical and implied in terms of the S&P and just a general strong dropoff in the five-day volatility,
making new highs, so those are all things I look at.”
About half an hour later, Black changed the subject to Business Week. Pajcin said he didn’t read it often. His answers became short. When he was shown some
copies of the “Inside Wall Street” column, he said he wasn’t familiar with it. Then when he was shown articles that had appeared the day he had sold stocks of
the companies mentioned, he looked like “a deer in headlights,” according to a lawyer who was present. His explanation? He had probably gotten the tips from
two guys he had met in Croatian nightclubs, whom he knew only as “Carlo” and “Vladimir.”
“How would you go about getting Carlo and Vladimir’s last names?” Black asked.
“I don’t know if I can get Vladimir’s last name, but Carlo I think would be a function of going and just trying to find people.”
“How would you know where to go?”
“Either to Zagreb or to Split … what’s cool about these countries, there is only like three major clubs, three major places everyone goes, so it would just be a
function of going there and being like, ‘Hey, hey, I’m a friend of Carlo….’”
“He was in a bad spot,” says Black. “We knew we had him on Business Week.”
When Pajcin walked out of the SEC’s offices around 8:10 P.M.-almost nine hours after he started testifying – FBI agents were waiting for him. They put him under
arrest for insider trading for the Business Week trades.
As the government’s investigation continued, Plotkin carried on working at Goldman, Shpigelman toiled away at Merrill, and for a time Renteria allegedly kept
stealing magazines from the printing plant. But while investigators knew most of what had transpired in the previous year or so, they had only enough evidence
to bring criminal charges against Pajcin for the Business Week scheme. And they still didn’t know who the mole was inside Merrill.
PunishmentThen, in early February 2006, Benjamin Lawsky, a 36-year-old assistant U.S. attorney assigned to the case, decided to try hardball. Along with FBI special agent
David Makol, Lawsky told Pajcin the government knew all about Reebok. Then Lawsky made him a proposition: Become a government cooperator in exchange
for the chance of a lesser sentence. Pajcin accepted and soon spent hours telling Lawsky, Makol, and the SEC about the scheme from start to finish. (The terms
of his cooperation, including which charges he has pleaded to, are sealed.)
About 9:20 A.M. on April 11, Plotkin was driving his leased black BMW south on the Palisades Parkway from his home in Rockland County, N.Y., to the Manhattan
offices of Goldman Sachs. A highway-patrol car pulled him over. “I thought I was getting a speeding ticket,” Plotkin says. “When the FBI arrived, I told them they
had the wrong man.”
That’s as much of a defense as Plotkin has offered so far. He and the two forklift operators, Renteria and Shuster, are the only ones left in the scheme pleading
not guilty. (Attorneys for Renteria and Shuster declined to comment.) Plotkin is under house arrest and wearing an electronic ankle bracelet after having spent
two months in jail. He’s set for trial in April 2007. If convicted on all counts, he could face more than ten years in federal prison.
As for the other people in the case, Shpigelman, the Merrill Lynch analyst, has pleaded guilty to one count of insider trading, and Smith, the grand jury spy, has
pleaded guilty to insider trading, conspiracy, and contempt for violating grand jury secrecy rules. Both likely face about four years in prison. (Shpigelman and
Smith declined to comment.)
The SEC’s civil case will probably not proceed until the criminal charges are resolved. Lawyers for Elvis Santana, Monika Vujovic, Sonja Anticevic, and Henry
Siegel say their clients acted on what they thought was legitimate advice. Lawyers for the other six people sued by the SEC either did not respond to requests
for comment or could not be reached.
When Plotkin spoke to Fortune in early September, he talked about his plans for the future. They don’t include Wall Street. His current ambition is to become a
novelist and screenwriter like Michael Crichton. “I’d love to do something with writing or something creative,” Plotkin says. “I never thought of it as a career
choice before, but maybe I was wrong not to.”
His lawyer, Edward Little, wouldn’t comment on any of the specifics of the case. “What’s happening to Gene is a real-life rendition of the movie he made,” he
says. “The bad guy in the movie is the government cooperator trying to shift blame for what he did to the good guy. Gene played the good guy there too.”
Indeed, toward the end of his script, Plotkin’s hero pleads, “I just want my life back.”
To which Pajcin’s sinister drug dealer responds, “Sorry, bud, but I don’t think that’s gonna happen.”

July 27th, 2010

Auto Draft

Running through a minefield, backwards
Part II – farewell Flanonia?

The last issue concentrated on sure sovereign default by Greece, Spain and Portugal – partly due to hopeless economic numbers but more because of various ‘soft’ issues. For, just as the numbers in a company’s balance sheet theoretically provide all that is required to understand and value it, the reality is that squishy issues, such as the quality of management, staff morale or even simple luck can make a mockery of these numbers. Part I also emphasised the futility of gnawing at the bone of the de facto bankruptcy of these three countries. Backward looking investment never makes money; better surely to recognise the sovereign default cycle has further to go, and so spend time identifying the next unexpected candidate.

On the numbers alone, the most likely casualties are the UK and US in that order, but both have good odds of escaping. Many hard issues help. In America, one such is the dollar’s currently irreplaceable role as the world’s reserve currency. In the UK, the relatively excellent debt duration (i.e. it is spread over many years rather than near-term) is a plus. Each also has good soft issues: the market likes the new British government’s tax and slash policies so is a willing buyer of UK debt, whilst the Asian central banks have so many US bonds they simply self destruct if they refuse to keep buying.

The standout surprise candidate for sovereign default by end-2012 is Belgium. A decent country; civilised, at peace, wealthy and globally competitive in several areas. Moreover, first glance at the numbers gives no particular reason to expect Belgium to default. Its potential financial problems have been on the radar screen for so long that we have grown used to them, rather like those many parents who fail to recognise the repulsiveness of their offspring. With net government debt of €400bn, it is hardly a huge world borrower in absolute terms. Yet default could occur almost entirely by accident and the ripples be far greater than its size warrants, because of its position as the de facto federal capital of the EU. Belgium’s hastening car crash is not in current bond prices or exchange rates.

The glue has dissolved

There are five reasons why Belgium has hung together for the last 180 years: Britain, God, the King, fear and most importantly, money. Before addressing these, it is necessary to understand why Belgium exists at all. When in 1815 Britain was the Big Beluga after the battle of Waterloo, it wanted a buffer state to contain France. The easy solution was to give the area now known as Belgium to one of its staunchest allies, Holland. Unfortunately, King William I of the now-renamed United Netherlands was not, even according to Dutch history books, the smartest primate in the zoo, and he suffered from the diplomatic skills of a water buffalo. Holland (or the Kingdom of the Netherlands to give it its official name) had a long history of Calvinism. This was unpopular with the newly acquired Dutch and French Catholic subjects alike. Moreover, by deliberately ensuring the French were under-represented in all parts of government, yet overtaxed, the embers of resentment smouldered. These grew hotter in 1823 after an attempt to make Dutch the official language for the whole population. Surprisingly, full rebellion was ignited by the staging of a sentimental patriotic opera in Brussels in 1830. The crowds poured out of the theatre and went on the rampage. As Britain still wanted a buffer state, and was still the world superpower, it quickly moved to ensure the creation of a new country called Belgium, uniting Flanders and Wallonia (hence Flanonia might have been more appropriate).

The people, having suddenly been rebranded, opted for a French king. Britain growled, ever mindful of France’s latent imperial ambitions, thus a minor German duke’s second son was chosen instead. After nine years’ skirmishing, as Holland held onto a few strong points, and a minor invasion by France, Holland withdrew to sulk.

The Dutch king’s alienation of his many Dutch speaking but Catholic subjects in Belgium united them with their French counterparts, providing a powerful glue to hold society together well into the late twentieth century. Now, like most of Western Europe, society has rapidly turned secular. In 1967, 43% of the population attended Catholic mass every Sunday. By 1998 (the last year in which the Roman Catholic Church produced data) this was down to 11%. It is estimated to have fallen by 0.5% p.a. ever since, possibly accelerating given the latest sex-scandal investigations. (The Bishop of Bruges confessed to an unpleasant 20-year history and resigned; the police then raided and sealed off the Archbishop’s palace, also the national catholic HQ on similar charges. The investigation continues.)

In line with this trend, reverence for the monarchy has also waned, although most of the country’s kings have done a good job given they have forever walked the high wire over ferocious political and linguistic divisions. Little needs to be said of the fear quotient. Belgium has suffered from three highly aggressive neighbours: Germany, France and the Netherlands. It was a popular sport for each to routinely stomp all over the area. They have all changed their ways. Leaving aside a lack of clout, the British are now wholly ignorant of how or why they created Belgium at all.

The language chasm

Belgium is a federation of three states: Flanders in the North, where Dutch (Flemish) is spoken by the native Flemings; Wallonia in the South where the official language is French; and thirdly the all-important region of Brussels. This is surrounded by Flanders although the majority of the region speaks French. The linguistic divide is well-known, but this is not of the Mandarin vs. Cantonese or Castilian vs. Catalan spat variety. It is aggressive. Ten metres either side of the official linguistic border, the other language does not exist. Municipalities can and often do insist official documents and meetings only take place in their local language. This draconian legal divide was foolishly legislated into place in 1980 and has become more intolerant every since. Belgian politics are so culturally divided that all 12 of the major parties break down on linguistic lines and cannot stand in the other language area.

A shifting balance of power

Post-independence the balance of power shifted to the French speakers. The richer Flemish Belgians were highly dependent on Holland’s colonial trade and capital. Post independence, this stagnated and so they concentrated on successfully out-breeding the French over the next 150 years. Meanwhile the French speaking south boomed. The development of iron, steel, coal and heavy industry – funded by French, and to a lesser extent German, capital and supplied by the major mineral deposits nearby – put all the financial and industrial power into Walloon hands. Like their previous masters in Holland, this was gradually abused. Almost all higher education was in French; plump political posts always went to French-speakers.

Meanwhile, the Flemish-speakers developed into a distinct but majority underclass. By the early 1970s, the wheel had again turned. Today, 75% of GDP is accounted for by the service sector as industry withers. The majority Flemings now sit in the financial chairs and have not hesitated to embark on a little light payback, such as splitting up key universities into Flemish and French speaking sections from 1968 onwards. The relative wealth of the Flemings is simply overwhelming. Their income per head is 118% of the EU average – the French-speakers 85%. Per capita productivity is 20% higher. They make up over 70% of the skilled labour force. French unemployment is twice that of the Flemish speakers.

Per capita, subsidies for French speakers are 50% more than for the Flemish. In short, Flanders funds and props up Wallonia.

This has not been lost on the ever chaotic voting system. Recent headlines have screamed that the independence parties have taken over. A slight exaggeration. True, the Flemish speaking, free market and pro-independence Vlaams Belang (VB) party won the most seats in the 150- member lower house, with an increase from 17 to 27 (in line with the wealth divide, the second largest party with 26 seats is the French-speaking Socialist “welfare” party). But this does not ensure separation, even though in those areas where it was allowed to stand, VB and its sympathisers won over 40% of the votes. Belgian law requires that at least four of the 12 “major” parties (seven Flemish and five French) form a government with at least one from each state. Hence, once again various caretakers are manning the desk. There is no elected government.

The most heated and longest debates in parliament concern two issues: language superiority and the French speakers demanding, and to date getting, an ever greater and disproportionate share of the welfare pie. Up north, not surprisingly this is unpopular. The result is net government borrowing equal to 100% of GDP. Not quite as bad as Greece and a few other miscreants, but add a budget deficit of 6% of GDP and a too-high a structural deficit, and Belgium is in the top fifth of over-borrowed nations globally, a position it has steadfastly maintained for the last 30 years. It has even been worse. Throughout most of the late 1980s and 1990s net government debt averaged 114% of GDP.

As with several Mediterranean countries, Belgium was a huge beneficiary of joining the euro (it was the first to do so) because the implicit German guarantee allowed heavy borrowing at much lower interest rates. Before joining the euro zone, general government net interest payments in 1992 absorbed a whopping 10.3% of GDP. In 2009, even after the collapse and necessary bailing out of its banks, especially the big two of Fortis and Dexia, interest payments were only 3.6%.

Follow the money

High debt and gradual linguistic separation have been a constant for 30 years. The recent elections confirm the trend of accelerating separatism. Yet these are likely to morph faster than expected into a financial problem because of Brussels.

Much to the dislike of most politicians across Europe, Brussels is the de facto Federal Capital. A small city; and only 1.1m people live within the “Brussels region”. It is wealthy, with income per head 233% above the EU average. Moreover, despite being only a tenth of the Belgian population, it accounts for over a fifth of GDP. The reasons are well-known. Since the early 1950s treaties presaging the European Union, money has poured into Brussels. The EU Commission alone employs 25,000 people, the EU parliament another 7,000. There are over 10,000 registered lobbyists and more diplomats and countries represented in Brussels than in Washington. Then there are 1,200 accredited journalists (which may explain why expenditure on expenses accounts alone was €800m in Brussels in 2009). Just for direct running costs (i.e. rentals and electricity), the EU pumps $1bn into Brussels every year. Yet this money fountain is not only the EU. 40% of the population comes from outside Belgium, as it is headquarters to a range of other organisations which have developed into an administrative cluster. The better known includes groups like NATO, where Brussels is the European HQ with 5,000 employees. The range includes the weird, such as the heavily funded, big employing World Customs Organisation or EURATOM.

All these foreigners, usually funded by their overseas governments, are amongst the very highest earners in Europe, creating a major multiplier effect on schools, restaurants, cleaners, auto sales or house building. Originally majority Flemish-speaking, now most locally born Brussels residents speak French, the result of policies introduced when they were at the top of the economic tree. Yet Flemings – residents and commuters – still dominate the better paid and skilled jobs, hence Brussels is the only part of Belgium where both languages must co-exist by law. Some local French speaking politicians have been muttering darkly about doing to Flanders what Flanders wants to do to Wallonia, i.e. spin out of Flanders or even Belgium itself. This is because the money spigot is about to jam.

Turning off the taps

As the third richest region in Europe (after Luxembourg and London) it could in theory exist as a wealthy city-state cum federal capital, but such a dream is a chimera. Derided eurocrats live a life apart. Even Brussels-born residents who benefit from their largesse often complain that the many organisations have created rich ghettos from which they are excluded. That these eurocrats are out of touch has been demonstrated both by pay and expenses enough to make a third world dictator blink, and recent demands for pay rises.

There is a commonsense test to apply to the financial future of Brussels. Most European countries are net recipients of aid from the EU. Of the minority putting money in, Germany dominates. Other small contributors such as Scandinavia or the UK are co-joined triplets with Germany. Forced to slash their own capital, social, and welfare budgets following the financial crash, they will not put more into Brussels. It is a matter of time before each country decides to reduce its net or gross cheques written out to various Brussels organisations; hence the second most important engine of Belgium’s economy (after the wider economy of Flanders) suffers its first ever post-war squeeze. This means it has less largesse to spread around – particularly in Wallonia

Moreover, Brussels is no longer so logical a geographic centre for a federal capital since the EU expanded eastwards. This has not been lost on the Germans (Brussels’ most significant honey provider). Its press and politicians have suggested for example that NATO be moved from a largely neutral country with minimal military capability to one with a little more vim, such as Germany. France would murder to get its hands on more EU institutions. Even the UK, ever-equivocal about what it really wants form the EU, and outside the euro zone, would like a few pointless but foreign funded pork barrels like EURATOM. Such major political changes will take time. Turning off the money spigot is easier and will happen sooner.

How it plays out?

What is evolving in Belgium is old news. The problem now, as for divorcing couples, is how to divide up the assets, or more precisely in Belgium’s case, its sovereign debt. It is noteworthy that the government is chary in producing full data on how much Brussels and Flanders subsidise the minority Walloons, but roughly speaking the national debt should probably be split about 35:65 Dutch:French. Yet relatively poor Wallonia simply could not service nearly €260bn of national debt (€175,000 per person in employment). Meanwhile, wealthy Flanders would emerge with a budget surplus, a minute structural deficit and debt to GDP the lower than any EU nation outside of Scandinavia. The imperative for Flanders, along with the scope for argument, is clear.

There is a growing risk of a faster than expected dissolution of Belgium which will result in sovereign default; this is based on a belief in the inability of the individual nations within the euro zone, let alone the EU institutions themselves, to realise that as nations unravel, speed is of the essence. To repeat, the net €400bn national debt is chicken feed – less than half the loss racked up by America’s AIG in 2007-8. And in wealthier times, the dream then shared by most of its members, of a politically united Europe would have ensured a quick bailout led by Germany. Mrs Merkel has already discovered that small cash subsidies to the profligate, such as Greece, are very expensive electorally. So foot dragging and evasion are sure to be the political order of the day. As the divorce commences, little is gained in double guessing the next phase. Whether Flanders goes alone as a fabulously rich small state or joins up with Holland (now the religious issue is moribund) is a moot point. Equally, whether France chooses to absorb Wallonia into greater France (Sarkozy’s wild card to escape likely electoral defenestration?) or to subsidise Wallonia as a client state again, is also an unknown. On every topic, there is no agreement on how these regions should evolve, nor who is responsible for the debts, further ensuring delay.

Investment conclusions

If markets have re-learned one lesson recently, it is that small events have disproportionate results. Belgium ranks as the world’s 20th economy by size, accounting for 0.8% of world GDP. Greece before the fall was No. 28, with 0.6%; its problems continue to shake markets, both because they were unexpected and because of the risk of a domino effect. So too would be the problem with Belgium. It is yet another reason why government bonds are toxic and why at some stage their yields will blow out, thus capital values fall.

Obviously, not holding Belgian shares on a medium term basis is sensible unless valuation work has fully taken account of these unexpected risks (clients have zero exposure). Once again the euro would fall and the German export machine boom. Equity markets would rattle around for a while but then absorb the key lesson. For Belgium is yet another example, as if one was needed, that the supply of government bonds over coming years will continue to soar to unprecedented levels even. All commodity prices tumble when the supply is perceived as infinite. Meanwhile, equities would benefit.

Regards
Bedlam Asset Management plc

July 6th, 2010

Climate change . . a different perspective from Robert B. Laughlin

Robert B. Laughlin takes a much longer perspective . . . . he is a professor of physics at Stanford University and a co-recipient of the 1998 Nobel Prize for Physics. This essay is adapted from his new book on the future of fossil fuels, which will appear next year.

Summer 2010

What the Earth Knows

Understanding the concept of geologic time and some basic science can give a new perspective on climate change and the energy future

Any serious conversation about the planet’s climate and our energy future must begin, paradoxically, with a backward look at geologic time. The reason for this is that the way forward is fogged by misunderstandings about the earth. Experts are little help in the constant struggle in this conversation to separate myth from reality, because they have the same difficulty, and routinely demonstrate it by talking past each other. Respected scientists warn of imminent energy shortages as geologic fuel supplies run out. Wall Street executives dismiss their predictions as myths and call for more drilling. Environmentalists describe the destruction to the earth from burning coal, oil, and natural gas. Economists ignore them and describe the danger to the earth of failing to burn coal, oil, and natural gas. Geology researchers report fresh findings about what the earth was like millions of years ago. Creationist researchers report fresh findings that the earth didn’t exist millions of years ago. The only way not to get lost in this awful swamp is to review the basics and decide for yourself what you believe and what you don’t.

Continue reading Climate change . . a different perspective from Robert B. Laughlin

June 20th, 2010

Inside the Machine: A Journey into the World of High-Frequency Trading

From the Institutional Investor . . .

Inside the Machine: A Journey into the World of High-Frequency Trading

10 Jun 2010

Michael Peltz

An editor’s journey into the world of high-speed trading and proprietary algorithms that make or break markets.

At 2:45p.m. on Thursday, May 6, George (Gus) Sauter received a frantic call from one of his traders to get in front of a Bloomberg terminal. The Dow Jones industrial average, already down 3.9 percent that day on fears about Greece, was in free fall. In just five minutes the index plunged 573 points. Less than two minutes later, the Dow had rocketed back up 543 points, going on to finish the day down 3.2 percent.

“It was just crazy,” Sauter, chief investment officer of mutual fund giant Vanguard Group, told me a few days later. “I had to go to our fixed-income building, about a five-minute walk from my office. By the time I got there, the market had rallied.”

Continue reading Inside the Machine: A Journey into the World of High-Frequency Trading

June 14th, 2010

The Sterling and George Soros . . .

Interesting read on financial markets and traders . . .
‘Go for the Jugular’

By ???

The collapse of Greece’s economy, and its domino effect on Spain, Portugal, and other countries in the euro currency zone, is in many ways a replay of an earlier financial crisis–the break-up of the continent’s Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992. Then, as now, Europe’s policymakers showed little patience with–or understanding of–markets. Then, as now, Germany often seemed contemptuous of  the less competitive economies on the periphery of Europe.

The 1992 crisis came to a head on Friday September 9, when currency speculators forced the devaluation of the Italian lira. By the following Tuesday, Britain was facing the same fate. In this excerpt from More Money Than God, his new history of hedge funds, Sebastian Mallaby tells the story of the crisis from inside the cockpit of George Soros’s Quantum Fund.

On Tuesday, September 15, the pound took another beating. Spain’s finance minister telephoned Norman Lamont, his British counterpart, to ask him how things were. “Awful,” Lamont answered.

Continue reading The Sterling and George Soros . . .

April 22nd, 2010

Decoding the Cold War, 20 Years Later

Frostbitten

Decoding the Cold War, 20 Years Later

Lawrence D. Freedman
LAWRENCE D. FREEDMAN is Professor of War Studies at King’s College, London.As the years pass, the Cold War increasingly appears as an undifferentiated chunk of history that stretched across time and space, with a vast cast of characters and occasional moments of drama. It is presented as a curious concatenation of summits and negotiations, alliances and clients, spies and border posts, ideological dogmas and underground resistance, and a combination of arcane theories about deterrence and some nasty actual wars.

Because the most important feature of the Cold War was that it stayed cold — and did not become the third in the twentieth century’s series of world wars — it is often recalled almost fondly as a time of calm and stability. The standoff between the West, led by the United States, and the Soviet Union and its satellites has taken on an institutionalized, ritualized quality that rarely seems to have posed any danger of giving way to the chaos and catastrophe of total war. It is now common to talk of the reassuring rationality and predictability of the old Soviet adversary, with unfavorable comparisons to Washington’s current enemies.

Continue reading Decoding the Cold War, 20 Years Later

April 22nd, 2010

Pragmatism in climate politics

I like this perspective – much more likely to work in the real world. Michael Lind writes:

A new approach to climate change requires, first and foremost, a change in tone from shrillness

to sobriety. In addition to being inaccurate, apocalyptic rhetoric is more likely to demoralise the

public than to inspire support for collective action. In this as in other areas, an unceasing barrage

of bad news is less likely to inspire civic cooperation than to convince people that problems are

overwhelming. They may respond by retreating into apathy, rather than mobilising and uniting. No

progressive political campaign, on this or any other subject, can succeed without an optimistic and

empowering vision of human agency.

Define the problem in terms of technology

Progressives in the US and other democracies should reject arguments that in order to “save the

earth” from climate change, radical changes in the social order or individual lifestyles are necessary.

It is political poison for any progressive programme to address climate change to be associated

with radical leftist denunciations of capitalism, decades-old schemes to replace cars with railroads

and trolleys, or calls for economic austerity and personal asceticism motivated by nostalgia for the

pre-industrial past or a moral objection to consumerism. Pragmatic progressives should insist that

climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions is a technological problem with technological

solutions.

Read it all here.

April 18th, 2010

Goldmans Abacus Presentation - 2007

For the presentation, click here

April 14th, 2010

Stratfor : Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Resurgence

Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Resurgence

April 13, 2010

By Lauren Goodrich
This past week saw another key success in Russia’s resurgence in former Soviet territory when pro-Russian forces took control of Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz revolution was quick and intense. Within 24 hours, protests that had been simmering for months spun into countrywide riots as the president fled and a replacement government took control. The manner in which every piece necessary to exchange one government for another fell into place in such a short period discredits arguments that this was a spontaneous uprising of the people in response to unsatisfactory economic conditions. Instead, this revolution appears prearranged.
April 11th, 2010

Country Default Risk as measured by CDS Prices – Bespoke Investment Group