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David Post – The Continuing Saga of Thomas Jefferson and the Internet

October 18th, 2011 · No Comments · Technology

 

 

The Continuing Saga of Thomas Jefferson and the Internet
Talk Delivered at The David Library Lecture Series
on “The Unfinished Constitution” Washington Crossing 
PA

I want to cover a lot of ground tonight, and I want to make some connections that might be new to you. I want to focus on two parts of our Constitution, one familiar, one not-so-familiar. The familiar one is the provision prohibiting Congress from making any law “abridging the freedom of speech or of the press” – the First Amendment. The not-so-familiar one is the provision granting to Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science” by “securing to Authors the exclusive Right to their Writings” – the so-called “Copyright Clause” of Article I Sec. 8.

The interplay between these two provisions – one a grant of power to the government, the other a prohibition on government’s use of power – is complicated, fascinating, and even profound.

To begin with, there is, and always must be, tension between them. It’s built in, as it were. Copyright law restricts free expression – indeed, that is the very point of copyright law. That’s its job. Copyright works by giving Authors certain exclusive rights – monopoly rights – to their expression, and it allows them to restrict the speech of others where that speech conflicts with those exclusive rights. I cannot reproduce today’s New York Times and distribute it to my friends or put it on my Facebook page – copyright restricts my freedom to speak. I cannot walk into a bar at Washington Crossing and sing my version of Bob Dylan’s Like a Rolling Stone (though I have a terrific cover version of the song . . .) – copyright restricts my freedom to speak. I cannot take the final scene from the Harry Potter motion picture and insert it into the video I’m making on the occasion of my parents’ 50th anniversary – copyright restricts my freedom to speak. I cannot translate Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom into Italian – copyright restricts my freedom to speak. If I do any of these things (without the permission of the copyright holder), I’m subject to legal sanction. That’s how copyright works – by restricting expression.

In fact, the Copyright Act specifically authorizes the seizure and destruction of books, DVDs, and the like – one of the very few places in our law that does so. US marshals can (and do) take books and throw them into the incinerator. Now, they only do so, mind you, on court order, after due process; I’m not suggesting that we live in some sort of barbaric, book-burning society. Not at all. But the fact remains that our copyright law permits the destruction, in certain circumstances, of books and newspapers and CDs and DVDs and . . . , and there is an obvious tension between such law and the freedom of speech protected by the 1st Amendment.

At the same time, of course, copyright law also encourages speech, and the production and dissemination of expressive communications – music and sculpture and news reporting and movies and all the rest. It is and was intended to be, as the Supreme Court put it recently, one of “the engines of free expression . . . by establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”

Like I said – it’s complicated.
I want to look tonight a little more closely at that tension between copyright and free expression, As I said, it is a tension inherent in the very notion of copyright law; so it’s always been there, ever since we’ve had copyright law – and because one of the very first bills enacted by the very first Congress in 1791 was a Copyright Act, we’ve had copyright for a long time.

It’s only recently, however – I’d say the last 20 years or so – that we’ve begun to look carefully at this tension, and to consider and to worry about its broader implications. This is due largely to the rise of the Internet and related digital technologies, which has moved copyright law from the outer periphery of the legal universe (and the outer periphery of our culture) to the very center of both. We all now have the ability at our fingertips to make millions of copies, at virtually no cost, of pretty much anything we can get onto our computers – songs, movies, software, articles, photographs, etc. – and to distribute those copies to millions of people around the globe – again, at virtually no cost. Pretty much all of that (whether you know it or not) is copyright-protected information; that’s just the way copyright law works these days. Somebody owns the copyright in just about everything you have on your computer, and just about everything you find on the Internet.

The scope and shape of copyright law thus has a very significant and substantial impact on the shape of the Net – on what you can find there, how you can get it, etc. And as the Internet has become a more important feature of our world, so too has copyright law become a more important feature of our legal world. For those of you in my generation, I would venture to bet that copyright law never came up during your breakfast table conversations with your family when you were growing up (unless your parents happened to be in the publishing or the entertainment business); but I bet your kids talk about copyright law – about file-sharing, re-mixing videos, and all the rest – maybe a lot. Maybe they’ve even heard about the Pirate Party – a political party in Sweden that has just gotten enough votes to be represented in the Swedish Parliament, and whose platform, basically, is: No More Copyright.

In pre-Internet analog days, this tension and conflict between copyright and free speech was an interesting but fairly insignificant question; today it has taken center stage.

As it happens, no one had more interesting or influential things to say about both of these subjects – copyright and the freedom of speech – than Thomas Jefferson. [Having just written a book about Jefferson and spent 12 years or so immersed in his work, I find that’s often true; there’s an astonishing range of things – from meteorology to linguistics to gardening to cryptology to paleontology and many others – which turn out, when you start to look closely at them, to have Jefferson’s fingerprints all over them.]
On the one hand, Jefferson was our first great free expression and First Amendment absolutist. Freedom of expression was a central tenet – really, the central tenet – of Jefferson’s creed.
To preserve the freedom of the human mind & freedom of expression and the press, he wrote, every spirit should be ready to devote itself to martyrdom; for as long as we may think as we will, and speak as we think, the condition of mankind will proceed in improvement. . . .
Diffusion of knowledge among the people is the only sure foundation that can be devised for the preservation of freedom and happiness. And then, his now-famous words: Were I faced with a choice between a government without newspapers, and newspapers without government, I would not hesitate for a moment to take the latter.”

The first object of government is to leave open to all the avenues to truth, and freedom of expression and freedom of the press are the most effectual means for doing that. The United States, he wrote, will demonstrate to the world the falsehood that freedom of [speech, and] freedom of the press are incompatible with orderly government.

And it was Jefferson’s election in 1800 that enshrined these principles into our government and our law – at a time when that was by no means foreordained. Adams and the Federalists, you may recall, during John Adams’s first (and, thankfully, only) term as President, enacted the most extraordinary restriction on the freedom of speech the United States had ever seen or ever was to see. The Sedition Act of 1798 made it a federal crime, punishable by 2 years in prison, to criticize the government — to “write or utter or publish,” any “malicious writings against the government of the United States, or either House of Congress, or the President,” or anything that would “bring them into disrepute.” Dozens of U.S. newspaper editors and pamphleteers had been rounded up and tossed in jail under its terms.

The Sedition Act would have destroyed the United States before the United States had even had the chance to really become the United States. The election of 1800 was very much a national referendum on the Sedition Act, and Jefferson prevailed; and his very first act, upon being sworn in as President, was to sign the bill repealing it.

Protecting the freedom of expression was a task of the very highest order, in Jefferson’s view, because freedom of expression was a natural right, belonging to all. It is not given to us by law, nor is it derived from law. It is just in the “nature” of things, part of the way the world is constructed, derived not from the laws of Man but “the laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”: if you bring two human beings together, they will think, and they will attempt to communicate with one another about what they are thinking. They’ll do that without any law to help them. Humans communicate with one another not because the law enables them to do so; they communicate with one another because—well, because that’s the kind of beings we are, and that is what is in our nature. Law’s job is not to enable that communication, but to protect it when it does occur.

Copyright, though, is different. Copyright is what Jefferson called – and I believe he was the first person to point this out and make this distinction — “social law.” Copyright does not derive from the nature of things, from the way the world is, or is constructed, because it is in the nature of things that ideas move freely from one person to another. As he memorably put it in an 1813 letter that has become one of the foundational documents for intellectual property law in the US:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the “idea.” That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe seems to have been particularly and benevolently designed by nature. Ideas are like the air we breathe – incapable of confinement or of exclusive appropriation, and expansible over all space.

The only way to keep an idea to yourself is to . . . well, to keep it to yourself. The moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Once it gets loose, it is like the air we breathe, expansible over all space, incapable of confinement.

And, like fire, ideas don’t get “used up” as more people use them: The peculiar character of ideas is that no one possesses an idea the less because others possess more; he who receives an idea from me receives instruction himself without lessening mine, just as he who lights his candle at mine receives light without darkening me.

Copyright, in other words, doesn’t come from the laws of nature, it comes from the laws of man. It is not, like freedom of expression, antecedent to the law, but entirely dependent on it.

What difference does all this make? A great deal. It does not mean that we should get rid of copyright law –it’s not an anti-copyright (or pro-copyright) notion. But it does mean that copyright law should always serve free expression, and not vice versa. It means that when these two great forces come into conflict with one another – and as I said, they do with some frequency nowadays – we know where we stand. We have our thumb on the scales on the side of free speech; we need to be vigilant and alert to the circumstances where copyright law is not serving the cause of free expression, where it is interfering with our right to speak and communicate with one another, and we need to adjust it accordingly.

To put it bluntly: When we’re destroying books under the authority of copyright law, we not only need to be sure that they’re the right books; we need to be damned sure.

To get a better sense, perhaps, of what this might mean, and a better sense of the complicated ways in which copyright and free expression are intertwined on the Net, I want to tell a copyright and free expression story.

In the mid-90s, when the Internet was just becoming “the Internet,” this fixture in our lives, many people began to realize that copyright law could strangle the medium before it even got going. As I mentioned, just about everything on the Net is protected by copyright – I’m not talking about bootleg songs or pirated DVDs, I’m talking about everything – every email you send, every blog posting, every picture of your children and grandchildren you post on Facebook, every product review you leave at Amazon.com, every video of stupid pet tricks posted to Youtube. All of it.

Hundreds of millions, probably billions, of such copyright-protected works have been making their way across the Internet since I began this talk.

Copyright means that you need permission from the copyright holder when you “copy” a work that is protected by copyright. Yet the very act of transmitting every one of those files from one place to another on the Internet involves making dozens of “copies,” as the message makes its way from server to server across the Net. If the Internet Service Providers who are moving these files across the Net have to obtain the permission of the copyright holders before they do all this (as it appeared, in the mid-1990s, to be the case) if they’re liable for all those copies they’re making, . . . many people, by the mid 90s, started to realize that we won’t have much of an Internet if that’s the case, because nobody in their right mind would go into that business.

“We understand,” the ISPs said, “that some of the stuff – maybe lots of the stuff – that we’re passing along from one user to another is infringing someone’s copyright. But we’re just standing in the middle, passing things along from user to user. Don’t hold us responsible for that – not if you want to have a robust Internet.”

So in 1998, Congress did a very smart thing. [We criticize them when they screw things up (and we can do so freely, thanks in large part to Jefferson) – we should dispense praise when they get it right]. In 1998 Congress passed a law – the DMCA – giving “providers of online services” an immunity from the claims of copyright infringement based on the actions of their users. We would suspend ordinary copyright law, in other words, weaken it, in order to allow these entities to do their indispensable work in creating this robust free-speech-enhancing place.

This immunity from copyright claims has been an astonishing success. It is in large part responsible for the explosion, over the last 10 years or so, in “social media” and “user-generated content” (or “Web 2.0”) services and applications. Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, Youtube, Craigslist, Tumblr, Blogger, Flickr . . . hundreds of thousands of sites, some of which are household names around the globe, all of which share one common characteristic: they provide no “content” of their own, but rely entirely on their users, who are charged with making the site valuable and engaging and attractive for other users.

Without the DMCA immunity from copyright liability, you wouldn’t get any of them. They couldn’t exist. Why not? Because without an immunity, their potential liability for their users’ infringements, at the scale at which they operate, would be astronomically large. The amount of stuff posted to YouTube every month is greater than the combined output of all US TV networks since their inception – if YouTube (or Facebook, or Craigslist, or . . .) were liable for even a tiny fraction of that, their copyright liability for a single day’s worth of uploaded content would be measured in the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars. Without the immunity from copyright infringement claims, allowing users to communicate and to exchange content freely with one another would be unthinkable; no rational investor would have provided financing for, say, the Facebook business plan without assurances on that score, some protection against the outsized risk.

It was a brilliant stroke – a truly Jeffersonian stroke – adjusting copyright law in the interest of free expression.

[Among other things, it explains why virtually all of UGC/Web 2.0 sites with global reach started in the United States – because United States law gave them this immunity from copyright liability]

And the events of the past year show us just how significant a development this was. Without the DMCA immunity, there’s no Facebook, YouTube, Blogger, or Twitter; and you can make a very strong argument that without Facebook, Youtube, Blogger, or Twitter, Hosni Mubarak is still the President of Egypt. For the first time in a history stretching back over 5000 years, ordinary Egyptians were able to freely communicate with one another, thanks to Facebook, and Twitter, and YouTube, and that has, in fact, changed the world we live in.

A direct line, in other words, connecting US copyright law – and a little, hidden-away provision of US copyright law, at that – and the Arab Spring uprisings. Jefferson – the Jefferson whose motto was
Malo periculosam libertatem quam quietam servitutem.
[I prefer the tumult of liberty to the quiet of servitude.]
would be thrilled, and proud.

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Perspectives on Amazon, Google, Microsoft and Facebook . . .

October 18th, 2011 · No Comments · Technology

 

Google Engineer Accidently Shares His Internal Memo About Google + Platform

JOHN FURRIER | OCTOBER 12TH
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Google engineer posted an internal memoon Google + that was mistakenly shared publicly – opps wrong setting.

This is an repost from a Google employee sharing his insight into the Google + platform and their cloud strategy. My goal here is to preserve the original content. Google is allowing it to be public since it’s already public. Thanks to Google + user Rip Rowan who shared it.

I think Google + is a winner and will evolve. Google has too much scale not to be a force. Their issue is about focus. Are they fighting Facebook, Amazon, IBM?? See IBM’s big OEM deal with Nirvanix today. That deal from IBM is very telling.

Anyway here i the engineer Steve Yegge post on Google + platform. This is one of the best essays from the trenches on tech platforms mainly because It’s honest, heartfelt, funny, insightful, courageous, hard hitting, and spot-on accurate.

As an aside I’ve interviewed over 400 executives and geeks this past year on SiliconANGLE.tv #theCUBE and all of them agree that the world needs a new programmable platform. SOA needs to be modernized for cloud, social, and mobile. Stay tuned into SiliconANGLE.com for all the coverage.

Stevey’s Google Platforms Rant

I was at Amazon for about six and a half years, and now I’ve been at Google for that long. One thing that struck me immediately about the two companies — an impression that has been reinforced almost daily — is that Amazon does everything wrong, and Google does everything right. Sure, it’s a sweeping generalization, but a surprisingly accurate one. It’s pretty crazy. There are probably a hundred or even two hundred different ways you can compare the two companies, and Google is superior in all but three of them, if I recall correctly. I actually did a spreadsheet at one point but Legal wouldn’t let me show it to anyone, even though recruiting loved it.

I mean, just to give you a very brief taste: Amazon’s recruiting process is fundamentally flawed by having teams hire for themselves, so their hiring bar is incredibly inconsistent across teams, despite various efforts they’ve made to level it out. And their operations are a mess; they don’t really have SREs and they make engineers pretty much do everything, which leaves almost no time for coding – though again this varies by group, so it’s luck of the draw. They don’t give a single shit about charity or helping the needy or community contributions or anything like that. Never comes up there, except maybe to laugh about it. Their facilities are dirt-smeared cube farms without a dime spent on decor or common meeting areas. Their pay and benefits suck, although much less so lately due to local competition from Google and Facebook. But they don’t have any of our perks or extras — they just try to match the offer-letter numbers, and that’s the end of it. Their code base is a disaster, with no engineering standards whatsoever except what individual teams choose to put in place.

To be fair, they do have a nice versioned-library system that we really ought to emulate, and a nice publish-subscribe system that we also have no equivalent for. But for the most part they just have a bunch of crappy tools that read and write state machine information into relational databases. We wouldn’t take most of it even if it were free.

I think the pubsub system and their library-shelf system were two out of the grand total of three things Amazon does better than google.

I guess you could make an argument that their bias for launching early and iterating like mad is also something they do well, but you can argue it either way. They prioritize launching early over everything else, including retention and engineering discipline and a bunch of other stuff that turns out to matter in the long run. So even though it’s given them some competitive advantages in the marketplace, it’s created enough other problems to make it something less than a slam-dunk.

But there’s one thing they do really really well that pretty much makes up for ALL of their political, philosophical and technical screw-ups.

Jeff Bezos is an infamous micro-manager. He micro-manages every single pixel of Amazon’s retail site. He hired Larry Tesler, Apple’s Chief Scientist and probably the very most famous and respected human-computer interaction expert in the entire world, and then ignored every goddamn thing Larry said for three years until Larry finally — wisely — left the company. Larry would do these big usability studies and demonstrate beyond any shred of doubt that nobody can understand that frigging website, but Bezos just couldn’t let go of those pixels, all those millions of semantics-packed pixels on the landing page. They were like millions of his own precious children. So they’re all still there, and Larry is not.

Micro-managing isn’t that third thing that Amazon does better than us, by the way. I mean, yeah, they micro-manage really well, but I wouldn’t list it as a strength or anything. I’m just trying to set the context here, to help you understand what happened. We’re talking about a guy who in all seriousness has said on many public occasions that people should be paying him to work at Amazon. He hands out little yellow stickies with his name on them, reminding people “who runs the company” when they disagree with him. The guy is a regular… well, Steve Jobs, I guess. Except without the fashion or design sense. Bezos is super smart; don’t get me wrong. He just makes ordinary control freaks look like stoned hippies.

So one day Jeff Bezos issued a mandate. He’s doing that all the time, of course, and people scramble like ants being pounded with a rubber mallet whenever it happens. But on one occasion — back around 2002 I think, plus or minus a year — he issued a mandate that was so out there, so huge and eye-bulgingly ponderous, that it made all of his other mandates look like unsolicited peer bonuses.

His Big Mandate went something along these lines:

1) All teams will henceforth expose their data and functionality through service interfaces.

2) Teams must communicate with each other through these interfaces.

3) There will be no other form of interprocess communication allowed: no direct linking, no direct reads of another team’s data store, no shared-memory model, no back-doors whatsoever. The only communication allowed is via service interface calls over the network.

4) It doesn’t matter what technology they use. HTTP, Corba, Pubsub, custom protocols — doesn’t matter. Bezos doesn’t care.

5) All service interfaces, without exception, must be designed from the ground up to be externalizable. That is to say, the team must plan and design to be able to expose the interface to developers in the outside world. No exceptions.

6) Anyone who doesn’t do this will be fired.

7) Thank you; have a nice day!

Ha, ha! You 150-odd ex-Amazon folks here will of course realize immediately that #7 was a little joke I threw in, because Bezos most definitely does not give a shit about your day.

#6, however, was quite real, so people went to work. Bezos assigned a couple of Chief Bulldogs to oversee the effort and ensure forward progress, headed up by Uber-Chief Bear Bulldog Rick Dalzell. Rick is an ex-Armgy Ranger, West Point Academy graduate, ex-boxer, ex-Chief Torturer slash CIO at Wal*Mart, and is a big genial scary man who used the word “hardened interface” a lot. Rick was a walking, talking hardened interface himself, so needless to say, everyone made LOTS of forward progress and made sure Rick knew about it.

Over the next couple of years, Amazon transformed internally into a service-oriented architecture. They learned a tremendous amount while effecting this transformation. There was lots of existing documentation and lore about SOAs, but at Amazon’s vast scale it was about as useful as telling Indiana Jones to look both ways before crossing the street. Amazon’s dev staff made a lot of discoveries along the way. A teeny tiny sampling of these discoveries included:

- pager escalation gets way harder, because a ticket might bounce through 20 service calls before the real owner is identified. If each bounce goes through a team with a 15-minute response time, it can be hours before the right team finally finds out, unless you build a lot of scaffolding and metrics and reporting.

- every single one of your peer teams suddenly becomes a potential DOS attacker. Nobody can make any real forward progress until very serious quotas and throttling are put in place in every single service.

- monitoring and QA are the same thing. You’d never think so until you try doing a big SOA. But when your service says “oh yes, I’m fine”, it may well be the case that the only thing still functioning in the server is the little component that knows how to say “I’m fine, roger roger, over and out” in a cheery droid voice. In order to tell whether the service is actually responding, you have to make individual calls. The problem continues recursively until your monitoring is doing comprehensive semantics checking of your entire range of services and data, at which point it’s indistinguishable from automated QA. So they’re a continuum.

- if you have hundreds of services, and your code MUST communicate with other groups’ code via these services, then you won’t be able to find any of them without a service-discovery mechanism. And you can’t have that without a service registration mechanism, which itself is another service. So Amazon has a universal service registry where you can find out reflectively (programmatically) about every service, what its APIs are, and also whether it is currently up, and where.

- debugging problems with someone else’s code gets a LOT harder, and is basically impossible unless there is a universal standard way to run every service in a debuggable sandbox.

That’s just a very small sample. There are dozens, maybe hundreds of individual learnings like these that Amazon had to discover organically. There were a lot of wacky ones around externalizing services, but not as many as you might think. Organizing into services taught teams not to trust each other in most of the same ways they’re not supposed to trust external developers.

This effort was still underway when I left to join Google in mid-2005, but it was pretty far advanced. From the time Bezos issued his edict through the time I left, Amazon had transformed culturally into a company that thinks about everything in a services-first fashion. It is now fundamental to how they approach all designs, including internal designs for stuff that might never see the light of day externally.

At this point they don’t even do it out of fear of being fired. I mean, they’re still afraid of that; it’s pretty much part of daily life there, working for the Dread Pirate Bezos and all. But they do services because they’ve come to understand that it’s the Right Thing. There are without question pros and cons to the SOA approach, and some of the cons are pretty long. But overall it’s the right thing because SOA-driven design enables Platforms.

That’s what Bezos was up to with his edict, of course. He didn’t (and doesn’t) care even a tiny bit about the well-being of the teams, nor about what technologies they use, nor in fact any detail whatsoever about how they go about their business unless they happen to be screwing up. But Bezos realized long before the vast majority of Amazonians that Amazon needs to be a platform.

You wouldn’t really think that an online bookstore needs to be an extensible, programmable platform. Would you?

Well, the first big thing Bezos realized is that the infrastructure they’d built for selling and shipping books and sundry could be transformed an excellent repurposable computing platform. So now they have the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud, and the Amazon Elastic MapReduce, and the Amazon Relational Database Service, and a whole passel’ o’ other services browsable at aws.amazon.com. These services host the backends for some pretty successful companies, reddit being my personal favorite of the bunch.

The other big realization he had was that he can’t always build the right thing. I think Larry Tesler might have struck some kind of chord in Bezos when he said his mom couldn’t use the goddamn website. It’s not even super clear whose mom he was talking about, and doesn’t really matter, because nobody’s mom can use the goddamn website. In fact I myself find the website disturbingly daunting, and I worked there for over half a decade. I’ve just learned to kinda defocus my eyes and concentrate on the million or so pixels near the center of the page above the fold.

I’m not really sure how Bezos came to this realization — the insight that he can’t build one product and have it be right for everyone. But it doesn’t matter, because he gets it. There’s actually a formal name for this phenomenon. It’s called Accessibility, and it’s the most important thing in the computing world.

The. Most. Important. Thing.

If you’re sorta thinking, “huh? You mean like, blind and deaf people Accessibility?” then you’re not alone, because I’ve come to understand that there are lots and LOTS of people just like you: people for whom this idea does not have the right Accessibility, so it hasn’t been able to get through to you yet. It’s not your fault for not understanding, any more than it would be your fault for being blind or deaf or motion-restricted or living with any other disability. When software — or idea-ware for that matter — fails to be accessible to anyone for any reason, it is the fault of the software or of the messaging of the idea. It is an Accessibility failure.

Like anything else big and important in life, Accessibility has an evil twin who, jilted by the unbalanced affection displayed by their parents in their youth, has grown into an equally powerful Arch-Nemesis (yes, there’s more than one nemesis to accessibility) named Security. And boy howdy are the two ever at odds.

But I’ll argue that Accessibility is actually more important than Security because dialing Accessibility to zero means you have no product at all, whereas dialing Security to zero can still get you a reasonably successful product such as the Playstation Network.

So yeah. In case you hadn’t noticed, I could actually write a book on this topic. A fat one, filled with amusing anecdotes about ants and rubber mallets at companies I’ve worked at. But I will never get this little rant published, and you’ll never get it read, unless I start to wrap up.

That one last thing that Google doesn’t do well is Platforms. We don’t understand platforms. We don’t “get” platforms. Some of you do, but you are the minority. This has become painfully clear to me over the past six years. I was kind of hoping that competitive pressure from Microsoft and Amazon and more recently Facebook would make us wake up collectively and start doing universal services. Not in some sort of ad-hoc, half-assed way, but in more or less the same way Amazon did it: all at once, for real, no cheating, and treating it as our top priority from now on.

But no. No, it’s like our tenth or eleventh priority. Or fifteenth, I don’t know. It’s pretty low. There are a few teams who treat the idea very seriously, but most teams either don’t think about it all, ever, or only a small percentage of them think about it in a very small way.

It’s a big stretch even to get most teams to offer a stubby service to get programmatic access to their data and computations. Most of them think they’re building products. And a stubby service is a pretty pathetic service. Go back and look at that partial list of learnings from Amazon, and tell me which ones Stubby gives you out of the box. As far as I’m concerned, it’s none of them. Stubby’s great, but it’s like parts when you need a car.

A product is useless without a platform, or more precisely and accurately, a platform-less product will always be replaced by an equivalent platform-ized product.

Google+ is a prime example of our complete failure to understand platforms from the very highest levels of executive leadership (hi Larry, Sergey, Eric, Vic, howdy howdy) down to the very lowest leaf workers (hey yo). We all don’t get it. The Golden Rule of platforms is that you Eat Your Own Dogfood. The Google+ platform is a pathetic afterthought. We had no API at all at launch, and last I checked, we had one measly API call. One of the team members marched in and told me about it when they launched, and I asked: “So is it the Stalker API?” She got all glum and said “Yeah.” I mean, I was joking, but no… the only API call we offer is to get someone’s stream. So I guess the joke was on me.

Microsoft has known about the Dogfood rule for at least twenty years. It’s been part of their culture for a whole generation now. You don’t eat People Food and give your developers Dog Food. Doing that is simply robbing your long-term platform value for short-term successes. Platforms are all about long-term thinking.

Google+ is a knee-jerk reaction, a study in short-term thinking, predicated on the incorrect notion that Facebook is successful because they built a great product. But that’s not why they are successful. Facebook is successful because they built an entire constellation of products by allowing other people to do the work. So Facebook is different for everyone. Some people spend all their time on Mafia Wars. Some spend all their time on Farmville. There are hundreds or maybe thousands of different high-quality time sinks available, so there’s something there for everyone.

Our Google+ team took a look at the aftermarket and said: “Gosh, it looks like we need some games. Let’s go contract someone to, um, write some games for us.” Do you begin to see how incredibly wrong that thinking is now? The problem is that we are trying to predict what people want and deliver it for them.

You can’t do that. Not really. Not reliably. There have been precious few people in the world, over the entire history of computing, who have been able to do it reliably. Steve Jobs was one of them. We don’t have a Steve Jobs here. I’m sorry, but we don’t.

Larry Tesler may have convinced Bezos that he was no Steve Jobs, but Bezos realized that he didn’t need to be a Steve Jobs in order to provide everyone with the right products: interfaces and workflows that they liked and felt at ease with. He just needed to enable third-party developers to do it, and it would happen automatically.

I apologize to those (many) of you for whom all this stuff I’m saying is incredibly obvious, because yeah. It’s incredibly frigging obvious. Except we’re not doing it. We don’t get Platforms, and we don’t get Accessibility. The two are basically the same thing, because platforms solve accessibility. A platform is accessibility.

So yeah, Microsoft gets it. And you know as well as I do how surprising that is, because they don’t “get” much of anything, really. But they understand platforms as a purely accidental outgrowth of having started life in the business of providing platforms. So they have thirty-plus years of learning in this space. And if you go to msdn.com, and spend some time browsing, and you’ve never seen it before, prepare to be amazed. Because it’s staggeringly huge. They have thousands, and thousands, and THOUSANDS of API calls. They have a HUGE platform. Too big in fact, because they can’t design for squat, but at least they’re doing it.

Amazon gets it. Amazon’s AWS (aws.amazon.com) is incredible. Just go look at it. Click around. It’s embarrassing. We don’t have any of that stuff.

Apple gets it, obviously. They’ve made some fundamentally non-open choices, particularly around their mobile platform. But they understand accessibility and they understand the power of third-party development and they eat their dogfood. And you know what? They make pretty good dogfood. Their APIs are a hell of a lot cleaner than Microsoft’s, and have been since time immemorial.

Facebook gets it. That’s what really worries me. That’s what got me off my lazy butt to write this thing. I hate blogging. I hate… plussing, or whatever it’s called when you do a massive rant in Google+ even though it’s a terrible venue for it but you do it anyway because in the end you really do want Google to be successful. And I do! I mean, Facebook wants me there, and it’d be pretty easy to just go. But Google is home, so I’m insisting that we have this little family intervention, uncomfortable as it might be.

After you’ve marveled at the platform offerings of Microsoft and Amazon, and Facebook I guess (I didn’t look because I didn’t want to get too depressed), head over to developers.google.com and browse a little. Pretty big difference, eh? It’s like what your fifth-grade nephew might mock up if he were doing an assignment to demonstrate what a big powerful platform company might be building if all they had, resource-wise, was one fifth grader.

Please don’t get me wrong here — I know for a fact that the dev-rel team has had to FIGHT to get even this much available externally. They’re kicking ass as far as I’m concerned, because they DO get platforms, and they are struggling heroically to try to create one in an environment that is at best platform-apathetic, and at worst often openly hostile to the idea.

I’m just frankly describing what developers.google.com looks like to an outsider. It looks childish. Where’s the Maps APIs in there for Christ’s sake? Some of the things in there are labs projects. And the APIs for everything I clicked were… they were paltry. They were obviously dog food. Not even good organic stuff. Compared to our internal APIs it’s all snouts and horse hooves.

And also don’t get me wrong about Google+. They’re far from the only offenders. This is a cultural thing. What we have going on internally is basically a war, with the underdog minority Platformers fighting a more or less losing battle against the Mighty Funded Confident Producters.

Any teams that have successfully internalized the notion that they should be externally programmable platforms from the ground up are underdogs — Maps and Docs come to mind, and I know GMail is making overtures in that direction. But it’s hard for them to get funding for it because it’s not part of our culture. Maestro’s funding is a feeble thing compared to the gargantuan Microsoft Office programming platform: it’s a fluffy rabbit versus a T-Rex. The Docs team knows they’ll never be competitive with Office until they can match its scripting facilities, but they’re not getting any resource love. I mean, I assume they’re not, given that Apps Script only works in Spreadsheet right now, and it doesn’t even have keyboard shortcuts as part of its API. That team looks pretty unloved to me.

Ironically enough, Wave was a great platform, may they rest in peace. But making something a platform is not going to make you an instant success. A platform needs a killer app. Facebook — that is, the stock service they offer with walls and friends and such — is the killer app for the Facebook Platform. And it is a very serious mistake to conclude that the Facebook App could have been anywhere near as successful without the Facebook Platform.

You know how people are always saying Google is arrogant? I’m a Googler, so I get as irritated as you do when people say that. We’re not arrogant, by and large. We’re, like, 99% Arrogance-Free. I did start this post — if you’ll reach back into distant memory — by describing Google as “doing everything right”. We do mean well, and for the most part when people say we’re arrogant it’s because we didn’t hire them, or they’re unhappy with our policies, or something along those lines. They’re inferring arrogance because it makes them feel better.

But when we take the stance that we know how to design the perfect product for everyone, and believe you me, I hear that a lot, then we’re being fools. You can attribute it to arrogance, or naivete, or whatever — it doesn’t matter in the end, because it’s foolishness. There IS no perfect product for everyone.

And so we wind up with a browser that doesn’t let you set the default font size. Talk about an affront to Accessibility. I mean, as I get older I’m actually going blind. For real. I’ve been nearsighted all my life, and once you hit 40 years old you stop being able to see things up close. So font selection becomes this life-or-death thing: it can lock you out of the product completely. But the Chrome team is flat-out arrogant here: they want to build a zero-configuration product, and they’re quite brazen about it, and Fuck You if you’re blind or deaf or whatever. Hit Ctrl-+ on every single page visit for the rest of your life.

It’s not just them. It’s everyone. The problem is that we’re a Product Company through and through. We built a successful product with broad appeal — our search, that is — and that wild success has biased us.

Amazon was a product company too, so it took an out-of-band force to make Bezos understand the need for a platform. That force was their evaporating margins; he was cornered and had to think of a way out. But all he had was a bunch of engineers and all these computers… if only they could be monetized somehow… you can see how he arrived at AWS, in hindsight.

Microsoft started out as a platform, so they’ve just had lots of practice at it.

Facebook, though: they worry me. I’m no expert, but I’m pretty sure they started off as a Product and they rode that success pretty far. So I’m not sure exactly how they made the transition to a platform. It was a relatively long time ago, since they had to be a platform before (now very old) things like Mafia Wars could come along.

Maybe they just looked at us and asked: “How can we beat Google? What are they missing?”

The problem we face is pretty huge, because it will take a dramatic cultural change in order for us to start catching up. We don’t do internal service-oriented platforms, and we just as equally don’t do external ones. This means that the “not getting it” is endemic across the company: the PMs don’t get it, the engineers don’t get it, the product teams don’t get it, nobody gets it. Even if individuals do, even if YOU do, it doesn’t matter one bit unless we’re treating it as an all-hands-on-deck emergency. We can’t keep launching products and pretending we’ll turn them into magical beautiful extensible platforms later. We’ve tried that and it’s not working.

The Golden Rule of Platforms, “Eat Your Own Dogfood”, can be rephrased as “Start with a Platform, and Then Use it for Everything.” You can’t just bolt it on later. Certainly not easily at any rate — ask anyone who worked on platformizing MS Office. Or anyone who worked on platformizing Amazon. If you delay it, it’ll be ten times as much work as just doing it correctly up front. You can’t cheat. You can’t have secret back doors for internal apps to get special priority access, not for ANY reason. You need to solve the hard problems up front.

I’m not saying it’s too late for us, but the longer we wait, the closer we get to being Too Late.

I honestly don’t know how to wrap this up. I’ve said pretty much everything I came here to say today. This post has been six years in the making. I’m sorry if I wasn’t gentle enough, or if I misrepresented some product or team or person, or if we’re actually doing LOTS of platform stuff and it just so happens that I and everyone I ever talk to has just never heard about it. I’m sorry.

But we’ve gotta start doing this right.

UPDATE: I just posted about Google VP of Product announcing they are cleaning house on the product organization. Killing off several initiatives

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Paul Yingling on Afghanistan and Pakistan : Exit Strategy ?

October 18th, 2011 · No Comments · Geopolitics

Paul Yingling has spoken up before . . .

 

ISAF Exit Strategy: Neither International nor an Exit nor a Strategy

Colonel Paul Yingling, U.S. Army

Based on remarks delivered at

International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan: 2001-2011-2014, the Roles and Capabilities of South-East Europe Countries

Zagreb, Croatia

October 12, 2011

Willy Brandt famously said of the former German Democratic Republic that it was neither German nor democratic nor a republic.  When I was asked to comment on the exit strategy of the International Security Assistance Force from Afghanistan, I had a similar reaction.  The events of the next three years in Afghanistan cannot properly be described as international, an exit, or a strategy.  The so-called transition to Afghan lead by the end of 2014 is a timetable driven largely by American domestic politics. When this timetable is complete, Afghanistan will still be at war.

Before going further, a few caveats are in order.  First, I want to acknowledge that many countries have contributed blood and treasure to the war in Afghanistan, and that the Afghan people have suffered terribly during decades of nearly constant fighting.  My argument that American domestic politics will drive the events of the next few years should not be interpreted as minimizing the contributions of other ISAF nations or the sacrifices and suffering of the Afghan people.  Second, my argument is predictive, not normative.  I will not describe what should happen in the next few years, but what will.  What will happen in Afghanistan will largely be determined by ISAF’s largest contributing nation – the United States.  As I will demonstrate, we passed up “should” long ago.

My argument consists of three parts.  First, I will describe both the aims of American policy and its underlying rationale.  Second, I will review the competing but deeply flawed ways to achieve these aims – a fully resourced counterinsurgency effort and a more limited counter-terrorism approach.  Finally, I will describe the most likely outcome of events in Afghanistan and Pakistan beyond 2014.

The Aims of Policy

In December 2009, President Obama described both the ends of American policy in Afghanistan and the ways those ends would be achieved:

…to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.

To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny al Qaeda a safe-haven. We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s Security Forces and government, so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.

The most striking feature of Obama Administration policy is the treatment of al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Pakistan and Afghanistan as a single and uniquely dangerous threat.  This region is not uniquely dangerous because it is an ungoverned space.  Large regions of Somalia and Yemen also fit this description.  This region is also not uniquely dangerous because the population has ideological sympathy for al Qaeda. Pockets of sympathy for al Qaeda can be found elsewhere, including in the West.  Finally, this region is not uniquely dangerous because it serves as a staging ground for attacks on the West.  Indeed, al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Islamic Magreb and the Arabian Peninsula have in recent years proven more lethal than the core of al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan.

This region is uniquely dangerous because of the confluence of the two most dangerous phenomena of the 21st century – radical ideology and nuclear weapons.  Pockets of radical ideology exist throughout the globe and at least nine states have nuclear weapons.  However, only in southern Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan do we find deep sympathy for al Qaeda’s radical ideology less than a day’s drive from the world’s least secure nuclear arsenal.  Moreover, sanctuary in Afghanistan is neither necessary nor sufficient for al Qaeda to achieve its goal of acquiring one or more nuclear weapons for use against the West.  Even if Afghanistan were perfectly stable, the danger of al Qaeda acquiring nuclear weapons in Pakistan would remain.  Even if Afghanistan were to return to civil war or Taliban rule, these conditions alone do not pose a unique threat to the West.  Without the threat of nuclear terrorism, the insurgency in Afghanistan would be no more important to the West than similar threats Yemen or Somalia.

Competing and Equally Flawed Ways to Achieve These Ends

While the ends of American policy in Afghanistan have been remarkably consistent since 2001, the ways to achieve those ends have not. The strategic blunders of the Bush Administration from 2002-2008 are well documented and need no elaboration.  The first opportunity to reassess our strategy in Afghanistan occurred in the Obama Administration’s policy reviews of 2009. During this period, two broad strategies were considered.  The first was a fully resourced counterinsurgency strategy and the second was a more limited counter-terrorism strategy.

The first approach was based on the tenets of COIN doctrine – protect the population, develop the capabilities of Afghan security forces and most importantly strengthen the legitimacy of the Afghan government by improving its capacity to provide security and other essential services to the population.  This approach would have required ISAF troop levels of approximately 140,000 or an increase of 40,000 over 2009 levels.  Most importantly, changes to future troop levels would be based on battlefield conditions.

This approach would have been a fine idea in 2001, but was politically infeasible by 2009.  Consider an ideal alternative history beginning in 2001.  With broad domestic and international support, a robust U.S.-led military coalition could have toppled the Taliban, captured or killed Osama bin Laden and other key al Qaeda leaders and provided post-conflict security to the Afghan people.  The U.S. military could have reformed its doctrine, organization, equipment and personnel policies to focus on irregular warfare, including the vital task of developing host nation security forces.  A robust civilian component could have assisted in the development of a legitimate Afghan government capable of providing essential services to the population. Skillful diplomacy could have convinced Pakistan that a stable Afghanistan was in its interests.  Enlightened security assistance could have assisted Pakistan in denying sanctuary in its northwest territories and discrediting extremist ideology nationwide.  Even in this ideal alternative history, denying sanctuary and support to al Qaeda and other extremist elements in Afghanistan and Pakistan would have been the work of a generation.

Alas, these events did not come to pass.  The U.S. low-balled troop estimates, allowing bin Laden and other key al Qaeda figures to escape to Pakistan and security within Afghanistan to deteriorate.  The U.S. squandered credibility at home and good will abroad with a disastrous unnecessary war in Iraq. The U.S. military failed to adapt to the challenges of irregular warfare until late 2006, and still does not devote adequate resources to security force development.  The civilian component to this day is unequal to the challenges of assisting in the development of a legitimate Afghan government.  Most importantly of all, elements within the Pakistani government continue to foster chaos in Afghanistan.

Those advocating a robust COIN effort in 2009 behaved as if these events either didn’t happen or don’t matter.  The reality is quite different; a decade’s worth of blunders and misrepresentations has exhausted the patience of the American people.  For nearly a decade, American political elites insisted that our Afghan policy was succeeding.  They did not ask the public to fight the war or pay for it, and did not tell the public of the deterioration in security on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border.  The plausibility of these policies collapsed at approximately the same time as the global economy.  In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, unemployment is the public’s top policy concern. Even more importantly, public trust in the U.S. Government has all but evaporated. Devoting hundreds of billions of dollars into an open-ended conflict in Afghanistan would have been difficult even in 2001.  By 2009, such a policy was politically impossible.

However, the alternative counter-terrorism approach was scarcely better.  This approach called for an increased emphasis on capturing or killing key insurgent and terrorist leaders and accelerating the development of Afghan security forces.  However, this approach is better described as a collection of tactics to disrupt al Qaeda than a strategy to defeat it.  It does not address the corruption and incompetence of the Afghan Government or Pakistan’s explicit support for the Taliban or its tacit support for al Qaeda.  Worst of all, it does nothing to address the political conditions inside Pakistan that fuel the growth of extremist ideology.

The policy that emerged from the Obama Administration’s 2009 debate was worse than either of the alternatives proposed.  It increased troop levels through the summer of 2011, with a transition to Afghan lead set for the end of 2014.  It failed to take into account that al Qaeda was all but gone from Afghanistan, and that the overwhelming majority of those fighting ISAF in Afghanistan were locals with very limited ambitions beyond the country’s borders. Increased troop levels allowed for increased fighting but time limits prevented that fighting from producing enduring political results.  It left largely unchanged the military’s failure to focus on security force assistance and the civilian component’s inability to address the corruption and incompetence of the Karzai Government. It relied on drone strikes to disrupt al Qaeda in Pakistan but did not address the toxic political conditions within Pakistan that make it a danger not only to itself and its neighbors, but much of the world.

Of course, policy makers must set priorities in domestic and foreign affairs and evaluate military advice through the prism of domestic politics.  Effective civil-military dialogue assists in this process by identifying gaps between the ends of policy and the means available to achieve them.  Civilian leaders have the final say in this unequal dialogue, but the product of such dialogue must be a coherent strategy – one that reconciles ends, ways and means.  It’s unclear that such a dialogue took place during the policy reviews of 2009.  If our goal is to end the war and focus on domestic priorities, then no additional forces were needed in Afghanistan.  If our goal is to prevent the Taliban from seizing power in Afghanistan, then time limits on troop commitments undermine our efforts.  If our goal is to defeat al Qaeda, then we’re focusing our resources on the wrong country.

A Return to Strategic Thinking After 2014?

Over the next three years, the U.S. and other ISAF nations will continue to withdraw forces from Afghanistan.  This withdrawal will be driven largely by American domestic politics and fiscal constraints.  No matter which political party prevails in the 2012 U.S. elections, the domestic political calculus will be the same: spiraling costs for entitlements and interest on the debt, deep divisions about what mix of spending cuts and tax increases will solve the problem, heavy pressure to cut defense spending and foreign aid, and little political will to continue the war in Afghanistan beyond 2014.  The best case scenario is that ISAF’s transition to Afghan lead will occur according to the timetable ending in 2014.  However, another financial shock in the West or further political dysfunction in Washington could accelerate that timetable appreciably and unpredictably.

The war in Afghanistan will continue to rage long after 2014.  Combined security operations, drone strikes and special operations raids will continue to take their toll on insurgent and terrorist networks until then.  Afghan security forces can continue to fight even without foreign combat troops, but it’s uncertain how the Afghan government will pay for its army and police without substantial external assistance.  Other regional actors such as India and China will continue to jockey for influence in Afghanistan, but are unlikely to assist the Afghan government on the scale required. More importantly, the Afghan government is unlikely to address the incompetence and corruption that makes such assistance necessary.

Pakistan’s future is more difficult to predict.  It could limp along as a failing state indefinitely, or fail suddenly with little warning.  The West knows so little about Pakistan’s internal dynamics that virtually any significant change will come as a surprise.  The safest prediction is one that would eliminate the best case scenario – that Pakistan will develop into a functioning state that will deny sanctuary and support for extremist organizations.

While the exact timing and extent of state failure in Pakistan is difficult to predict, the consequences of such failure are not.  Partial or total state failure of a nuclear Pakistan would pose a grave threat to the United States.  In such a scenario, the United States would not know who controlled Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.  A nuclear armed al Qaeda, Lashkar e Taiba or another extremist group would be difficult if not impossible to deter.  The nightmare scenario of a nuclear armed terrorist group would be upon us.

When we ask about ISAF exit strategy, we are asking the wrong question.  ISAF’s exit from Afghanistan has much more to do with American domestic politics than coalition strategy. American fiscal constraints and political paralysis set this course in motion long ago and corrective measures are unlikely in the absence of a crisis.  ISAF will transfer the lead for security to Afghan security forces in 2014, on or ahead of the political timetable driving this outcome and with little regard for security conditions.

However, the crisis of Pakistan as a failed nuclear state looms darkly on the horizon. Those of us charged with strategic thinking need not wait for a crisis to think clearly about this challenge.

The example of the U.S. military in the 1920s provides a helpful example.  In the aftermath of World War I, military planners recognized that the U.S. lacked the capabilities to defend America’s possessions in the western Pacific.  Led by the Navy, the U.S. held wargames and constructed war plans to understand this challenge and the capabilities necessary to meet it.  Throughout the 1920s, the U.S. military had neither the equipment nor the money nor the manpower to solve this challenge.  Rather than prevent clear strategic thinking, these conditions enabled it.  When war in the Pacific came, the U.S. had already imagined the capabilities necessary for victory – including carrier aviation, amphibious assault, strategic bombing, and close air support for ground forces.  When the crisis came, these ideas needed only money and political will to become reality.

Those of us charged with strategic thinking ought to heed this example.  Imagine a failed Pakistan that results in a terrorist organization acquiring one or more nuclear weapons.  What would our response be in the aftermath of such a crisis?  What intelligence capabilities do we need to locate compromised nuclear materials?  What civil security and law enforcement measures might disrupt or minimize the impacts of such a threat?  What counter-proliferation capabilities are required to seize and render safe compromised nuclear weapons or materials?  Imagine further the capabilities required to avoid such a crisis.  What diplomatic measures might change the Pakistani strategic calculus that lends support to extremism?  What broader engagement with Pakistani civil society might render this troubled country less amenable to radical ideology?  Now imagine still further back to the institutional arrangements that generate national security capabilities.  Do we have the right priorities?  Are we buying the right equipment?  Are we selecting the right leaders?  Are we making the best use of increasingly scarce tax payer dollars?

Too often, what passes for strategic thought in the United States is actually a struggle among self-interested elites seeking political, commercial or bureaucratic advantage.  Such behavior is the privilege of a country that is both rich and safe.  However, a pattern of such behavior is self-correcting: no country that behaves this way will stay rich or safe for long.  Strategic thought will be in high demand in 2014 or upon the collapse of Pakistan, whichever comes first.

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Steve Jobs: The Secular Prophet

October 9th, 2011 · No Comments · Technology

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  • The Wall Street Journal

Steve Jobs: The Secular Prophet

Steve Jobs turned Eve’s apple, the symbol of fallen humankind, into a religious icon for true believers in technology. But can salvation be downloaded?

By ANDY CROUCH

For every magical thing Steve Jobs revealed in his Apple keynote addresses, there were many other things he concealed. Like the devices he created, his life was more and more opaque even while becoming more and more celebrated. So his death this week came as a shock for nearly all of us, even though we knew that only grave illness could be keeping him from the company he co-founded and loved. He told us almost nothing about his prognosis—right through his last public appearance he was as turtleneck-clad and upbeat as ever. But suddenly, this week, he was gone.

[JOBSHOPE]Portrait by Tim O’BrienPortrait of Steve Jobs

Steve Jobs was extraordinary in countless ways—as a designer, an innovator, a (demanding and occasionally ruthless) leader. But his most singular quality was his ability to articulate a perfectly secular form of hope. Nothing exemplifies that ability more than Apple’s early logo, which slapped a rainbow on the very archetype of human fallenness and failure—the bitten fruit—and turned it into a sign of promise and progress.

That bitten apple was just one of Steve Jobs’s many touches of genius, capturing the promise of technology in a single glance. The philosopher Albert Borgmann has observed that technology promises to relieve us of the burden of being merely human, of being finite creatures in a harsh and unyielding world. The biblical story of the Fall pronounced a curse upon human work—”cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life.” All technology implicitly promises to reverse the curse, easing the burden of creaturely existence. And technology is most celebrated when it is most invisible—when the machinery is completely hidden, combining godlike effortlessness with blissful ignorance about the mechanisms that deliver our disburdened lives.

Brett Arends discusses on Lunch Break why he believes Steve Jobs was the best chief executive of his generation and wasn’t just a technology genius but also a hype master.

No company combined simplicity and hiddenness better than Apple under Mr. Jobs’s leadership. Apple made technology not for geeks but for cool people—and ordinary people. It made products that worked, beautifully, without fuss and with great style. They improved markedly, unmistakably, from one generation to the next—not in the way geeks wanted technology to improve, with ever longer lists of features (I’m looking at you, Microsoft Word) and technical specifications, but in simplicity. Press the single button on the face of the iPad and, whether you are 5 or 95, you can begin using it with almost no instruction. It has no manual. You cannot open it up to see its inner workings even if you want to. No geeks required—or allowed. The iPad offers its blessings to ordinary mortals.

WSJ Personal Technology Columnist Walt Mossberg joins this special edition of Digits to discuss Steve Jobs’s post-PC vision for the future and what his path would have been had he lived longer, as well as what he believes motivated him throughout his legendary career.

And so it came to pass that in the 2000s, when much about the wider world was causing Americans intense anxiety and frustration, the one thing that got inarguably better, much better, was our personal technology.

In October 2001, with the ruins of the World Trade Center still smoldering and the Internet financial bubble burst, Apple introduced the iPod. In January 2010, in the depths of the Great Recession, the very month when unemployment breached 10% for the first time in a generation, Apple introduced the iPad.

JOBSHOPEjump

JOBSHOPEjump

ReutersA tribute to Steve Jobs in front of a Tokyo Apple store Thursday. The 2000s were defined by disappointments—except technologically, as Mr. Jobs strode on stage always with another miracle in his pocket.

Politically, militarily, economically, the decade was defined by disappointment after disappointment—but technologically, it was defined by a series of elegantly produced events in which Steve Jobs, commanding more attention and publicity each time, strode on stage with a miracle in his pocket.

Steve Jobs was the evangelist of this particular kind of progress—and he was the perfect evangelist because he had no competing source of hope. He believed so sincerely in the “magical, revolutionary” promise of Apple precisely because he believed in no higher power. In his celebrated Stanford commencement address (which is itself an elegant, excellent model of the genre), he spoke frankly about his initial cancer diagnosis in 2003. It’s worth pondering what Jobs did, and didn’t, say:

Betaworks CEO John Borthwick and Dow Jones’s Neal Lipschutz discuss Apple’s future and the challenges any company faces after the loss of its innovator-in-chief.

 

“No one wants to die. Even people who want to go to heaven don’t want to die to get there. And yet death is the destination we all share. No one has ever escaped it. And that is as it should be, because death is very likely the single best invention of life. It’s life’s change agent; it clears out the old to make way for the new. Right now, the new is you. But someday, not too long from now, you will gradually become the old and be cleared away. Sorry to be so dramatic, but it’s quite true. Your time is limited, so don’t waste it living someone else’s life. Don’t be trapped by dogma, which is living with the results of other people’s thinking. Don’t let the noise of others’ opinions drown out your own inner voice, heart and intuition. They somehow already know what you truly want to become.”

Apple co-founder Steve Jobs died on Wednesday at age 56. Wall Street Journal managing editor Alan Murray and editors discuss Jobs’s legacy, early reactions to his death and how his showmanship changed the retail and tech landscape.

This is the gospel of a secular age. It has the great virtue of being based only on what we can all perceive—it requires neither revelation nor dogma. And it promises nothing it cannot deliver—since all that is promised is the opportunity to live your own unique life, a hope that is manifestly realizable since it is offered by one who has so spectacularly succeeded by following his own “inner voice, heart and intuition.”

Mr. Jobs was by no means the first person to articulate this vision of a meaningful life—Socrates, the Buddha and Emerson come to mind. To be sure, fully embracing this secular gospel requires an austerity of spirit that few have been able to muster, even if it sounds quite fine on the lawn of Stanford University.

Upon close inspection, this gospel offers no hope that you cannot generate yourself and only the comfort of having been true to yourself. In the face of tragedy and evil—the kind of tragedy that cuts off lives not just at 56 years old but at 5 or 6, the kind of evil bent on eradicating whole tribes and nations from the earth—it is strangely inert.

Perhaps every human system of meaning fails or at least falls silent in the face of these harsh realities, but the gospel of self-fulfillment does require an extra helping of stability and privilege to be plausible. Death is “life’s change agent”? For most human beings, that would sound like cold comfort indeed.

But the genius of Steve Jobs was to persuade us, at least for a little while, that cold comfort is enough. The world—at least the part of the world in our laptop bags and our pockets, the devices that display our unique lives to others and reflect them to ourselves—will get better. This is the sense in which the tired old cliché of “the Apple faithful” and the “cult of the Mac” is true. It is a religion of hope in a hopeless world, hope that your ordinary and mortal life can be elegant and meaningful, even if it will soon be dated, dusty and discarded like a 2001 iPod.

It is said that human beings can live for 40 days without food, four days without water and four minutes without air. But we cannot live for four seconds without hope.

It’s probably true for nations as well.

Mr. Jobs’s final leave of absence was announced this year on Martin Luther King Jr. Day. And, as it happened, Mr. Jobs died on the same day as one of Dr. King’s companions, the Reverend Fred L. Shuttlesworth, one of the last living co-founders of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Dr. King, too, had had a close encounter with his own mortality when he was stabbed by a mentally ill woman at a book signing in 1958. He told that story a decade later to a rally on the night of April 3, 1968, and then turned, with unsettling foresight, to the possibility of his own early death. His words, at the beginning, could easily have been a part of Steve Jobs’s commencement address:

“Like anybody, I would like to live a long life. Longevity has its place. But I’m not concerned about that now.”

But here Dr. King, the civic and religious leader, turned a corner that Mr. Jobs never did. “I just want to do God’s will. And He’s allowed me to go up to the mountain. And I’ve looked over. And I’ve seen the Promised Land. I may not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight, that we, as a people, will get to the promised land! And so I’m happy, tonight. I’m not worried about anything, I’m not fearing any man! Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord!”

Is it possible to live a good, full, human life without that kind of hope? Steve Jobs would have said yes in a heartbeat. A convert to Zen Buddhism, he was convinced as anyone could be that this life is all there is. He hoped to put a “ding in the universe” by his own genius and vision in this life alone—and who can deny that he did?

But the rest of us, as grateful as we are for his legacy, still have to decide whether technology’s promise is enough to take us to the promised land. Is technology enough? Has the curse truly been repealed? Is the troublesome world simply awaiting another Steve Jobs, the evangelist of our power to unfold our own possibilities?

And, correspondingly, was the hope beyond themselves, and beyond this life, that animated Dr. King and his companions merely superfluous to the success of their cause, an accident of religious history rather than a civic necessity?

For people of a secular age, Steve Jobs’s gospel may seem like all the good news we need. But people of another age would have considered it a set of beautifully polished empty promises, notwithstanding all its magical results. Indeed, they would have been suspicious of it precisely because of its magical results.

And that may be true of a future age as well. Our grandchildren may discover that technological progress, for all its gifts, is the exception rather than the rule. It works wonders within its own walled garden, but it falters when confronted with the worst of the world and the worst in ourselves. Indeed, it may be that rather than concealing difficulty and relieving burdens, the only way forward in the most tenacious human troubles is to embrace difficulty and take up burdens—in Dr. King’s words, to embrace a “dangerous unselfishness.”

Whatever the limits of Steve Jobs’s secular gospel, or for that matter of Dr. King’s Christian one, our keen sense of loss at his passing reminds us that the oxygen of human societies is hope. Steve Jobs kept hope alive. We will not soon see his like again. Let us hope that when we do, it is soon enough to help us deal with the troubles that this century, and every century, will bring.

—Mr. Crouch is the author of “Culture Making: Recovering Our Creative Calling” and an editor-at-large at Christianity Today.

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Tom Barnett : The New Rules: The Rise of the Rest Spells U.S. Strategic Victory

September 14th, 2011 · No Comments · Geopolitics

Tom Barnett, one of my favourite thinkers on geopolitics . . .

World Politics Review

The New Rules: The Rise of the Rest Spells U.S. Strategic Victory

By Thomas P.M. Barnett | 12 Sep 2011

The 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks has garnered America almost as much schadenfreude from the world as the original events did. Back in 2001, the line was that we had it coming to us for lording it over the world since the Cold War’s end. Today, it takes the form of writing off our alleged “hegemony” in light of the shifts in global power over the intervening decade, a claim that is as absurd the previous one was insulting. Naturally, the Chinese are celebrated as our presumed replacement. So, as always throughout our history as a superpower, we’re being treated to “sophisticated” analysis that says America fought the war, but they – our next security obsession – won the peace.

First the absurdity: A few of the most over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did indeed promote a vision of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn’t be afraid to wage war to keep other rising powers at bay. It was a nutty concept then, and it remains a nutty concept today. But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy, don’t expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon’s internal budget fights are growing in intensity.

Meanwhile, the Chinese do their stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation’s dependency on resources flowing from unstable developing regions skyrockets. With America’s fiscal constraints now abundantly clear, the world’s primary policing force is pulling back, while that force’s implied successor is nowhere close to being able to field a similar power-projection capacity — and never will be. So with NATO clearly stretched to its limits by the combination of Afghanistan and Libya, a lot of future fires in developing regions will likely be left to burn on their own. We’ll just have to wait and see how much foreign commentators delight in that G-Zero dynamic in the years ahead.

That gets us to the original “insult”: the U.S. did not lord it over the world in the 1990s. Yes, it did argue for and promote the most rapid spread of globalization possible. But the “evil” of the Washington Consensus only yielded the most rapid growth of a truly global middle class that the world has ever seen. Yes, we can, in our current economic funk, somehow cast that development as the “loss of U.S. hegemony,” in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization’s universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II.

Numerous world powers served as global or regional hegemons before we came along, and their record on economic development was painfully transparent: Elites got richer, and the masses got poorer. Then America showed up after World War II and engineered an international liberal trade order, one that was at first admittedly limited to the West. But within four decades it went virally global, and now for the first time in history, more than half of our planet’s population lives in conditions of modest-to-mounting abundance — after millennia of mere sustenance.

You may choose to interpret this as some sort of cosmic coincidence, but the historical sequence is undeniable: With its unrivaled power, America made the world a far better place.

That spreading wave of global abundance has reformatted all sorts of traditional societies that lay in its path. Some, like the Chinese, have adapted to it magnificently in an economic and social sense, with the political adaptation sure to follow eventually. Others, being already democracies, have done far better across the board, like Turkey, Indonesia and India. But there are also numerous traditional societies where that reformatting impulse from below has been met by both harsh repression from above and violent attempts by religious extremists to effect a “counterreformation” that firewalls the “faithful” from an “evil” outside world.

Does this violent blowback constitute the great threat of our age? Not really. As I’ve long argued, this “friction” from globalization’s tectonic advance is merely what’s left over now that great-power war has gone dormant for 66 years and counting, with interstate wars now so infrequent and so less lethal as to be dwarfed by the civil strife that plagues those developing regions still suffering weak connectivity to the global economy.

Let’s remember what the U.S. actually did across the 1990s after the Soviet threat disappeared. It went out of its way to police the world’s poorly governed spaces, battling rogue regimes and answering the 9-1-1 call repeatedly when disaster and/or civil strife struck vulnerable societies. Yes, playing globalization’s bodyguard made America public enemy No. 1 in the eyes of its most violent rejectionist movements, including al-Qaida, but we made the effort because, in our heart of hearts, we knew that this is what blessed powers are supposed to do.

Some, like the Bush-Cheney neocons, were driven by more than that sense of moral responsibility. They saw a chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as America’s decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden. The rest, as they say, is history.

The follow-on irony of the War on Terror is that its operational requirements actually revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military — specifically the Army, Marines and Special Forces — in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big wars to small ones. It also forged a new operational bond between the military’s irregular elements and that portion of the Central Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006 midterm election. But the end result is clear: We now have the force we actually need to manage this global era.

But, of course, that can all be tossed into the dumpster if we convince ourselves that our “loss” of hegemony was somehow the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered not only the greatest redistribution — and expansion — of global wealth ever seen, but also the greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen.

Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great power, China, whose growing strength upsets us so much, then in combination with the rest of the world’s rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power to manage what’s yet to come.

As always, the choice is ours.

Thomas P.M. Barnett is chief analyst at Wikistrat and a contributing editor for Esquire magazine. His forthcoming eBook serial is “The Emily Updates: One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived” (September-December 2011). His weekly WPR column, The New Rules, appears every Monday. Reach him and his blog at thomaspmbarnett.com.

 

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Peter Brabeck-Letmathe, CEO, Nestles on Food . .

September 11th, 2011 · No Comments · Markets

Very interesting thoughts on a global scale on price, food, free markets, fuel . . . .
  • The Wall Street Journal
  • SEPTEMBER 3, 2011

Can the World Still Feed Itself?

Yes, says Nestle’s chairman Peter Brabeck-Letmathe, but not if we burn food for fuel, fear genetic advances and fail to charge for water.

By BRIAN M. CARNEY

Vevey, Switzerland

As befits the chairman of the world’s largest food-production company, Peter Brabeck-Letmathe is counting calories. But it’s not his diet that the chairman and former CEO of Nestlé is worried about. It’s all the food that the U.S. and Europe are converting into fuel while the world’s poor get hungrier.

“Politicians,” Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe says, “do not understand that between the food market and the energy market, there is a close link.” That link is the calorie.

The energy stored in a bushel of corn can fuel a car or feed a person. And increasingly, thanks to ethanol mandates and subsidies in the U.S. and biofuel incentives in Europe, crops formerly grown for food or livestock feed are being grown for fuel. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s most recent estimate predicts that this year, for the first time, American farmers will harvest more corn for ethanol than for feed. In Europe some 50% of the rapeseed crop is going into biofuel production, according to Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe, while “world-wide about 18% of sugar is being used for biofuel today.”

In one sense, this is a remarkable achievement—five decades ago, when the global population was half what it is today, catastrophists like Paul Ehrlich were warning that the world faced mass starvation on a biblical scale. Today, with nearly seven billion mouths to feed, we produce so much food that we think nothing of burning tons of it for fuel.

Or at least we think nothing of it in the West. If the price of our breakfast cereal goes up because we’re diverting agricultural production to ethanol or biodiesel, it’s an annoyance. But if the price of corn or flour doubles or triples in the Third World, where according to Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe people “are spending 80% of [their] disposable income on food,” hundreds of millions of people go hungry. Sometimes, as in the Middle East earlier this year, they revolt.

“What we call today the Arab Spring,” Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe says over lunch at Nestle’s world headquarters, “really started as a protest against ever-increasing food prices.”

Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe has extensive experience at the intersection of food, politics and development. He spent most of his first two decades at Nestlé in Latin America. In 1970, he was posted to Chile, where Salvador Allende’s socialist government was threatening to nationalize milk production, and Nestlé’s Chilean operations along with it. He knows that most of the world is not as fortunate as we are.

wintercarney

wintercarney

Terry Shoffner

“There is a huge difference,” he says, “between how we live this crisis and what the reality of today is for hundreds of millions of people, who we have been pushing back into extreme poverty with wrong policy making.” First there’s the biofuels craze, driven by concerns over energy independence, oil supplies, global warming and, ironically, Mideast political stability.

Add to that, especially in Europe, a paralyzing fear of genetically modified crops, or GMOs. This refusal to use “available technology” in agriculture, Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe contends, has halted the multi-decade rise in agricultural productivity that has allowed us, so far, to feed more mouths than many people believed was possible.

Then there is demographics. Recent decades have seen “the creation of more than a billion new consumers in the world who have had the opportunity to move from extreme poverty into what we would call today a moderate middle class,” thanks to economic growth in places like China and India. This means a billion people who have “access to meat” for the first time, Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe says.

“And the demand for meat,” he says, “has a multiplier effect of 10. You need 10 times as much land, 10 times as much [feed], 10 times as much water to produce one calorie of meat as you do to have one calorie of vegetables or grain.” Even so, we are capable of satisfying this increased demand—if we choose to. “If politicians of this world really want to tackle food security,” Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe says, “there’s only one decision they have to make: No food for fuel. . . . They just have to say ‘No food for fuel,’ and supply and demand would balance again.”

 

If we don’t do that, we can never hope to square the drive for biofuels with the world’s food needs. The calories don’t add up. “The energy market,” Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe argues, “is 20 times as big, in calories, as the food market.” So “when politicians say, ‘We want to replace 20% of the energy market through the food market,’” this means “we would have to triple food production” to meet that goal—and that’s before we eat the first kernel of what we’ve grown.

Even if we could pull this off, we will never get there by turning our backs on genetically modified crops and holding up “organic” food as the new gold standard of safety, purity and health. Organic production is all the rage in the rich West, but we can’t “feed the world with this stuff,” he says. Agricultural productivity with organics is too low.

“If you look at those countries that have introduced GMOs,” Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe says, “you will see that the yield per hectare has increased by about 30% over the past few years. Whereas the yields for non-GMO crops are flat to slightly declining.” And that gap, he says, “is a voluntary gap. . . . It’s just a political decision.”

And it’s one thing for rich, well-fed Europe to say, as Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe puts it, “I don’t want to produce GMO [crops] because frankly speaking I don’t want to produce so much food.” That, he says, he can understand.

What’s harder for him to understand is that Europe’s policies effectively forbid poor countries in places like Africa from using genetically modified seed. These countries, he says, urgently need the technology to increase yields and productivity in their backward agricultural sectors. But if they plant GMOs, then under Europe’s rules the EU “will not allow you to export anything—anything. Not just the [crop] that has GMO—anything,” because of European fears about cross-contamination and almost impossibly strict purity standards. The European fear of genetically modified crops is, he says, “purely emotional. It’s becoming almost a religious belief.”

This makes Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe, a jovial man with a quick smile, get emotional himself. “How many people,” he asks with a touch of irritation, “have died from food contamination from organic products, and how many people have died from GMO products?” He answers his own question: “None from GMO. And I don’t have to ask too long how many people have died just recently from organic,” he adds, referring to the e. coli outbreak earlier this year in Europe.

Nestlé itself has at times been painted as an enemy of the world’s poor—for 30 years it has contended with a sporadic boycott movement over the sale and marketing of infant formula in the Third World, a push that some rich Westerners find unethical. On the other hand, under Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe, Nestlé’s corporate strategy has emphasized that all food markets are intensely local. Americans may increasingly buy all drinks by the gallon and chocolate bars by the pound, but in many parts of the world a trip to the store might yield a single Maggi cube—the Nestlé-made bullion cubes that are ubiquitous in many countries. In these countries, single servings of many products are sold in little foil packets to allow people to match their spending to their cash flow.

This is, Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe contends, an extension of Nestlé’s original reason for being. Nestlé exists, Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe says, because as Europe’s population “urbanized,” as people moved to the cities and traded their ploughshares for time cards, “somebody had to ensure that people” who worked 12 hours a day in a factory could feed themselves. For the first time in history, “you need[ed] a food industry. You need[ed] somebody who takes a product, who treats it so that its shelf life allows it to be transported, to be brought into the consumption center. That’s why we have canning, that’s why we have pasteurization, that’s why we have all these things.”

The vast majority of us would have no idea any longer how to feed ourselves if we turned up one day to find the supermarket empty. We rely on industrialized food production, distribution, preservation and storage to make our urban lifestyles, our very lives, possible. And “it was not the state that took care of this thing. It was private initiative.” Today, Nestlé employs some 300,000 people, takes in some $100 billion a year in revenue—and yet represents just 1.5% of a global food industry that feeds billions.

But for private initiative to work that kind of miracle, you need a market. Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe even worries about the absence of a functioning market for water. Some 98.5% of the fresh water the world uses every year goes to agricultural or industrial use. And in most cases, there is no market for how that water is allocated and used. The result is waste, overuse and misuse of the water we have. If we don’t do something about that, Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe fears, we will soon run ourselves dry.

Up to now, he says, our response to water shortages has focused “on the supply-side”: We build another dam, or a canal to bring water from one place to another. But “the big issue,” he contends, “is on the demand side,” and the “best regulator” of demand is prices.

“If oil becomes scarce,” he notes, “the oil price goes up. But if water does, well, we still pump the same amount. It doesn’t matter because it doesn’t cost. It has no value.” He drives this point home by connecting it back to biofuels: “We would never have had a biofuel policy—never,” he contends, “if we would have given water any value.” It takes, Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe says, “9,100 liters of water to produce one liter of biodiesel. You can only do that because water has no price.”

He cites Spain as an example of an agricultural sector in need of adjustment. “The total [output] of the Spanish agricultural system,” he says, “is less in value than the subsidies they receive between the Common Agricultural Policy, the subsidies for tax relief, the subsidies for water.”

 

‘Take away the emotion of the water issue,” Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe argues. “Give the 1.5% of the water [that we use to drink and wash with], make it a human right. But give me a market for the 98.5% so the market forces are able to react, and they will be the best guidance that you can have. Because if the market forces are there the investments are going to be made.”

The world’s population is projected to hit nine billion by mid-century, up from 6.7 billion today. So, can we feed all those people? Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe doesn’t hesitate. “We can feed nine billion people,” he says, with a wave of the hand. And we can provide them with water and fuel. But only if we let the market do its thing.

Mr. Carney is editorial page editor of The Wall Street Journal Europe and coauthor of “Freedom, Inc.,” (Crown Business, 2009).

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Edward Luttwak on Israeli security, Henry Kissinger, the Arab Spring, and the death of Osama Bin Laden

September 9th, 2011 · No Comments · Geopolitics

 

Interesting thinking . . the kind I like the most

http://www.tabletmag.com/news-and-politics/76739/qa-edward-luttwak/

Q&A: Edward Luttwak

The military strategist talks about Israeli security, Henry Kissinger, the Arab Spring, and the death of Osama Bin Laden

By David Samuels|September 6, 2011 12:01 AM

 

Edward Luttwak is a rare bird whose peripatetic life and work are the envy of academics and spies alike. A well-built man who looks like he is in his mid-50s (he turns 70 next year), Luttwak—who was born in 1942 to a wealthy Jewish family in Arad, Romania, and educated in Italy and England—speaks with a resonant European accent that conveys equal measures of authority, curiosity, egomania, bluster, impatience, and good humor. He is a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies [1] at Georgetown University, and he published his first book [2]Coup d’État: A Practical Handbook, at the age of 26. Over the past 40 years, he has made provocative and often deeply original contributions to multiple academic fields, including military strategy, Roman history, Byzantine history, and economics. He owns a large eco-friendly ranch in Bolivia and can recite poetry and talk politics in eight languages, a skill that he displayed during a recent four-hour conversation at his house, located on a quiet street in Chevy Chase, Md., by taking phone calls in Italian, Spanish, Korean, and Chinese, during which I wandered off to the porch, where I sat and talked with his lovely Israeli-born wife, Dalya Luttwak, a sculptor [3].

The walls of Luttwak’s donnish study—which is by far the nicest room in the Luttwaks’ house, with the best view, and might otherwise have served as the dining room, if Edward and Dalya were more like their neighbors—are lined with bookshelves containing the Roman classics, biographies of Winston Churchill, works on military history and strategy, intelligence gathering, Byzantine art, old atlases, and decorations and plaques from foreign governments. Luttwak’s work as a high-level strategic and intelligence consultant for the U.S. Defense Department, the National Security Council, the State Department, the Japanese government, and the defense departments and intelligence services of other countries in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East (he appears to be spending a lot of time in South Korea and China) is also augmented by a parallel life as an “operator,” about which he is both secretive and obviously proud.

While the details of Luttwak’s life as a private intelligence operative are sketchy, he has been actively involved in military and paramilitary operations sponsored by the U.S. government, foreign governments, and various private entities. By his own admission, he has been directly involved in attacks on physical targets, interdiction efforts, and the capture and interrogation of wanted persons—although “admission” is clearly the wrong word here, since he is almost boyishly eager for visitors to understand his familiarity with the nuts and bolts of special ops and cites his own field experience to support his estimations of people like Gen. David Petraeus, whose reputation as a counter-insurgency genius he dismisses as a fraud. He is also careful to state that his activities have never violated U.S. law. The Walter Mitty-ish component of Luttwak’s enthusiasm for his other life—academic by day, special operator by night—seems less significant in his psyche than a driving appetite for physical risk that has helped him understand military strategy and related policy questions in a way that the current generation of Western policymakers often does not.

Loved and loathed, and capable of living multiple lives, any one of which would quickly tire out a less intellectually and physically robust man, Luttwak glories in the undeniable fact that he is not the usual Washington think-tank product. His instinctive tendency to reject common wisdom as idiotic, combined with his need to prove that he is the smartest person in every room, has deprived him of the chance to shape events in the way that every policy intellectual not-so-secretly craves. Yet his first allegiance is clearly to the habits of mind that have made him one of the most brilliant strategic thinkers in America, capable of understanding the psychological and practical necessities that drive human action in a highly original, insightful and counterintuitive way.

We met last month, at the height of a rainstorm. What follows are selectively edited portions of the transcript of our interview, during which I made a point of not asking him about his childhood experience as a Jewish refugee in Europe, which seemed like a subject for a different conversation.

I think that if America had been able to tolerate a second Henry Kissinger, that person would have been you.

Kissinger at 88 is writing brochures for Kissinger Associates. His last book on China is one such work written by the staff at Kissinger Associates. It is designed to curry favor with the Chinese authorities and nothing else.

I know him personally very well, but he is such a deceptive person; he’s a habitual liar and dissembler. Although I’ve spent a lot of time talking to him, I have no insight on him at all. His book ends with a paean to U.S.-Chinese friendship and how every other country has to fit in. I have to review it for the TLS, but I’ve been delaying it by weeks because I don’t know whether it is a case of senility or utter corruption.

There are two differing interpretations of the events of the Arab Spring. The dominant one is: “Here is this marvelous wave of popular revolutions where everyone uses Facebook and Twitter to spread democratic ideas.” The other is that “Rickety state structures held together by repressive police and state apparatus are now collapsing into tribal bloodshed.”

Well, any dictatorship creates an unnatural environment, analogous to that of taking peasants from the field and putting them in an army, where they get uniforms and are drilled and disciplined. Dictatorships attempt to turn entire populations into well-drilled regiments. The North Korean regime takes it to the logical extreme of actually having the entire population drilled in regiments. The Ben Ali and Mubarak dictatorships were attempting to regiment their populations by having state structures imposed on them. Both of them, for example, were able to create loyal police forces.

Once the regiment dissolves, then the people are released and they revert to their natural order. They stop wearing uniforms, they put on the clothes they want, and they manifest the proclivities that they have. A few Egyptians are Westernized, hence they have exited Islam whatever their personal beliefs may be. But otherwise, there is no room for civilization in Egypt other than Islam, and the number of extremists that you need to make life impossible for the average Westernized or slightly Westernized Egyptian who wants to have a beer, for example, is very small. The number you need to close all the bars in Egypt is maybe 15 percent of the population.

Do you think stepping away from Mubarak was a mistake or it made no difference?

I think it made no difference. The regime was senile. Literally.

How much of a role do you think the so-called “democracy promotion” efforts of the United States under President George W. Bush, including the invasion of Iraq, played in the increasing instability of the Arab regimes, and how much of their collapse was the result of their own senility?

I will pretend that this is an easy question; it’s not. The easy answer is that Bush and the Bush Administration for a brief period of less than two years were on a democracy-promotion binge. They used a pickax and attacked a wall, seemingly making an impression, and perhaps they caused some structural damage. The Iraq War, with the defeat, humbling, and execution of a dictator, was a big blow with a pickax. On the other hand, when the regime becomes sufficiently involuted as to become hereditary, which is what happened in Syria and appeared to be happening in Egypt, then you are dealing with senility of the regime embodied: “The dictator is old.” So, both answers are true.

There have been many different explanations given over the past 10 years for the strength of the American-Israeli relationship, ranging from the idea that Israel has the best and most immediately deployable army in the Middle East, to the idea that a small cabal of wealthy and influential Jews has hijacked American foreign policy.

You mean the Z.O.G.? The Zionist Occupied Government?

Yes.

Personally, from an emotional point of view, myself, as me, I prefer the Z.O.G. explanation above all others. I love the idea that the Zionists have sufficient power to actually occupy America, and through America to basically run the world. I love the idea of being a member of a secretive and powerful cabal. If you put my name Luttwak together with Perle and Wolfowitz and you search the Internet, you will get this little list of people who run the American government and the world, and I’m on it. I love that.

Anytime you need an added jolt of ego gratification, you open your laptop and confirm the fact that you rule the world.

In Pakistan, there are millions of people who go to schools where they are taught that I am the ruler of the universe. So, emotionally speaking, I would explain everything that happens by referring to the Z.O.G., the Zionist Occupied Government, which is run by a small cabal of people, and that I am one of them.

Now, if I’m forced to actually think about this question, I would say that the cleanest analytical way of understanding the American-Israeli relationship is to say that the post-1945 career of the United States as a world-meddling, imperialist power has forced Americans to be very foreign-oriented. Many American families have had their sons killed overseas, and many other Americans have become foreign-oriented for many reasons. Among them there is a group of Christians who read the Bible, who believe in the Bible to some degree as a document that registers God’s will. For them, Israel is the proof of the truth of the Bible. Hence, the notion that the United States should be supporting rather than opposing Israel has now become expected, which was absolutely not true in 1948 when the United States did every possible thing to prevent the existence of Israel by systematically intercepting arms flows to the Jews.

Luttwak Q&A

Therefore, if we in the Z.O.G. didn’t really run everything, and there was no Zionist influence, then this solid mass of foreign-aware Americans, who also happen to be Bible-believers—we’re talking 50 million people—to them, the only foreign policy that counts is America’s support for Israel. Period.

Many American Jews are viscerally uncomfortable with this kind of support. They say, “Oh, look at these Bible-thumping Christians who want to make us kiss Jesus. The only reason they like Israel is so they can turn it into a landing strip for their God.”

You are now invoking a second constant—

Why are so many Jews so stupid about politics?

They have not had a state for 2,000 years, they have had no power or responsibility and it will take centuries before they catch up with the instinctive political understanding that any ordinary Englishman has. They don’t understand politics, and of course they confuse their friends and their enemies, and that is the ultimate political proof of imbecility.

When you look at the current conduct of American policy in the Middle East, do you see any coherent policy or strategy?

Obama is no different than most previous administrations that come into office with ready-made solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jimmy Carter was the first one, and his plan was redacted by Zbigniew Brzezinski. It led to Sadat’s journey to Jerusalem because his brilliant idea was to subject Egyptians and Israelis to a Soviet-American condominium, which was a terrible idea, and so Sadat created his own reality. It was really one of the funnier moments in history. The national security adviser officials, and I believe Brzezinski himself, came out with a lot of negative statements when Sadat first made his announcement because he was ruining their policy scheme, which was, of course, impossible.

Obama is in that tradition. He came in with an impossible policy scheme, which is first you get Israelis to stop agreeing to settlements, and then you proceed. Of course, that doesn’t make any sense. When you draw a border that is what matters. The Israelis removed all the settlements from Sinai without any American involvement in two minutes after the agreement was made with Egypt.

[The phone rings. Luttwak breaks into impossibly perfect Italian. I wander out onto the porch to talk to Dalya and return 20 minutes later, as he is finishing up the call.]

There’s nobody involved who is anti-Israeli like there were in the past, when there was a strong Arabist position in the State Department. The people in the Obama Administration read the New York Times and they don’t know Arabic, and therefore they are operating systematically with false categories. The fundamental error with regard to settlements is a very simple one: When borders are established, borders are established, and settlements are neither here nor there. This notion that when some faction of Israelis puts a camper on a hilltop that this changes anything is a fantasy.

A fantasy both on the part of the people who put the campers on the ground and also American policymakers.

They’re both equally deluded.

Do you anticipate violence this fall between the Israelis and the Palestinians?

I don’t anticipate violence this fall. War leads to peace. Peace leads to war. So, now logically we should have war. And the Iranians, of course, would love to pay for one. But the moment there is an intifada, the Palestinian regiment collapses and gangsters take over. So, the moment the violence escalates they stop fighting and they start talking peace. The moment the talking appears to be approaching an actual peace, they start an intifada.

Do you think the cost of the violence and other social ills that come out of the stalemate you are describing is something Israeli society can easily afford, or do you think there is any alternative to it?

I’m not sure it’s a cost.

Because the strategic depth that it affords and the control over those borders is more important?

Listen, my wife is a very good cook. And we have a housekeeper, who is an even better cook. It’s a weird situation, but I think my housekeeper is a better cook than any restaurant in Washington. She is a simple woman with no education, from Chile, and she just happens to have a superhuman talent. She being such a good cook, she achieves wonderful effects with very strange ingredients, and strange combinations of ingredients. Israel’s success as a state has been made possible by Arab threats of different kinds. Arab violence or threats of violence are part of the Israeli soup. There are certain levels of violence that are so high that they’re damaging, and there are also levels that are so low they are damaging. There is an optimum level of the Arab threat. I would say for about nine days of the 1973 war, the level of violence was much too high. Even when Israelis were successful, the level of violence was destroying the tissue of the state. Most of the time, the violence is positive.

When you say that the effects of Arab violence are positive, you mean that they generate social cohesion inside Israel?

Lenin taught, “Power is mass multiplied by cohesion.” Arab violence generates Jewish cohesion. Cohesion turns mass into power. Israel has had very small mass, very high cohesion. If only the Palestinians understood that, they would have attacked the Jews with flowers.

Shimon Peres says, “Iran is a decaying corpse of a country and the idea that they are any long-term threat to anybody, based on demographics and based on the rickety state of their economy, is a joke. So yes, it would be terrible if they ended up with an atomic bomb, but otherwise, Iran is not a long-term strategic threat to anybody.”

I think to get a good view on Iran you have to put yourself in the shoes of Hezbollah. Hezbollah is wholly dependent on Iran. Without Iran, Hezbollah is just a band of hotheads with a few thousand highly trained men. So, view Iran from Hezbollah’s point of view. What do you see? It’s a regime that has been around since 1979 in one way or the other. Is it consolidated? Is it functioning better and better and getting more and more support? It’s not. Is it getting more dependent on police repression or less? The answer is more. So, from the Hezbollah point of view, you realize that your days are counted because the regime is in a downward spiral.

There is a good measure of social control in Iran, and that is the price of genuine imported Scotch whiskey in Tehran, because it’s a) forbidden, and b) has to be smuggled in for practical purposes from Dubai, and the only way it can come from Dubai is with the cooperation of the Revolutionary Guard. The price of whiskey has been declining for years, and you go to a party in north Tehran now and you get lots of whiskey. And it’s only slightly more expensive than in Northwest Washington.

But on the other hand, the regime is doing something for which they will have my undying gratitude—that is, they have been manufacturing the one and only post-Islamic society. They created a situation in which Iranians in general, worldwide, not only in Iran, are disaffiliated. They are converting Muslim Iranians into post-Muslim Iranians.

What do you make of the Obama Administration’s increasingly close diplomatic alliance with Turkey? There seems to be this effort to build up the Turks as an alternative hegemon to Iran in the region, even as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister, is trying his best to create an Islamic one-party state.

Hillary Clinton and her staff are not fools. Therefore, they must know that the Turkish foreign minister is a fool. I know him personally. The man is an idiot. Hillary Clinton and her advisers are not idiots. No advantage would be served for the United States to recognize where Erdogan is really going. It’s much better to pretend that he’s a member of NATO and North Atlantic Alliance and all the rest of it.

One way to look at the place of Israel in this landscape is “Wow, you have a functioning neo-liberal state with a tech economy second to Silicon Valley amidst the rubble of all these failed Arab states. Imagine the Syrian army trying to attack anybody. Egypt’s army is incapable of doing anything despite $10 billion worth of American weapons, Iran is falling to pieces, Lebanon is still a mess, Jordan is a joke of a country with a Palestinian majority.” On the other hand, you could look at it and say, “Israel is a tiny country in a chaotic neighborhood where it will always get sucked into conflicts with its neighbors and will never have a moment of peace.”

Luttwak Q&A

Yes, everything you say is correct, but there is a third element you are omitting. The very innermost circle of Israeli security is actually within the 1967 borders. And there you have almost 1.5 million Arabs, some Christian, some Muslim. The current situation is helping consolidate their loyalty to the Israeli state. If you ask them, “Are you loyal to the Israeli state?” They will say, “Oh no, we hate them all.” Are they involved in terror plots? The answer is that out of the 1.5 million, the ones involved in terror plots or even plain criminality of any sort, they could all sleep in my house. Or if not, they could sleep in a motel.

But there is even a more fundamental issue within Israel, which is the functioning of the Israeli economy and its impact on Israeli society. What’s happened, as you know from these latest demonstrations, is that the Israeli economy has become so successful that it has generated big numbers of millionaires, which means that four-room apartments in Tel Aviv cost as much as they do in New York. Israel is becoming Aspen, Colo., where normal people have to travel 20 miles to go to sleep because they can’t live anywhere within Aspen proper.

Are strategic minds nurtured through upbringing and education, or is the ability to think strategically an inborn gift, like mathematics?

It’s a gift like mathematics. The paradoxical logic of strategy contradicts the logic of everyday life, it goes against all normal definitions of intelligence we have. It only makes sense if you understand the dialectic. If you want peace, prepare for war. If you actively want war, disarm yourself, and then you’ll get war. Virile and martial elites understand that kind of thinking instinctively.

Here’s an easily falsifiable statement, but there’s something in it that interests me and I want you to pick it apart. I would start with the moment when George W. Bush met Vladimir Putin and said, “I looked into his eyes and saw this was a man I could really trust.” So, my thesis is this: If you’re Vladimir Putin, and you rise to the top of this chaotic and brutal society after going through the KGB, you must be some kind of strategic genius with amazing survival skills, because the penalty for failure may be torture or death. This kind of Darwinian set-up exists in many countries around the world. What does it mean to be head of the security services in Egypt? It means that you had to betray your friends but only at the right time, and you had to survive many vicious predators who would have loved to kill you or torture you, or otherwise derail your career. By the time you become Vladimir Putin or Omar Suleiman, your ability to think ahead and analyze threats has been adequately tested.

By contrast, what does it take to become a U.S. Senator? You have to eat rubber chicken dinners, you have to impress some rich people who are generally pretty stupid about politics, and smile in TV commercials. The penalties for failure are hardly so dire. And so, American leadership generally sucks, and America is perennially in the position of being the sucker in the global poker game. That’s the thesis. So, tell me why it’s wrong.

Even if your analysis is totally correct, your conclusion is wrong. Think about what it means to work for a Putin, whose natural approach to any problem is deception. For example, he had an affair with this athlete, a gymnast, and he went through two phases. Phase one: He concealed it from his wife. Phase two: He launched a public campaign showing himself to be a macho man. He had photographs of him shooting a rifle, and as a Judo champion, and therefore had the news leaked that he was having an affair. Not only an affair with a young woman, but a gymnast, an athlete. Obviously such a person is much more wily and cunning and able to handle conflict than his American counterpart. But when such a person is the head of a department, the whole department is actually paralyzed and they are all reduced to serfs and valets. Therefore, what gets applied to a problem is only the wisdom of the aforementioned wily head of the department. All the other talent is wasted, all the other knowledge is wasted.

Now you have a choice: You can have a non-wily head of a department and the collective knowledge and wisdom of the whole department, or else you can have a wily head and zero functioning. And that is how the Russian government is currently working. Putin and Medvedev have very little control of the Russian bureaucracy. When you want to deal with them, and I dealt with them this morning, they act in very uncooperative, cagey, and deceptive ways because they are first of all trying to protect their security and stability and benefits from their boss. They have to deceive you because they are deceiving their boss before he even shows up to work. And they are all running little games. So, that’s the alternative. You can have a wily Putin and a stupid government. Or an intelligent government and an innocent head. There’s always is a trade-off. A Putin cannot be an inspiring leader.

One final question. When I heard the Bin Laden news and you look at the circumstances surrounding his place of residence, and the length of his stay there, it seems clear that he was sold to the U.S. by somebody inside the Pakistani security apparatus, no?

I don’t believe that at all.

You think that the CIA independently developed this information?

First of all, it was not the CIA because the CIA doesn’t run interrogations in Guantanamo.

You believe the story [4] about the courier?

I believe it and I believe it categorically. Look, the Pakistanis had been sheltering Bin Laden. But in these matters, the only way to proceed is to develop thoughts that are based only on uncontroversial facts. Any analysis of the Bin Laden story tells you that there was active Pakistani complicity simply because people cannot go to Abbottabad and live in a compound without somebody asking questions. For one thing, Pakistan has this system where foreign citizens have to obtain the residence permits and renew them, and there are foreigners including Arabs living there, and they would be asked to show their papers. Pakistani complicity is certain. That’s point one. Point two: The guy uses couriers. Therefore, if you’re going to find him, you had to find the courier. The courier story is not the cover story.

The proof of this is that if they got the information from some Pakistani guy, if one of the protectors of Osama decided to sell out, they would have known what was in the compound, and if they had known what was in the compound, they would not have attacked it the way they did. The attack against the compound reflected the central fact they did not know what they would find inside. The only thing that they hoped to find was Osama Bin Laden, among other objects, furniture, walls, people. Had a Pakistani provided the information, they would have provided two pieces of information, not just one. One is that Osama Bin Laden is there and two, a platoon is not there.

You understand the thing that keeps bothering me.

Now you are entering an area that is highly technical, and I’m not at liberty to speak because I’m in this line of business myself so there are limits to what I can tell you. But tell me what bothers you?

What bothers me is that you have a secret that was obviously known by more than one person. Let’s say that only three people in the ISI knew that Bin Laden was there.

The people who knew that he was in Abbottabad were a minimum number of some 12 people, and the reason is that you had to keep telling the police not to enter, you had to communicate with the other parts of the Pakistani state. But I repeat, but if American information had come from inside Pakistan, and there was knowledge of what was in the compound, they would have not attacked the compound in this way.

If 12 people know a secret, then there are also many people surrounding those 12 people who might also have access to some part of that information.

So, in other words, there are fragments of that secret.

With that many people knowing a big secret over that long a period of time, something must have leaked.

I know the courier information would tell you that Osama Bin Laden is in that space and nothing else. And the military operation that was mounted reflects that fact. Whoever designed that military operation had the kind of information that is consistent with the courier and is not consistent with any other story.

If I am in the receipt of information about Bin Laden’s whereabouts from a source in the ISI who wanted to submarine his boss, or gain the support of America, or pay off his mistress, I might design an operation that would match my cover story about the courier, who definitely existed, but might not have led anyone back to Bin Laden’s house.

No, no, no. It’s a very technical thing. It has to do with how you attack a target when you know that there are maximum of two people who will shoot at you or three people who will shoot at you, neither of the three being trained gunmen, versus how you design an attack on a target when you think there might be 25 people shooting at you. That’s all. The official word is that there was a courier, and I’m inclined to believe it. Because when somebody tells you how something happened, operationally speaking, do not disbelieve it until you have evidence that tells you that it’s wrong. Then you can pursue some other theory. All the information I have is consistent with the courier story because the courier story would tell you that there’s the bad guy in the space but nothing else.

Why kill him?

They were under orders to kill him.

Wouldn’t Osama Bin Laden be a source of useful intelligence? Alternately, one good reason to kill him is that you have a deal with the Pakistanis—“we’re gonna get rid of this problem”—then you need to kill him, because otherwise he might start talking about who protected him for the past 10 years.

There was no deal with the Pakistanis. There’s no institutional integrity. Therefore you cannot make deals with the Pakistani system. They would betray each other. There was no deal.

They killed Bin Laden simply because of the inconvenience of a trial?

They killed him because of the fact that if we captured Bin Laden, every Jihadist in the world would have been duty-bound to kidnap any American citizen anywhere and exchange him for Bin Laden.

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Gerhard Schröder : Perspectives . . .

September 6th, 2011 · No Comments · Geopolitics

Not one of my favourite people . . but worth reading . . .

09/05/2011 01:16 PM

SPIEGEL Interview with Gerhard Schröder

‘Europe Needs to Wake Up’

In a SPIEGEL interview, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, 67, discusses the German government’s learning curve in the euro crisis and his idea of a United States of Europe. He also addresses allegations that his government helped set the stage for the current common currency woes.

SPIEGEL: Mr. Schröder, is the euro in mortal danger?

Schröder: No. If you look at the external value of the euro in relation to the dollar, we were once at 82 cents and are now at 1.40. The euro is not in danger. What is missing is a political concept.

SPIEGEL: But something is going fundamentally wrong with the euro at the moment.

Schröder: (Former French President Francois) Mitterand and (former German Chancellor Helmut) Kohl were pursuing two basic ideas in creating the euro. Mitterand wanted to contain Germany’s economic power within Europe by means of a common currency. That couldn’t work. If you create a common currency, the stronger economy will prevail. Kohl’s mistake was to assume that the common currency would inevitably lead to political union. And the crisis we are currently experiencing makes it abundantly clear that you can’t have a common currency without a common fiscal, economic and social policy.

SPIEGEL: You said the same thing before you became chancellor, and then you didn’t pursue it.

Schröder: Europe is a very tough nut to crack. Everyone who has ever done it knows this. That’s why I am also hesitant to criticize administrations now in power. I admit that I would like to have achieved more than I did. When I was in office, I would have liked to bring the European constitutional process to a satisfactory conclusion. But it didn’t fail because of us.

SPIEGEL: Helmut Kohl blames you for the crisis, arguing that you were too quick to accept Greece into the euro zone. Does that mean that you are to blame for the euro debacle?

Schröder: Anyone who considers the issue fairly knows that this isn’t true. At the time, it was the European Commission that felt that the conditions had been met. All the relevant groups in the European Parliament agreed to Greece’s acceptance into the euro zone, as did the (center-right Christian Democratic Union) CDU and the (pro-business Free Democratic Party) FDP. Only the (conservative Christian Social Union) CSU was opposed.

SPIEGEL: The European Central Bank (ECB) is also leveling accusations against you, namely that your administration softened the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty — that is, the Stability and Growth Pact.

Schröder: Now that’s a criticism that should be taken more seriously. But one has to consider the context. The reform strengthened the growth aspect of the pact. Special burdens, like the costs of (German) reunification, were built in. But it was far more important that countries pursuing difficult structural reforms were given more latitude for growth programs. It was important for us in Germany, because we had launched the Agenda 2010 (program of structural reforms). We had a stagnating economy in Germany. We were also determined to implement the reforms, that is, to adjust the social security systems to the new conditions. Therefore, there was a need to emerge from stagnation with an economic stimulus program. In that situation, and because of the internal reforms, we were forced to emphasize the growth component of the pact. And it was ultimately successful. We did our homework as far as the Agenda 2010 was concerned, which is another reason we made it through the economic crisis more successfully than others. Now countries like France and Italy have to catch up under difficult conditions.

SPIEGEL: You say it’s a tough nut to crack. But what Europe needs is speed and clout. Do you think that this Europe of 27 nations is capable of that?

Schröder: Germany and France issued a strong signal with the plan for a European economic government — if they are serious about it — and the corresponding powers, like a European finance minister. That’s the right approach and the prerequisite for the right instrument, namely euro bonds — if only for the reason that it creates a huge bond market, and no speculator can hope to divide this market.

SPIEGEL: Merkel is accused of being too hesitant and too contradictory.

Schröder: There is a difference between being the political leader of a European Union of six or even 10 countries and one of 27. When it comes to their economies, the 27 countries are even more diverse than was ever the case previously.

SPIEGEL: It sounds as if you were trying to protect the chancellor.

Schröder: No, but to those who are so quick to criticize, I would like to say: Couldn’t you tone it down a little? It’s hard work, making progress in a Europe of 27 countries. And I do give credit to the government for that, even if it’s not the government I would like to see in power.

SPIEGEL: Does the federal government have a strategy?

Schröder: Now more than at the beginning. I’m critical of those who believed at the beginning that they could scrape by on the domestic political front by bashing Greece, without having to suffer on the European political front. They listened to the voice of the street. That was a big mistake. They apparently recognized this mistake. The decisions reached by Germany and France are moving in the right direction. It would be completely wrong to dispute that. For this reason, I assume that my party will also support it in the Bundestag (Germany’s federal parliament), which I think is absolutely the right approach.

SPIEGEL: The experience made over the years in Europe is that many agreements are made, only to be broken when necessary. Why should anyone believe that this would ever change?

Schröder: The weakness of Maastricht and the Stability and Growth Pact was the lack of political control. Merkel and Sarkozy are now taking steps to correct this. But when taken to its logical conclusion, this mean that countries will have to give up some of their national sovereignty.

SPIEGEL: How exactly?

Schröder: The Commission or a European finance minister will have to retain the right of initiative, but the control mechanisms will have to be democratized. National parliaments cannot be expected to accept a loss of sovereignty on budgetary matters without parliamentary control mechanisms being implemented elsewhere. The decisions reached by the national parliaments must end up in the European Parliament, as the ultimate authority. A possible approach would be for the parliament to form a special committee, which would consist of the members of the euro zone and assume this control function. The transfer of such parliamentary rights to any expert committees would pose a serious risk, because it would be associated with the curtailment of democracy.

SPIEGEL: Would you entrust the European Parliament to perform this task?

Schröder: Yes, of course. This sort of parliamentary control mechanism is needed, and if the crisis results in the problems we have discussed being corrected, there is a good side to the crisis.

 

‘Great Britain Is Causing the Greatest Problem’

SPIEGEL: And what happens after that?

Schröder: The Commission will have to be turned into a government that is controlled, in parliamentary terms, by the European Parliament. That translates into a United States of Europe. (German Labor Minister Ursula) Von der Leyen is entirely correct in this regard. Conservative politicians and members of the administration are also calling for the same thing now.

SPIEGEL: But that’s a Europe modeled after German ideas of fiscal, economic and social policy, which horrifies the other countries.

Schröder: It’s a reasonable concept, not a German concept. I’m a member of a European think thank founded by Nicolas Berggruen, along with conservative colleagues from other European countries. If there is one thing we agree on, it is that we need a reasonable, transnational mix between stimulating growth, on the one hand, and austerity, on the other. This is not a German concept. Look at Scandinavia, where you see good Europeans, and look at the Netherlands and Austria. They’re all good Europeans.

SPIEGEL: But that’s more of a northern European and not a southern European idea.

Schröder: I don’t know about that. The Greeks are currently forced to pursue an austerity policy at least as strict as what others are doing.

SPIEGEL: And if it isn’t enough, the rich countries, especially Germany, will be footing the bill.

Schröder: If you look at the economic data, Germany, as an exporting and industrialized nation, has benefited immensely from the euro. That’s just the way it is. We will have to explain to people the benefits we have derived from the euro, economically, socially and politically. We will have to explain that in a common currency zone, you accept a joint responsibility for this currency and relinquish sovereignty rights.

SPIEGEL: That’s not what the Lisbon Treaty says.

Schröder: These treaties are relevant to specific historic situations. And when they change, the treaties have to be modified.

SPIEGEL: Lisbon has to be revised?

Schröder: Yes. Lisbon was a compromise. Our original goal was to create a political union with the European constitution, which was defeated in the referendums. We didn’t get it right. But it’s important to say that it wasn’t Germany’s fault. Now that the crisis has emphasized that the things that could not be done until now are necessary to overcome the crisis, we have to take advantage of the opportunity.

SPIEGEL: How is that supposed to work? The constitutional treaty failed because of referendums in France and the Netherlands — that is, in EU founding members considered to be part of core Europe.

Schröder: The situation has changed. This crisis presents a great opportunity to create a real political union in Europe. I’m convinced that this has majority appeal in the member states. But the pro-European politicians also have to fight for it.

SPIEGEL: You and the euro — it wasn’t love at first sight. What turned you into a European when you were in office?

Schröder: I once referred to the euro as a sickly premature baby, because I felt that political union was needed. When I was in office, it became clear to me that the euro had created a new situation that, if terminated, would have catastrophic economic and political consequences. So while in office I had to learn that my assessment was untenable. Add to that the 2004 EU expansion to include 10 additional countries. It would certainly have been preferable to achieve deeper integration first. But this wasn’t historically possible.

SPIEGEL: Why not? Why couldn’t someone have said: You’ll have to wait a moment. The house has to be stabilized first, before we build an addition?

Schröder: That would have been an untenable position vis-à-vis the Eastern Europeans, who suffered for almost five decades under the division of Europe and oppression. A German position of this sort would have been unthinkable, especially toward Poland. These are European countries, just as the Western Balkans are part of Europe. But we can’t say to the Serbs today: Just wait a while. And the real problems aren’t even coming from these new member states.

SPIEGEL: Then where are they coming from?

Schröder: Great Britain is causing the biggest problem. Great Britain is not part of the euro, and yet the British always want to have their say in the design of an economic zone. This is inconsistent. And besides, the British have been very skeptical about every integration step, and that’s putting it very diplomatically.

SPIEGEL: In reality they’ve been obstructionists?

Schröder: Yes. I was originally of the opinion that Great Britain could be treated like France. But what was overlooked, also by myself, is that Great Britain still sees itself in a sort of middle position between the United States on one side and Europe on the other. In other words, it’s in an “in-between” position. And that is unacceptable.

SPIEGEL: But if nothing works with Great Britain, what role can the British play in the future?

Schröder: The decision on the concrete configuration of the economic government can only be made by members in the euro zone, and not by the Council (the powerful EU institution comprised of European national leaders) as a whole.

SPIEGEL: The Poles and others won’t stand for that. It will trigger shockwaves.

Schröder: The Poles and others will understand it. They’ll have a say as soon as they have become members of the euro zone.

SPIEGEL: Then we’ll finally have a two-speed Europe.

Schröder: But we’ve already had that for a long time with the euro zone. We should stop dithering and get serious with the idea of a core Europe. Otherwise Europe and its countries will sink into irrelevance between Asia under China’s leadership, on the one hand, and a reinvigorated America, in which I believe. The Europe I imagine is a more integrated Europe, complemented by Turkey’s membership, on the one hand, and association with Russia, on the other. This is the once chance to enable this Europe to operate on a level playing field with Asia and the United States. Otherwise I don’t see the slightest chance for European countries to maintain their importance. Europe has to wake up.

SPIEGEL: Is it that drastic?

Schröder: Yes. If you need an example, just take a look at the 2009 climate summit in Copenhagen. What happened there, politically speaking? What happened is that neither the European Union nor the countries of the EU played a role there. The Americans didn’t play a role, either. At the Copenhagen summit Asia, under China’s leadership, said: This is what’s going to happen. Then they graciously invited the American president to sign the finished document. Not a single European player, neither the climate chancellor nor Mr. Barroso, nor anyone else, played a role there.

SPIEGEL: Now that we’re talking about global issues, are the financial markets running the world?

Schröder: We made some proposals to regulate those financial markets more effectively.

SPIEGEL: After the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Green Party coalition government had initially done some deregulating.

Schröder: In Germany? This isn’t a national problem. We tried to make headway at the 2005 G-8 summit in Gleneagles. The British and the Americans laughed at us when we said: We have to get a handle on these financial markets. No one was willing to do so, out of consideration for the financial centers on Wall Street and in London.

SPIEGEL: No one was laughing at the G-20 summit in 2009, but no one did anything, either.

Schröder: That’s the problem. The world’s new financial architecture can only be shaped within the framework of the G-20. The G-8 can’t do this anymore.

SPIEGEL: Perhaps it’s really true that the real globalized world is a world of money, but not of politics?

Schröder: That’s too defeatist for me. Of course politicians have a difficult time of it, because they cannot simply make take-it-or-leave-it decisions without justifying them first.

SPIEGEL: And that’s coming from you.

Schröder: (laughing) Sometimes it simply feels good to put your foot down. But of course I too am aware that democracy doesn’t work that way. Democracy is slow, while the markets are fast. But that doesn’t mean that politicians have to capitulate in the face of the markets. For instance, they set the rules through the G-20. Let’s put it this way: The political system might be slower, but it has greater leverage. It just has to use it.

SPIEGEL: Mr. Schröder, we thank you for this interview.

Interview conducted by Georg Mascolo and Christoph Schwennicke. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan.

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George Friedman : 9/11 and the Successful War

September 6th, 2011 · No Comments · Geopolitics

George Friedman’s perspective . . . .

 

9/11 and the Successful War

Created Sep 6 2011 – 03:54

 

Germany's Choice: Part 2

 

By George Friedman

It has been 10 years since 9/11, and all of us who write about such things for a living are writing about it. That causes me to be wary. I prefer being the lonely voice, but the fact is that 9/11 was a defining moment in American history. On Sept. 12, 2001, few would have anticipated the course the resulting war would take — but then, few knew what to think. The nation was in shock. In retrospect, many speak with great wisdom about what should have been thought about 9/11 at the time and what should have been done in its aftermath. I am always interested in looking at what people actually said and did at the time.

The country was in shock, and shock was a reasonable response. The country was afraid, and fear was a reasonable response. Ten years later, we are all much wiser and sure that our wisdom was there from the beginning. But the truth is that, in retrospect, we know we would have done things superbly had we the authority. Few of us are being honest with ourselves. We were all shocked and frightened. Our wisdom came much later, when it had little impact. Yes, if we knew then what we know now we would have all bought Google stock. But we didn’t know things then that we know now, so it is all rather pointless to lecture those who had decisions to make in the midst of chaos.

Some wars are carefully planned, but even those wars rarely take place as expected. Think of the Germans in World War I, having planned the invasion of France for decades and with meticulous care. Nothing went as planned for either side, and the war did not take a course that was anticipated by anyone. Wars occur at unpredictable times, take unpredictable courses and have unexpected consequences. Who expected the American Civil War to take the course it did? We have been second-guessing Lincoln and Davis, Grant and Lee and all the rest for more than a century.

This particular war — the one that began on 9/11 and swept into Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries — is hard to second-guess because there are those who do not think it is a war. Some people, including President George W. Bush, seem to regard it as a criminal conspiracy. When Bush started talking about bringing al Qaeda to justice, he was talking about bringing them before the bar of justice. Imagine trying to arrest British sailors for burning Washington. War is not about bringing people to justice. It is about destroying their ability to wage war. The contemporary confusion between warfare and criminality creates profound confusion about the rules under which you operate. There are the rules of war as set forth in the Geneva Conventions, and there are criminal actions. The former are designed to facilitate the defense of national interests and involve killing people because of the uniform they wear. The latter is about punishing people for prior action. I have never sorted through what it was that the Bush administration thought it was doing.

This entire matter is made more complex by the fact that al Qaeda doesn’t wear a uniform. Under the Geneva Conventions, there is no protection for those who do not openly carry weapons or wear uniforms or at least armbands. They are regarded as violating the rules of war. If they are not protected by the rules of war then they must fall under criminal law by default. But criminal law is not really focused on preventing acts so much as it is on punishing them. And as satisfying as it is to capture someone who did something, the real point of the U.S. response to 9/11 was to prevent anyone else from doing something — killing and capturing people who have not done anything yet but who might.

 

Coming to Grips

 

The problem is that international law has simply failed to address the question of how a nation-state deals with forces that wage war through terrorism but are not part of any nation-state. Neither criminal law nor the laws of war apply. One of the real travesties of 9/11 was the manner in which the international legal community — the United Nations and its legal structures, the professors of international law who discuss such matters and the American legal community — could not come to grips with the tensions underlying the resulting war. There was an unpleasant and fairly smug view that the United States had violated both the rules of war and domestic legal processes, but very little attempt was made to craft a rule of warfare designed to cope with a group like al Qaeda — organized, covert, effective — that attacked a nation-state.

As U.S. President Barack Obama has discovered, the failure of the international legal community to rapidly evolve new rules of war placed him at odds with his erstwhile supporters. The ease with which the international legal community found U.S. decision makers’ attempts to craft a lawful and effective path “illegal and immoral” (an oft-repeated cliche of critics of post-9/11 policy) created an insoluble dilemma for the United States. The mission of the U.S. government was to prevent further attacks on the homeland. The Geneva Conventions, for the most part, didn’t apply. Criminal law is not about prevention. The inability of the law to deal with reality generated an image of American lawlessness.

Of course, one of the most extraordinary facts of the war that begin on 9/11 was that there have been no more successful major attacks on the United States. Had I been asked on Sept. 11, 2001, about the likelihood of that (in fact, I was asked), my answer would have been that it was part of a series of attacks, and not just the first. This assumption came from a knowledge of al Qaeda’s stated strategic intent, the fact that the 9/11 team had operated with highly effective covert techniques based on technical simplicity and organizational effectiveness, and that its command structure seemed to operate with effective command and control. Put simply, the 9/11 team was good and was prepared to go to its certain death to complete the mission. Anyone not frightened by this was out of touch with reality.

Yet there have been no further attacks. This is not, I think, because they did not intend to carry out such attacks. It is because the United States forced the al Qaeda leadership to flee Afghanistan during the early days of the U.S. war, disrupting command and control. It is also because U.S. covert operations on a global scale attacked and disrupted al Qaeda’s strength on the ground and penetrated its communications. A significant number of attacks on the United States were planned and prosecuted. They were all disrupted before they could be launched, save for the attempted and failed bombing in Times Square, the famed shoe bomber and, my favorite, the crotch bomber. Al Qaeda has not been capable of mounting effective attacks against the United States (though it has conducted successful attacks in Spain and Britain) because the United States surged its substantial covert capabilities against it.

Obviously, as in all wars, what is now called “collateral damage” occurred (in a more civilized time it would have been called “innocent civilians killed, wounded and detained”). How could it have been otherwise? Just as aircraft dropping bombs don’t easily discriminate against targets and artillery sometimes kills innocent people, covert operations can harm the unintended. That is the nature and horror of war. The choice for the United States was to accept the danger of another al Qaeda attack — an event that I am certain was intended and would have happened without a forceful U.S. response — or accept innocent casualties elsewhere. The foundation of a polity is that it protects its own at the cost of others. This doctrine might be troubling, but few of us in World War II felt that protecting Americans by bombing German and Japanese cities was a bad idea. If this troubles us, the history of warfare should trouble us. And if the history of warfare troubles us, we should bear in mind that we are all its heirs and beneficiaries, particularly in the United States.

The first mission of the war that followed 9/11 was to prevent any further attacks. That mission was accomplished. That is a fact often forgotten.

Of course, there are those who believe that 9/11 was a conspiracy carried out by the CIA in order to justify interference in our liberty. But an organization as capable as they believe the CIA is would not need a justification to abridge liberty. That was a lot of work to justify something, and the truly powerful don’t need to justify anything. Nor do they need to leave people who are revealing the truth alive. It is striking that the “doubters” believe 9/11 was created in order to crush American freedoms but that the conspirators are so incompetent they cannot shut down those who have discovered the conspiracy and are telling the world about it. Personally, if I were interested in global domination triggered by a covert act like 9/11, I would silence those revealing my secret. But then I’m not that good at it, and the doubters all have reasons why they are blogging the truth and are not dead or languishing in a concentration camp.

I take this detour for four reasons. First, doubters should not be ignored but answered. Second, unless they are answered, they will be able to say the CIA (or whomever they think did it) needed one attack to achieve its goals. Third, the issue the doubters raise is not the structural integrity of a building but the underlying intent of the CIA in carrying out the attack. The why is everything to them, and it is important to point out that it is their explanation of motive that makes no sense. Finally, I am engaging the doubters here because I enjoy receiving an abundance of emails containing fascinating accusations and the occasional threat.

 

Considering the Failures

 

But to return to the main theme, it is important here to consider not only the successes but also the failures of the war, and here Iraq comes to mind. There is a case to be made that the Iraq campaign was not irrational, but even more interesting, I think, is the fact that no war is without its disastrous misjudgments, even successful wars. In my mind, the U.S. invasion of the Philippines in 1944 was a major mistake. It did little to contribute to the fall of Japan, cost far more than the 4,000 American lives lost in Iraq, and it could have actually delayed the end of the war. It was opposed by senior commanders and was essentially something Gen. Douglas MacArthur insisted on for political reasons. The Battle of the Somme in World War I cost 600,000 British and French casualties, with 60,000 in one day. Their total gain during the battle was perhaps six miles. And in the American Civil War, the federal drive into Virginia turned into a disaster.

Every successful war is built around a series of defeats and miscalculations. The perfect war is built around deeply flawed and unnecessary campaigns. My own personal selections are not as important as the principle that all successful wars contain massive mistakes. If we simply write off Iraq as one of these, that in itself does not change the fact that the American homeland was not attacked again. Did Iraq contribute to that? This is a question that warrants a long discussion. But conceding that it had no effect simply makes the post-9/11 war normal and, in that normality, tragic.

What has not been normal has been the length of the war. Heavy fighting continues in Afghanistan, Iraq is not quite done and new theaters for covert operations are constantly opening and closing. It is the first U.S. campaign — Afghanistan — that actually poses the most vexing problem, one that is simple to express: When is the war over? That, of course, depends on the goal. What is the United States trying to achieve there?

The initial goal of the invasion was to dislodge al Qaeda, overthrow the government that had supported it and defeat the Taliban. The first two goals were accomplished quickly. The third goal has not been accomplished to this day, nor is it likely that the United States will ever accomplish it. Other powers have tried to subdue Afghanistan, but few have succeeded. The Taliban are optimized for the battlefield they fight on, have superior intelligence and have penetrated and are able to subvert government institutions, including the Afghan military. They have the implicit support of elements in a neighboring major nation — Pakistan — that are well beyond American means to intimidate. The United States has no port from which to supply its forces except the one controlled by Pakistan and only complex and difficult supply routes through other countries.

On the other hand, the Taliban cannot defeat the United States, which can stay in Afghanistan indefinitely. But the major U.S. mission in Afghanistan is concluded. Al Qaeda has not used Afghanistan as a primary base since 2002. Al Qaeda in Pakistan, according to the United States, has been crippled. The Taliban, products of Afghanistan for the most part, have no international ambitions. Al Qaeda has relocated to other countries like Yemen and Somalia.

Given this, continued combat in Afghanistan cannot be linked to al Qaeda. It could be said that the reason to go to war in Afghanistan was to prevent al Qaeda’s return. But the fact is that it doesn’t need Afghanistan, and if it did return to Afghanistan, it would be no more dangerous to the United States than it currently is with its bases elsewhere.

In wars, and especially in counterinsurgencies, the mission tends to creep upward. In Afghanistan, the goal is now the transformation of Afghan society into one that is democratic, no longer corrupt by American standards and able to defend itself against the Taliban. This goal does not seem attainable given the relative forces and interests in the country.

Therefore, this war will go on until the United States decides to end it or there is a political evolution in Kabul in which the government orders us out. The point is that the goal has become disengaged from the original intent and is unattainable. Unlike other wars, counterinsurgencies rarely end in victory. They usually end when the foreign forces decide to leave.

There is talk of a long war against radical Islam. It had better not be. The Islamic world is more than a billion people and radical Islam is embedded in many places. The idea that the United States has the power to wage an interminable war in the Islamic world is fantasy. This is not a matter of ideology or willpower or any other measures. It is a matter of available forces, competing international interests and American interests.

Ultimately, there are three lessons of the last decade that I think are important. The first is the tremendous success the United States has had in achieving its primary goal — blocking attacks on the homeland. The second is that campaigns of dubious worth are inevitable in war, and particularly in one as ambiguous as this war has been. Finally, all wars end, and the idea of an interminable war dominating American foreign policy and pushing all other considerations to the side is not what is going to happen. The United States must have a sense of proportion, of what can be done, what is worth doing and what is too dangerous to do. An unlimited strategic commitment is the definitive opposite of strategy.

The United States has done as well as can be expected. Over the coming years there will be other terrorist attacks. As it wages war in response, the United States will be condemned for violating international laws that are insensate to reality. At this point, for all its mistakes and errors — common to all wars — the United States has achieved its primary mission. There have been no more concerted terrorist attacks against the United States. Now it is time to resume history.

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Steve Jobs and Apple . . more perspectives . .

August 28th, 2011 · No Comments · Technology

From Jean-Louis Gassee

Steve: Who’s Going to Protect Us From Cheap and Mediocre Now?

by Jean-Louis Gassée


Not so fast.

Until the last sinew, the last synapse gives up, Steve will continue to influence the company he co-founded and later recreated. Seeing he could no longer ‘‘meet [his] duties and expectations as Apple’s CEO’’, Jobs kicks himself upstairs and becomes Chairman, director, and “mere” Apple employee. In a distant future, I see him haunting the circular hallways of Apple’s Cupertino spaceship, theCommendatore hunting the clock punchers and damning the linear thinkers straight to Hell.

Let’s review. In 1983, Apple’s Board of Directors felt that Steve required “adult supervision’’. John Sculley, the designated grownup, replaced Jobs as CEO and eventually pushed him out of the company.

Fast forward a decade and a half. In 1997, Steve returns to run his company unchallenged…but not unassisted. The Apple 2.0 management team, hand-picked, well-groomed, isn’t so much a stroke of genius as it is an emblem of the enfant terrible all grown up. As the Fortune chart below shows, Apple has no lack of ‘‘bench strength’’– and who’s providing the adult supervision now?

With Steve as Chairman, Tim Cook, Apple’s long-time COO, moves to the center of the chart.He joined the company 13 years ago, has always reported directly to Steve and saw his responsibilities increase over time. He now drives the team that made Apple the most valued and valuable high-tech company in the world.
As for ourselves: No whining. It’s our job, as consumers, to protect ourselves, to vote with our wallets against the bean counters, the Paint by Numbers product planners. It’s our place to provide ‘‘constructive feedback’’ when Apple products fail to meet the combined aesthetic and functional standards Dear Leader drilled into the marketplace. From MobileMe to “skeuomorphic” calendars, address books and bookshelves — to say nothing of fresh Lion bugs. Steve’s Apple may not be perfect, but…

A portentous example: The 1998 Bondi Blue iMac, the first visible re-assertion of Steve’s style — and ofJony Ive’s portfolio in the making:

Immediately iconic, users adored their iMacs. The unexpected shape and color set a new standard for high-tech products, so much so Apple competitors tried to rub the amulet for luck — and showed us what they really stood for: Cheap, imitative mediocrity. I recall going to Palo Alto’s Fry’s store and seeing beige PC clone boxes with candy-colored plastic inserts that approximated the iMac palette.

As a Forbes article put it, speaking of Dell’s similar fig-leaf attempt:

“Dell, ever concerned with keeping its inventory low, seems to be approaching colored notebooks in a much less risky way, using cheaper plastic inserts. Of course, the appearance of the Inspiron doesn’t inspire the way the first iMacs and iBooks did.”

The aesthetic knockoffs weren’t just cheap, they were ugly. The inserts looked even worse than the faux-wood ‘‘accents’’ on Chrysler dashboards. No cojones, no imagination, no taste.

Fast forward a bit more: Steve introduces the Apple Store. We’ll pass over the record-beating numbers and address the two messages the store imparts.
First, the architecture, an expression of the Apple ethos, says: ‘This is what we think of ourselves’.
Second, once inside the store, the experience states: ‘Here’s what we think of our relationship with you, our customer’.
In comparison, I see carriers trying to spruce up their store fronts with shiny metal appliqués — but go inside and you find cheap trade-show modular furniture.

Taste matters. Let’s turn to this YouTube video of the opening of an Apple Store clone. Not a Chinese counterfeit but a Microsoft Store in Scottsdale, Arizona. It starts much like the “real” thing: Happy customer, rows of high-fiving employees, a decor that looks familiar.  But 40 seconds into the one minute video, we get the “tell”, the killer detail that gives the imitation away.  Here we get the men in suits and ties:

Still more evidence of Steve’s influence: Just as HP decides to spin off its PC business (or perhaps not), PC clone makers demand an additional $100 subsidy per ‘‘ultra-portable’’ laptop from Intel. Why? They want to compete with Apple’s increasingly popular MacBook Air. It seems that the “Apple tax”, the premium we’re willing to pay for quality, isn’t enough to dissuade us.

PC clone makers can’t match Apple’s cost or its Bill Of Materials (BOM). The way Apple procures parts and subsystems, the way it runs contract manufacturing and stays on top of complicated but delicate distribution logistics is evidence of the company’s aggressive Supply-Chain Management (SCM). Steve – and thus Apple – understands that the channels need to be fed Just So, neither starved nor stuffed.

I found the BOM story interesting and looked up current ultra-portable prices. Who better than Sony in that product category? I went to their site and got this:

A nice MacBook Air competitor starting at $1969. The real thing starts at $1299.
Quite a reversal of the old world order and, I hope, a source of satisfaction for Jobs.

Spanning an amazing arc of thirty years, the company with the anti-establishment image has become the most disciplined, best-managed high-tech giant — and arbiter of taste.

When I first met Steve, in February 1981, he was sitting cross-legged on a credenza in the Apple board room, picking his toes. Since then I’ve watched with glee as he went against received wisdom, causing pundits to have fits at every turn. I picture them as a gaggle of eunuchs standing around the caliph’s bed, braying in high-pitched voice: ‘Steve, you’re doing it wrong!’

For a long time, I’ve seen him as having an animal inside him, the one with the desires, the instinct, the drive. In 1985, that animal threw Steve to the ground. He picked himself up at Pixar — you’d be a captain of industry for doing no more — and NeXT. Then, in 1997, armed with Pixar’s success and Next’s technical prowess, he came back to run Apple and make it really his.

He had learned to ride the animal.

Steve and Tim both speak, rightly, of Apple being at the crossroads of technology and humanities, liberal arts. In tribute to Jobs’ aesthetic sense, and why it deeply matters, I’ll conclude with a quote from Herman Hesse’s Steppenwolf:

‘’Before all else, I learned all these playthings were not mere idle trifles invented by manufacturers and dealers for the purposes of gain.  They were, on the contrary, a little or, rather, a big world, authoritative and beautiful, many sided, containing a multiplicity of things all of which had the one and only aim of serving love, refining the senses, giving life to the dead world around us, endowing it in a magical way with new instruments of love, from powder and scent to the dancing show, from ring to cigarette case, from waist buckle to handbag.  This bag was no bag, this purse no purse, flowers no flowers, the fan no fan.  All were the plastic material of love, of magic and delight.  Each was a messenger, a smuggler, a weapon, a battle cry.’’

— JLG@mondaynote.com

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