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	<title>Financial Markets &#187; Barnett</title>
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		<title>Despite Rhetoric, Obama Still Following Cheney&#8217;s Lead in Dictatorial Justice</title>
		<link>http://www.appapillai.com/blog/2009/05/22/despite-rhetoric-obama-still-following-cheneys-lead-in-dictatorial-justice/</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2009 18:14:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>mano</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Barnett]]></category>

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Despite Rhetoric, Obama Still Following Cheney&#8217;s Lead in Dictatorial Justice

It seems like the former vice-president is the one piggybacking on the new president&#8217;s detainee policy spotlight, but a top foreign-policy analyst argues that, when it comes to tribunals, it&#8217;s the other way around: the Obama administration is maintaining the practice of inventing justice as America [...]]]></description>
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<h3>Despite Rhetoric, Obama Still Following Cheney&#8217;s Lead in Dictatorial Justice</h3>
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<p class="teaser">It seems like the former vice-president is the one piggybacking on the new president&#8217;s detainee policy spotlight, but a top foreign-policy analyst argues that, when it comes to tribunals, it&#8217;s the other way around: the Obama administration is maintaining the practice of inventing justice as America sees fit.</p>
<p class="by">By Thomas P.M. Barnett</p>
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<p>Soren McCarty/WireImage.com (Obama); Manny Ceneta/Getty (Cheney)</p></div>
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<p><strong>This morning,</strong> even as the man whose misguided sense of justice started this whole &#8220;mess&#8221; was preparing to beat him back down on the issue, President Obama sought to distance himself more than ever before from the last administration on detainees — and what the hell to do with them. &#8220;Decisions over the last eight years developed an <em>ad hoc</em> legal approach for fighting terrorism that was neither effective nor sustainable,&#8221; Obama said in a major speech moments ago, &#8220;a framework that failed to trust in our institutions, and that failed to use our values as a compass.&#8221;</p>
<p>And despite <em>more</em> answers than ever before on the most controversial issue of the day, the president might as well have been talking to himself when he said &#8220;there are no neat or easy answers here.&#8221; In fact, when it comes to the thorniest nuance of the detainee issue — not their release, but their trial in Bush administration-invented military commissions — he didn&#8217;t offer many good answers at all.</p>
<p>President Obama&#8217;s decision to stick with a modified version of these tribunals — &#8220;an appropriate venue for trying detainees,&#8221; as he called them today — seriously undermines his campaign pledge to turn the page on Bush-Cheney&#8217;s deeply flawed approach to terrorism. No matter how many times he enumerates the &#8220;swift changes&#8221; by his administration to ditch its predecessor&#8217;s out-of-thin-air concepts — &#8220;war on terror,&#8221; &#8220;enhanced interrogation methods,&#8221; &#8220;unlawful enemy combatants&#8221; — Obama continues to promote Bush-Cheney&#8217;s isolating notion that detainees should be tried in a special, U.S.-executive-branch-controlled system of<em>alternative</em> justice that lies outside of two proven pillars of traditional justice: the military&#8217;s ever-effective courts martial and our civilian court system, which is held in place by the same safeguards of the Constitution that Obama invoked so many times this morning.</p>
<p>Beyond the rhetoric, then, Obama has told the world that America&#8217;s definitions of terror remain its own. He says it&#8217;s not a reversal? It is. The president has reminded the world of a Cheney-ism: <em>We know terrorism when we see it, and when we see it, we&#8217;ll let you know.</em></p>
<p>Clearly, this approach undercuts our international moral authority on the subject of terror, making our efforts seem less an attempt to bolster international rules and more a continued rationalization for going anywhere and doing whatever to whomever we choose to define as enemies of our state. By continuing to justify an exceptional system, Obama chooses to perpetuate nothing less than an international version of the same sort of dictatorial practices that America routinely condemns &#8220;bad&#8221; regimes for using within their own borders.</p>
<h4>Hedging on Absolutism, More Power in the Opinions of Men</h4>
<p><strong>Obama made a point of noting</strong> in his speech today that the Bush-Cheney calculation of Guantanamo-plus-military-tribunals-equals-safety has yielded only three convictions in seven years. If that&#8217;s his rationale for closing the detention center, then why give the tribunals a pass at all? Here&#8217;s a hint from Cheney, who followed Obama&#8217;s speech with one of his own: &#8220;I think the president will find, upon reflection, that to bring the worst of the worst terrorists inside the United States would be cause for great danger and regret for years to come.&#8221;</p>
<p>Obama&#8217;s smart enough to foresee the Willie Horton-like ads (&#8220;designed to frighten the American people,&#8221; as he noted today) that the Republicans will broadcast en masse in the run-up to <a href="http://www.esquire.com/features/data/obama-mid-terms-033009">next year&#8217;s mid-term elections</a>. No wonder Congressional Democrats voted to deny the President the funds he needs to close Gitmo down by next January.</p>
<p>So the president&#8217;s invocation of &#8220;decisions based on fear rather than foresight&#8221; may have been aimed as much at his own party as at the man following his speech, but the political wrangling, the Guantanamo funding votes, and even Obama&#8217;s promises of more procedural safeguards for defendants at his commissions all miss the larger point: America continues to ignore the utility of building up case law with regard to terrorism — either within our own military/civilian systems or across the international system as a whole, where the International Criminal Court remains a wholly untested option.</p>
<p>Worst of all, Obama seems to be letting the tail wag the dog on this one: In order to keep his more prominent campaign pledge of shutting the doors at Guantanamo, his administration is bowing to the immediate challenge of figuring out how to process this current batch of terrorism suspects in as politically expedient a manner as possible. And to the glee of some Republicans, that sense of urgency has led Obama to essentially bless Bush-Cheney&#8217;s past use of special military commissions by correcting it only on the margins. &#8220;These reforms,&#8221; Obama said today, &#8220;will make our commissions a more credible and effective means of administering justice.&#8221;</p>
<p>What reforms, you ask? And to what end? Less use of hearsay (Obama now wants prosecutors to bear the burden of proving its reliability), more defendant rights to pick their own lawyers, and more protection for defendants if they choose not to testify on their own behalf. These are slim improvements to a system that Candidate Obama once described as &#8220;an enormous failure.&#8221; These are indications that President Obama feels the pang of reality — that he must retain this extraordinary option for cases he fears won&#8217;t end in convictions in standard military or civilian court settings.</p>
<p>This &#8220;modified&#8221; approach smells much like Obama&#8217;s nuanced take on the CIA&#8217;s controversial rendition program by which Bush-Cheney routinely shuttled terror suspects around the world to both regimes known to engage in torture and the CIA&#8217;s own infamous &#8220;black sites&#8221; where agency employees or contractors did much the same. Obama has closed down the CIA sites and banned the torture techniques but has nonetheless indicated that his administration will continue the rendition program. It just promises not to send suspects to places where bad things will happen to them.</p>
<p>What constitutes &#8220;bad&#8221;? Ah, there again the public is asked to trust Obama-Biden in ways not dissimilar to the trust once abused by Bush-Cheney: instead of trusting the rule of law, we are asked to trust the opinions of men.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t know about you, but that&#8217;s not my definition of a republic.</p>
<h4>Dispatching of Tribunals, More Opportunity for the International Criminal Court</h4>
<p><strong>Here&#8217;s how I would modify</strong> Obama&#8217;s modifications:</p>
<p>First, get rid of the military commissions altogether. Any court that doesn&#8217;t build up case law — either at home or on an international scale — is a judicial sinkhole not worth digging.</p>
<p>Second, divide up prosecutions as follows:</p>
<p><strong>1.</strong> If suspects commit or plot terrorism directly against the United States (and last night&#8217;s arrests reminded us this is still happening actively), they should be tried in U.S. criminal courts — no matter where they&#8217;re snatched up. Existing federal laws provide sufficient protection regarding the preservation of classified intelligence-gathering techniques.</p>
<p><strong>2.</strong> If suspects do the same inside countries where America&#8217;s military is currently conducting operations, they should be tried in U.S. courts martial. Terrorism inside recognized war zones (always a subjective definition) should be handled on the spot. The United States military has used courts martial successfully in virtually every major intervention it has conducted in the post-Cold War era, and its Uniform Code of Military Justice&#8217;s protection of due process is admired around the world.</p>
<p><strong>3.</strong> In situations when neither of those two conditions are met, and local judicial systems aren&#8217;t up to the task (because we&#8217;re talking a failed state or a rogue regime that either allows such terrorism or commits it itself), the International Criminal Court (ICC) should be encouraged to step in on the basis that such terrorism constitutes &#8220;crimes against humanity.&#8221; Most international legal scholars accept this rationale — straight out of the court&#8217;s founding treaty — as a legitimate entry point for the ICC, so long as further, clarifying amendments are added to the 2002 Rome Statute. The ICC was set up for exactly this purpose: extend the global community&#8217;s legal norms into those frontier-like situations where local governments, such as they are, don&#8217;t provide fair trial. Where functioning states exist and such crimes are suitably prosecuted, the ICC — by definition — has no purview. It is designed to fill in the judicial &#8220;blanks&#8221; on a global basis, which is why virtually all of its cases to date have focused on Africa — ground zero for the world&#8217;s failed states. Ultimately, I think we should funnel as many terrorism cases as possible to the ICC, encouraging fellow great powers to do the same, because the more the United States can do that, the faster we collectively build up international case law on transnational terrorism.</p>
<p>Having said that, I don&#8217;t harbor any illusions about America — that long-serving military Leviathan of Planet Earth — wanting to prioritize the ICC in the short run. So long as globalization continues to advance around the planet, it will generate localized friction (i.e., attempts to preserve collective identity in the face of globalization&#8217;s &#8220;dangerous&#8221; individual freedoms) that routinely manifests itself as terror-based resistance. And so long as America plays globalization&#8217;s bodyguard, we will remain the most universally recognized target of such groups. Those are just the cold, hard facts.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, America needs to recognize that there is a half-life attached to the flawed ideological equation that states the following: Globalization = Westernization = Americanization. The future dictates that our days of serving as the No. 1 target of anti-globalization forces around the planet eventually come to an end. With the rise of globalizing agents such as China and India and Brazil, we&#8217;ll inevitably see these states share some of that body-guarding burden. And when they do, I guarantee you that America will prefer those states submit to an international legal code of our patient shaping than having them add their own, self-serving definitions of &#8220;universal&#8221; justice.</p>
<p>History&#8217;s clock is ticking, whether President Obama hears it or not.</p>
<p><strong><em>Esquire contributing editor <a href="http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/" target="_blank">Thomas P.M. Barnett</a> is the author of </em><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Great-Powers-America-World-After/dp/0399155376" target="_blank">Great Powers: America and the World After Bush</a>.</strong></div>
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		<title>Tom Barnett : Seven Reasons Why Obama&#8217;s Nuke-Free Utopia Won&#8217;t Work</title>
		<link>http://www.appapillai.com/blog/2009/05/21/tom-barnett-seven-reasons-why-obamas-nuke-free-utopia-wont-work/</link>
		<comments>http://www.appapillai.com/blog/2009/05/21/tom-barnett-seven-reasons-why-obamas-nuke-free-utopia-wont-work/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2009 03:27:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>mano</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Barnett]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[obama]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.appapillai.com/blog/?p=905</guid>
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May 14, 2009, 12:58 PM
Seven Reasons Why Obama&#8217;s Nuke-Free Utopia Won&#8217;t Work

The president wants to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Sounds like he&#8217;s fighting the good fight, but Esquire.com&#8217;s global-strategy expert argues that it&#8217;s absolutely the wrong one — a fight that might open globalization&#8217;s door to World War III.

By Thomas P.M. Barnett




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<p class="date">May 14, 2009, 12:58 PM</p>
<h3>Seven Reasons Why Obama&#8217;s Nuke-Free Utopia Won&#8217;t Work</h3>
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<div class="yahoobuzz">The president wants to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Sounds like he&#8217;s fighting the good fight, but Esquire.com&#8217;s global-strategy expert argues that it&#8217;s absolutely the wrong one — a fight that might open globalization&#8217;s door to World War III.</div>
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<p class="by">By Thomas P.M. Barnett</p>
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<p><strong>Last month in Prague,</strong> President Obama <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/" target="_blank">declared</a> his country&#8217;s &#8220;moral responsibility to act&#8221; in transforming our planet into one free of nuclear weapons. He called for a global summit and a treaty to end nuke development, then signaled his seriousness back home by <a href="http://blogs.tnr.com/tnr/blogs/the_plank/archive/2009/05/12/obama-breaks-with-gates-cancels-nuke-program.aspx" target="_blank">axing</a> the Pentagon&#8217;s much-needed Reliable Replacement Warhead program. Speaking before tens of thousands of Czechs on the day North Korea tested a long-range missile, Obama may have sounded like Martin Luther King (&#8220;This goal will not be reached quickly — perhaps not in my lifetime&#8221;), but his concept of a nuclear-proof world is patently unattainable, potentially dangerous, and inherently wrong. &#8220;I&#8217;m not naïve,&#8221; the president said. &#8220;But we go forward with no illusions.&#8221; But he is, and he has.</div>
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<p>George W. Bush had his &#8220;axis of evil,&#8221; while Obama seems to find nuclear weapons to represent a kind of natural evil unto themselves — no matter who possesses them. Now the twentysomethings in Prague may have cheered his invocations of &#8220;hope&#8221; and &#8220;change,&#8221; and others may be<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joe-cirincione/the-new-realism-of-arms-c_b_202996.html" target="_blank">jumping on board</a>, but I&#8217;ve discovered something in my years of global-strategy analysis, and it&#8217;s not the deadly fatalism Obama describes — it&#8217;s the modern realism he ignores: Nuclear weapons are the single best thing that has ever happened in mankind&#8217;s long history of war.</p>
<p>Globalization existed prior to World War One, but then nukes arrived with their own &#8220;crystal-ball effect,&#8221; previewing the suicidal destruction of modern war between great powers. And if globalization&#8217;s economic interdependence <a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=HiKuvZ8NYDgC&amp;dq=norman+angell+great+illusion&amp;printsec=frontcover&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=tt4fyVFpCB&amp;sig=35xrTZAVl2IOlaGmh06X845hSVQ&amp;hl=en&amp;ei=LTkMSurnI9bgtgfdneGRCA&amp;sa=X&amp;oi=book_result&amp;ct=result&amp;resnum=3" target="_blank">was a &#8220;great illusion&#8221; back then</a>, it&#8217;s become a rock-solid strategic reality in recent decades — and our recent global financial contagion has only made that more indisputably clear. Meanwhile, the world&#8217;s great powers have come to understand that nuclear weapons are for <em>having</em>, not <em>using</em>. And that is why no nuclear power has ever directly gone to war against another.</p>
<p>If Obama simply wants to reengage Russia on further warhead reductions, fine. But it seems to me that his nuclear utopianism is not so much an extension of his youthful optimism as a vestige of the generational guilt promoted by Cold Warriors like Henry Kissinger — &#8220;wise men&#8221; who seek to end America&#8217;s hypocrisy in preaching non-proliferation while relying on nuclear weapons as strategic back-stop. This vision isn&#8217;t just a backwards one; it&#8217;s a dangerously destabilizing policy agenda that makes conventional great-power war conceivable once again. Here&#8217;s why Obama&#8217;s nuclear ideals put World War III back on the table:</p>
<h4>1. The &#8220;increasing speed&#8221; of proliferation is a myth.</h4>
<p>As far as a world filled with nuclear powers is concerned, we&#8217;re just reaching double digits (as in, ten!) with North Korea and Iran. Meanwhile, roughly three-dozen additional states have achieved nuclear power while eschewing weaponization.</p>
<p>Ah, but we are told that when &#8220;irrational&#8221; regimes reach for the Bomb, like<a href="http://www.esquire.com/the-side/richardson-report/iran-elections-042109">Tehran&#8217;s mullahs</a> or <a href="http://www.esquire.com/features/stateoftheworld0507-12">Pyongyang&#8217;s whacked-out Kims</a>, we enter into a new, far more threatening era. And yet history remains clear on this subject: When nuclear monopolies are ended and existing rivalries are nuclearized, stability tends to break out — time and again.</p>
<p>So, yeah, let&#8217;s manage Iran&#8217;s ascension to the great-power club (and Israel&#8217;s temptation to wipe it off the map preemptively) and encourage Beijing to rid the world of Kim&#8217;s war-crime-worthy regime (lest South Korea and Japan go nuclear, too), but let&#8217;s not pretend that a nuclear-free world facilitates either evolution.</p>
<h4>2. One nuke in a nuke-free world is more usable.</h4>
<p>If nuclear weapons are suddenly in short supply by the destabilized great powers, <em>any</em> regime that rapidly fields them would become, overnight, the strategic equivalent of the one-eyed man in the land of the blind.</p>
<p>As much as some experts hype the dangers associated with Iran and North Korea, the fact that Israel possesses hundreds of nuclear warheads, while Pyongyang&#8217;s potential opponents own them in the thousands, keeps these threats reasonably deterred (Ahmadinejad being no more rhetorically aggressive than Mao was in his nuclear debut).</p>
<h4>3. An America with fewer nukes breeds a new class of military powers.</h4>
<p>By reducing &#8220;barriers to entry&#8221; to the marketplace called great-power war, I believe we would actually <em>encourage</em> the proliferation of nuclear weaponry. If Obama and his successors were to withdraw America&#8217;s virtually global nuclear umbrella, numerous middle powers would become highly incentivized to fill that security gap.</p>
<p>Of course, the dream would be to include all such states in a global rejection of nuclear weaponry, but that&#8217;s not likely if the system&#8217;s clear Leviathan (the United States) demotes itself to the status of a de-nuclearized great power. That scenario (Obama&#8217;s scenario) instantly elevates a slew of suddenly &#8220;near-peer&#8221; military powers in a manner that smaller states will likely find strategically unpalatable. As in, they could be blown into oblivion — strategic or literal — at any moment.</p>
<h4>4. A new class of military powers breeds a new round of local wars.</h4>
<p>The fallout from the collapse of our nuclear umbrella would be as frightening as it would be immediate: the resumption of great-power rivalries and proxy wars in regions once again subject to profound spheres of influence. That would further complicate the strategic landscape and undo so much of the Obama administration&#8217;s diplomatic success between now and then.</p>
<h4>5. An America without nuclear retaliation doesn&#8217;t keep enemies scared.</h4>
<p>It&#8217;s not that fear-mongering accomplishes much, really. But a superpower needs an outwardly fearless image beyond this one that Obama offered in Prague: &#8220;As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.&#8221;</p>
<p>Even if the capability remains, Obama&#8217;s words eliminate the existential threat of massive American retaliation to disabling strikes, be they directly mounted by nation-states or indirectly by their proxies. And without the threat of our &#8220;unhinged&#8221; or &#8220;angry&#8221; response, the U.S. arguably encourages further asymmetrical responses from likely opponents, cyberwarfare being preeminent among them.</p>
<h4>6. Getting rid of old-school nukes won&#8217;t stop the rise of new-school biological weapons.</h4>
<p>This century&#8217;s scientific advances in warfare will certainly be centered in biology — not in physics, which defined that great twentieth-century advance known as the atom bomb. These new advances will lead to weapons likely destined to the same fate as chemical weaponry: unusable in any deterrent sense because of their uncontrollability (once unleashed, who knows where they spread?).</p>
<p>So if the only players crazy enough to use warfare&#8217;s new scientific weaponry are nihilistic terror groups — groups that don&#8217;t care where the blowback hits because their aim is widespread instability and fear — undoing nuclear capabilities won&#8217;t diminish that danger whatsoever.</p>
<h4>7. The threat of &#8220;loose nukes&#8221; is for Jack Bauer to worry about, not Barack Obama.</h4>
<p>In his speech, Obama described a scenario in which a nuclear weapon falls into the hands of terrorists &#8220;the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.&#8221; But the historical record here is equally clear: Recognized nuclear powers do not share technology indiscriminately, while unrecognized ones (e.g., North Korea, Pakistan) are tempted to cash in.</p>
<p>Recognized nuclear states don&#8217;t just pass bombs to terrorists, because that would negate the primary reason for having them: keeping the state safe from any attacks by fellow nuclear powers (in Iran&#8217;s case, from the U.S. and Israel).</p>
<p><strong>The Obama administration wants to separate itself</strong> from the Bush-Cheney legacy of rejecting nuclear arms control while, at the same time, obsessing over the dangers of nuclear terrorism. I understand this. But there are better ways to bridge those two dangers than seeking to turn back the clock on nuclear weapons, which — counter-intuitive as it may seem — have actually kept us free of great-power war for well over six decades and counting.</p>
<p>Don&#8217;t underestimate the power of America&#8217;s large nuclear arsenal; it constitutes a very big stick that allows our leadership to speak softly as the world&#8217;s sole military superpower. For a president of Obama&#8217;s temperament and ambition, this is a match made in heaven. Now all he has to do is appreciate it, because with enough on his plate to consume five or six terms, Obama needs to husband his political capital at home and his diplomatic capital abroad to focus more on pressing matters and immediate threats.</p>
<p>I mean, this man is attempting to unwind America&#8217;s two military quagmires while finessing Iran and North Korea. As Obama makes Afghanistan-Pakistan <em>his</em> war, he disappoints the Left. As he&#8217;s forced to engage Iran more equally, he angers the Right. And promising a &#8220;nuclear-free world&#8221; preemptively apologizes in both directions. Instead, America should remain committed to the strategic concepts of nuclear deterrence and continue our decades-long policy of being openly ambiguous about the conditions that will trigger our use of such weapons. Because if the threat is out there, America — and Obama — has to remain in control of it.</p>
<p><strong><em>Esquire contributing editor <a href="http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/" target="_blank">Thomas P.M. Barnett</a> is the author of </em><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Great-Powers-America-World-After/dp/0399155376" target="_blank">Great Powers: America and the World After Bush</a>.</strong></div>
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		<title>Dr. Tom Barnett in Washington &#8211; great read !!!</title>
		<link>http://www.appapillai.com/blog/2009/03/26/dr-tom-barnett-in-washington-great-read/</link>
		<comments>http://www.appapillai.com/blog/2009/03/26/dr-tom-barnett-in-washington-great-read/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2009 02:53:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>mano</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Tom&#8217;s testimony today




Statement submitted
By 
Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett,
Senior Managing Director,
Enterra Solutions LLC 
To 
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee,
House Armed Services Committee,
United States Congress

26 March 2009 
 
I appear before the subcommittee today to provide my professional analysis of the current global security environment and future conflict trends, concentrating on how accurately&#8211;in my opinion&#8211;America&#8217;s naval services address both in their strategic [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Tom&#8217;s testimony today</h3>
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<p align="center"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;"><strong>Statement submitted</strong></span></p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;"><strong><span style="font-family: Georgia; font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;"><strong>By</strong></span> </span></strong></span></p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;"><strong>Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett,</strong></span></p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;"><strong>Senior Managing Director,</strong></span></p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;"><strong>Enterra Solutions LLC</strong></span> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;"><strong>To</strong></span> </p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;"><strong>Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee,</strong></span></p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;"><strong>House Armed Services Committee,</strong></span></p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;"><strong>United States Congress</strong></span></p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;"><strong></strong></span></p>
<p align="center"><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;"><strong>26 March 2009</strong></span> <br />
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<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">I appear before the subcommittee today to provide my professional analysis of the current global security environment and future conflict trends, concentrating on how accurately&#8211;in my opinion&#8211;America&#8217;s naval services address both in their strategic vision and force-structure planning.  As has been the case throughout my two decades of working for, and with, the Department of Navy, current procurement plans portend a &#8220;train wreck&#8221; between desired fleet size and likely future budget levels dedicated to shipbuilding.  I am neither surprised nor dismayed by this current mismatch, for it reflects the inherent tension between the Department&#8217;s continuing desire to maintain some suitable portion of its legacy force and its more recent impulse toward adapting itself to the far more prosaic tasks of integrating globalization&#8217;s &#8220;frontier areas&#8221;&#8211;as I like to call them&#8211;as part of our nation&#8217;s decades-long effort to play bodyguard to the global economy&#8217;s advance, as well as defeat its enemies in the &#8220;long war against violent extremism&#8221; following 9/11.  Right now, this tension is mirrored throughout the Defense Department as a whole:  between what Secretary Gates has defined as the &#8220;next-war-itis&#8221; crowd (primarily Air Force and Navy) and those left with the ever-growing burdens of the long war&#8211;namely, the Army and Marines.</span> </p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">It is my sense that the current naval leadership views the global environment with great accuracy, understanding its service role to be one of balancing between four strategic tasks:  a) sensibly hedging against the slim possibility of great-power war; b) preparing the force for high-end combat operations against a regional rogue power armed with nascent nuclear weapons capacity; c) supporting/conducting ground operations in the struggle against violent extremism; and d) improving maritime governance and security in those regions where today it remains virtually non-existent (e.g., most of Africa&#8217;s coastline).  Using the vernacular of my published works<sup>*</sup>, I consider the first two tasks (great-power war, war against regional rogues) to fall under the rubric of America&#8217;s Leviathan<sup>**</sup> or big-war force, while the latter two tasks (struggle against extremism, extending governance) define the growing portfolio of our nation&#8217;s System Administrator<sup>*</sup> or small-wars force.</span> </p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">Historically, the Department of Navy defined the totality of our nation&#8217;s would-be System Administrator force, meaning, prior to the World Wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it was the job of the Navy and Marine Corps to both defend and extend America&#8217;s commercial networks with the outside world, while the U.S. Army (i.e., Department of War) served mainly as a continental constabulary force that worked to integrate western frontier lands.  Those World Wars, in combination with the Cold War, transformed the U.S. Army and its offshoot, the Air Force, into <em>the </em>primary Leviathan services vis-à-vis the Soviet threat, while the naval services, despite the grand ambitions of their 1980s Maritime Strategy, were left overwhelmingly in the role of managing the adjacent theaters known as the Third World.  At Cold War&#8217;s end, those naval forces gladly embraced their enduring &#8220;SysAdmin&#8221; role, portraying themselves as de facto global police capable of handling&#8211;on their own&#8211;virtually all developing-region crisis scenarios short of regional war.  But with the post-9/11 interventions (Iraq, Afghanistan), the Navy quickly saw its global constabulary role eclipsed by the U.S. Army, as that force, supported by the Marines, once again stepped into its pre-20<sup>th</sup>-century role as our nation&#8217;s primary nation-building /occupational/counterinsurgency force&#8211;this time on the shifting frontiers of globalization&#8217;s advance.</span> </p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">Now, the Navy finds itself split between preserving its blue-ocean Leviathan fleet while simultaneously expanding its green/brown-water SysAdmin fleet, the former speaking primarily to 20<sup>th</sup>-century great-power war scenarios that have lingered despite globalization&#8217;s deep, pacifying embrace (see my geographic definition of globalization&#8217;s Functioning Core<sup>*</sup> in Figure 1 below), while demand for the latter only increases<em>because</em> of globalization&#8217;s historically swift penetration of a raft of previously off-grid, still largely traditional regions (my definition of globalization&#8217;s Non-Integrated Gap<sup>**</sup>) where today we locate virtually all of the wars, civil wars, genocide and ethnic &#8220;cleansing,&#8221; mass rape as a tool of terror, children lured or forced into combat activity, acts of terrorism, exporters of illegal narcotics, UN peacekeeping efforts, and 95 percent of U.S. military overseas interventions since 1990.</span> </p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: x-small;"><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Figure 1:  The Pentagon&#8217;s New Map (2004)</span></strong></span></p>
<p><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image"><a href="http://thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2009/03/1.jpg"><img class="mt-image-center" src="http://thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/assets_c/2009/03/1-thumb-500x418.jpg" alt="1.jpg" width="500" height="418" /></a></span><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">As someone who helped write the Department of Navy&#8217;s white paper,<em>&#8230;From the Sea</em>, in the early 1990s and has spent the last decade arguing that America&#8217;s grand strategy should center on fostering globalization&#8217;s advance, I greatly welcome the Department&#8217;s 2007 Maritime Strategic Concept that stated:</span> </p>
<ul><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">United State seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world.  As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance.</span> </ul>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">Rather than merely focusing on whatever line-up of rogue powers constitutes today&#8217;s most pressing security threats, the Department&#8217;s strategic concept locates its operational center of gravity amidst the most pervasive and persistently revolutionary dynamics associated with globalization&#8217;s advance around the planet, for it is primarily in those frontier-like regions currently experiencing heightened levels of integration with the global economy (increasingly as the result of Asian economic activity, not Western) that we locate virtually all of the mass violence and instability in the system.  </span> </p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">Moreover, this strategic bias toward globalization&#8217;s Gap regions (e.g., a continuous posturing of &#8220;credible combat power&#8221; in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean) and SysAdmin-style operations there makes eminent sense in a time horizon likely to witness the disappearance of the three major-war scenarios that currently justify our nation&#8217;s continued funding of our Leviathan force&#8211;namely, China-Taiwan, Iran, and North Korea.  First, the Taiwan scenario increasingly bleeds plausibility as that island state seeks a peace treaty with the mainland and proceeds in its course of economic integration with China.  Second, as Iran moves ever closer to achieving an A-to-Z nuclear weapon capability, America finds itself effectively deterred from major war with that regime (even as Israel will likely make a show&#8211;largely futile&#8211;of delaying this achievement through conventional strikes sometime in the next 12 months).  Meanwhile, the six-party talks on North Korea have effectively demystified any potential great-power war scenarios stemming from that regime&#8217;s eventual collapse, as America now focuses largely on the question of &#8220;loose nukes&#8221; and China fears only that Pyongyang&#8217;s political demise might reflect badly on continued &#8220;communist&#8221; rule in Beijing&#8211;hardly the makings of World War III.</span> </p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">As the Leviathan&#8217;s primary warfighting rationales fade with time, its proponents will seek to sell both this body and the American public on the notion of coming &#8220;resource wars&#8221; with other great powers.  This logic is an artifact from the Cold War era, during which the notion of zero-sum competition for Third World resources held significant plausibility primarily because economic connectivity between the capitalist West and the socialist East was severely limited.  But as the recent financial contagion proved, that reality no longer exists (see Figure 2 below).  The level of financial interdependence across globalization&#8217;s Functioning Core, in addition to the supply-chain connectivity generated by globally integrated production lines, renders moot the specter of zero-sum resource competition among the world&#8217;s great powers.  If anything, global warming&#8217;s long-term effects on agricultural production around the planet will dramatically increase both East-West and North-South interdependency as a result of the emerging global middle class&#8217;s burgeoning demand for higher caloric intake/resource-intensive foodstuffs.  To the extent that rising demand goes unmet or Gap regions suffer significant resource shortages in the future, we are exceedingly unlikely to see resumed great-power conflict as a result.  Rather, we are likely to witness even more destabilizing civil strife in many fragile states (a situation to which even rising great powers such as Brazil, Russia, India and China could return under the right macro-economic conditions), thus additionally increasing the SysAdmin force&#8217;s global workload and triggering further Pentagon resource shifts from the underutilized Leviathan force.  Naturally, the same could be said about the legacy of today&#8217;s global economic crisis.</span> </p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: x-small;"><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Figure 2:  Initial market declines during 2008 global financial crisis, Core-Gap superimposed</span></strong></span></p>
<p><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image"><a href="http://thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2009/03/2.jpg"><img class="mt-image-center" src="http://thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/assets_c/2009/03/2-thumb-500x322.jpg" alt="2.jpg" width="500" height="322" /></a></span><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: xx-small;"><em>(Source: Wall Street Journal, 13 October 2008)</em></span> </p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">In sum, I see a future in which the SysAdmin side of the ledger (more Green than Blue) experiences continued significant growth in its global workload, while the Leviathan (more Blue than Green) experiences the opposite.  As such, the U.S. Government&#8217;s ongoing budget woes, in combination with the rising costs associated with equipping the Leviathan force (e.g., incredibly expensive capital ships), means that the Leviathan&#8217;s platform numbers will shrink significantly over the next couple decades while the SysAdmin&#8217;s numbers (a cheaper mix of smaller and more disposable/unmanned platforms) will rise dramatically&#8211;along with personnel requirements (already seen with the move to add 92,000 ground troops).   As a result, America&#8217;s &#8220;soft power&#8221; military resources will grow in size and capabilities, over time generating pressure to create some new bureaucratic entity more operationally in line with such activities&#8211;namely, somewhere between our current departments of &#8220;peace&#8221; (State) and &#8220;war&#8221; (Defense).</span> </p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">As for the Department of Navy&#8217;s current force-structure plan, I think it&#8217;s safe to say that our naval Leviathan force enjoys a significant&#8211;as in, <em>several times over</em>&#8211;advantage over any other force out there today.  As such, our decisions regarding new capital ship development and procurement should center largely on the issue of preserving industrial base.  My strategic advice is that America should go as low and as slow as possible in the production of such supremely expensive platforms, meaning we accept that our low number of per-class buys will be quite costly.  To the extent that ship or aircraft numbers are kept up or even expanded in aggregate, I believe such procurement should largely benefit the SysAdmin force&#8217;s need for many cheap and small platforms, preferably of the sort that can be utilized by our forces for some suitable period of time and then given away to smaller navies around the world to boost their own capacity for local maritime governance.  In other words, we should increasingly make our overall naval force structure symmetrical to the now-asymmetrical challenges and threats found in globalization&#8217;s frontier regions (what I call the Gap), our long-term focus being on increasingly the capacity of states there to govern those spaces on their own.  </span> </p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">As such, I am a firm believer in Admiral Mike Mullen&#8217;s notion of the &#8220;1,000-ship navy&#8221; and the Global Maritime Partnerships initiative, especially when, as a part of such efforts, our naval forces expand cooperation with the navies of rising great powers like China and India, two countries whose militaries remain far too myopically structured around border conflict scenarios (Taiwan for China, Kashmir for India).  America must dramatically widen its definition of strategic allies going forward, as the combination of the overleveraged United States and the demographically-moribund Europe and Japan no longer constitutes a global quorum of great powers sufficient to address today&#8217;s global security agenda.   </span> </p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">To conclude, the U.S. Navy faces severe budgetary pressures on future construction of traditional capital ships and submarines.  Those pressures will only grow as a result of the current global economic crisis (which&#8211;lest we forget&#8211;generates similar pressures on navies around the world) and America&#8217;s continued military operations abroad as part of our ongoing struggle against violent extremism.  Considering these trends as a whole, I would rather abuse the Navy&#8211;force structure-wise&#8211;before doing the same to either the Marine Corps or the Coast Guard.  Why?  It is my professional opinion that the United States defense community currently accepts far too much risk <em>and</em> casualties <em>and</em> instability on the low end of the conflict spectrum while continuing to spend far too much money on building up our combat capabilities for high-end scenarios.  In effect, we over-feed our Leviathan force while starving our SysAdmin force, accepting far too many avoidable casualties in the latter while hedging excessively against theoretical future casualties in the former.  Personally, I find this risk-management strategy to be both strategically unsound and morally reprehensible.</span> </p>
<p><span style="font-family: Cambria; font-size: small;">As this body proceeds in its collective judgment regarding the naval services&#8217; long-range force-structure planning, my suggested standard is a simple one:  give our forces fewer big ships with fewer personnel on them and many more smaller ships with far more personnel on them.   As the Department of Navy <em>finally</em> gets around to fulfilling the strategic promise of systematically engaging the littoral <em>&#8230; from the sea</em>, doing so in complete agreement&#8211;in my professional opinion&#8211;with the security trends triggered by globalization&#8217;s tumultuous advance, I would humbly advise Congress not to stand in its way.</span></div>
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<p class="entry-footer"><span class="post-footers">Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett on March 26, 2009 9:00 AM </span><a class="permalink" href="http://thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2009/03/toms_testimony_today.html">Permalink</a> |</p>
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		<title>Barnett: Develop Iraq to cut deals with world</title>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 12:35:15 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Insight into the developments in Iraq &#8211; the big message is that it takes time to build anything worthwhile

Barnett: Develop Iraq to cut deals with world
By Thomas P.M. Barnett
Sunday, August 31, 2008




 With American combat troops now slated to depart Iraq by 2011, our intervention moves into its final phase, with the crucial goal being the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Insight into the developments in Iraq &#8211; the big message is that it takes time to build anything worthwhile</p>
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<h2>Barnett: Develop Iraq to cut deals with world</h2>
<p class="byline">By Thomas P.M. Barnett<br />
Sunday, August 31, 2008</p>
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<div id="sponsor"> With American combat troops now slated to depart Iraq by 2011, our intervention moves into its final phase, with the crucial goal being the expansion of economic opportunity for ordinary citizens.</div>
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<p>Our &#8211; and Iraq&#8217;s &#8211; success here will determine the likelihood of our military&#8217;s return down the road under less favorable circumstances.</p>
<p>Much is made of Iraq&#8217;s seeming unwillingness to spend its oil profits on infrastructure, the assumption being that Baghdad is milking American taxpayers. Let me offer another explanation: Iraq lacks sufficient &#8220;counterparty&#8221; capacity to negotiate, conclude and manage the necessary deals with the outside world.</p>
<p>Any market for services or goods requires counterparties of roughly equal capacity: Player A wants to sell and B wants to buy, and both possess all the necessary skills to pull off that transaction. It takes two to tango &#8211; and sign a contract.</p>
<p>When international business looks at oil-rich Iraq, it sees plenty of opportunity. What it doesn&#8217;t see in many instances, despite rising security, are sufficient local counterparties &#8211; both private and public &#8211; to make the necessary deals happen.</p>
<p>Such skills were hoarded under Saddam Hussein by the top political leadership to maintain state control of the economy.</p>
<p>Iraq is hardly unique in this deficit. It characterizes a lot of poor economies struggling to connect to the global economic grid.</p>
<p>They just don&#8217;t have sufficient personnel, venues and associated rule sets for striking deals and then executing them. It generally takes a generation to grow such &#8220;soft&#8221; infrastructure because it&#8217;s a people-driven process in which experience is accumulated and best practices are identified.</p>
<p>Americans take this capacity for granted, because it&#8217;s so woven into our communities: the chamber of commerce, the local land titling office, and the realtors and lawyers eager to deal.</p>
<p>Drop a businessperson armed with ambition and vision into your average American community, and he or she will soon be approached by a small network of locals ready to facilitate the identification of appropriate counterparties.</p>
<p>All economically vibrant communities possess this informal network.</p>
<p>When a country lacks such deal-making infrastructure, it&#8217;s essentially a low-trust environment, meaning most deals are managed by family or clan-defined businesses.</p>
<p>These networks are inherently limited in size: Blood ties define the known, trusted universe.</p>
<p>These traditional networks may suffice when economic activity is modest or within a classic sustenance economy in which everybody&#8217;s just getting by, but they&#8217;re insufficient when globalization knocks on the door.</p>
<p>Globalization is knocking down a lot of doors right now, as the rising East&#8217;s seemingly unquenchable thirst for energy and commodities propels all manner of infrastructure investment in emerging and underdeveloped economies alike.</p>
<p>That push, however, reveals just how many immature economies out there lack those institutional and informal counterparty capacities.</p>
<p>When the fictional Jed Clampett, a &#8220;poor mountaineer,&#8221; struck &#8220;black gold&#8221; and suddenly amassed a fortune, he instinctively recognized his own lack of deal-making skills and quickly outsourced that function to his new, Beverly Hills banker, Mr. Drysdale, who in turn represented the Clampett family as its competent counterparty in deals with outside entities seeking advantage.</p>
<p>When a state does that, like the House of Saud did almost eight decades ago by creating the Arabian American Oil Co., or ARAMCO, it&#8217;s essentially buying time to develop its own counterparty capability.</p>
<p>Once that capacity emerged, the Saudis progressively bought out their foreign partners, taking complete control of the company.</p>
<p>As globalization knits together high-trust economies with low-trust ones, a market emerges in what can be described as the &#8220;sovereignty services space,&#8221; wherein private entities temporarily provide an emerging market with sufficient counterparty capacity to jump-start desired connectivity with the global economy.</p>
<p>Iraq&#8217;s Kurds are further along in this process than the rest of country.</p>
<p>As America moves on, we must leverage that example to lock in our hard-fought security gains with follow-on economic progress in connecting Iraq to globalization&#8217;s juggernaut.</p>
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<p>Thomas P.M. Barnett (<a href="mailto:tom@thomaspmbarnett.com">tom@thomaspmbarnett.com</a>) is a scholar at the Howard Baker Center (U. Tennessee) and author of &#8220;Great Powers: America and the World After Bush.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
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